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1 problem of science
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2 problem of science
теоретическая задачаБольшой англо-русский и русско-английский словарь > problem of science
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3 problem of science
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4 problem of science
Англо-русский словарь по исследованиям и ноу-хау > problem of science
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5 science-based problem
Англо-русский словарь по исследованиям и ноу-хау > science-based problem
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6 theoretical computer science
теория вычислительных машин и систем; теоретические основы вычислительной техникиEnglish-Russian base dictionary > theoretical computer science
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7 Cognitive Science
The basic idea of cognitive science is that intelligent beings are semantic engines-in other words, automatic formal systems with interpretations under which they consistently make sense.... [P]eople and intelligent computers turn out to be merely different manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon. (Haugeland, 1981b, p. 31)2) Experimental Psychology, Theoretical Linguistics, and Computational Simulation of Cognitive Processes Are All Components of Cognitive ScienceI went away from the Symposium with a strong conviction, more intuitive than rational, that human experimental psychology, theoretical linguistics, and computer simulation of cognitive processes were all pieces of a larger whole, and that the future would see progressive elaboration and coordination of their shared concerns.... I have been working toward a cognitive science for about twenty years beginning before I knew what to call it. (G. A. Miller, 1979, p. 9)Cognitive Science studies the nature of cognition in human beings, other animals, and inanimate machines (if such a thing is possible). While computers are helpful within cognitive science, they are not essential to its being. A science of cognition could still be pursued even without these machines.Computer Science studies various kinds of problems and the use of computers to solve them, without concern for the means by which we humans might otherwise resolve them. There could be no computer science if there were no machines of this kind, because they are indispensable to its being. Artificial Intelligence is a special branch of computer science that investigates the extent to which the mental powers of human beings can be captured by means of machines.There could be cognitive science without artificial intelligence but there could be no artificial intelligence without cognitive science. One final caveat: In the case of an emerging new discipline such as cognitive science there is an almost irresistible temptation to identify the discipline itself (as a field of inquiry) with one of the theories that inspired it (such as the computational conception...). This, however, is a mistake. The field of inquiry (or "domain") stands to specific theories as questions stand to possible answers. The computational conception should properly be viewed as a research program in cognitive science, where "research programs" are answers that continue to attract followers. (Fetzer, 1996, pp. xvi-xvii)What is the nature of knowledge and how is this knowledge used? These questions lie at the core of both psychology and artificial intelligence.The psychologist who studies "knowledge systems" wants to know how concepts are structured in the human mind, how such concepts develop, and how they are used in understanding and behavior. The artificial intelligence researcher wants to know how to program a computer so that it can understand and interact with the outside world. The two orientations intersect when the psychologist and the computer scientist agree that the best way to approach the problem of building an intelligent machine is to emulate the human conceptual mechanisms that deal with language.... The name "cognitive science" has been used to refer to this convergence of interests in psychology and artificial intelligence....This working partnership in "cognitive science" does not mean that psychologists and computer scientists are developing a single comprehensive theory in which people are no different from machines. Psychology and artificial intelligence have many points of difference in methods and goals.... We simply want to work on an important area of overlapping interest, namely a theory of knowledge systems. As it turns out, this overlap is substantial. For both people and machines, each in their own way, there is a serious problem in common of making sense out of what they hear, see, or are told about the world. The conceptual apparatus necessary to perform even a partial feat of understanding is formidable and fascinating. (Schank & Abelson, 1977, pp. 1-2)Within the last dozen years a general change in scientific outlook has occurred, consonant with the point of view represented here. One can date the change roughly from 1956: in psychology, by the appearance of Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin's Study of Thinking and George Miller's "The Magical Number Seven"; in linguistics, by Noam Chomsky's "Three Models of Language"; and in computer science, by our own paper on the Logic Theory Machine. (Newell & Simon, 1972, p. 4)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Cognitive Science
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8 management science
Gen Mgtthe application of scientific methods and principles to management decision making and problem solving. Management science encompasses the use of quantitative, mathematical, and statistical techniques. The term can be used to denote scientific management, which has origins in the work of Frederick Winslow Taylor, Henry Gantt, and Frank and Lillian Gilbreth. Management science lies at the opposite end of the spectrum to the human relations school. -
9 Mind-body Problem
From this I knew that I was a substance the whole essence or nature of which is to think, and that for its existence there is no need of any place, nor does it depend on any material thing; so that this "me," that is to say, the soul by which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from body, and is even more easy to know than is the latter; and even if body were not, the soul would not cease to be what it is. (Descartes, 1970a, p. 101)still remains to be explained how that union and apparent intermingling [of mind and body]... can be found in you, if you are incorporeal, unextended and indivisible.... How, at least, can you be united with the brain, or some minute part in it, which (as has been said) must yet have some magnitude or extension, however small it be? If you are wholly without parts how can you mix or appear to mix with its minute subdivisions? For there is no mixture unless each of the things to be mixed has parts that can mix with one another. (Gassendi, 1970, p. 201)here are... certain things which we experience in ourselves and which should be attributed neither to the mind nor body alone, but to the close and intimate union that exists between the body and the mind.... Such are the appetites of hunger, thirst, etc., and also the emotions or passions of the mind which do not subsist in mind or thought alone... and finally all the sensations. (Descartes, 1970b, p. 238)With any other sort of mind, absolute Intelligence, Mind unattached to a particular body, or Mind not subject to the course of time, the psychologist as such has nothing to do. (James, 1890, p. 183)[The] intention is to furnish a psychology that shall be a natural science: that is to represent psychical processes as quantitatively determinate states of specifiable material particles, thus making these processes perspicuous and free from contradiction. (Freud, 1966, p. 295)The thesis is that the mental is nomologically irreducible: there may be true general statements relating the mental and the physical, statements that have the logical form of a law; but they are not lawlike (in a strong sense to be described). If by absurdly remote chance we were to stumble on a non-stochastic true psychophysical generalization, we would have no reason to believe it more than roughly true. (Davidson, 1970, p. 90)We can divide those who uphold the doctrine that men are machines, or a similar doctrine, into two categories: those who deny the existence of mental events, or personal experiences, or of consciousness;... and those who admit the existence of mental events, but assert that they are "epiphenomena"-that everything can be explained without them, since the material world is causally closed. (Popper & Eccles, 1977, p. 5)Mind affects brain and brain affects mind. That is the message, and by accepting it you commit yourself to a special view of the world. It is a view that shows the limits of the genetic imperative on what we turn out to be, both intellectually and emotionally. It decrees that, while the secrets of our genes express themselves with force throughout our lives, the effect of that information on our bodies can be influenced by our psychological history and beliefs about the world. And, just as important, the other side of the same coin argues that what we construct in our minds as objective reality may simply be our interpretations of certain bodily states dictated by our genes and expressed through our physical brains and body. Put differently, various attributes of mind that seem to have a purely psychological origin are frequently a product of the brain's interpreter rationalizing genetically driven body states. Make no mistake about it: this two-sided view of mind-brain interactions, if adopted, has implications for the management of one's personal life. (Gazzaniga, 1988, p. 229)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Mind-body Problem
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10 turn the cold searchlight of science on the problem
Образное выражение: осветить проблему холодным лучом наукиУниверсальный англо-русский словарь > turn the cold searchlight of science on the problem
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11 теоретический задача
Большой англо-русский и русско-английский словарь > теоретический задача
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12 Bibliography
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(1997a). Cognitive science and the symbolic operations of human and artificial intelligence: Theory and research into the intellective processes. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1997b). The general unified theory of intelligence: Central conceptions and specific application to domains of cognitive science. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1998a). Cognitive science and the mind- body problem: From philosophy to psychology to artificial intelligence to imaging of the brain. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1998b). Language and thought in humans and computers: Theory and research in psychology, artificial intelligence, and neural science. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1998c). The ultimate objectives of artificial intelligence: Theoretical and research foundations, philosophical and psychological implications. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1999). The human mind according to artificial intelligence: Theory, re search, and implications. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (2000). Scientific discovery processes in humans and computers: Theory and research in psychology and artificial intelligence. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wall, R. (1972). Introduction to mathematical linguistics. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.■ Wallas, G. (1926). The Art of Thought. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.■ Wason, P. (1977). Self contradictions. In P. Johnson-Laird & P. Wason (Eds.), Thinking: Readings in cognitive science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.■ Wason, P. C., & P. N. Johnson-Laird. (1972). Psychology of reasoning: Structure and content. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.■ Watson, J. (1930). Behaviorism. New York: W. W. Norton.■ Watzlawick, P. (1984). Epilogue. In P. Watzlawick (Ed.), The invented reality. New York: W. W. Norton, 1984.■ Weinberg, S. (1977). The first three minutes: A modern view of the origin of the uni verse. New York: Basic Books.■ Weisberg, R. W. (1986). Creativity: Genius and other myths. New York: W. H. Freeman.■ Weizenbaum, J. (1976). Computer power and human reason: From judgment to cal culation. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.■ Wertheimer, M. (1945). Productive thinking. New York: Harper & Bros.■ Whitehead, A. N. (1925). Science and the modern world. New York: Macmillan.■ Whorf, B. L. (1956). In J. B. Carroll (Ed.), Language, thought and reality: Selected writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Whyte, L. L. (1962). The unconscious before Freud. New York: Anchor Books.■ Wiener, N. (1954). The human use of human beings. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.■ Wiener, N. (1964). God & Golem, Inc.: A comment on certain points where cybernetics impinges on religion. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Winograd, T. (1972). Understanding natural language. New York: Academic Press.■ Winston, P. H. (1987). Artificial intelligence: A perspective. In E. L. Grimson & R. S. Patil (Eds.), AI in the 1980s and beyond (pp. 1-12). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Winston, P. H. (Ed.) (1975). The psychology of computer vision. New York: McGrawHill.■ Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical investigations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.■ Wittgenstein, L. (1958). The blue and brown books. New York: Harper Colophon.■ Woods, W. A. (1975). What's in a link: Foundations for semantic networks. In D. G. Bobrow & A. Collins (Eds.), Representations and understanding: Studies in cognitive science (pp. 35-84). New York: Academic Press.■ Woodworth, R. S. (1938). Experimental psychology. New York: Holt; London: Methuen (1939).■ Wundt, W. (1904). Principles of physiological psychology (Vol. 1). E. B. Titchener (Trans.). New York: Macmillan.■ Wundt, W. (1907). Lectures on human and animal psychology. J. E. Creighton & E. B. Titchener (Trans.). New York: Macmillan.■ Young, J. Z. (1978). Programs of the brain. New York: Oxford University Press.■ Ziman, J. (1978). Reliable knowledge: An exploration of the grounds for belief in science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Bibliography
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13 Technical
adjective1) technisch [Problem, Detail, Daten, Fortschritt]; (of particular science, art, etc.) fachlich; Fach[kenntnis, -sprache, -begriff, -wörterbuch]; (of the execution of a work of art) technisch [Fertigkeit, Schwierigkeit]technical expertise/expert — Sachkenntnis, die/Fachmann, der
technical college/school — Fachhochschule, die/Fachschule, die
explain something without being or getting too technical — etwas erklären, ohne sich zu fachsprachlich auszudrücken
technical term — Fachbegriff, der; Fachausdruck, der; Fachterminus, der
for technical reasons — aus technischen Gründen
2) (Law) formaljuristisch3)technical knockout — (Boxing) technischer K.o
* * *['teknikəl]1) (having, or relating to, a particular science or skill, especially of a mechanical or industrial kind: a technical college; technical skill; technical drawing.) technisch2) ((having many terms) relating to a particular art or science: `Myopia' is a technical term for `short-sightedness'.) Fach-...•- academic.ru/73731/technicality">technicality- technically
- technician* * *tech·ni·cal[ˈteknɪkəl]1. (concerning applied science) technisch2. (detailed) Fach-some parts of the book were too \technical to follow einige Teile des Buches waren fachlich zu anspruchsvoll, als dass man hätte folgen können\technical aspects fachliche Aspekte\technical term Fachausdruck m3. (in technique) technisch\technical skill technisches Können4. STOCKEX technisch\technical analysis Fachanalyse f, technische Analyse\technical correction technische Kurskorrektur\technical decline technischer Rückgang* * *['teknIkəl]adj1) (= concerning technology and technique) technischtechnical hitch — technische Schwierigkeit, technisches Problem
technical term — Fachausdruck m, Terminus technicus m (geh)
for technical reasons (Jur) — aus verfahrenstechnischen Gründen
the book is a bit too technical for me — in dem Buch sind mir zu viele Fachausdrücke
he uses very technical language — er benutzt sehr viele Fachausdrücke
a 2L 54, if you want to be technical —
that's true, if you want to be technical — das stimmt schon, wenn mans genau nimmt
* * *ASTMS abk Br Association of Scientific, Technical, and Managerial Staffs* * *adjective1) technisch [Problem, Detail, Daten, Fortschritt]; (of particular science, art, etc.) fachlich; Fach[kenntnis, -sprache, -begriff, -wörterbuch]; (of the execution of a work of art) technisch [Fertigkeit, Schwierigkeit]technical expertise/expert — Sachkenntnis, die/Fachmann, der
technical college/school — Fachhochschule, die/Fachschule, die
explain something without being or getting too technical — etwas erklären, ohne sich zu fachsprachlich auszudrücken
technical term — Fachbegriff, der; Fachausdruck, der; Fachterminus, der
2) (Law) formaljuristisch3)technical knockout — (Boxing) technischer K.o
* * *adj.fachlich adj.technisch adj. -
14 technical
adjective1) technisch [Problem, Detail, Daten, Fortschritt]; (of particular science, art, etc.) fachlich; Fach[kenntnis, -sprache, -begriff, -wörterbuch]; (of the execution of a work of art) technisch [Fertigkeit, Schwierigkeit]technical expertise/expert — Sachkenntnis, die/Fachmann, der
technical college/school — Fachhochschule, die/Fachschule, die
explain something without being or getting too technical — etwas erklären, ohne sich zu fachsprachlich auszudrücken
technical term — Fachbegriff, der; Fachausdruck, der; Fachterminus, der
for technical reasons — aus technischen Gründen
2) (Law) formaljuristisch3)technical knockout — (Boxing) technischer K.o
* * *['teknikəl]1) (having, or relating to, a particular science or skill, especially of a mechanical or industrial kind: a technical college; technical skill; technical drawing.) technisch2) ((having many terms) relating to a particular art or science: `Myopia' is a technical term for `short-sightedness'.) Fach-...•- academic.ru/73731/technicality">technicality- technically
- technician* * *tech·ni·cal[ˈteknɪkəl]1. (concerning applied science) technisch2. (detailed) Fach-some parts of the book were too \technical to follow einige Teile des Buches waren fachlich zu anspruchsvoll, als dass man hätte folgen können\technical aspects fachliche Aspekte\technical term Fachausdruck m3. (in technique) technisch\technical skill technisches Können4. STOCKEX technisch\technical analysis Fachanalyse f, technische Analyse\technical correction technische Kurskorrektur\technical decline technischer Rückgang* * *['teknIkəl]adj1) (= concerning technology and technique) technischtechnical hitch — technische Schwierigkeit, technisches Problem
technical term — Fachausdruck m, Terminus technicus m (geh)
for technical reasons (Jur) — aus verfahrenstechnischen Gründen
the book is a bit too technical for me — in dem Buch sind mir zu viele Fachausdrücke
he uses very technical language — er benutzt sehr viele Fachausdrücke
a 2L 54, if you want to be technical —
that's true, if you want to be technical — das stimmt schon, wenn mans genau nimmt
* * *1. allg technisch:b) engS. betriebs-, verfahrenstechnisch (Daten etc):technical department technische Betriebsabteilung;technical director technische(r) Leiter(in)c) das Technische eines Fachgebiets, eines Kunstzweigs, einer Sportart betreffend:technical merit (Eis-, Rollkunstlauf) technischer Wert;technical skill technisches Geschick, gute Techniktechnical drawing SCHULE technisches Zeichnene) fachmännisch, fachgemäß, Fach…, Spezial…:technical dictionary Fachwörterbuch n;technical man Fachmann m;2. fig technisch:a) sachlichb) rein formal, theoretisch:technical foul (Basketball) technisches Foul;technical knockout (Boxen) technischer K.o.;3. WIRTSCH manipuliert (Markt, Preise)tech. abk1. technical techn.2. technology* * *adjective1) technisch [Problem, Detail, Daten, Fortschritt]; (of particular science, art, etc.) fachlich; Fach[kenntnis, -sprache, -begriff, -wörterbuch]; (of the execution of a work of art) technisch [Fertigkeit, Schwierigkeit]technical expertise/expert — Sachkenntnis, die/Fachmann, der
technical college/school — Fachhochschule, die/Fachschule, die
explain something without being or getting too technical — etwas erklären, ohne sich zu fachsprachlich auszudrücken
technical term — Fachbegriff, der; Fachausdruck, der; Fachterminus, der
2) (Law) formaljuristisch3)technical knockout — (Boxing) technischer K.o
* * *adj.fachlich adj.technisch adj. -
15 Mind
It becomes, therefore, no inconsiderable part of science... to know the different operations of the mind, to separate them from each other, to class them under their proper heads, and to correct all that seeming disorder in which they lie involved when made the object of reflection and inquiry.... It cannot be doubted that the mind is endowed with several powers and faculties, that these powers are distinct from one another, and that what is really distinct to the immediate perception may be distinguished by reflection and, consequently, that there is a truth and falsehood which lie not beyond the compass of human understanding. (Hume, 1955, p. 22)Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white Paper, void of all Characters, without any Ideas: How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store, which the busy and boundless Fancy of Man has painted on it, with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of Reason and Knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from Experience. (Locke, quoted in Herrnstein & Boring, 1965, p. 584)The kind of logic in mythical thought is as rigorous as that of modern science, and... the difference lies, not in the quality of the intellectual process, but in the nature of things to which it is applied.... Man has always been thinking equally well; the improvement lies, not in an alleged progress of man's mind, but in the discovery of new areas to which it may apply its unchanged and unchanging powers. (Leґvi-Strauss, 1963, p. 230)MIND. A mysterious form of matter secreted by the brain. Its chief activity consists in the endeavor to ascertain its own nature, the futility of the attempt being due to the fact that it has nothing but itself to know itself with. (Bierce, quoted in Minsky, 1986, p. 55)[Philosophy] understands the foundations of knowledge and it finds these foundations in a study of man-as-knower, of the "mental processes" or the "activity of representation" which make knowledge possible. To know is to represent accurately what is outside the mind, so to understand the possibility and nature of knowledge is to understand the way in which the mind is able to construct such representation.... We owe the notion of a "theory of knowledge" based on an understanding of "mental processes" to the seventeenth century, and especially to Locke. We owe the notion of "the mind" as a separate entity in which "processes" occur to the same period, and especially to Descartes. We owe the notion of philosophy as a tribunal of pure reason, upholding or denying the claims of the rest of culture, to the eighteenth century and especially to Kant, but this Kantian notion presupposed general assent to Lockean notions of mental processes and Cartesian notions of mental substance. (Rorty, 1979, pp. 3-4)Under pressure from the computer, the question of mind in relation to machine is becoming a central cultural preoccupation. It is becoming for us what sex was to Victorians-threat, obsession, taboo, and fascination. (Turkle, 1984, p. 313)7) Understanding the Mind Remains as Resistant to Neurological as to Cognitive AnalysesRecent years have been exciting for researchers in the brain and cognitive sciences. Both fields have flourished, each spurred on by methodological and conceptual developments, and although understanding the mechanisms of mind is an objective shared by many workers in these areas, their theories and approaches to the problem are vastly different....Early experimental psychologists, such as Wundt and James, were as interested in and knowledgeable about the anatomy and physiology of the nervous system as about the young science of the mind. However, the experimental study of mental processes was short-lived, being eclipsed by the rise of behaviorism early in this century. It was not until the late 1950s that the signs of a new mentalism first appeared in scattered writings of linguists, philosophers, computer enthusiasts, and psychologists.In this new incarnation, the science of mind had a specific mission: to challenge and replace behaviorism. In the meantime, brain science had in many ways become allied with a behaviorist approach.... While behaviorism sought to reduce the mind to statements about bodily action, brain science seeks to explain the mind in terms of physiochemical events occurring in the nervous system. These approaches contrast with contemporary cognitive science, which tries to understand the mind as it is, without any reduction, a view sometimes described as functionalism.The cognitive revolution is now in place. Cognition is the subject of contemporary psychology. This was achieved with little or no talk of neurons, action potentials, and neurotransmitters. Similarly, neuroscience has risen to an esteemed position among the biological sciences without much talk of cognitive processes. Do the fields need each other?... [Y]es because the problem of understanding the mind, unlike the wouldbe problem solvers, respects no disciplinary boundaries. It remains as resistant to neurological as to cognitive analyses. (LeDoux & Hirst, 1986, pp. 1-2)Since the Second World War scientists from different disciplines have turned to the study of the human mind. Computer scientists have tried to emulate its capacity for visual perception. Linguists have struggled with the puzzle of how children acquire language. Ethologists have sought the innate roots of social behaviour. Neurophysiologists have begun to relate the function of nerve cells to complex perceptual and motor processes. Neurologists and neuropsychologists have used the pattern of competence and incompetence of their brain-damaged patients to elucidate the normal workings of the brain. Anthropologists have examined the conceptual structure of cultural practices to advance hypotheses about the basic principles of the mind. These days one meets engineers who work on speech perception, biologists who investigate the mental representation of spatial relations, and physicists who want to understand consciousness. And, of course, psychologists continue to study perception, memory, thought and action.... [W]orkers in many disciplines have converged on a number of central problems and explanatory ideas. They have realized that no single approach is likely to unravel the workings of the mind: it will not give up its secrets to psychology alone; nor is any other isolated discipline-artificial intelligence, linguistics, anthropology, neurophysiology, philosophy-going to have any greater success. (Johnson-Laird, 1988, p. 7)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Mind
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16 Creativity
Put in this bald way, these aims sound utopian. How utopian they areor rather, how imminent their realization-depends on how broadly or narrowly we interpret the term "creative." If we are willing to regard all human complex problem solving as creative, then-as we will point out-successful programs for problem solving mechanisms that simulate human problem solvers already exist, and a number of their general characteristics are known. If we reserve the term "creative" for activities like discovery of the special theory of relativity or the composition of Beethoven's Seventh Symphony, then no example of a creative mechanism exists at the present time. (Simon, 1979, pp. 144-145)Among the questions that can now be given preliminary answers in computational terms are the following: how can ideas from very different sources be spontaneously thought of together? how can two ideas be merged to produce a new structure, which shows the influence of both ancestor ideas without being a mere "cut-and-paste" combination? how can the mind be "primed," so that one will more easily notice serendipitous ideas? why may someone notice-and remember-something fairly uninteresting, if it occurs in an interesting context? how can a brief phrase conjure up an entire melody from memory? and how can we accept two ideas as similar ("love" and "prove" as rhyming, for instance) in respect of a feature not identical in both? The features of connectionist AI models that suggest answers to these questions are their powers of pattern completion, graceful degradation, sensitization, multiple constraint satisfaction, and "best-fit" equilibration.... Here, the important point is that the unconscious, "insightful," associative aspects of creativity can be explained-in outline, at least-by AI methods. (Boden, 1996, p. 273)There thus appears to be an underlying similarity in the process involved in creative innovation and social independence, with common traits and postures required for expression of both behaviors. The difference is one of product-literary, musical, artistic, theoretical products on the one hand, opinions on the other-rather than one of process. In both instances the individual must believe that his perceptions are meaningful and valid and be willing to rely upon his own interpretations. He must trust himself sufficiently that even when persons express opinions counter to his own he can proceed on the basis of his own perceptions and convictions. (Coopersmith, 1967, p. 58)he average level of ego strength and emotional stability is noticeably higher among creative geniuses than among the general population, though it is possibly lower than among men of comparable intelligence and education who go into administrative and similar positions. High anxiety and excitability appear common (e.g. Priestley, Darwin, Kepler) but full-blown neurosis is quite rare. (Cattell & Butcher, 1970, p. 315)he insight that is supposed to be required for such work as discovery turns out to be synonymous with the familiar process of recognition; and other terms commonly used in the discussion of creative work-such terms as "judgment," "creativity," or even "genius"-appear to be wholly dispensable or to be definable, as insight is, in terms of mundane and well-understood concepts. (Simon, 1989, p. 376)From the sketch material still in existence, from the condition of the fragments, and from the autographs themselves we can draw definite conclusions about Mozart's creative process. To invent musical ideas he did not need any stimulation; they came to his mind "ready-made" and in polished form. In contrast to Beethoven, who made numerous attempts at shaping his musical ideas until he found the definitive formulation of a theme, Mozart's first inspiration has the stamp of finality. Any Mozart theme has completeness and unity; as a phenomenon it is a Gestalt. (Herzmann, 1964, p. 28)Great artists enlarge the limits of one's perception. Looking at the world through the eyes of Rembrandt or Tolstoy makes one able to perceive aspects of truth about the world which one could not have achieved without their aid. Freud believed that science was adaptive because it facilitated mastery of the external world; but was it not the case that many scientific theories, like works of art, also originated in phantasy? Certainly, reading accounts of scientific discovery by men of the calibre of Einstein compelled me to conclude that phantasy was not merely escapist, but a way of reaching new insights concerning the nature of reality. Scientific hypotheses require proof; works of art do not. Both are concerned with creating order, with making sense out of the world and our experience of it. (Storr, 1993, p. xii)The importance of self-esteem for creative expression appears to be almost beyond disproof. Without a high regard for himself the individual who is working in the frontiers of his field cannot trust himself to discriminate between the trivial and the significant. Without trust in his own powers the person seeking improved solutions or alternative theories has no basis for distinguishing the significant and profound innovation from the one that is merely different.... An essential component of the creative process, whether it be analysis, synthesis, or the development of a new perspective or more comprehensive theory, is the conviction that one's judgment in interpreting the events is to be trusted. (Coopersmith, 1967, p. 59)In the daily stream of thought these four different stages [preparation; incubation; illumination or inspiration; and verification] constantly overlap each other as we explore different problems. An economist reading a Blue Book, a physiologist watching an experiment, or a business man going through his morning's letters, may at the same time be "incubating" on a problem which he proposed to himself a few days ago, be accumulating knowledge in "preparation" for a second problem, and be "verifying" his conclusions to a third problem. Even in exploring the same problem, the mind may be unconsciously incubating on one aspect of it, while it is consciously employed in preparing for or verifying another aspect. (Wallas, 1926, p. 81)he basic, bisociative pattern of the creative synthesis [is] the sudden interlocking of two previously unrelated skills, or matrices of thought. (Koestler, 1964, p. 121)11) The Earliest Stages in the Creative Process Involve a Commerce with DisorderEven to the creator himself, the earliest effort may seem to involve a commerce with disorder. For the creative order, which is an extension of life, is not an elaboration of the established, but a movement beyond the established, or at least a reorganization of it and often of elements not included in it. The first need is therefore to transcend the old order. Before any new order can be defined, the absolute power of the established, the hold upon us of what we know and are, must be broken. New life comes always from outside our world, as we commonly conceive that world. This is the reason why, in order to invent, one must yield to the indeterminate within him, or, more precisely, to certain illdefined impulses which seem to be of the very texture of the ungoverned fullness which John Livingston Lowes calls "the surging chaos of the unexpressed." (Ghiselin, 1985, p. 4)New life comes always from outside our world, as we commonly conceive our world. This is the reason why, in order to invent, one must yield to the indeterminate within him, or, more precisely, to certain illdefined impulses which seem to be of the very texture of the ungoverned fullness which John Livingston Lowes calls "the surging chaos of the unexpressed." Chaos and disorder are perhaps the wrong terms for that indeterminate fullness and activity of the inner life. For it is organic, dynamic, full of tension and tendency. What is absent from it, except in the decisive act of creation, is determination, fixity, and commitment to one resolution or another of the whole complex of its tensions. (Ghiselin, 1952, p. 13)[P]sychoanalysts have principally been concerned with the content of creative products, and with explaining content in terms of the artist's infantile past. They have paid less attention to examining why the artist chooses his particular activity to express, abreact or sublimate his emotions. In short, they have not made much distinction between art and neurosis; and, since the former is one of the blessings of mankind, whereas the latter is one of the curses, it seems a pity that they should not be better differentiated....Psychoanalysis, being fundamentally concerned with drive and motive, might have been expected to throw more light upon what impels the creative person that in fact it has. (Storr, 1993, pp. xvii, 3)A number of theoretical approaches were considered. Associative theory, as developed by Mednick (1962), gained some empirical support from the apparent validity of the Remote Associates Test, which was constructed on the basis of the theory.... Koestler's (1964) bisociative theory allows more complexity to mental organization than Mednick's associative theory, and postulates "associative contexts" or "frames of reference." He proposed that normal, non-creative, thought proceeds within particular contexts or frames and that the creative act involves linking together previously unconnected frames.... Simonton (1988) has developed associative notions further and explored the mathematical consequences of chance permutation of ideas....Like Koestler, Gruber (1980; Gruber and Davis, 1988) has based his analysis on case studies. He has focused especially on Darwin's development of the theory of evolution. Using piagetian notions, such as assimilation and accommodation, Gruber shows how Darwin's system of ideas changed very slowly over a period of many years. "Moments of insight," in Gruber's analysis, were the culminations of slow long-term processes.... Finally, the information-processing approach, as represented by Simon (1966) and Langley et al. (1987), was considered.... [Simon] points out the importance of good problem representations, both to ensure search is in an appropriate problem space and to aid in developing heuristic evaluations of possible research directions.... The work of Langley et al. (1987) demonstrates how such search processes, realized in computer programs, can indeed discover many basic laws of science from tables of raw data.... Boden (1990a, 1994) has stressed the importance of restructuring the problem space in creative work to develop new genres and paradigms in the arts and sciences. (Gilhooly, 1996, pp. 243-244; emphasis in original)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Creativity
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17 Philosophy
And what I believe to be more important here is that I find in myself an infinity of ideas of certain things which cannot be assumed to be pure nothingness, even though they may have perhaps no existence outside of my thought. These things are not figments of my imagination, even though it is within my power to think of them or not to think of them; on the contrary, they have their own true and immutable natures. Thus, for example, when I imagine a triangle, even though there may perhaps be no such figure anywhere in the world outside of my thought, nor ever have been, nevertheless the figure cannot help having a certain determinate nature... or essence, which is immutable and eternal, which I have not invented and which does not in any way depend upon my mind. (Descartes, 1951, p. 61)Let us console ourselves for not knowing the possible connections between a spider and the rings of Saturn, and continue to examine what is within our reach. (Voltaire, 1961, p. 144)As modern physics started with the Newtonian revolution, so modern philosophy starts with what one might call the Cartesian Catastrophe. The catastrophe consisted in the splitting up of the world into the realms of matter and mind, and the identification of "mind" with conscious thinking. The result of this identification was the shallow rationalism of l'esprit Cartesien, and an impoverishment of psychology which it took three centuries to remedy even in part. (Koestler, 1964, p. 148)It has been made of late a reproach against natural philosophy that it has struck out on a path of its own, and has separated itself more and more widely from the other sciences which are united by common philological and historical studies. The opposition has, in fact, been long apparent, and seems to me to have grown up mainly under the influence of the Hegelian philosophy, or, at any rate, to have been brought out into more distinct relief by that philosophy.... The sole object of Kant's "Critical Philosophy" was to test the sources and the authority of our knowledge, and to fix a definite scope and standard for the researches of philosophy, as compared with other sciences.... [But Hegel's] "Philosophy of Identity" was bolder. It started with the hypothesis that not only spiritual phenomena, but even the actual world-nature, that is, and man-were the result of an act of thought on the part of a creative mind, similar, it was supposed, in kind to the human mind.... The philosophers accused the scientific men of narrowness; the scientific men retorted that the philosophers were crazy. And so it came about that men of science began to lay some stress on the banishment of all philosophic influences from their work; while some of them, including men of the greatest acuteness, went so far as to condemn philosophy altogether, not merely as useless, but as mischievous dreaming. Thus, it must be confessed, not only were the illegitimate pretensions of the Hegelian system to subordinate to itself all other studies rejected, but no regard was paid to the rightful claims of philosophy, that is, the criticism of the sources of cognition, and the definition of the functions of the intellect. (Helmholz, quoted in Dampier, 1966, pp. 291-292)Philosophy remains true to its classical tradition by renouncing it. (Habermas, 1972, p. 317)I have not attempted... to put forward any grand view of the nature of philosophy; nor do I have any such grand view to put forth if I would. It will be obvious that I do not agree with those who see philosophy as the history of "howlers" and progress in philosophy as the debunking of howlers. It will also be obvious that I do not agree with those who see philosophy as the enterprise of putting forward a priori truths about the world.... I see philosophy as a field which has certain central questions, for example, the relation between thought and reality.... It seems obvious that in dealing with these questions philosophers have formulated rival research programs, that they have put forward general hypotheses, and that philosophers within each major research program have modified their hypotheses by trial and error, even if they sometimes refuse to admit that that is what they are doing. To that extent philosophy is a "science." To argue about whether philosophy is a science in any more serious sense seems to me to be hardly a useful occupation.... It does not seem to me important to decide whether science is philosophy or philosophy is science as long as one has a conception of both that makes both essential to a responsible view of the world and of man's place in it. (Putnam, 1975, p. xvii)What can philosophy contribute to solving the problem of the relation [of] mind to body? Twenty years ago, many English-speaking philosophers would have answered: "Nothing beyond an analysis of the various mental concepts." If we seek knowledge of things, they thought, it is to science that we must turn. Philosophy can only cast light upon our concepts of those things.This retreat from things to concepts was not undertaken lightly. Ever since the seventeenth century, the great intellectual fact of our culture has been the incredible expansion of knowledge both in the natural and in the rational sciences (mathematics, logic).The success of science created a crisis in philosophy. What was there for philosophy to do? Hume had already perceived the problem in some degree, and so surely did Kant, but it was not until the twentieth century, with the Vienna Circle and with Wittgenstein, that the difficulty began to weigh heavily. Wittgenstein took the view that philosophy could do no more than strive to undo the intellectual knots it itself had tied, so achieving intellectual release, and even a certain illumination, but no knowledge. A little later, and more optimistically, Ryle saw a positive, if reduced role, for philosophy in mapping the "logical geography" of our concepts: how they stood to each other and how they were to be analyzed....Since that time, however, philosophers in the "analytic" tradition have swung back from Wittgensteinian and even Rylean pessimism to a more traditional conception of the proper role and tasks of philosophy. Many analytic philosophers now would accept the view that the central task of philosophy is to give an account, or at least play a part in giving an account, of the most general nature of things and of man. (Armstrong, 1990, pp. 37-38)8) Philosophy's Evolving Engagement with Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive ScienceIn the beginning, the nature of philosophy's engagement with artificial intelligence and cognitive science was clear enough. The new sciences of the mind were to provide the long-awaited vindication of the most potent dreams of naturalism and materialism. Mind would at last be located firmly within the natural order. We would see in detail how the most perplexing features of the mental realm could be supported by the operations of solely physical laws upon solely physical stuff. Mental causation (the power of, e.g., a belief to cause an action) would emerge as just another species of physical causation. Reasoning would be understood as a kind of automated theorem proving. And the key to both was to be the depiction of the brain as the implementation of multiple higher level programs whose task was to manipulate and transform symbols or representations: inner items with one foot in the physical (they were realized as brain states) and one in the mental (they were bearers of contents, and their physical gymnastics were cleverly designed to respect semantic relationships such as truth preservation). (A. Clark, 1996, p. 1)Socrates of Athens famously declared that "the unexamined life is not worth living," and his motto aptly explains the impulse to philosophize. Taking nothing for granted, philosophy probes and questions the fundamental presuppositions of every area of human inquiry.... [P]art of the job of the philosopher is to keep at a certain critical distance from current doctrines, whether in the sciences or the arts, and to examine instead how the various elements in our world-view clash, or fit together. Some philosophers have tried to incorporate the results of these inquiries into a grand synoptic view of the nature of reality and our human relationship to it. Others have mistrusted system-building, and seen their primary role as one of clarifications, or the removal of obstacles along the road to truth. But all have shared the Socratic vision of using the human intellect to challenge comfortable preconceptions, insisting that every aspect of human theory and practice be subjected to continuing critical scrutiny....Philosophy is, of course, part of a continuing tradition, and there is much to be gained from seeing how that tradition originated and developed. But the principal object of studying the materials in this book is not to pay homage to past genius, but to enrich one's understanding of central problems that are as pressing today as they have always been-problems about knowledge, truth and reality, the nature of the mind, the basis of right action, and the best way to live. These questions help to mark out the territory of philosophy as an academic discipline, but in a wider sense they define the human predicament itself; they will surely continue to be with us for as long as humanity endures. (Cottingham, 1996, pp. xxi-xxii)10) The Distinction between Dionysian Man and Apollonian Man, between Art and Creativity and Reason and Self- ControlIn his study of ancient Greek culture, The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche drew what would become a famous distinction, between the Dionysian spirit, the untamed spirit of art and creativity, and the Apollonian, that of reason and self-control. The story of Greek civilization, and all civilizations, Nietzsche implied, was the gradual victory of Apollonian man, with his desire for control over nature and himself, over Dionysian man, who survives only in myth, poetry, music, and drama. Socrates and Plato had attacked the illusions of art as unreal, and had overturned the delicate cultural balance by valuing only man's critical, rational, and controlling consciousness while denigrating his vital life instincts as irrational and base. The result of this division is "Alexandrian man," the civilized and accomplished Greek citizen of the later ancient world, who is "equipped with the greatest forces of knowledge" but in whom the wellsprings of creativity have dried up. (Herman, 1997, pp. 95-96)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Philosophy
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18 Artificial Intelligence
In my opinion, none of [these programs] does even remote justice to the complexity of human mental processes. Unlike men, "artificially intelligent" programs tend to be single minded, undistractable, and unemotional. (Neisser, 1967, p. 9)Future progress in [artificial intelligence] will depend on the development of both practical and theoretical knowledge.... As regards theoretical knowledge, some have sought a unified theory of artificial intelligence. My view is that artificial intelligence is (or soon will be) an engineering discipline since its primary goal is to build things. (Nilsson, 1971, pp. vii-viii)Most workers in AI [artificial intelligence] research and in related fields confess to a pronounced feeling of disappointment in what has been achieved in the last 25 years. Workers entered the field around 1950, and even around 1960, with high hopes that are very far from being realized in 1972. In no part of the field have the discoveries made so far produced the major impact that was then promised.... In the meantime, claims and predictions regarding the potential results of AI research had been publicized which went even farther than the expectations of the majority of workers in the field, whose embarrassments have been added to by the lamentable failure of such inflated predictions....When able and respected scientists write in letters to the present author that AI, the major goal of computing science, represents "another step in the general process of evolution"; that possibilities in the 1980s include an all-purpose intelligence on a human-scale knowledge base; that awe-inspiring possibilities suggest themselves based on machine intelligence exceeding human intelligence by the year 2000 [one has the right to be skeptical]. (Lighthill, 1972, p. 17)4) Just as Astronomy Succeeded Astrology, the Discovery of Intellectual Processes in Machines Should Lead to a Science, EventuallyJust as astronomy succeeded astrology, following Kepler's discovery of planetary regularities, the discoveries of these many principles in empirical explorations on intellectual processes in machines should lead to a science, eventually. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)5) Problems in Machine Intelligence Arise Because Things Obvious to Any Person Are Not Represented in the ProgramMany problems arise in experiments on machine intelligence because things obvious to any person are not represented in any program. One can pull with a string, but one cannot push with one.... Simple facts like these caused serious problems when Charniak attempted to extend Bobrow's "Student" program to more realistic applications, and they have not been faced up to until now. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 77)What do we mean by [a symbolic] "description"? We do not mean to suggest that our descriptions must be made of strings of ordinary language words (although they might be). The simplest kind of description is a structure in which some features of a situation are represented by single ("primitive") symbols, and relations between those features are represented by other symbols-or by other features of the way the description is put together. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)[AI is] the use of computer programs and programming techniques to cast light on the principles of intelligence in general and human thought in particular. (Boden, 1977, p. 5)The word you look for and hardly ever see in the early AI literature is the word knowledge. They didn't believe you have to know anything, you could always rework it all.... In fact 1967 is the turning point in my mind when there was enough feeling that the old ideas of general principles had to go.... I came up with an argument for what I called the primacy of expertise, and at the time I called the other guys the generalists. (Moses, quoted in McCorduck, 1979, pp. 228-229)9) Artificial Intelligence Is Psychology in a Particularly Pure and Abstract FormThe basic idea of cognitive science is that intelligent beings are semantic engines-in other words, automatic formal systems with interpretations under which they consistently make sense. We can now see why this includes psychology and artificial intelligence on a more or less equal footing: people and intelligent computers (if and when there are any) turn out to be merely different manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon. Moreover, with universal hardware, any semantic engine can in principle be formally imitated by a computer if only the right program can be found. And that will guarantee semantic imitation as well, since (given the appropriate formal behavior) the semantics is "taking care of itself" anyway. Thus we also see why, from this perspective, artificial intelligence can be regarded as psychology in a particularly pure and abstract form. The same fundamental structures are under investigation, but in AI, all the relevant parameters are under direct experimental control (in the programming), without any messy physiology or ethics to get in the way. (Haugeland, 1981b, p. 31)There are many different kinds of reasoning one might imagine:Formal reasoning involves the syntactic manipulation of data structures to deduce new ones following prespecified rules of inference. Mathematical logic is the archetypical formal representation. Procedural reasoning uses simulation to answer questions and solve problems. When we use a program to answer What is the sum of 3 and 4? it uses, or "runs," a procedural model of arithmetic. Reasoning by analogy seems to be a very natural mode of thought for humans but, so far, difficult to accomplish in AI programs. The idea is that when you ask the question Can robins fly? the system might reason that "robins are like sparrows, and I know that sparrows can fly, so robins probably can fly."Generalization and abstraction are also natural reasoning process for humans that are difficult to pin down well enough to implement in a program. If one knows that Robins have wings, that Sparrows have wings, and that Blue jays have wings, eventually one will believe that All birds have wings. This capability may be at the core of most human learning, but it has not yet become a useful technique in AI.... Meta- level reasoning is demonstrated by the way one answers the question What is Paul Newman's telephone number? You might reason that "if I knew Paul Newman's number, I would know that I knew it, because it is a notable fact." This involves using "knowledge about what you know," in particular, about the extent of your knowledge and about the importance of certain facts. Recent research in psychology and AI indicates that meta-level reasoning may play a central role in human cognitive processing. (Barr & Feigenbaum, 1981, pp. 146-147)Suffice it to say that programs already exist that can do things-or, at the very least, appear to be beginning to do things-which ill-informed critics have asserted a priori to be impossible. Examples include: perceiving in a holistic as opposed to an atomistic way; using language creatively; translating sensibly from one language to another by way of a language-neutral semantic representation; planning acts in a broad and sketchy fashion, the details being decided only in execution; distinguishing between different species of emotional reaction according to the psychological context of the subject. (Boden, 1981, p. 33)Can the synthesis of Man and Machine ever be stable, or will the purely organic component become such a hindrance that it has to be discarded? If this eventually happens-and I have... good reasons for thinking that it must-we have nothing to regret and certainly nothing to fear. (Clarke, 1984, p. 243)The thesis of GOFAI... is not that the processes underlying intelligence can be described symbolically... but that they are symbolic. (Haugeland, 1985, p. 113)14) Artificial Intelligence Provides a Useful Approach to Psychological and Psychiatric Theory FormationIt is all very well formulating psychological and psychiatric theories verbally but, when using natural language (even technical jargon), it is difficult to recognise when a theory is complete; oversights are all too easily made, gaps too readily left. This is a point which is generally recognised to be true and it is for precisely this reason that the behavioural sciences attempt to follow the natural sciences in using "classical" mathematics as a more rigorous descriptive language. However, it is an unfortunate fact that, with a few notable exceptions, there has been a marked lack of success in this application. It is my belief that a different approach-a different mathematics-is needed, and that AI provides just this approach. (Hand, quoted in Hand, 1985, pp. 6-7)We might distinguish among four kinds of AI.Research of this kind involves building and programming computers to perform tasks which, to paraphrase Marvin Minsky, would require intelligence if they were done by us. Researchers in nonpsychological AI make no claims whatsoever about the psychological realism of their programs or the devices they build, that is, about whether or not computers perform tasks as humans do.Research here is guided by the view that the computer is a useful tool in the study of mind. In particular, we can write computer programs or build devices that simulate alleged psychological processes in humans and then test our predictions about how the alleged processes work. We can weave these programs and devices together with other programs and devices that simulate different alleged mental processes and thereby test the degree to which the AI system as a whole simulates human mentality. According to weak psychological AI, working with computer models is a way of refining and testing hypotheses about processes that are allegedly realized in human minds.... According to this view, our minds are computers and therefore can be duplicated by other computers. Sherry Turkle writes that the "real ambition is of mythic proportions, making a general purpose intelligence, a mind." (Turkle, 1984, p. 240) The authors of a major text announce that "the ultimate goal of AI research is to build a person or, more humbly, an animal." (Charniak & McDermott, 1985, p. 7)Research in this field, like strong psychological AI, takes seriously the functionalist view that mentality can be realized in many different types of physical devices. Suprapsychological AI, however, accuses strong psychological AI of being chauvinisticof being only interested in human intelligence! Suprapsychological AI claims to be interested in all the conceivable ways intelligence can be realized. (Flanagan, 1991, pp. 241-242)16) Determination of Relevance of Rules in Particular ContextsEven if the [rules] were stored in a context-free form the computer still couldn't use them. To do that the computer requires rules enabling it to draw on just those [ rules] which are relevant in each particular context. Determination of relevance will have to be based on further facts and rules, but the question will again arise as to which facts and rules are relevant for making each particular determination. One could always invoke further facts and rules to answer this question, but of course these must be only the relevant ones. And so it goes. It seems that AI workers will never be able to get started here unless they can settle the problem of relevance beforehand by cataloguing types of context and listing just those facts which are relevant in each. (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p. 80)Perhaps the single most important idea to artificial intelligence is that there is no fundamental difference between form and content, that meaning can be captured in a set of symbols such as a semantic net. (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)Artificial intelligence is based on the assumption that the mind can be described as some kind of formal system manipulating symbols that stand for things in the world. Thus it doesn't matter what the brain is made of, or what it uses for tokens in the great game of thinking. Using an equivalent set of tokens and rules, we can do thinking with a digital computer, just as we can play chess using cups, salt and pepper shakers, knives, forks, and spoons. Using the right software, one system (the mind) can be mapped into the other (the computer). (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)19) A Statement of the Primary and Secondary Purposes of Artificial IntelligenceThe primary goal of Artificial Intelligence is to make machines smarter.The secondary goals of Artificial Intelligence are to understand what intelligence is (the Nobel laureate purpose) and to make machines more useful (the entrepreneurial purpose). (Winston, 1987, p. 1)The theoretical ideas of older branches of engineering are captured in the language of mathematics. We contend that mathematical logic provides the basis for theory in AI. Although many computer scientists already count logic as fundamental to computer science in general, we put forward an even stronger form of the logic-is-important argument....AI deals mainly with the problem of representing and using declarative (as opposed to procedural) knowledge. Declarative knowledge is the kind that is expressed as sentences, and AI needs a language in which to state these sentences. Because the languages in which this knowledge usually is originally captured (natural languages such as English) are not suitable for computer representations, some other language with the appropriate properties must be used. It turns out, we think, that the appropriate properties include at least those that have been uppermost in the minds of logicians in their development of logical languages such as the predicate calculus. Thus, we think that any language for expressing knowledge in AI systems must be at least as expressive as the first-order predicate calculus. (Genesereth & Nilsson, 1987, p. viii)21) Perceptual Structures Can Be Represented as Lists of Elementary PropositionsIn artificial intelligence studies, perceptual structures are represented as assemblages of description lists, the elementary components of which are propositions asserting that certain relations hold among elements. (Chase & Simon, 1988, p. 490)Artificial intelligence (AI) is sometimes defined as the study of how to build and/or program computers to enable them to do the sorts of things that minds can do. Some of these things are commonly regarded as requiring intelligence: offering a medical diagnosis and/or prescription, giving legal or scientific advice, proving theorems in logic or mathematics. Others are not, because they can be done by all normal adults irrespective of educational background (and sometimes by non-human animals too), and typically involve no conscious control: seeing things in sunlight and shadows, finding a path through cluttered terrain, fitting pegs into holes, speaking one's own native tongue, and using one's common sense. Because it covers AI research dealing with both these classes of mental capacity, this definition is preferable to one describing AI as making computers do "things that would require intelligence if done by people." However, it presupposes that computers could do what minds can do, that they might really diagnose, advise, infer, and understand. One could avoid this problematic assumption (and also side-step questions about whether computers do things in the same way as we do) by defining AI instead as "the development of computers whose observable performance has features which in humans we would attribute to mental processes." This bland characterization would be acceptable to some AI workers, especially amongst those focusing on the production of technological tools for commercial purposes. But many others would favour a more controversial definition, seeing AI as the science of intelligence in general-or, more accurately, as the intellectual core of cognitive science. As such, its goal is to provide a systematic theory that can explain (and perhaps enable us to replicate) both the general categories of intentionality and the diverse psychological capacities grounded in them. (Boden, 1990b, pp. 1-2)Because the ability to store data somewhat corresponds to what we call memory in human beings, and because the ability to follow logical procedures somewhat corresponds to what we call reasoning in human beings, many members of the cult have concluded that what computers do somewhat corresponds to what we call thinking. It is no great difficulty to persuade the general public of that conclusion since computers process data very fast in small spaces well below the level of visibility; they do not look like other machines when they are at work. They seem to be running along as smoothly and silently as the brain does when it remembers and reasons and thinks. On the other hand, those who design and build computers know exactly how the machines are working down in the hidden depths of their semiconductors. Computers can be taken apart, scrutinized, and put back together. Their activities can be tracked, analyzed, measured, and thus clearly understood-which is far from possible with the brain. This gives rise to the tempting assumption on the part of the builders and designers that computers can tell us something about brains, indeed, that the computer can serve as a model of the mind, which then comes to be seen as some manner of information processing machine, and possibly not as good at the job as the machine. (Roszak, 1994, pp. xiv-xv)The inner workings of the human mind are far more intricate than the most complicated systems of modern technology. Researchers in the field of artificial intelligence have been attempting to develop programs that will enable computers to display intelligent behavior. Although this field has been an active one for more than thirty-five years and has had many notable successes, AI researchers still do not know how to create a program that matches human intelligence. No existing program can recall facts, solve problems, reason, learn, and process language with human facility. This lack of success has occurred not because computers are inferior to human brains but rather because we do not yet know in sufficient detail how intelligence is organized in the brain. (Anderson, 1995, p. 2)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Artificial Intelligence
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19 number
ˈnʌmbə
1. сущ.
1) а) мат. число;
сумма, цифра;
австрал. арифметика high number ≈ большое число low number ≈ небольшое число algebraic number complex number compound number decimal number even number imaginary number infinite number irrational number mass number mixed number natural number negative number odd number positive number prime number quantum number whole number science of numbers б) количество, число to decrease, reduce a number ≈ сокращать число, уменьшать количество to increase a number ≈ увеличивать число, увеличивать количество to reduce the number of traffic accidents ≈ сокращать число дорожно-транспортных происшествий large number ≈ большое число small number ≈ небольшое число in great numbers approximate number round number certain number enormous number untold number growing number a number of in numbers out of number without number Numbers Syn: quantity в) номер( какого-л. объекта;
также предмет, на котором написан, вырезан и т.д. номер) to call, dial a number ≈ набирать номер, звонить lucky number ≈ счастливый номер, счастливое число serial number( of a product) ≈ серийный номер (продукта) serial number (of a soldier) ≈ личный номер (солдата) telephone number ≈ телефонный номер unlisted number ≈ номер телефона, не внесенный в телефонную книгу winning number (of a lottery) ≈ выигрышный номер (в лотерее) get the wrong number call number motorcar's number Number 10
2) а) номер, пункт( в программе какого-л. действа) б) номер, выпуск, экземпляр( чего-л. периодического и т. п.) the daily number ≈ выпуск газеты, выходящий ежедневно back number в) разг. что-л. выделяющееся, могущее служить образцом г) элемент оглавления, списка;
часть музыкального произведения
3) а) грам. число б) грам. числительное cardinal number ordinal number Syn: numeral
4) редк. ритм, размер (стихотворный) ;
перен. мн. стихи ∙ his number goes up ≈ он умирает, его песенка спета, ему крышка number one number two get one's number take one's number have one's number
2. гл.
1) а) нумеровать;
считать, пересчитывать( о людях, реже о предметах) His days are numbered. ≈ Его дни сочтены. Mussulmans consider every attempt to number the people as a mark of great impiety. ≈ Мусульмане считают любую попытку пересчитать людей как признак нечестивости. Syn: enumerate;
count б) воен. рассчитываться to number off ≈ делать перекличку по номерам
2) а) числиться, быть в числе (among, in) I am proud to number her among my friends. ≈ Я горд, что я ее друг. Syn: count>, reckon, class б) зачислять, причислять be numbered with Syn: rank
3) насчитывать The crew and passengers numbered
33.. ≈ Команда плюс пассажиры, тридцать три человека. Syn: equal, amount
4) прожить столько-то лет число, количество - livestock *s поголовье скота - * of copies (полиграфия) тираж - in * численно, числом - they are twenty in * их двадцать - we were few in * нас было мало - to the * of 10,000 в добровольцы записалось до 10 000 человек - a large * много - a large * of people масса народу - a limited * of cars is available поступило в продажу некоторое количество автомашин - quite a * of people довольно многие (люди) - out of * бесчисленное множество;
несть числа - times without * бесчисленное множество раз - any * любое количество;
много - I have shown him any * of kindnesses я оказывал ему множество любезностей - many people, myself among the *, think that... многие люди, и я в том числе, думают, что... - he is not of our * он не принадлежит к нашему кругу - given equal *s we should be stronger при одинаковой численности мы должны быть сильнее некоторое количество, ряд - a * of people некоторые( люди) ;
кое-кто - a * of accidents always occur on slippery roadways на скользкой мостовой всегда происходят несчастные случаи - a * of books is missing from the library из библиотеки пропал ряд книг большое число, масса - in *s в большом количестве;
значительными силами - in superior *s (военное) превосходящей численностью - *s of people came to see the exhibition посмотреть выставку пришла масса народу - to win by *s победить благодаря численному превосходству - to be overpowered by *s, to yield to *s отступить перед превосходящими силами (военное) количество вооружений - actual * фактическое количество - aggregate * суммарное количетсво - agreed * согласованное количество (порядковый) номер - index * порядковый номер - registration * инвентарный номер - reference * (официальное) номер для ссылок;
номер заказа - code * (телефония) номер по телеграфному коду - wrond *! вы не туда попали! (ответ по телефону) - atomic * атомный номер( в таблице Менделеева) - call * шифр( карты, книги) - the * of a house номер дома - * of the piece crew (военное) номер орудийного расчета - to take the driver's * записать номер такси номер (дома) (употр. в сокр. форме No) - he lives at No. 18 он живет в доме N 18 - he lives in No. 4 он живет в четвертом номере (гостиницы) номер, выпуск (издания) - back * старый номер (газеты) ;
нечто устаревшее;
отсталый человек - to feel oneself a back * чувствовать, что отстал от жизни - the current * of a magazine последний номер журнала - a story issued in *s роман, выходящий отдельными выпусками номер программы, выступление - the first * on the program первый номер программы - she sang several *s from the opera она спела несколько арий из этой оперы (разговорное) что-л. выделяющееся, бросающееся в глаза - this hat is a smart * эта шляпка - верх изящества - he is a sly * он большой хитрец( разговорное) девушка, девчонка - blonde * блондиночка (американизм) ежедневная нелегальная лотерея (ставки делаются на цифры в статистических таблицах и т. п., помещаемых в газетах) (американизм) мошенничество, жульничество (сленг) наркотик - * 3 кокаин - * 8 героин - * 13 морфин позывные сумма, цифра;
число - binary * двоичное число - broken * дробь - intact * целое число - Roman *s римские цифры - artificial *s логарифмы - in round *s в круглых цифрах;
примерно;
короче говоря арифметика - he has skill in *s он силен в арифметике (грамматика) число - plural * множественное число( специальное) показатель, число - gloss * (текстильное) показатель блеска - acid * кислотное число, коэффициент кислотности - solubility * показатель растворимости - elevation * высотная отметка - scale * знаменатель масштаба - weight * весовой коэффициент (в статистике) - base * (информатика) основной индекс( классификации) - * of dimension размерность - * in a scale (метеорология) балл( силы ветра) (стихосложение) (музыкальное) метр, размер;
ритм стихи - mournful *s унылые строфы > No. 10 (Downing Street) резиденция премьер-министра Великобритании > smb.'s * goes up чье-л. дело плохо, кому-л. крышка, чья-л. песенка спета > to lose the * of one's mess (военное) (жаргон) "сняться с довольствия" (т. е. умереть) > to get smb.'s * (американизм) (сленг) раскусить кого-л > to do a * on smb. (американизм) (сленг) морочить, ловко обработать кого-л;
высмеивать кого-л.;
издеваться над кем-л;
заигрывать с кем-л > to do a * on smb.'s head заморочить кому-л. голову > to have smb.'s * on it (американизм) (сленг) быть специально предназначенным для кого-л. (о пуле) > opposite * (математика) противолежащий нумеровать - *ed copy нумерованный экземпляр (книги) - to * houses нумеровать дома - * the questins from 1 to 10 перенумеруйте вопросы от первого до десятого насчитывать - we *ed twenty in all всего нас было двадцать человек - the population *s 1000 население составляет 1000 человек - he *s fourscore years ему перевалило за восемьдесят - those present *ed fifty присутствующих насчитывалось пятьдесят человек - they * in hundreds их число доходит до нескольких сотен причислять, зачислять;
числить (кем-л, чем-л.) - to be *ed with the saints быть причисленным к лику святых - I * Thomas among my friends я причисляю Томаса к своим друзьям - Julius Caesar is *ed among the greatest captains of all ages Юлия Цезаря считают одним из величайших полководцев всех времен - this painting is *ed among the treasures of the gallery это полотно относится к числу сокровиц галереи (книжное) считать, пересчитывать - his days are *ed дни его сочтены - who can * the stars? кто сочтет звезды?;
кто знает, сколько на небе звезд? (военное) производить расчет - by twos, *! на первый-второй - рассчитайсь! (команда) - * (off) ! по порядку номеров - рассчитайсь! (команда) absolute ~ вчт. неименованное число abstract ~ вчт. неименованное число account ~ номер счета account ~ вчт. учетный номер actual ~ вчт. фактическое число application ~ пат. номер заявки arithmetic ~ вчт. арифметическое число assembly ~ вчт. шифр комплекта average sample ~ средний объем выборки base ~ вчт. основание системы счисления basic ~ базисная величина ~ причислять, зачислять;
to be numbered with быть причисленным к binary decimal ~ вчт. двоично-десятичное число binary ~ вчт. двоичное число binary-coded decimal ~ вчт. двоично-кодированное десятичное число binary-coded ~ вчт. двоично-кодированное число block ~ вчт. номер блока book ~ учетный номер книги ~ номер;
motorcar's number номер автомашины;
call number шифр (книги, пленки и т. п.) call ~ вызываемый номер call ~ вчт. вызывающий параметр cardinal ~ мат. кардинальное число cardinal ~ количественное числительное catalogue ~ каталожный номер check ~ вчт. контрольное число column ~ вчт. номер столбца commercial register ~ номер коммерческой фирмы в регистре register: commercial ~ number (for tax and VAT collection purposes) номер коммерческой фирмы в регистре (для налогообложения и сбора налога на добавленную стоимость) customer account ~ номер счета клиента cylinder ~ вчт. номер цилиндра danger ~ категория риска decimal ~ десятичное число device ~ вчт. номер устройства double-precision ~ вчт. число с двойной точностью error ~ вчт. номер ошибки extension ~ добавочный номер file ~ номер дела file ~ номер документа file ~ номер единицы хранения floating-point ~ вчт. число с плавающей запятой fractional ~ дробное число generation ~ вчт. номер версии giro account ~ номер жиросчета ~ первоклассный, самый главный;
problem No. 1 самая важная проблема;
his number goes up он умирает, его песенка спета, ему крышка identity ~ идентификационный номер identity ~ личный номер ~ число, количество;
a number of некоторое количество;
in number численно, количеством in (great) ~s в большом количестве in (great) ~s значительными силами;
out of (или without) number множество, без числа;
a number (или numbers) of people много народу index ~ вчт. индекс index ~ коэффициент index ~ числовой показатель insurance ~ номер страхового договора integer ~ вчт. целое число inverse ~ вчт. обратное число invoice ~ номер счета-фактуры item ~ номер изделия item ~ вчт. номер позиции item ~ вчт. номер элемента journal ~ номер журнала land register ~ номер кадастра licence ~ номерной знак автомобиля line ~ вчт. номер строки lot ~ номер лота lot ~ число изделий в партии magic ~ вчт. системный код mixed ~ вчт. смешанное число ~ номер;
motorcar's number номер автомашины;
call number шифр (книги, пленки и т. п.) natural ~ вчт. натуральное число natural ~ мат. натуральное число negative ~ вчт. отрицательное число number разг. (что-л.) выделяющееся, могущее служить образцом;
number one (или No. ~ выпуск, номер, экземпляр (журнала и т. п.) ~ выпуск ~ зачислять ~ количество ~ насчитывать;
the population numbers 5000 население составляет 5000 человек ~ насчитывать ~ номер (программы) ~ номер;
motorcar's number номер автомашины;
call number шифр (книги, пленки и т. п.) ~ номер ~ нумеровать ~ нумеровать ~ первоклассный, самый главный;
problem No. 1 самая важная проблема;
his number goes up он умирает, его песенка спета, ему крышка ~ пересчитывать ~ показатель ~ (No.) порядковый номер ~ предназначать ~ причислять, зачислять;
to be numbered with быть причисленным к ~ воен. рассчитываться;
to number off делать перекличку по номерам ~ прос. ритм, размер ~ свое "я";
собственная персона ~ pl прос. стихи ~ мат. сумма, число, цифра;
science of numbers арифметика ~ сумма ~ уст. считать, пересчитывать;
his days are numbered его дни сочтены ~ цифра ~ числиться, быть в числе (among, in) ~ грам. число ~ число, количество;
a number of некоторое количество;
in number численно, количеством ~ число ~ in succession нумеровать по порядку ~ in system вчт. число в системе ~ in the queue вчт. длина очереди ~ число, количество;
a number of некоторое количество;
in number численно, количеством ~ of allocation units количество голосов, на основании которых распределяются мандаты в парламенте ~ of claims число исков ~ of members число членов ~ of packages число мест груза in (great) ~s значительными силами;
out of (или without) number множество, без числа;
a number (или numbers) of people много народу ~ of persons employed число сотрудников ~ of respondents число опрошенных ~ of risks число рисков ~ of units waiting вчт. длина очереди ~ of votes число голосов ~ of years возраст ~ воен. рассчитываться;
to number off делать перекличку по номерам number разг. (что-л.) выделяющееся, могущее служить образцом;
number one (или No. odd ~ нечетное число opposite ~ лицо, занимающее такую же должность в другом учреждении opposite ~ партнер по переговорам opposite: ~ number лицо, занимающее такую же должность в другом учреждении, государстве и т. п.;
партнер, коллега order ~ номер заказа order ~ порядковый номер ordinal ~ вчт. порядковый номер ordinal ~ порядковый номер in (great) ~s значительными силами;
out of (или without) number множество, без числа;
a number (или numbers) of people много народу packed decimal ~ вчт. упакованное десятичное число page ~ вчт. номер страницы page ~ полигр. номер страницы parcel ~ номер земельного участка patent ~ номер патента personal identification ~ вчт. личный идентификационный номер personal ~ личный идентификационный номер phone ~ номер телефона physical block ~ вчт. физический номер блока policy ~ номер страхового полиса ~ насчитывать;
the population numbers 5000 население составляет 5000 человек positive ~ вчт. положительное число precedence ~ вчт. приоритетный номер prime ~ простое число prime: ~ mover тех. первичный двигатель;
перен. душа( какого-л.) дела;
prime number мат. простое число priority ~ вчт. показатель приоритета ~ первоклассный, самый главный;
problem No. 1 самая важная проблема;
his number goes up он умирает, его песенка спета, ему крышка pseudorandom ~ псевдослучайное число random ~ случайное число rational ~ рациональное число real ~ вещественное число real ~ действительное число reciprocal ~ обратное число reference ~ номер для ссылок reference ~ номер документа reference ~ шифр документа registration ~ номерной знак registration ~ регистрационный номер round ~ округленное число ~ мат. сумма, число, цифра;
science of numbers арифметика securities ~ номер ценной бумаги sequence ~ порядковый номер serial ~ номер в серии serial ~ порядковый номер serial ~ регистрационный номер serial ~ серийный номер serial: ~ последовательный;
serial number порядковый номер share serial ~ серийный номер акции shelf ~ doc. регистрационный номер shelf ~ doc. учетный номер signed ~ вчт. число со знаком simple ~ однозначное число special service ~ специальный служебный номер statement ~ вчт. номер оператора statistical code ~ статистический кодовый номер suffix ~ нижний индекс tag ~ вчт. кодовая метка tariff ~ позиция в таможенном тарифе tax identification ~ регистрационный номер фирмы в налоговом управлении (США) telephone ~ номер телефона three-figure ~ трехзначное число three-figure ~ трехзначный номер title ~ титульный номер track ~ вчт. номер дорожки two-digit ~ двузначное число unit ~ вчт. номер устройства unlisted ~ номер телефона, не внесенный в телефонный справочник unobtainable ~ номер телефона, не помещенный в телефонный справочник и не сообщаемый справочной службой unsigned ~ вчт. число без знака user identification ~ вчт. шифр пользователя user ~ вчт. код пользователя vacant ~ незанятый абонентский номер vacant ~ свободный абонентский номер version ~ вчт. номер версии virtual block ~ вчт. виртуальный номер блока wave ~ волновое число -
20 present
I 1. adjective1) anwesend, (geh.) zugegen (at bei)be present in the air/water/in large amounts — in der Luft/im Wasser/in großen Mengen vorhanden sein
all present and correct — (joc.) alle sind da
2) (being dealt with) betreffendin the present case — im vorliegenden Fall
3) (existing now) gegenwärtig; jetzig, derzeitig [Bischof, Chef usw.]4) (Ling.)2. nounpresent tense — Präsens, das; Gegenwart, die; see also academic.ru/53737/participle">participle
1)the present — die Gegenwart
up to the present — bis jetzt; bisher
2) (Ling.) Präsens, das; Gegenwart, dieII 1.['prezənt] noun (gift) Geschenk, dasparting present — Abschiedsgeschenk, das
2.make a present of something to somebody, make somebody a present of something — jemandem etwas zum Geschenk machen; see also give 1. 2)
[prɪ'zent] transitive verb1) schenken; überreichen [Preis, Medaille, Geschenk]present something to somebody or somebody with something — jemandem etwas schenken/überreichen
present somebody with difficulties/a problem — jemanden vor Schwierigkeiten/ein Problem stellen
he was presented with an opportunity that... — ihm bot sich eine Gelegenheit, die...
2) (deliver) überreichen [Gesuch] (to bei); vorlegen [Scheck, Bericht, Rechnung] (to Dat.)3) (exhibit) zeigen; bereiten [Schwierigkeit]; aufweisen [Aspekt]4) (introduce) vorstellen (to Dat.)5) (to the public) geben, aufführen [Theaterstück]; zeigen [Film]; moderieren [Sendung]; bringen [Fernsehserie, Schauspieler in einer Rolle]; vorstellen [Produkt usw.]; vorlegen [Abhandlung]6)3. reflexive verbpresent arms! — (Mil.) präsentiert das Gewehr!
[Problem:] auftreten; [Möglichkeit:] sich ergebenpresent oneself for interview/an examination — zu einem Gespräch/einer Prüfung erscheinen
* * *I ['preznt] adjective1) (being here, or at the place, occasion etc mentioned: My father was present on that occasion; Who else was present at the wedding?; Now that the whole class is present, we can begin the lesson.) anwesend2) (existing now: the present moment; the present prime minister.) gegenwärtig3) ((of the tense of a verb) indicating action now: In the sentence `She wants a chocolate', the verb is in the present tense.) das Präsens•- presently- the present
- at present
- for the present II [pri'zent] verb1) (to give, especially formally or ceremonially: The child presented a bunch of flowers to the Queen; He was presented with a gold watch when he retired.) überreichen3) (to arrange the production of (a play, film etc): The Elizabethan Theatre Company presents `Hamlet', by William Shakespeare.) vorführen4) (to offer (ideas etc) for consideration, or (a problem etc) for solving: She presents (=expresses) her ideas very clearly; The situation presents a problem.) vorbringen5) (to bring (oneself); to appear: He presented himself at the dinner table half an hour late.) erscheinen•- presenter- presentable
- presentation
- present arms III ['preznt] noun(a gift: a wedding present; birthday presents.) das Geschenk* * *pres·ent1[ˈprezənt]I. n▪ the \present die Gegenwartthe play is set [or takes place] in the \present das Stück spielt in der Gegenwartto live for the \present im Hier und Jetzt lebento refuse to think beyond the \present nicht an die Zukunft denken wollenat \present zurzeit, gegenwärtigfor the \present vorläufigthat's all [or that will be all] for the \present das ist vorläufig [o zunächst einmal] allesup to the \present bis jetzt, bislangthe verbs are all in the \present die Verben stehen alle im Präsens3. LAWthese \presents vorliegende Urkundeby these \presents hierdurch, durch diese Urkunde4.▶ there's no time like the \present ( prov) was du heute kannst besorgen, das verschiebe nicht auf morgen provwhen do you want me to leave? — no time like the \present wann möchtest du, dass ich gehe? — am besten sofortII. adjsb's \present address jds derzeitige Adressedown to the \present day bis zum heutigen Tagduration of \present employment Dauer f der gegenwärtigen Beschäftigungthe \present generation die heutige Generationat the \present moment im Moment [o Augenblick]the \present month der laufende Monatat the \present time zurzeit, gegenwärtigthat's not relevant to the \present matter das ist für diese Sache nicht von Bedeutungin the \present case im vorliegenden Fallin the \present connection in diesem Zusammenhangall \present and correct BRIT\present company excepted Anwesende ausgenommencounting those \present Anwesende eingeschlossenall those \present alle Anwesendenhow many people will be \present at the ceremony? wie viele Personen werden an der Feier teilnehmen?are there certain chemicals \present in the air? sind in der Luft bestimmte Chemikalien enthalten?traces of arsenic were \present in the body im Körper konnten Spuren von Arsen nachgewiesen werdenthe patient was weak, fever was also \present der Patient war schwach, Fieber war auch aufgetretenpres·ent2[ˈprezənt]as a retirement \present she was given a week's vacation to the Caribbean zur Pensionierung schenkte man ihr einen einwöchigen Urlaub in der Karibikbirthday/Christmas/wedding \present Geburtstags-/Weihnachts-/Hochzeitsgeschenk ntto give sth to sb [or sb sth] as a \present jdm etw schenkento make sb a \present of sth jdm etw schenkenpre·sent3[prɪˈzent]I. vt▪ to \present sth [to sb/sth] gift [jdm/etw] etw schenken; award, medal, diploma [jdm/etw] etw überreichenhe is going to \present the town with a new hospital er wird der Stadt ein neues Krankenhaus stiften2. (express)the major \presents his apologies, but he is unable to attend der Bürgermeister lässt sich entschuldigen, aber er kann leider nicht teilnehmenMr Barney \presents his compliments Herr Barney lässt Grüße ausrichtenplease \present my compliments to the chef mein Kompliment an den Kochto \present one's thoughts/view seine Gedanken/Ansichten darlegen▪ to \present sth [to sb/sth] [jdm/etw] etw vorlegen [o präsentieren]she \presented her passport at the checkpoint sie zeigte ihren Reisepass am Kontrollpunkt vorto \present a bill for £3000 eine Rechnung über 3000 Pfund präsentieren [o vorlegen]to \present a cheque for payment einen Scheck einreichento \present one's credentials sich akk ausweisento \present a petition ein Gesuch einreichento \present proof of payment einen Zahlungsnachweis erbringen4. (put forward)▪ to \present sth [to sb/sth] [jdm/etw] etw präsentierento \present an argument ein Argument anführento \present a bill LAW einen Gesetzentwurf einbringen [o zur Zahlung vorlegen]to \present a motion einen Antrag stellento \present a motion of no confidence einen Misstrauensantrag einbringento \present a paper/report eine Arbeit/einen Bericht vorlegento \present a plan/theory einen Plan/eine Theorie darlegento \present a proposal einen Vorschlag unterbreitento \present sb with a challenge jdn vor eine Herausforderung stellento \present sb with [the] facts jdm die Fakten vor Augen führento be \presented with different options verschiedene Wahlmöglichkeiten geboten bekommento \present sb with a problem jdn vor ein Problem stellento \present sb with an ultimatum jdm ein Ultimatum stellen6.use of these chemicals may \present a fire risk die Verwendung dieser Chemikalien könnte ein Brandrisiko darstellenthe classroom \presented a cheerful atmosphere to the visitor das Klassenzimmer bot den Besuchern eine freundliche Atmosphäreto \present a challenge to sb eine Herausforderung für jdn seinto \present difficulties for sb jdm Schwierigkeiten bereitento \present a problem for sb jdn vor ein Problem stellen▪ to \present sb [to sb] jdn [jdm] vorstellenmay I \present Professor Carter? darf ich Professor Carter vorstellen?allow me to \present Mrs Richards to you darf ich Ihnen Frau Richards vorstellen?8. (compère)to \present a programme eine Sendung moderieren; (show)to \present a film einen Film zeigento \present a play ein Stück aufführento \present a product ein Produkt vorstellento \present a TV-series eine Fernsehserie bringen [o zeigen▪ to \present sb/sth [as sb/sth] jdn/etw [als jdn/etw] präsentierento \present sb/sth in a favourable light jdn/etw in einem günstigen Licht präsentieren [o zeigen]you need to \present yourself better du musst dich besser präsentierenhe likes to \present himself as an intellectual er gibt sich gerne als Intellektueller10. MILto \present arms das Gewehr präsentieren\present arms! präsentiert das Gewehr!11. (appear)you will be asked to \present yourself for an interview man wird Sie bitten, zu einem Vorstellungsgespräch zu kommento \present oneself in court vor Gericht erscheinento \present oneself at the doctor's sich akk beim Arzt vorstellen12. (arise)the opportunity to work in Boston \presented itself quite out of the blue die Gelegenheit, in Boston zu arbeiten, kam aus heiterem Himmel13. MED1. patientthe patient \presented with a serious case of TB der Patient zeigte Anzeichen einer schweren Tuberkulose2. fetus ausgetrieben werdenthe fetus \presented to the birth canal feet first der Fötus trat mit den Füßen zuerst in den Geburtskanal3. illness sich zeigen, auftretento bring the rifle down to the \present das Gewehr in Anschlag bringen* * *I ['preznt]1. adj1) (= in attendance) anwesend2) (= existing in sth) vorhandena quality present in all great men — eine Eigenschaft, die man bei allen großen Männern findet
3)at the present time — gegenwärtig, derzeitig, augenblicklich; year, season etc laufend; century gegenwärtig, jetzig
of the present day — heutig, modern
till or to or until the present day — bis zum heutigen Tag, bis auf den heutigen Tag
in the present case —
the present writer (form) — der Autor des hier vorliegenden Werkes
4) (GRAM)in the present tense — in der Gegenwart, im Präsens
present participle — Partizip nt Präsens, Mittelwort nt der Gegenwart
present perfect (tense) — zweite Vergangenheit, Perfekt nt
2. n1) Gegenwart fat present — zur Zeit, im Moment or Augenblick, derzeit
up to the present — bislang, bis jetzt
there's no time like the present (prov) — was du heute kannst besorgen, das verschiebe nicht auf morgen (Prov)
IIpresent continuous/simple — erweitertes/einfaches Präsens, aktuelles/generelles Präsens
1. n(= gift) Geschenk ntto make sb a present of sth — jdm etw schenken (also fig), jdm etw zum Geschenk machen (form)
2. vt[prɪ'zent]1) (= hand over formally) medal, prize etc übergeben, überreichen; (= give as a gift) art collection, book etc schenken, zum Geschenk machen (form)to present sb with sth, to present sth to sb — jdm etw übergeben or überreichen; (as a gift)
they presented us with a hefty bill she presented him with a son — sie präsentierten or überreichten uns (dat) eine gesalzene Rechnung sie schenkte ihm einen Sohn
2) (= put forward) vorlegen; cheque (for payment) präsentieren; proof vorlegen, erbringen (of sth für etw); proposal vorlegen, unterbreitenshe asked me to present her apologies/compliments (form) please present my apologies to your mother (form) — sie bat mich, ihre Entschuldigung/Komplimente weiterzuleiten bitte entschuldigen Sie mich bei Ihrer Mutter
his report presents the matter in another light — sein Bericht zeigt die Angelegenheit in anderem Licht or stellt die Angelegenheit in anderem Licht dar
3) (= offer, provide) target, view, opportunity bietento present a brave face to the world — sich (dat) nichts anmerken lassen
4) (RAD, TV) präsentieren; (THEAT) zeigen, aufführen; (commentator) moderierenpresenting, in the blue corner... — in der blauen Ecke des Rings...
5) (= introduce) vorstellento present Mr X to Miss Y — Herrn X Fräulein Y (dat) vorstellen
may I present Mr X? (form) — erlauben Sie mir, Herrn X vorzustellen (form)
3. vr[prɪ'zent] (opportunity, problem etc) sich ergebenhow you present yourself is very important — es ist sehr wichtig, wie man sich präsentiert
he was asked to present himself for interview —
* * *present1 [ˈpreznt]1. gegenwärtig, anwesend ( beide:in a place an einem Ort;were you present? warst du da(bei)?;those present, present company die Anwesenden;present! (bei Namensaufruf) hier!2. gegenwärtig, augenblicklich, derzeitig, jetzig, momentan:it is present to my mind es ist mir gegenwärtig5. vorliegend:the present writer der Schreiber oder Verfasser (dieser Zeilen)present perfect Perfekt n, zweite Vergangenheit;B s1. Gegenwart f:at present im Augenblick, augenblicklich, gegenwärtig, zum gegenwärtigen Zeitpunkt, momentan;for the present vorläufig, für den Augenblick, einstweilen2. LING (Verb n im) Präsens n, (Zeitwort n in der) Gegenwart fby these presents hiermit, hierdurch;know all men by these presents that … hiermit wird allen kundgetan, dass …present2 [prıˈzent]A v/tpresent sb with sth jemandem etwas schenken oder verehren;present sb with a problem jemanden vor ein Problem stellen;be presented with a prize einen Preis (überreicht) bekommen2. darbieten, (über)reichen, etwas schenken:present sth to sb jemandem etwas schenken;present a message eine Botschaft überbringen;present one’s compliments to sb sich jemandem empfehlenpresent o.s.a) sich vorstellen,b) sich einfinden, erscheinen, sich melden ( alle:for zu),c) fig sich bieten (Möglichkeit etc)4. bei Hof vorstellen oder einführen:5. present no difficulty to sb jemandem keine Schwierigkeit bieten;present a problem (a threat) ein Problem (eine Bedrohung) darstellen;present an appearance (of) erscheinen (als);present a smiling face ein lächelndes Gesicht zeigen6. WIRTSCH einen Wechsel, Scheck (zur Zahlung) vorlegen, präsentieren:present a bill for acceptance einen Wechsel zum Akzept vorlegen7. ein Gesuch, eine Klage einreichen, vorlegen, unterbreiten8. eine Bitte, Klage, ein Argument etc vorbringen, einen Gedanken, Wunsch äußern, unterbreiten:present a case einen Fall vortragen oder vor Gericht vertreten9. JURa) Klage oder Anzeige erstatten gegenb) ein Vergehen anzeigen10. ein Theaterstück, einen Film etc darbieten, geben, zeigen, auch eine Sendung bringen, eine Sendung moderieren11. eine Rolle spielen, verkörpern12. fig vergegenwärtigen, vor Augen führen, schildern, darstellen13. jemanden (für ein Amt) vorschlagen14. MILa) das Gewehr präsentierenB s MILa) Präsentiergriff mb) (Gewehr)Anschlag m:at the present in Präsentierhaltung;present arms Präsentierstellung fpresent3 [ˈpreznt] s Geschenk n, Präsent n, Gabe f:make sb a present of sth, make a present of sth to sb jemandem etwas zum Geschenk machen oder schenken;what do you want for a present? was willst du als Geschenk?pres. abk1. present2. presidency* * *I 1. adjective1) anwesend, (geh.) zugegen (at bei)be present in the air/water/in large amounts — in der Luft/im Wasser/in großen Mengen vorhanden sein
all present and correct — (joc.) alle sind da
2) (being dealt with) betreffend3) (existing now) gegenwärtig; jetzig, derzeitig [Bischof, Chef usw.]4) (Ling.)2. nounpresent tense — Präsens, das; Gegenwart, die; see also participle
1)up to the present — bis jetzt; bisher
2) (Ling.) Präsens, das; Gegenwart, dieII 1.['prezənt] noun (gift) Geschenk, dasparting present — Abschiedsgeschenk, das
2.make a present of something to somebody, make somebody a present of something — jemandem etwas zum Geschenk machen; see also give 1. 2)
[prɪ'zent] transitive verb1) schenken; überreichen [Preis, Medaille, Geschenk]present something to somebody or somebody with something — jemandem etwas schenken/überreichen
present somebody with difficulties/a problem — jemanden vor Schwierigkeiten/ein Problem stellen
he was presented with an opportunity that... — ihm bot sich eine Gelegenheit, die...
2) (deliver) überreichen [Gesuch] (to bei); vorlegen [Scheck, Bericht, Rechnung] (to Dat.)3) (exhibit) zeigen; bereiten [Schwierigkeit]; aufweisen [Aspekt]4) (introduce) vorstellen (to Dat.)5) (to the public) geben, aufführen [Theaterstück]; zeigen [Film]; moderieren [Sendung]; bringen [Fernsehserie, Schauspieler in einer Rolle]; vorstellen [Produkt usw.]; vorlegen [Abhandlung]6)3. reflexive verbpresent arms! — (Mil.) präsentiert das Gewehr!
[Problem:] auftreten; [Möglichkeit:] sich ergebenpresent oneself for interview/an examination — zu einem Gespräch/einer Prüfung erscheinen
* * *adj.derzeitig (jetzig) adj.gegenwärtig adj.präsent adj.vorhanden adj. n.Geschenk -e n.Präsent -e n. v.aufweisen v.beschenken v.präsentieren v.vorführen v.vorlegen v.vorstellen v.überreichen v.
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