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Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Bibliography
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42 Cognitive Science
The basic idea of cognitive science is that intelligent beings are semantic engines-in other words, automatic formal systems with interpretations under which they consistently make sense.... [P]eople and intelligent computers turn out to be merely different manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon. (Haugeland, 1981b, p. 31)2) Experimental Psychology, Theoretical Linguistics, and Computational Simulation of Cognitive Processes Are All Components of Cognitive ScienceI went away from the Symposium with a strong conviction, more intuitive than rational, that human experimental psychology, theoretical linguistics, and computer simulation of cognitive processes were all pieces of a larger whole, and that the future would see progressive elaboration and coordination of their shared concerns.... I have been working toward a cognitive science for about twenty years beginning before I knew what to call it. (G. A. Miller, 1979, p. 9)Cognitive Science studies the nature of cognition in human beings, other animals, and inanimate machines (if such a thing is possible). While computers are helpful within cognitive science, they are not essential to its being. A science of cognition could still be pursued even without these machines.Computer Science studies various kinds of problems and the use of computers to solve them, without concern for the means by which we humans might otherwise resolve them. There could be no computer science if there were no machines of this kind, because they are indispensable to its being. Artificial Intelligence is a special branch of computer science that investigates the extent to which the mental powers of human beings can be captured by means of machines.There could be cognitive science without artificial intelligence but there could be no artificial intelligence without cognitive science. One final caveat: In the case of an emerging new discipline such as cognitive science there is an almost irresistible temptation to identify the discipline itself (as a field of inquiry) with one of the theories that inspired it (such as the computational conception...). This, however, is a mistake. The field of inquiry (or "domain") stands to specific theories as questions stand to possible answers. The computational conception should properly be viewed as a research program in cognitive science, where "research programs" are answers that continue to attract followers. (Fetzer, 1996, pp. xvi-xvii)What is the nature of knowledge and how is this knowledge used? These questions lie at the core of both psychology and artificial intelligence.The psychologist who studies "knowledge systems" wants to know how concepts are structured in the human mind, how such concepts develop, and how they are used in understanding and behavior. The artificial intelligence researcher wants to know how to program a computer so that it can understand and interact with the outside world. The two orientations intersect when the psychologist and the computer scientist agree that the best way to approach the problem of building an intelligent machine is to emulate the human conceptual mechanisms that deal with language.... The name "cognitive science" has been used to refer to this convergence of interests in psychology and artificial intelligence....This working partnership in "cognitive science" does not mean that psychologists and computer scientists are developing a single comprehensive theory in which people are no different from machines. Psychology and artificial intelligence have many points of difference in methods and goals.... We simply want to work on an important area of overlapping interest, namely a theory of knowledge systems. As it turns out, this overlap is substantial. For both people and machines, each in their own way, there is a serious problem in common of making sense out of what they hear, see, or are told about the world. The conceptual apparatus necessary to perform even a partial feat of understanding is formidable and fascinating. (Schank & Abelson, 1977, pp. 1-2)Within the last dozen years a general change in scientific outlook has occurred, consonant with the point of view represented here. One can date the change roughly from 1956: in psychology, by the appearance of Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin's Study of Thinking and George Miller's "The Magical Number Seven"; in linguistics, by Noam Chomsky's "Three Models of Language"; and in computer science, by our own paper on the Logic Theory Machine. (Newell & Simon, 1972, p. 4)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Cognitive Science
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43 false
fo:ls1) (not true; not correct: He made a false statement to the police.) falso2) (not genuine; intended to deceive: She has a false passport.) falso3) (artificial: false teeth.) postizo4) (not loyal: false friends.) falso, desleal•- falsify
- falsification
- falsity
- false alarm
- false start
false adj1. falsospiders are insects, true or false? las arañas son insectos, ¿verdadero o falso?2. postizowhere are my false teeth? ¿dónde está mi dentadura postiza?tr[fɔːls]1 (untrue) falso,-a2 (artificial) postizo,-a\SMALLIDIOMATIC EXPRESSION/SMALLto play somebody false traicionar a alguien, engañar a alguienunder false pretences por medio de engañosfalse alarm falsa alarmafalse bottom doble fondofalse friend SMALLLINGUISTICS/SMALL falso amigofalse move / false step paso en falsofalse start salida nulafalse teeth dentadura postiza1) untrue: falso2) erroneous: erróneo, equivocado3) fake: falso, postizo4) unfaithful: infiel5) fraudulent: fraudulentounder false pretenses: por fraudeadj.• desleal adj.• engañoso, -a adj.• erróneo, -a adj.• falso, -a adj.• fingido, -a adj.• postizo, -a adj.• seudo, -a adj.• zaino, -a adj.fɔːls1)a) ( untrue) <statement/rumor> falsotrue or false? — ¿verdadero o falso?, ¿verdad o mentira?
c) ( misplaced) <modesty/pride> falso2) ( not genuine) <eyelashes/fingernails> postizo; <name/passport> falso3) ( disloyal) (arch or liter) <friend/spouse> infiel[fɔːls]1. ADJ1) (=untruthful) [statement, accusation] falso; (=mistaken) [idea, assumption, accusation] equivocadolull, true 1., 1)•
a false sense of security — una falsa sensación de seguridad2) (=deceitful)•
under false pretences — con engaños, con insidias•
to bear false witness — (esp Bible) levantar falso testimonio3) (=inappropriate, insincere)•
his words rang false — sus palabras sonaban a falso4) (=artificial) [hair, eyelashes] postizo5) † (=disloyal) [friend] desleal, pérfido; (=unfaithful) [lover] infiel2.CPDfalse alarm N — falsa alarma f
false arrest N — detención f ilegal
false ceiling N — cielo m raso, falso techo m
false dawn N — (fig) espejismo m
false friend N — (Ling) falso amigo m
false imprisonment N — (by police) detención f ilegal; (by criminal) retención f ilegal
false memory syndrome N — síndrome m de (la) falsa memoria
false negative N — (=result) falso negativo m
false positive N — (=result) falso positivo m
false start N — (Sport) salida f nula; (fig) comienzo m fallido
false teeth NPL — dentadura fsing postiza, dientes mpl postizos
false tooth N — diente m postizo
* * *[fɔːls]1)a) ( untrue) <statement/rumor> falsotrue or false? — ¿verdadero o falso?, ¿verdad o mentira?
c) ( misplaced) <modesty/pride> falso2) ( not genuine) <eyelashes/fingernails> postizo; <name/passport> falso3) ( disloyal) (arch or liter) <friend/spouse> infiel -
44 false
adjectivefalsch; Fehl[deutung, -urteil]; Falsch[meldung. -eid, -aussage]; treulos [Geliebte[r]]; gefälscht [Urkunde, Dokument]; künstlich [Wimpern, Auge]; geheuchelt [Bescheidenheit]* * *[fo:ls]3) (artificial: false teeth.) künstlich4) (not loyal: false friends.) falsch•- academic.ru/26342/falsehood">falsehood- falsify
- falsification
- falsity
- false alarm
- false start* * *I. adjis that true or \false? stimmt das oder nicht?her whole theory is based on a \false premise ihre ganze Theorie geht von falschen Voraussetzungen ausa \false alarm ein falscher Alarma \false dawn [of hope] eine trügerische Hoffnung\false friend LING falscher Freundto raise \false hopes falsche Hoffnungen weckento give sb a \false impression jdm einen falschen Eindruck vermitteln\false imprisonment LAW unrechtmäßige Verhaftunga \false move [or step] eine unbedachte Bewegungone \false move and I'll shoot! eine falsche Bewegung und ich schieße!\false pregnancy MED, PSYCH Scheinschwangerschaft fa \false rib ANAT eine falsche Rippeto turn out [or prove] to be \false sich akk als falsch erweisena \false bottom ein doppelter Boden (in einem Behälter)thou shalt not bear \false witness REL du sollst kein falsches Zeugnis geben\false accounting LAW, FIN Unterschlagung f\false claim [or information] falsche Angaben plto give \false evidence in court vor Gericht falsch aussagento give \false information falsche Angaben machenunder \false pretences unter Vorspiegelung falscher Tatsachen\false optimism trügerischer Optimismus; (intending to deceive)a \false front ( fig) eine Fassadethey put up a \false front of friendly concern sie gaben vor, sehr besorgt zu seinto be in a \false position in der Bredouille sein famto put sb in a \false position jdn in die Bredouille bringen famhe turned out to be a \false friend er war mir ein schöner Freund hum iron▪ to be \false to sb/sth jdm/etw untreu werdenyou have been \false to your principles du hast deine Prinzipien verratento play sb \false jdn betrügen* * *[fɔːls]1. adj (+er)1) (= wrong) falschthat's a false economy — das ist am falschen Ort gespart
false imprisonment/arrest — willkürliche Inhaftierung/Festnahme
or pretenses (US) —
false god/prophet — falscher Gott/Prophet
to bear false witness (old) ( ), — Bibl, old ), eine falsche Aussage machen
false bottom (of suitcase) — doppelter Boden
3) (pej: insincere) laughter, enthusiasm gekünsteltto ring false — nicht echt klingen
4) (= disloyal) friend, lover, wife, husband, servant treulos2. advto play sb false — mit jdm ein falsches Spiel treiben
* * *false [fɔːls]A adj (adv falsely) falsch:a) unwahr:false name Falschname m;false oath, false swearing JUR Falsch-, Meineid mb) unrichtig, fehlerhaft, irrigc) unaufrichtig, hinterhältig:be false to sb falsch gegen jemanden oder gegenüber jemandem seind) irreführend, vorgetäuscht:give a false impression einen falschen Eindruck vermitteln, ein falsches Bild gebene) gefälscht, unecht:false coin Falschgeld n;false acacia falsche Akazie, Robinie f;false fruit Scheinfrucht fg) ARCH, TECH Schein…, zusätzlich, verstärkend:false bottom doppelter Boden;false door blinde Türh) unbegründet:false modesty (shame) falsche Bescheidenheit (Scham)i) JUR widerrechtlich:false accusation falsche Anschuldigung;false claim unberechtigter Anspruch;false imprisonment Freiheitsberaubung f* * *adjectivefalsch; Fehl[deutung, -urteil]; Falsch[meldung. -eid, -aussage]; treulos [Geliebte[r]]; gefälscht [Urkunde, Dokument]; künstlich [Wimpern, Auge]; geheuchelt [Bescheidenheit]* * *adj.falsch adj.unaufrichtig adj.unrichtig adj.unwahr adj. -
45 false
[fo:ls]1) (not true; not correct: He made a false statement to the police.) falso2) (not genuine; intended to deceive: She has a false passport.) falso3) (artificial: false teeth.) artificial/postiço4) (not loyal: false friends.) falso•- falsify
- falsification
- falsity
- false alarm
- false start* * *[fɔ:ls] adj falso: 1 não verdadeiro, contrário à verdade. 2 desleal, infiel. 3 errado, inexato, incorreto. 4 artificial, postiço. • adv falso, falsamente, erroneamente, desafinadamente. to sail under false colors navegar sob bandeira falsa. fig fingir. -
46 false
[fɔːls]1) (mistaken, proved wrong) [idea, information, move, step] falso; [ belief] erroneo2) (fraudulent) [banknotes, passport] falso; dir. [evidence, witness] falso3) (artificial) [beard, nose] fintofalse bottom — (in bag) doppiofondo
4) (disloyal) [ person] falso* * *[fo:ls]1) (not true; not correct: He made a false statement to the police.) falso2) (not genuine; intended to deceive: She has a false passport.) falso3) (artificial: false teeth.) artificiale, finto4) (not loyal: false friends.) falso•- falsify
- falsification
- falsity
- false alarm
- false start* * *[fɔːls]1) (mistaken, proved wrong) [idea, information, move, step] falso; [ belief] erroneo2) (fraudulent) [banknotes, passport] falso; dir. [evidence, witness] falso3) (artificial) [beard, nose] fintofalse bottom — (in bag) doppiofondo
4) (disloyal) [ person] falso -
47 Philosophy
And what I believe to be more important here is that I find in myself an infinity of ideas of certain things which cannot be assumed to be pure nothingness, even though they may have perhaps no existence outside of my thought. These things are not figments of my imagination, even though it is within my power to think of them or not to think of them; on the contrary, they have their own true and immutable natures. Thus, for example, when I imagine a triangle, even though there may perhaps be no such figure anywhere in the world outside of my thought, nor ever have been, nevertheless the figure cannot help having a certain determinate nature... or essence, which is immutable and eternal, which I have not invented and which does not in any way depend upon my mind. (Descartes, 1951, p. 61)Let us console ourselves for not knowing the possible connections between a spider and the rings of Saturn, and continue to examine what is within our reach. (Voltaire, 1961, p. 144)As modern physics started with the Newtonian revolution, so modern philosophy starts with what one might call the Cartesian Catastrophe. The catastrophe consisted in the splitting up of the world into the realms of matter and mind, and the identification of "mind" with conscious thinking. The result of this identification was the shallow rationalism of l'esprit Cartesien, and an impoverishment of psychology which it took three centuries to remedy even in part. (Koestler, 1964, p. 148)It has been made of late a reproach against natural philosophy that it has struck out on a path of its own, and has separated itself more and more widely from the other sciences which are united by common philological and historical studies. The opposition has, in fact, been long apparent, and seems to me to have grown up mainly under the influence of the Hegelian philosophy, or, at any rate, to have been brought out into more distinct relief by that philosophy.... The sole object of Kant's "Critical Philosophy" was to test the sources and the authority of our knowledge, and to fix a definite scope and standard for the researches of philosophy, as compared with other sciences.... [But Hegel's] "Philosophy of Identity" was bolder. It started with the hypothesis that not only spiritual phenomena, but even the actual world-nature, that is, and man-were the result of an act of thought on the part of a creative mind, similar, it was supposed, in kind to the human mind.... The philosophers accused the scientific men of narrowness; the scientific men retorted that the philosophers were crazy. And so it came about that men of science began to lay some stress on the banishment of all philosophic influences from their work; while some of them, including men of the greatest acuteness, went so far as to condemn philosophy altogether, not merely as useless, but as mischievous dreaming. Thus, it must be confessed, not only were the illegitimate pretensions of the Hegelian system to subordinate to itself all other studies rejected, but no regard was paid to the rightful claims of philosophy, that is, the criticism of the sources of cognition, and the definition of the functions of the intellect. (Helmholz, quoted in Dampier, 1966, pp. 291-292)Philosophy remains true to its classical tradition by renouncing it. (Habermas, 1972, p. 317)I have not attempted... to put forward any grand view of the nature of philosophy; nor do I have any such grand view to put forth if I would. It will be obvious that I do not agree with those who see philosophy as the history of "howlers" and progress in philosophy as the debunking of howlers. It will also be obvious that I do not agree with those who see philosophy as the enterprise of putting forward a priori truths about the world.... I see philosophy as a field which has certain central questions, for example, the relation between thought and reality.... It seems obvious that in dealing with these questions philosophers have formulated rival research programs, that they have put forward general hypotheses, and that philosophers within each major research program have modified their hypotheses by trial and error, even if they sometimes refuse to admit that that is what they are doing. To that extent philosophy is a "science." To argue about whether philosophy is a science in any more serious sense seems to me to be hardly a useful occupation.... It does not seem to me important to decide whether science is philosophy or philosophy is science as long as one has a conception of both that makes both essential to a responsible view of the world and of man's place in it. (Putnam, 1975, p. xvii)What can philosophy contribute to solving the problem of the relation [of] mind to body? Twenty years ago, many English-speaking philosophers would have answered: "Nothing beyond an analysis of the various mental concepts." If we seek knowledge of things, they thought, it is to science that we must turn. Philosophy can only cast light upon our concepts of those things.This retreat from things to concepts was not undertaken lightly. Ever since the seventeenth century, the great intellectual fact of our culture has been the incredible expansion of knowledge both in the natural and in the rational sciences (mathematics, logic).The success of science created a crisis in philosophy. What was there for philosophy to do? Hume had already perceived the problem in some degree, and so surely did Kant, but it was not until the twentieth century, with the Vienna Circle and with Wittgenstein, that the difficulty began to weigh heavily. Wittgenstein took the view that philosophy could do no more than strive to undo the intellectual knots it itself had tied, so achieving intellectual release, and even a certain illumination, but no knowledge. A little later, and more optimistically, Ryle saw a positive, if reduced role, for philosophy in mapping the "logical geography" of our concepts: how they stood to each other and how they were to be analyzed....Since that time, however, philosophers in the "analytic" tradition have swung back from Wittgensteinian and even Rylean pessimism to a more traditional conception of the proper role and tasks of philosophy. Many analytic philosophers now would accept the view that the central task of philosophy is to give an account, or at least play a part in giving an account, of the most general nature of things and of man. (Armstrong, 1990, pp. 37-38)8) Philosophy's Evolving Engagement with Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive ScienceIn the beginning, the nature of philosophy's engagement with artificial intelligence and cognitive science was clear enough. The new sciences of the mind were to provide the long-awaited vindication of the most potent dreams of naturalism and materialism. Mind would at last be located firmly within the natural order. We would see in detail how the most perplexing features of the mental realm could be supported by the operations of solely physical laws upon solely physical stuff. Mental causation (the power of, e.g., a belief to cause an action) would emerge as just another species of physical causation. Reasoning would be understood as a kind of automated theorem proving. And the key to both was to be the depiction of the brain as the implementation of multiple higher level programs whose task was to manipulate and transform symbols or representations: inner items with one foot in the physical (they were realized as brain states) and one in the mental (they were bearers of contents, and their physical gymnastics were cleverly designed to respect semantic relationships such as truth preservation). (A. Clark, 1996, p. 1)Socrates of Athens famously declared that "the unexamined life is not worth living," and his motto aptly explains the impulse to philosophize. Taking nothing for granted, philosophy probes and questions the fundamental presuppositions of every area of human inquiry.... [P]art of the job of the philosopher is to keep at a certain critical distance from current doctrines, whether in the sciences or the arts, and to examine instead how the various elements in our world-view clash, or fit together. Some philosophers have tried to incorporate the results of these inquiries into a grand synoptic view of the nature of reality and our human relationship to it. Others have mistrusted system-building, and seen their primary role as one of clarifications, or the removal of obstacles along the road to truth. But all have shared the Socratic vision of using the human intellect to challenge comfortable preconceptions, insisting that every aspect of human theory and practice be subjected to continuing critical scrutiny....Philosophy is, of course, part of a continuing tradition, and there is much to be gained from seeing how that tradition originated and developed. But the principal object of studying the materials in this book is not to pay homage to past genius, but to enrich one's understanding of central problems that are as pressing today as they have always been-problems about knowledge, truth and reality, the nature of the mind, the basis of right action, and the best way to live. These questions help to mark out the territory of philosophy as an academic discipline, but in a wider sense they define the human predicament itself; they will surely continue to be with us for as long as humanity endures. (Cottingham, 1996, pp. xxi-xxii)10) The Distinction between Dionysian Man and Apollonian Man, between Art and Creativity and Reason and Self- ControlIn his study of ancient Greek culture, The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche drew what would become a famous distinction, between the Dionysian spirit, the untamed spirit of art and creativity, and the Apollonian, that of reason and self-control. The story of Greek civilization, and all civilizations, Nietzsche implied, was the gradual victory of Apollonian man, with his desire for control over nature and himself, over Dionysian man, who survives only in myth, poetry, music, and drama. Socrates and Plato had attacked the illusions of art as unreal, and had overturned the delicate cultural balance by valuing only man's critical, rational, and controlling consciousness while denigrating his vital life instincts as irrational and base. The result of this division is "Alexandrian man," the civilized and accomplished Greek citizen of the later ancient world, who is "equipped with the greatest forces of knowledge" but in whom the wellsprings of creativity have dried up. (Herman, 1997, pp. 95-96)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Philosophy
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48 free
I 1. [friː]1) (unhindered, unrestricted) [person, country, election, press, translation, access, choice] liberoto leave sb. free to do — lasciare qcn. libero di fare
"may I use your phone?" - "feel free" — "posso usare il telefono?" - "certamente"
to break free of o from liberarsi da [influence, restriction]; to set sb. free to do — lasciare a qcn. la libertà di fare
2) (not captive or tied) [person, limb] libero; [ animal] libero, in libertàto pull [sth.] free — liberare [ shoe]
to break free — [person, animal] liberarsi
3) (devoid)to be free from o of sb. essersi liberato di qcn.; free from o of weeds libero dalle erbacce; free from o of pollution non inquinato; he's not entirely free from o of blame non è del tutto innocente; a day free from o of interruptions una giornata senza interruzioni; this soup is free from o of artificial colourings questa zuppa non contiene coloranti artificiali; free of o from tax econ. non soggetto a imposta; free of o from interest — econ. senza interessi
4) (costing nothing) gratuito"admission free" — "ingresso gratuito"
free gift — comm. omaggio
you can't expect a free ride — fig. ogni cosa ha il suo prezzo
he's had a free ride — fig. non ha faticato molto per arrivare
5) (not occupied) libero"please leave o keep this parking space free for disabled drivers" — "posto riservato ai disabili"
6) (generous, lavish)7) (familiar) disinvolto, sfacciato, impudenteto make free with sb. — prendersi delle libertà con qcn
8) chim. [ atom] libero9) ling. [vowel, stress] libero10) - free in compostisugar-, additive -free — senza zucchero, additivi
2.interest -free — econ. senza interessi
nome (anche free period) scol. ora f. libera, ora f. buca••II [friː]to have a free hand — avere mano libera (in per; in doing per fare)
1) (at liberty) liberamenteto go free — [ hostage] essere liberato; [ criminal] circolare liberamente
2) (without payment) gratuitamente, gratisbuy two, get one free — (offerta) tre per due
III 1. [friː]for free — gratuitamente, gratis
1) (set at liberty) [run, roam] liberareto free sb. from — liberare qcn. da [prison, oppression, anxiety, burden, suffering]; esentare qcn. da [blame, responsibility]
2) (make available) sbloccare, rendere disponibile [ capital]; liberare [person, hands]2.to free oneself from — liberarsi da [chains, wreckage, influence, burden]; liberarsi di [ anxiety]; sottrarsi a [blame, responsibility]
* * *[fri:] 1. adjective1) (allowed to move where one wants; not shut in, tied, fastened etc: The prison door opened, and he was a free man.) libero2) (not forced or persuaded to act, think, speak etc in a particular way: free speech; You are free to think what you like.) libero3) ((with with) generous: He is always free with his money/advice.) generoso4) (frank, open and ready to speak: a free manner.) sciolto5) (costing nothing: a free gift.) gratuito, gratis6) (not working or having another appointment; not busy: I shall be free at five o'clock.) libero7) (not occupied, not in use: Is this table free?) libero8) ((with of or from) without or no longer having (especially something or someone unpleasant etc): She is free from pain now; free of charge.) esente2. verb1) (to make or set (someone) free: He freed all the prisoners.) liberare2) ((with from or of) to rid or relieve (someone) of something: She was able to free herself from her debts by working at an additional job.) liberarsi di, sbarazzarsi di•- freedom- freely
- free-for-all
- freehand
- freehold
- freelance 3. verb(to work in this way: He is freelancing now.) lavorare come freelance/libero professionista- Freepost- free skating
- free speech
- free trade
- freeway
- freewheel
- free will
- a free hand
- set free* * *I 1. [friː]1) (unhindered, unrestricted) [person, country, election, press, translation, access, choice] liberoto leave sb. free to do — lasciare qcn. libero di fare
"may I use your phone?" - "feel free" — "posso usare il telefono?" - "certamente"
to break free of o from liberarsi da [influence, restriction]; to set sb. free to do — lasciare a qcn. la libertà di fare
2) (not captive or tied) [person, limb] libero; [ animal] libero, in libertàto pull [sth.] free — liberare [ shoe]
to break free — [person, animal] liberarsi
3) (devoid)to be free from o of sb. essersi liberato di qcn.; free from o of weeds libero dalle erbacce; free from o of pollution non inquinato; he's not entirely free from o of blame non è del tutto innocente; a day free from o of interruptions una giornata senza interruzioni; this soup is free from o of artificial colourings questa zuppa non contiene coloranti artificiali; free of o from tax econ. non soggetto a imposta; free of o from interest — econ. senza interessi
4) (costing nothing) gratuito"admission free" — "ingresso gratuito"
free gift — comm. omaggio
you can't expect a free ride — fig. ogni cosa ha il suo prezzo
he's had a free ride — fig. non ha faticato molto per arrivare
5) (not occupied) libero"please leave o keep this parking space free for disabled drivers" — "posto riservato ai disabili"
6) (generous, lavish)7) (familiar) disinvolto, sfacciato, impudenteto make free with sb. — prendersi delle libertà con qcn
8) chim. [ atom] libero9) ling. [vowel, stress] libero10) - free in compostisugar-, additive -free — senza zucchero, additivi
2.interest -free — econ. senza interessi
nome (anche free period) scol. ora f. libera, ora f. buca••II [friː]to have a free hand — avere mano libera (in per; in doing per fare)
1) (at liberty) liberamenteto go free — [ hostage] essere liberato; [ criminal] circolare liberamente
2) (without payment) gratuitamente, gratisbuy two, get one free — (offerta) tre per due
III 1. [friː]for free — gratuitamente, gratis
1) (set at liberty) [run, roam] liberareto free sb. from — liberare qcn. da [prison, oppression, anxiety, burden, suffering]; esentare qcn. da [blame, responsibility]
2) (make available) sbloccare, rendere disponibile [ capital]; liberare [person, hands]2.to free oneself from — liberarsi da [chains, wreckage, influence, burden]; liberarsi di [ anxiety]; sottrarsi a [blame, responsibility]
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49 man-made
adjective (made, happening or formed by man, not by natural means: a man-made lake.) artificialtr[mæn'meɪd]1 (lake etc) artificial2 (fabric etc) sintético,-aman-made ['mæn'meɪd] adj: artificialman-made fabrics: telas sintéticasadj.• artificial adj.'mæn'meɪd['mæn'meɪd]ADJ [material] sintético, artificial; [lake, island, environment] artificial; [gas, chemical] producido por el hombreman-made fibres — fibras fpl sintéticas
* * *['mæn'meɪd] -
50 Cross, Charles Frederick
[br]b. 11 December 1855 Brentwood, Middlesex, Englandd. 15 April 1935 Hove, England[br]English chemist who contributed to the development of viscose rayon from cellulose.[br]Cross was educated at the universities of London, Zurich and Manchester. It was at Owens College, Manchester, that Cross first met E.J. Bevan and where these two first worked together on the nature of cellulose. After gaining some industrial experience, Cross joined Bevan to set up a partnership in London as analytical and consulting chemists, specializing in the chemistry and technology of cellulose and lignin. They were at the Jodrell laboratory, Kew Gardens, for a time and then set up their own laboratory at Station Avenue, Kew Gardens. In 1888, the first edition of their joint publication A Textbook of Paper-making, appeared. It went into several editions and became the standard reference and textbook on the subject. The long introductory chapter is a discourse on cellulose.In 1892, Cross, Bevan and Clayton Beadle took out their historic patent on the solution and regeneration of cellulose. The modern artificial-fibre industry stems from this patent. They made their discovery at New Court, Carey Street, London: wood-pulp (or another cheap form of cellulose) was dissolved in a mixture of carbon disulphide and aqueous alkali to produce sodium xanthate. After maturing, it was squirted through fine holes into dilute acid, which set the liquid to give spinnable fibres of "viscose". However, it was many years before the process became a commercial operation, partly because the use of a natural raw material such as wood involved variations in chemical content and each batch might react differently. At first it was thought that viscose might be suitable for incandescent lamp filaments, and C.H.Stearn, a collaborator with Cross, continued to investigate this possibility, but the sheen on the fibres suggested that viscose might be made into artificial silk. The original Viscose Spinning Syndicate was formed in 1894 and a place was rented at Erith in Kent. However, it was not until some skeins of artificial silk (a term to which Cross himself objected) were displayed in Paris that textile manufacturers began to take an interest in it. It was then that Courtaulds decided to investigate this new fibre, although it was not until 1904 that they bought the English patents and developed the first artificial silk that was later called "rayon". Cross was also concerned with the development of viscose films and of cellulose acetate, which became a rival to rayon in the form of "Celanese". He retained his interest in the paper industry and in publishing, in 1895 again collaborating with Bevan and publishing a book on Cellulose and other technical articles. He was a cultured man and a good musician. He was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society in 1917.[br]Principal Honours and DistinctionsFRS 1917.Bibliography1888, with E.J.Bevan, A Text-book of Papermaking. 1892, British patent no. 8,700 (cellulose).Further ReadingObituary Notices of the Royal Society, 1935, London. Obituary, 1935, Journal of the Chemical Society 1,337. Chambers Concise Dictionary of Scientists, 1989, Cambridge.Edwin J.Beer, 1962–3, "The birth of viscose rayon", Transactions of the Newcomen Society 35 (an account of the problems of developing viscose rayon; Beer worked under Cross in the Kew laboratories).C.Singer (ed.), 1978, A History of Technology, Vol. VI, Oxford: Clarendon Press.RLHBiographical history of technology > Cross, Charles Frederick
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51 person
ˈpə:sn сущ.
1) а) человек;
личность, особа;
субъект not a single person ≈ ни единой живой души, никого missing person ≈ лицо, пропавшее без вести real person ≈ фактическое лицо б) человеческое существо, человек разумный (в отличие от животных) He does not have a right to be called a person. ≈ У нет права называться человеком.
2) внешность, облик a man of exquisite person ≈ человек выдающейся внешности Syn: appearance
3) а) действующее лицо;
персонаж б) важная особа, примечательная личность ∙ Syn: personage
4) грам. лицо the first person ≈ первое лицо the second person ≈ второе лицо the third person ≈ третье лицо
5) юр. юридическое лицо (тж. juridical person)
6) зоол. особь человек;
личность;
особа;
субъект - who is that *? кто этот человек? - a very important * важная персона /личность/ - I noticed that two or three *s were there я заметил, что там было два-три человека - he was a pleasant * он был приятным человеком - a pale thin * of a man худой, бледный человек - in one's (own) * лично, собственной персоной - not a single * никого, ни души - without exception of *s невзирая на лица - a * does not like to be treated like that никто не любит, чтобы с ним так обращались - what is a * to do? что человеку делать? - displaced * перемещенное лицо - offences against the * (юридическое) преступления против личности - the said *s упомянутые лица - some * or *s unknown неизвестное лицо или лица внешность;
облик - a young woman of an agreeable * молодая женщина приятной наружности - he has a fine * он хорош собой - to have a commanding * иметь внушительный вид - he was attracted not by her * but by her mind его привлекла в ней не внешность, а ум действующее лицо, персонаж - in the * of в роли - she was wonderful in the * of Ophelia она была великолепна в роли Офелии (юридическое) физическое лицо (тж. natural *) ;
юридическое лицо (тж. legal *, artificial *) - public juridical *s публичные юридические лица - composite international *s сложные международные лица - * of law субъект права - stateless * лицо без гражданства (грамматика) лицо - the second * plural второе лицо множественного числа (зоология) самостоятельная особь, самостоятельный зооид( в колонии) (религия) лицо (божества) ;
ипостась accompanying ~ сопровождающее лицо (например, сопровождает инвалида, нуждающегося в постоянной помощи) accused ~ обвиняемый approved ~ утвержденное лицо artificial ~ юридическое лицо assisted ~ лицо, получающее консультацию адвоката authorized ~ лицо, наделенное правами authorized ~ уполномоченное лицо competent ~ компетентное лицо convicted ~ лицо, признанное виновным convicted ~ осужденный disabled ~ инвалид disabled ~ недееспособное лицо disabled ~ нетрудоспособное лицо disabled ~ нетрудоспособный emergency telephone for an old or disabled ~ телефон службы скорой помощи для пожилых людей и инвалидов employed ~ лицо, работающее по найму fictitious ~ фиктивное лицо field service ~ лицо, обслуживающее изделие на месте продажи handicapped ~ рын.тр. лицо с умственными недостатками handicapped ~ лицо с физическими недостатками person внешность, облик;
he has a fine person он красив ~ человек;
личность, особа;
субъект;
in (one's own) person лично, собственной персоной;
not a single person ни единой живой души, никого incapacitated ~ лицо с ограниченной дееспособностью incapacitated ~ лицо с ограниченной правоспособностью incapacitated ~ нетрудоспособный, потерявший трудоспособность insured ~ застрахованный juridical ~ юридическое лицо juristic ~ юридическое лицо key ~ лицо, занимающее ведущий пост, играющее важнейшую роль( в политике, промышленности) law ~ юридическое лицо law-defying ~ нарушитель закона law-defying ~ правонарушитель lay ~ непрофессионал layout ~ верстальщик legal ~ юридическое лицо mentally disordered ~ лицо с психическими отклонениями missing ~ лицо, пропавшее без вести natural ~ физическое лицо ~ человек;
личность, особа;
субъект;
in (one's own) person лично, собственной персоной;
not a single person ни единой живой души, никого offence against ~ преступление против личности partially disabled ~ частично нетрудоспособное лицо person внешность, облик;
he has a fine person он красив ~ действующее лицо;
персонаж ~ лицо ~ грам. лицо ~ личность ~ зоол. особь ~ субъект ~ физическое лицо ~ человек;
личность, особа;
субъект;
in (one's own) person лично, собственной персоной;
not a single person ни единой живой души, никого ~ человек ~ юридическое лицо ~ for whose honour bill is paid or accepted лицо, для которого оплачен или акцептован вексель ~ in arrears должник ~ in charge ответственное лицо ~ in full-time employment работник, занятый полный рабочий день ~ in question лицо, о котором идет речь question!: the person (the matter) in ~ лицо (вопрос), о котором идет речь;
to put the question ставить на голосование ~ in receipt of benefits лицо, получающее социальное пособие ~ of good repute человек с хорошей репутацией ~ of independent means материально независимый человек physical ~ физическое лицо physically handicapped ~ человек с физическими недостатками previously convicted ~ лицо, имеющее судимость private ~ частное лицо prudent ~ благоразумный человек qualified ~ квалифицированный работник retired ~ пенсионер salaried ~ работник на твердом окладе self-employed ~ лицо, работающее не по найму self-employed ~ лицо, обслуживающее собственное предприятие self-employed ~ лицо, занимающееся собственным бизнесом seriously disabled ~ человек с серьезным физическим дефектом service ~ вчт. техник stateless ~ лицо без гражданства suspicious-looking ~ человек, вызывающий подозрение taxable ~ лицо, облагаемое налогом thrifty ~ бережливый человек unauthorized ~ лицо, не обладающее полномочиями undesirable ~ нежелательное лицо well-to-do ~ состоятельный человек young ~ молодой человек young ~ юноша -
52 false
[fo:ls]1) (not true; not correct: He made a false statement to the police.) falsk; ukorrekt2) (not genuine; intended to deceive: She has a false passport.) falsk3) (artificial: false teeth.) kunstig; forloren4) (not loyal: false friends.) falsk•- falsify
- falsification
- falsity
- false alarm
- false start* * *[fo:ls]1) (not true; not correct: He made a false statement to the police.) falsk; ukorrekt2) (not genuine; intended to deceive: She has a false passport.) falsk3) (artificial: false teeth.) kunstig; forloren4) (not loyal: false friends.) falsk•- falsify
- falsification
- falsity
- false alarm
- false start -
53 Ransome, Frederick
[br]b. 18 June 1818 Rushmere, Suffolk, Englandd. 19 April 1893 London, England[br]English engineer and inventor of a type of artificial stone.[br]Frederick Ransome was the son of James Ransome (1782–1849) and grandson of Robert Ransome, founder of the well-known Ipswich firm of engineers. He did not become a partner in the family firm, but devoted his life to experiments to develop an artificial stone. These experiments were recorded in a paper which he presented to the Institution of Civil Engineers in 1848 and in a long series of over thirty patents dating from 1844. The material so formed was a sandstone, the particles of which were bonded together by a silicate of lime. It could be moulded into any required form while in its initial soft state, and when hard was suitable for surface-dressing or carving. It was used for many public buildings, but time proved it unsuitable for outside work. Ransome also used his artificial stone to make grinding wheels by incorporating emery powder in the mixture. These were found to be much superior to those made of natural stone. Another use of the artificial stone was in a porous form which could be used as a filter. In later years Ransome turned his attention to the manufacture of Portland cement and of a cheaper substitute incorporating blast-furnace slag. He also invented a rotary kiln for burning the cement, the first of these being built in 1887. It was 26 ft (7.9 m) long and 5 ft (1.5 m) in diameter; although reasonably successful, the development of such kilns of much greater length was carried out in America rather than England. Ransome was elected an Associate of the Institution of Civil Engineers in 1848 and served as an Associate of[br]Bibliography1848, "On the manufacture of artificial stone with a silica base", Minutes of the Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers 7:57.RTS -
54 false
[fo:ls]1) (not true; not correct: He made a false statement to the police.) fals2) (not genuine; intended to deceive: She has a false passport.) fals3) (artificial: false teeth.) fals, artificial4) (not loyal: false friends.) fals, ipocrit•- falsify
- falsification
- falsity
- false alarm
- false start -
55 leg
leɡ1) (one of the limbs by which animals and man walk: The horse injured a front leg; She stood on one leg.) pierna2) (the part of an article of clothing that covers one of these limbs closely: He has torn the leg of his trousers.) pernera3) (a long, narrow support of a table etc: One of the legs of the chair was broken.) pata4) (one stage in a journey, competition etc: the last leg of the trip; the second leg of the contest.) etapa•- - legged- pull someone's leg
leg n1. pierna2. patatr[leg]1 SMALLANATOMY/SMALL pierna (of animal) pata3 (of furniture) pata, pie nombre masculino4 (of trousers) pernera5 (stage) etapa\SMALLIDIOMATIC EXPRESSION/SMALLnot to have a leg to stand on no tener en qué basarseto be on one's last legs estar en las últimasto give somebody a leg up familiar ayudar a alguien a subir (aguantándole un pie)to pull somebody's leg familiar tomarle el pelo a alguiento show a leg familiar levantarse de la camaleg ['lɛg] n1) : pierna f (de una persona, de carne, de ropa), pata f (de un animal, de muebles)2) stage: etapa f (de un viaje), vuelta f (de una carrera)n.• pata s.f.• pernil s.m.• pierna s.f.• recorrido s.m.
I leghe/she can talk the hind legs off a donkey! — (colloq) habla como una cotorra or (hasta) por los codos (fam)
not to have a leg to stand on — (colloq) llevar todas las de perder
to be on one's/its last legs — (colloq) estar* en las últimas (fam)
to pull somebody's leg — (colloq) tomarle el pelo a alguien (fam)
to stretch one's legs — estirar las piernas; (before n) < muscle> de la pierna; < injury> en la pierna
2)a) ( Culin) (of lamb, pork) pierna f, pernil m; ( of chicken) pata f, muslo mb) ( Clothing) pierna f; ( measurement) entrepierna fc) (of chair, table) pata f3) (stage - of competition, race) manga f, vuelta f; (- of journey) etapa f
II
[leɡ]to leg it — (colloq) ( go on foot) ir* a pata (fam); ( run) ir* corriendo
1. N1) [of person] pierna f; [of animal, bird, insect] pata f; [of furniture] (=one of set) pata f; (=central support) pie m; [of trousers] pernera f; [of stocking] caña fartificial leg — pierna f ortopédica or artificial
wooden leg — pierna f de madera, pata f de palo *
to give sb a leg up — (Brit) * (lit) aupar a algn; (fig) dar un empujoncito a algn *, echar un cable a algn *
- get one's or a leg over- have legs- be on its/one's last legsevery, gasp 1., laugh 1., 1), post I, 1., 2), supper, resort 1., 1), straw 1., 1), word 1., 1)- pull sb's leg- shake a legarm I break 2., 1), hind I inside 5., last I, 1., 3) stretch 2., 3)2) (Culin) [of lamb, mutton, pork] pierna f; [of chicken, turkey] muslo m, pata ffrogs' legs — ancas fpl de rana
3) (=stage) [of journey] tramo m, etapa f; [of race] etapa f, manga f; [of championship] vuelta f2.VT*to leg it — (=go on foot) ir a pata *; (=run) echarse una carrera *; (=run away) salir por piernas or patas *
3.CPDleg iron N — (Med) aparato m ortopédico
leg irons NPL — (for prisoner) grilletes mpl
leg muscles NPL — músculos mpl de las piernas
* * *
I [leg]he/she can talk the hind legs off a donkey! — (colloq) habla como una cotorra or (hasta) por los codos (fam)
not to have a leg to stand on — (colloq) llevar todas las de perder
to be on one's/its last legs — (colloq) estar* en las últimas (fam)
to pull somebody's leg — (colloq) tomarle el pelo a alguien (fam)
to stretch one's legs — estirar las piernas; (before n) < muscle> de la pierna; < injury> en la pierna
2)a) ( Culin) (of lamb, pork) pierna f, pernil m; ( of chicken) pata f, muslo mb) ( Clothing) pierna f; ( measurement) entrepierna fc) (of chair, table) pata f3) (stage - of competition, race) manga f, vuelta f; (- of journey) etapa f
II
to leg it — (colloq) ( go on foot) ir* a pata (fam); ( run) ir* corriendo
-
56 leg
1. noun1) Bein, dasupper/lower leg — Ober-/Unterschenkel, der
artificial leg — Beinprothese, die
wooden leg — Holzbein, das
give somebody a leg up on to a horse/over the gate — jemandem auf ein Pferd/über das Gatter helfen
be on one's last legs — sich kaum noch auf den Beinen halten können; (be about to die) mit einem Fuß od. Bein im Grabe stehen
the car is on its last legs — das Auto macht es nicht mehr lange (ugs.)
pull somebody's leg — (fig.) jemanden auf den Arm nehmen (ugs.)
not have a leg to stand on — (fig.) nichts in der Hand haben (fig.)
stretch one's legs — sich (Dat.) die Beine vertreten
get one's leg over — (sl.) einen wegstecken (ugs.)
2) (of table, chair, etc.) Bein, das3)4) (Gastr.) Keule, die2. transitive verb,leg of lamb/veal — Lamm-/Kalbskeule, die
- gg-leg it — (coll.) die Beine in die Hand od. unter die Arme nehmen (ugs.)
* * *[leɡ]1) (one of the limbs by which animals and man walk: The horse injured a front leg; She stood on one leg.) das Bein2) (the part of an article of clothing that covers one of these limbs closely: He has torn the leg of his trousers.) das Bein3) (a long, narrow support of a table etc: One of the legs of the chair was broken.) das Bein4) (one stage in a journey, competition etc: the last leg of the trip; the second leg of the contest.) die Etappe•- academic.ru/83843/-legged">-legged- pull someone's leg* * *[leg]I. nshe ran home as fast as her \legs would carry her sie rannte nach Hause so schnell sie ihre Füße trugen\leg brace Beinschiene fto break a/one's \leg sich dat ein/das Bein brechento show [a lot of] \leg [viel] Bein zeigenchair/table \leg Stuhl-/Tischbein ntthe last \leg of the race die letzte Teilstrecke des Rennensthe first/second \leg of sth der erste/zweite Abschnitt einer S. gento have \legs (remain popular) langfristig halten; (succeed) klappen fam; play, series ein Dauerbrenner sein8.▶ break a \leg! Hals- und Beinbruch!▶ to get up on one's hind \legs (rise) sich akk erheben; (defend oneself) sich akk auf die Hinterbeine stellen fam▶ to give sb a \leg up ( fam: help to climb) jdm hinaufhelfen; ( fig: help sb) jdm unter die Arme greifen fam▶ to have one's tail between one's \legs den Schwanz eingezogen habenI need a new car, my old one is on its last \legs ich brauch' ein neues Auto, mein altes macht's nicht mehr lange famII. vt<- gg->we are late, we really need to \leg it wir sind spät dran, wir müssen uns wirklich beeilen* * *I [leg]1. n1) (also of trousers) Bein ntthe new-born calf seemed to be all legs — das neugeborene Kalb schien nur aus Beinen zu bestehen
this carpet is on its last legs — dieser Teppich hält or machts (inf) nicht mehr lange
to walk one's legs off — sich (dat) die Füße wund laufen
you've walked my legs off — du bist mir zu schnell gelaufen
he ran the other athletes' legs off — er rannte den anderen Läufern davon
I'll take the children to the park and run their legs off —
to be out leg before wicket (Cricket) — aus sein, weil sein vor dem Mal stehendes Bein von einem Wurf getroffen wurde
to get one's leg over ( Brit inf ) — bumsen (inf)
leg of lamb — Lammkeule f
4) (= stage) Etappe f2. vtII [ledZ]n (sl)you're a true leg — du bist ein Held (inf)
* * *leg [leɡ]a) laufen, zu Fuß gehen,b) rennen,c) die Beine in die Hand oder unter den Arm nehmenB s1. Bein n2. Unterschenkel m3. (Hammel- etc) Keule f:4. a) (Hosen-, Strumpf) Bein n5. a) (Stuhl-, Tisch- etc) Bein nb) Stütze f, Strebe f, Stützpfosten mc) Schenkel m (eines Zirkels)6. MATH Kathete f, Schenkel m (eines Dreiecks)7. Etappe f, Abschnitt m (einer Reise etc), auch FLUG, SPORT (Teil)Strecke f8. SCHIFF Schlag m (Strecke, die ein kreuzendes Schiff zurücklegt, ohne zu wenden)9. SPORTa) Durchgang m, Lauf mb) Runde f:10. HIST Kratzfuß m:she is never off her legs sie kommt nie zur Ruhe;be on one’s legs again wieder auf den Beinen sein (nach einer Krankheit);be on one’s last legs umg auf dem letzten Loch pfeifen;my car is on its last legs umg mein Wagen macht nicht mehr lange;find one’s legsb) fig sich freischwimmen; lernen, selbstständig zu handeln,c) fig sich eingewöhnen;get (up) on one’s legs (aufstehen und) sich zu Wort melden;get sb back on their legs fig jemandem wieder auf die Beine helfen;a) jemandem (hin)aufhelfen,b) fig jemandem unter die Arme greifen;give sb a leg up into the saddle jemandem in den Sattel helfen;a) keinerlei Beweise haben,b) sich nicht herausreden können;shake a leg umga) das Tanzbein schwingen,b) Dampf oder Tempo machen;show a leg umg aufstehen, aus dem Bett steigen;stretch one’s legs sich die Beine vertreten;take to one’s legs die Beine in die Hand oder unter den Arm nehmen umg; → break1 B 1, hind2, walk off B 2* * *1. noun1) Bein, dasupper/lower leg — Ober-/Unterschenkel, der
artificial leg — Beinprothese, die
wooden leg — Holzbein, das
give somebody a leg up on to a horse/over the gate — jemandem auf ein Pferd/über das Gatter helfen
be on one's last legs — sich kaum noch auf den Beinen halten können; (be about to die) mit einem Fuß od. Bein im Grabe stehen
pull somebody's leg — (fig.) jemanden auf den Arm nehmen (ugs.)
not have a leg to stand on — (fig.) nichts in der Hand haben (fig.)
stretch one's legs — sich (Dat.) die Beine vertreten
get one's leg over — (sl.) einen wegstecken (ugs.)
2) (of table, chair, etc.) Bein, das3)4) (Gastr.) Keule, die2. transitive verb,leg of lamb/veal — Lamm-/Kalbskeule, die
- gg-leg it — (coll.) die Beine in die Hand od. unter die Arme nehmen (ugs.)
* * *n.Bein -e n.Programmzweig m. -
57 Coade, Eleanor
SUBJECT AREA: Architecture and building[br]b. 24 June 1733 Exeter, Devon, Englandd. 18 November 1821 Camberwell, London, England[br]English proprietor of the Coade Factory, making artificial stone.[br]Born Elinor Coade, she never married but adopted, as was customary in business in the eighteenth century, the courtesy title of Mrs. Following the bankruptcy and death of her father, George Coade, in Exeter, Eleanor and her mother (also called Eleanor) moved to London and founded the works at Lambeth, South London, in 1769 that later became famous as the Coade factory. The factory was located at King's Arms Stairs, Narrow Wall. During the eighteenth century, several attempts had been made in other businesses to manufacture a durable, malleable artificial stone that would be acceptable to architects for decorative use. These substances were not very successful, but Coade stone was different. Although stories are legion about the secret formula supposedly used in this artificial stone, modern methods have established the exact formula.Coade stone was a stoneware ceramic material fired in a kiln. The body was remarkable in that it shrank only 8 per cent in drying and firing: this was achieved by using a combination of china clay, sand, crushed glass and grog (i.e. crushed and ground, previously fired stoneware). The Coade formula thus included a considerable proportion of material that, having been fired once already, was unshrinkable. Mrs Coade's name for the firm, Coade's Lithodipyra Terra-Cotta or Artificial Stone Manufactory (where "Lithodipyra" is a term derived from three Greek words meaning "stone", "twice" and "fire"), made reference to the custom of including such material (such as in Josiah Wedgwood's basalt and jasper ware). The especially low rate of shrinkage rendered the material ideal for making extra-life-size statuary, and large architectural, decorative features to be incorporated into stone buildings.Coade stone was widely used for such purposes by leading architects in Britain and Ireland from the 1770s until the 1830s, including Robert Adam, Sir Charles Barry, Sir William Chambers, Sir John Soane, John Nash and James Wyatt. Some architects introduced the material abroad, as far as, for example, Charles Bulfinch's United States Bank in Boston, Massachusetts, and Charles Cameron's redecoration for the Empress Catherine of the great palace Tsarkoe Selo (now Pushkin), near St Petersburg. The material so resembles stone that it is often mistaken for it, but it is so hard and resistant to weather that it retains sharpness of detail much longer than the natural substance. The many famous British buildings where Coade stone was used include the Royal Hospital, Chelsea, Carlton House and the Sir John Soane Museum (all of which are located in London), St George's Chapel at Windsor, Alnwick Castle in Northumberland, and Culzean Castle in Ayrshire, Scotland.Apart from the qualities of the material, the Coade firm established a high reputation for the equally fine quality of its classical statuary. Mrs Coade employed excellent craftsmen such as the sculptor John Bacon (1740–99), whose work was mass-produced by the use of moulds. One famous example which was widely reproduced was the female caryatid from the south porch of the Erechtheion on the acropolis of Athens. A drawing of this had appeared in the second edition of Stuart and Revett's Antiquities of Athens in 1789, and many copies were made from the original Coade model; Soane used them more than once, for example on the Bank of England and his own houses in London.Eleanor Coade was a remarkable woman, and was important and influential on the neo-classical scene. She had close and amicable relations with leading architects of the day, notably Robert Adam and James Wyatt. The Coade factory was enlarged and altered over the years, but the site was finally cleared during 1949–50 in preparation for the establishment of the 1951 Festival of Britain.[br]Further ReadingA.Kelly, 1990, Mrs Coade's Stone, pub. in conjunction with the Georgian Group (an interesting, carefully written history; includes a detailed appendix on architects who used Coade stone and buildings where surviving work may be seen).DY -
58 Language
Philosophy is written in that great book, the universe, which is always open, right before our eyes. But one cannot understand this book without first learning to understand the language and to know the characters in which it is written. It is written in the language of mathematics, and the characters are triangles, circles, and other figures. Without these, one cannot understand a single word of it, and just wanders in a dark labyrinth. (Galileo, 1990, p. 232)It never happens that it [a nonhuman animal] arranges its speech in various ways in order to reply appropriately to everything that may be said in its presence, as even the lowest type of man can do. (Descartes, 1970a, p. 116)It is a very remarkable fact that there are none so depraved and stupid, without even excepting idiots, that they cannot arrange different words together, forming of them a statement by which they make known their thoughts; while, on the other hand, there is no other animal, however perfect and fortunately circumstanced it may be, which can do the same. (Descartes, 1967, p. 116)Human beings do not live in the object world alone, nor alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression for their society. It is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially without the use of language and that language is merely an incidental means of solving specific problems of communication or reflection. The fact of the matter is that the "real world" is to a large extent unconsciously built on the language habits of the group.... We see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do because the language habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation. (Sapir, 1921, p. 75)It powerfully conditions all our thinking about social problems and processes.... No two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the same social reality. The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same worlds with different labels attached. (Sapir, 1985, p. 162)[A list of language games, not meant to be exhaustive:]Giving orders, and obeying them- Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements- Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)Reporting an eventSpeculating about an eventForming and testing a hypothesisPresenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagramsMaking up a story; and reading itPlay actingSinging catchesGuessing riddlesMaking a joke; and telling itSolving a problem in practical arithmeticTranslating from one language into anotherLANGUAGE Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, and praying-. (Wittgenstein, 1953, Pt. I, No. 23, pp. 11 e-12 e)We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages.... The world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds-and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds.... No individual is free to describe nature with absolute impartiality but is constrained to certain modes of interpretation even while he thinks himself most free. (Whorf, 1956, pp. 153, 213-214)We dissect nature along the lines laid down by our native languages.The categories and types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do not find there because they stare every observer in the face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds-and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds.... We are thus introduced to a new principle of relativity, which holds that all observers are not led by the same physical evidence to the same picture of the universe, unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar or can in some way be calibrated. (Whorf, 1956, pp. 213-214)9) The Forms of a Person's Thoughts Are Controlled by Unperceived Patterns of His Own LanguageThe forms of a person's thoughts are controlled by inexorable laws of pattern of which he is unconscious. These patterns are the unperceived intricate systematizations of his own language-shown readily enough by a candid comparison and contrast with other languages, especially those of a different linguistic family. (Whorf, 1956, p. 252)It has come to be commonly held that many utterances which look like statements are either not intended at all, or only intended in part, to record or impart straightforward information about the facts.... Many traditional philosophical perplexities have arisen through a mistake-the mistake of taking as straightforward statements of fact utterances which are either (in interesting non-grammatical ways) nonsensical or else intended as something quite different. (Austin, 1962, pp. 2-3)In general, one might define a complex of semantic components connected by logical constants as a concept. The dictionary of a language is then a system of concepts in which a phonological form and certain syntactic and morphological characteristics are assigned to each concept. This system of concepts is structured by several types of relations. It is supplemented, furthermore, by redundancy or implicational rules..., representing general properties of the whole system of concepts.... At least a relevant part of these general rules is not bound to particular languages, but represents presumably universal structures of natural languages. They are not learned, but are rather a part of the human ability to acquire an arbitrary natural language. (Bierwisch, 1970, pp. 171-172)In studying the evolution of mind, we cannot guess to what extent there are physically possible alternatives to, say, transformational generative grammar, for an organism meeting certain other physical conditions characteristic of humans. Conceivably, there are none-or very few-in which case talk about evolution of the language capacity is beside the point. (Chomsky, 1972, p. 98)[It is] truth value rather than syntactic well-formedness that chiefly governs explicit verbal reinforcement by parents-which renders mildly paradoxical the fact that the usual product of such a training schedule is an adult whose speech is highly grammatical but not notably truthful. (R. O. Brown, 1973, p. 330)he conceptual base is responsible for formally representing the concepts underlying an utterance.... A given word in a language may or may not have one or more concepts underlying it.... On the sentential level, the utterances of a given language are encoded within a syntactic structure of that language. The basic construction of the sentential level is the sentence.The next highest level... is the conceptual level. We call the basic construction of this level the conceptualization. A conceptualization consists of concepts and certain relations among those concepts. We can consider that both levels exist at the same point in time and that for any unit on one level, some corresponding realizate exists on the other level. This realizate may be null or extremely complex.... Conceptualizations may relate to other conceptualizations by nesting or other specified relationships. (Schank, 1973, pp. 191-192)The mathematics of multi-dimensional interactive spaces and lattices, the projection of "computer behavior" on to possible models of cerebral functions, the theoretical and mechanical investigation of artificial intelligence, are producing a stream of sophisticated, often suggestive ideas.But it is, I believe, fair to say that nothing put forward until now in either theoretic design or mechanical mimicry comes even remotely in reach of the most rudimentary linguistic realities. (Steiner, 1975, p. 284)The step from the simple tool to the master tool, a tool to make tools (what we would now call a machine tool), seems to me indeed to parallel the final step to human language, which I call reconstitution. It expresses in a practical and social context the same understanding of hierarchy, and shows the same analysis by function as a basis for synthesis. (Bronowski, 1977, pp. 127-128)t is the language donn eґ in which we conduct our lives.... We have no other. And the danger is that formal linguistic models, in their loosely argued analogy with the axiomatic structure of the mathematical sciences, may block perception.... It is quite conceivable that, in language, continuous induction from simple, elemental units to more complex, realistic forms is not justified. The extent and formal "undecidability" of context-and every linguistic particle above the level of the phoneme is context-bound-may make it impossible, except in the most abstract, meta-linguistic sense, to pass from "pro-verbs," "kernals," or "deep deep structures" to actual speech. (Steiner, 1975, pp. 111-113)A higher-level formal language is an abstract machine. (Weizenbaum, 1976, p. 113)Jakobson sees metaphor and metonymy as the characteristic modes of binarily opposed polarities which between them underpin the two-fold process of selection and combination by which linguistic signs are formed.... Thus messages are constructed, as Saussure said, by a combination of a "horizontal" movement, which combines words together, and a "vertical" movement, which selects the particular words from the available inventory or "inner storehouse" of the language. The combinative (or syntagmatic) process manifests itself in contiguity (one word being placed next to another) and its mode is metonymic. The selective (or associative) process manifests itself in similarity (one word or concept being "like" another) and its mode is metaphoric. The "opposition" of metaphor and metonymy therefore may be said to represent in effect the essence of the total opposition between the synchronic mode of language (its immediate, coexistent, "vertical" relationships) and its diachronic mode (its sequential, successive, lineal progressive relationships). (Hawkes, 1977, pp. 77-78)It is striking that the layered structure that man has given to language constantly reappears in his analyses of nature. (Bronowski, 1977, p. 121)First, [an ideal intertheoretic reduction] provides us with a set of rules"correspondence rules" or "bridge laws," as the standard vernacular has it-which effect a mapping of the terms of the old theory (T o) onto a subset of the expressions of the new or reducing theory (T n). These rules guide the application of those selected expressions of T n in the following way: we are free to make singular applications of their correspondencerule doppelgangers in T o....Second, and equally important, a successful reduction ideally has the outcome that, under the term mapping effected by the correspondence rules, the central principles of T o (those of semantic and systematic importance) are mapped onto general sentences of T n that are theorems of Tn. (P. Churchland, 1979, p. 81)If non-linguistic factors must be included in grammar: beliefs, attitudes, etc. [this would] amount to a rejection of the initial idealization of language as an object of study. A priori such a move cannot be ruled out, but it must be empirically motivated. If it proves to be correct, I would conclude that language is a chaos that is not worth studying.... Note that the question is not whether beliefs or attitudes, and so on, play a role in linguistic behavior and linguistic judgments... [but rather] whether distinct cognitive structures can be identified, which interact in the real use of language and linguistic judgments, the grammatical system being one of these. (Chomsky, 1979, pp. 140, 152-153)23) Language Is Inevitably Influenced by Specific Contexts of Human InteractionLanguage cannot be studied in isolation from the investigation of "rationality." It cannot afford to neglect our everyday assumptions concerning the total behavior of a reasonable person.... An integrational linguistics must recognize that human beings inhabit a communicational space which is not neatly compartmentalized into language and nonlanguage.... It renounces in advance the possibility of setting up systems of forms and meanings which will "account for" a central core of linguistic behavior irrespective of the situation and communicational purposes involved. (Harris, 1981, p. 165)By innate [linguistic knowledge], Chomsky simply means "genetically programmed." He does not literally think that children are born with language in their heads ready to be spoken. He merely claims that a "blueprint is there, which is brought into use when the child reaches a certain point in her general development. With the help of this blueprint, she analyzes the language she hears around her more readily than she would if she were totally unprepared for the strange gabbling sounds which emerge from human mouths. (Aitchison, 1987, p. 31)Looking at ourselves from the computer viewpoint, we cannot avoid seeing that natural language is our most important "programming language." This means that a vast portion of our knowledge and activity is, for us, best communicated and understood in our natural language.... One could say that natural language was our first great original artifact and, since, as we increasingly realize, languages are machines, so natural language, with our brains to run it, was our primal invention of the universal computer. One could say this except for the sneaking suspicion that language isn't something we invented but something we became, not something we constructed but something in which we created, and recreated, ourselves. (Leiber, 1991, p. 8)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Language
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59 inactive
[ɪn'æktɪv]1) Общая лексика: бездействующий, бездеятельный, инертный, недействующий, неэффективный (о лекарстве), вялый2) Медицина: пассивный3) Военный термин: не находящийся в строю, несформированный, обезвреженный, состоящий в запасе, состоящий в резерве4) Техника: неподвижный5) Химия: выведенный из строя, неактивный, недеятельный6) Математика: безактиваторный7) Бухгалтерия: вялый (о конъюнктуре), несамодеятельный (о населении)8) Нефть: бездействующий (о скважине), ненагруженный (о резерве)9) Космонавтика: (satellite)("inactive" means that the satellite is not transmitting according to the Table of Artificial Earth Satellites) недействующий, (satellite)("inactive" means that the satellite is not transmitting according to the Table of Artificial Earth Satellites) пассивный (спутник)10) SAP. неактивно11) Автоматика: неработающий12) Макаров: выключенный, неисправный, бездействующий (о приборе) -
60 dry
1. adjective1) (having little, or no, moisture, sap, rain etc: The ground is very dry; The leaves are dry and withered; I need to find dry socks for the children.) seco2) (uninteresting and not lively: a very dry book.) aburrido3) ((of humour or manner) quiet, restrained: a dry wit.) agudo, mordaz4) ((of wine) not sweet.) seco
2. verb(to (cause to) become dry: I prefer drying dishes to washing them; The clothes dried quickly in the sun.) secar- dried- drier
- dryer
- drily
- dryly
- dryness
- dry-clean
- dry land
- dry off
- dry up
dry1 adj secois the washing dry? ¿está seca la ropa?dry2 vb secartr[draɪ]2 (cow) sin leche, que no da leche3 (dull, uninteresting) aburrido,-a, árido,-a4 (amusing, ironic) agudo,-a, mordaz, cáustico,-a1 (gen) secar1 (become dry) secarse ( off, -)1 (Also to dry up) (dry the dishes) secar (los platos)\SMALLIDIOMATIC EXPRESSION/SMALLthere wasn't a dry eye in the house no hubo quien no lloraraas dry as a bone completamente seco,-aas dry as dust muy árido,-ato be dry / feel dry (thirsty) tener la garganta seca, tener sedto dry one's eyes enjugarse las lágrimasto dry oneself (off) secarseto run dry (river, well) secarseto wipe something dry secar algodry dock dique nombre masculino secodry goods SMALLBRITISH ENGLISH/SMALL comestibles nombre masculino plural no perecederos 2 SMALLAMERICAN ENGLISH/SMALL artículos nombre masculino plural de merceríadry ice hielo secodry land tierra firmedry rot putrefacción nombre femenino de la maderadry run simulacro: secardry vi: secarse1) : seco2) thirsty: sediento3) : donde la venta de bebidas alcohólicas está prohibidaa dry county: un condado seco4) dull: aburrido, árido5) : seco (dícese del vino), brut (dícese de la champaña)adj.• enjuto, -a adj.• seco, -a adj.• sediento, -a adj.• árido, -a adj.n.• sequedal s.m.v.• acecinar v.• desecar v.• enjugar v.• enjutar v.• quemar v.• quemarse v.• secar v.draɪ
I
adjective drier, driest1)a) ( not wet) <ground/washing> secob) ( lacking natural moisture) <leaves/skin/hair> seco; < cough> secothere wasn't a dry eye in the house — (set phrase) no hubo quien no llorara
c) ( dried-up) <well/river> secoto run dry — \<\<river/well\>\> secarse*
d) (not rainy, not humid) <climate/weather/heat> secoe) ( using no fluid) < cell> seco2) ( prohibiting sale of alcohol) <state/county> seco, donde está prohibida la venta de bebidas alcohólicas4)a) ( ironic) <humor/wit> mordaz, cáusticob) ( lacking warmth) <laugh/style> seco5) (dull, boring) <lecture/book> árido
II
1.
dries, drying, dried transitive verba) \<\<clothes/crockery\>\> secar*to dry oneself — secarse*
to dry one's eyes/tears — secarse* or (liter) enjugarse* las lágrimas
b) ( preserve) \<\<fish/fruit/meat\>\> secar*
2.
vi \<\<washing/dishes/paint\>\> secarse*Phrasal Verbs:- dry off- dry out- dry up[draɪ]1. ADJ(compar drier) (superl driest)1) (=not moist) [clothes, paint, leaves, weather] seco; [climate] árido, secoher throat/mouth was dry, she had a dry throat/mouth — tenía la garganta/boca seca
her eyes were dry — (=without tears) no había lágrimas en sus ojos
for dry skin/hair — para piel seca/pelo seco
•
to get dry — secarse•
to wipe sth dry — secar algo (con un trapo)2) * (=thirsty)to be or feel dry — tener sed, estar seco *
3) * (=prohibiting alcohol) [country, state] secodue to a storm, the island was dry for a week — a causa de una tormenta, durante una semana no hubo ni una gota de alcohol en la isla
4) (=wry) [humour, wit] mordaz; [laugh] sardónicohe has a very dry sense of humour — tiene un sentido del humor muy mordaz or cargado de ironía
5) (=harsh)6) (=uninteresting) [lecture, subject, book] árido; [voice] seco7) (=not sweet) [wine, sherry, cider] seco; [champagne] brut, seco8) (=not producing milk)2.Nthe dry — (Brit) lo seco
such cars grip the road well, even in the dry — estos coches se agarran bien al firme, incluso en seco
3.VT secarto dry one's hands/eyes — secarse las manos/las lágrimas
to dry o.s. — secarse
4. VI1) (=become dry) secarsewould you rather wash or dry? — ¿prefieres lavar o secar?
2) (esp Brit) (Theat) quedarse en blanco5.CPDdry cleaner's N — tintorería f, tinte m (Sp)
dry cleaning N — limpieza f en seco
dry fly N — (Fishing) mosca f seca
dry ginger N — ginebra f seca
dry goods store N — (US) mercería f
dry measure N — medida f para áridos
dry rot N — putrefacción seca de la madera causada por un hongo
dry run N — (fig) ensayo m
dry shampoo N — champú m seco
dry shave N —
dry ski slope N — pista f artificial de esquí
dry stone wall N — muro m seco
- dry off- dry out- dry up* * *[draɪ]
I
adjective drier, driest1)a) ( not wet) <ground/washing> secob) ( lacking natural moisture) <leaves/skin/hair> seco; < cough> secothere wasn't a dry eye in the house — (set phrase) no hubo quien no llorara
c) ( dried-up) <well/river> secoto run dry — \<\<river/well\>\> secarse*
d) (not rainy, not humid) <climate/weather/heat> secoe) ( using no fluid) < cell> seco2) ( prohibiting sale of alcohol) <state/county> seco, donde está prohibida la venta de bebidas alcohólicas4)a) ( ironic) <humor/wit> mordaz, cáusticob) ( lacking warmth) <laugh/style> seco5) (dull, boring) <lecture/book> árido
II
1.
dries, drying, dried transitive verba) \<\<clothes/crockery\>\> secar*to dry oneself — secarse*
to dry one's eyes/tears — secarse* or (liter) enjugarse* las lágrimas
b) ( preserve) \<\<fish/fruit/meat\>\> secar*
2.
vi \<\<washing/dishes/paint\>\> secarse*Phrasal Verbs:- dry off- dry out- dry up
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