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21 expert system
Gen Mgta computer program that emulates the reasoning and decision making of a human expert in a particular field. The main components of an expert system are the knowledge base, which consists of facts and rules about appropriate courses of action based on the knowledge and experience of human experts; the inference engine, which simulates the inductive reasoning of a human expert; and the user interface, which enables users to interact with the system. Expert systems may be used by nonexperts to solve well-defined problems when human expertise is unavailable or expensive, or by experts seeking to find solutions to complex questions. They are used for a wide variety of tasks including medical diagnostics and financial decision making, and are an application of artificial intelligence. -
22 case-based reasoning
= CBRдоказательная аргументация, система рассуждений на основе прецедентов (аналогичных случаев)методология ИИ, применяемая при построении экспертных систем, базирующихся на накопленном опыте. В отличие от экспертных систем, действующих на основе логических правил, CBR-системы хранят успешные решения ряда реальных проблем, называемые case( примерами, или прецедентами), и при появлении новой проблемы находят (по определённому алгоритму, зачастую при помощи машины логического вывода, с количественной оценкой) наиболее подходящие (похожие) прецеденты, после чего предлагает соответственно модифицированную комбинацию их решений. Если новая проблема оказывается таким образом успешно решённой, это решение заносится (вводится) в базу прецедентов для повышения эффективности системы в будущем. Недостаток CBR-систем в том, что они не создают моделей или правил, обобщающих накопленный опытАнгло-русский толковый словарь терминов и сокращений по ВТ, Интернету и программированию. > case-based reasoning
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23 formal system of reasoning
Лингвистика: формальная система рассужденийУниверсальный англо-русский словарь > formal system of reasoning
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24 разумная система
Большой англо-русский и русско-английский словарь > разумная система
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25 knowledge
знания, сведения, представление знаний
– knowledge accumulation
– knowledge acquisition
– knowledge base
– knowledge compilation
– knowledge domain
– knowledge elicitation
– knowledge engineer
– knowledge engineering
– knowledge frame
– knowledge information
– knowledge language
– knowledge management
– knowledge refinement
– knowledge representation/reasoning system
– knowledge schema
– knowledge synthesis
– knowledge system
– knowledge-based
– knowledge-based processing
– knowledge-based robot
– knowledge-based system
– knowledge-bearing construct
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26 inference engine
механизм (метод) [логического] вывода, машина логического выводав ИИ - часть экспертной системы, которая соотносит информацию от пользователя с известными фактами и правилами вывода (inference rule), хранящимися в базе знаний, и вырабатывает результат, на котором затем основывается решение, предлагаемое экспертной системой. Обычно активируется оболочкой ЭСАнгло-русский толковый словарь терминов и сокращений по ВТ, Интернету и программированию. > inference engine
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27 Artificial Intelligence
In my opinion, none of [these programs] does even remote justice to the complexity of human mental processes. Unlike men, "artificially intelligent" programs tend to be single minded, undistractable, and unemotional. (Neisser, 1967, p. 9)Future progress in [artificial intelligence] will depend on the development of both practical and theoretical knowledge.... As regards theoretical knowledge, some have sought a unified theory of artificial intelligence. My view is that artificial intelligence is (or soon will be) an engineering discipline since its primary goal is to build things. (Nilsson, 1971, pp. vii-viii)Most workers in AI [artificial intelligence] research and in related fields confess to a pronounced feeling of disappointment in what has been achieved in the last 25 years. Workers entered the field around 1950, and even around 1960, with high hopes that are very far from being realized in 1972. In no part of the field have the discoveries made so far produced the major impact that was then promised.... In the meantime, claims and predictions regarding the potential results of AI research had been publicized which went even farther than the expectations of the majority of workers in the field, whose embarrassments have been added to by the lamentable failure of such inflated predictions....When able and respected scientists write in letters to the present author that AI, the major goal of computing science, represents "another step in the general process of evolution"; that possibilities in the 1980s include an all-purpose intelligence on a human-scale knowledge base; that awe-inspiring possibilities suggest themselves based on machine intelligence exceeding human intelligence by the year 2000 [one has the right to be skeptical]. (Lighthill, 1972, p. 17)4) Just as Astronomy Succeeded Astrology, the Discovery of Intellectual Processes in Machines Should Lead to a Science, EventuallyJust as astronomy succeeded astrology, following Kepler's discovery of planetary regularities, the discoveries of these many principles in empirical explorations on intellectual processes in machines should lead to a science, eventually. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)5) Problems in Machine Intelligence Arise Because Things Obvious to Any Person Are Not Represented in the ProgramMany problems arise in experiments on machine intelligence because things obvious to any person are not represented in any program. One can pull with a string, but one cannot push with one.... Simple facts like these caused serious problems when Charniak attempted to extend Bobrow's "Student" program to more realistic applications, and they have not been faced up to until now. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 77)What do we mean by [a symbolic] "description"? We do not mean to suggest that our descriptions must be made of strings of ordinary language words (although they might be). The simplest kind of description is a structure in which some features of a situation are represented by single ("primitive") symbols, and relations between those features are represented by other symbols-or by other features of the way the description is put together. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)[AI is] the use of computer programs and programming techniques to cast light on the principles of intelligence in general and human thought in particular. (Boden, 1977, p. 5)The word you look for and hardly ever see in the early AI literature is the word knowledge. They didn't believe you have to know anything, you could always rework it all.... In fact 1967 is the turning point in my mind when there was enough feeling that the old ideas of general principles had to go.... I came up with an argument for what I called the primacy of expertise, and at the time I called the other guys the generalists. (Moses, quoted in McCorduck, 1979, pp. 228-229)9) Artificial Intelligence Is Psychology in a Particularly Pure and Abstract FormThe basic idea of cognitive science is that intelligent beings are semantic engines-in other words, automatic formal systems with interpretations under which they consistently make sense. We can now see why this includes psychology and artificial intelligence on a more or less equal footing: people and intelligent computers (if and when there are any) turn out to be merely different manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon. Moreover, with universal hardware, any semantic engine can in principle be formally imitated by a computer if only the right program can be found. And that will guarantee semantic imitation as well, since (given the appropriate formal behavior) the semantics is "taking care of itself" anyway. Thus we also see why, from this perspective, artificial intelligence can be regarded as psychology in a particularly pure and abstract form. The same fundamental structures are under investigation, but in AI, all the relevant parameters are under direct experimental control (in the programming), without any messy physiology or ethics to get in the way. (Haugeland, 1981b, p. 31)There are many different kinds of reasoning one might imagine:Formal reasoning involves the syntactic manipulation of data structures to deduce new ones following prespecified rules of inference. Mathematical logic is the archetypical formal representation. Procedural reasoning uses simulation to answer questions and solve problems. When we use a program to answer What is the sum of 3 and 4? it uses, or "runs," a procedural model of arithmetic. Reasoning by analogy seems to be a very natural mode of thought for humans but, so far, difficult to accomplish in AI programs. The idea is that when you ask the question Can robins fly? the system might reason that "robins are like sparrows, and I know that sparrows can fly, so robins probably can fly."Generalization and abstraction are also natural reasoning process for humans that are difficult to pin down well enough to implement in a program. If one knows that Robins have wings, that Sparrows have wings, and that Blue jays have wings, eventually one will believe that All birds have wings. This capability may be at the core of most human learning, but it has not yet become a useful technique in AI.... Meta- level reasoning is demonstrated by the way one answers the question What is Paul Newman's telephone number? You might reason that "if I knew Paul Newman's number, I would know that I knew it, because it is a notable fact." This involves using "knowledge about what you know," in particular, about the extent of your knowledge and about the importance of certain facts. Recent research in psychology and AI indicates that meta-level reasoning may play a central role in human cognitive processing. (Barr & Feigenbaum, 1981, pp. 146-147)Suffice it to say that programs already exist that can do things-or, at the very least, appear to be beginning to do things-which ill-informed critics have asserted a priori to be impossible. Examples include: perceiving in a holistic as opposed to an atomistic way; using language creatively; translating sensibly from one language to another by way of a language-neutral semantic representation; planning acts in a broad and sketchy fashion, the details being decided only in execution; distinguishing between different species of emotional reaction according to the psychological context of the subject. (Boden, 1981, p. 33)Can the synthesis of Man and Machine ever be stable, or will the purely organic component become such a hindrance that it has to be discarded? If this eventually happens-and I have... good reasons for thinking that it must-we have nothing to regret and certainly nothing to fear. (Clarke, 1984, p. 243)The thesis of GOFAI... is not that the processes underlying intelligence can be described symbolically... but that they are symbolic. (Haugeland, 1985, p. 113)14) Artificial Intelligence Provides a Useful Approach to Psychological and Psychiatric Theory FormationIt is all very well formulating psychological and psychiatric theories verbally but, when using natural language (even technical jargon), it is difficult to recognise when a theory is complete; oversights are all too easily made, gaps too readily left. This is a point which is generally recognised to be true and it is for precisely this reason that the behavioural sciences attempt to follow the natural sciences in using "classical" mathematics as a more rigorous descriptive language. However, it is an unfortunate fact that, with a few notable exceptions, there has been a marked lack of success in this application. It is my belief that a different approach-a different mathematics-is needed, and that AI provides just this approach. (Hand, quoted in Hand, 1985, pp. 6-7)We might distinguish among four kinds of AI.Research of this kind involves building and programming computers to perform tasks which, to paraphrase Marvin Minsky, would require intelligence if they were done by us. Researchers in nonpsychological AI make no claims whatsoever about the psychological realism of their programs or the devices they build, that is, about whether or not computers perform tasks as humans do.Research here is guided by the view that the computer is a useful tool in the study of mind. In particular, we can write computer programs or build devices that simulate alleged psychological processes in humans and then test our predictions about how the alleged processes work. We can weave these programs and devices together with other programs and devices that simulate different alleged mental processes and thereby test the degree to which the AI system as a whole simulates human mentality. According to weak psychological AI, working with computer models is a way of refining and testing hypotheses about processes that are allegedly realized in human minds.... According to this view, our minds are computers and therefore can be duplicated by other computers. Sherry Turkle writes that the "real ambition is of mythic proportions, making a general purpose intelligence, a mind." (Turkle, 1984, p. 240) The authors of a major text announce that "the ultimate goal of AI research is to build a person or, more humbly, an animal." (Charniak & McDermott, 1985, p. 7)Research in this field, like strong psychological AI, takes seriously the functionalist view that mentality can be realized in many different types of physical devices. Suprapsychological AI, however, accuses strong psychological AI of being chauvinisticof being only interested in human intelligence! Suprapsychological AI claims to be interested in all the conceivable ways intelligence can be realized. (Flanagan, 1991, pp. 241-242)16) Determination of Relevance of Rules in Particular ContextsEven if the [rules] were stored in a context-free form the computer still couldn't use them. To do that the computer requires rules enabling it to draw on just those [ rules] which are relevant in each particular context. Determination of relevance will have to be based on further facts and rules, but the question will again arise as to which facts and rules are relevant for making each particular determination. One could always invoke further facts and rules to answer this question, but of course these must be only the relevant ones. And so it goes. It seems that AI workers will never be able to get started here unless they can settle the problem of relevance beforehand by cataloguing types of context and listing just those facts which are relevant in each. (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p. 80)Perhaps the single most important idea to artificial intelligence is that there is no fundamental difference between form and content, that meaning can be captured in a set of symbols such as a semantic net. (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)Artificial intelligence is based on the assumption that the mind can be described as some kind of formal system manipulating symbols that stand for things in the world. Thus it doesn't matter what the brain is made of, or what it uses for tokens in the great game of thinking. Using an equivalent set of tokens and rules, we can do thinking with a digital computer, just as we can play chess using cups, salt and pepper shakers, knives, forks, and spoons. Using the right software, one system (the mind) can be mapped into the other (the computer). (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)19) A Statement of the Primary and Secondary Purposes of Artificial IntelligenceThe primary goal of Artificial Intelligence is to make machines smarter.The secondary goals of Artificial Intelligence are to understand what intelligence is (the Nobel laureate purpose) and to make machines more useful (the entrepreneurial purpose). (Winston, 1987, p. 1)The theoretical ideas of older branches of engineering are captured in the language of mathematics. We contend that mathematical logic provides the basis for theory in AI. Although many computer scientists already count logic as fundamental to computer science in general, we put forward an even stronger form of the logic-is-important argument....AI deals mainly with the problem of representing and using declarative (as opposed to procedural) knowledge. Declarative knowledge is the kind that is expressed as sentences, and AI needs a language in which to state these sentences. Because the languages in which this knowledge usually is originally captured (natural languages such as English) are not suitable for computer representations, some other language with the appropriate properties must be used. It turns out, we think, that the appropriate properties include at least those that have been uppermost in the minds of logicians in their development of logical languages such as the predicate calculus. Thus, we think that any language for expressing knowledge in AI systems must be at least as expressive as the first-order predicate calculus. (Genesereth & Nilsson, 1987, p. viii)21) Perceptual Structures Can Be Represented as Lists of Elementary PropositionsIn artificial intelligence studies, perceptual structures are represented as assemblages of description lists, the elementary components of which are propositions asserting that certain relations hold among elements. (Chase & Simon, 1988, p. 490)Artificial intelligence (AI) is sometimes defined as the study of how to build and/or program computers to enable them to do the sorts of things that minds can do. Some of these things are commonly regarded as requiring intelligence: offering a medical diagnosis and/or prescription, giving legal or scientific advice, proving theorems in logic or mathematics. Others are not, because they can be done by all normal adults irrespective of educational background (and sometimes by non-human animals too), and typically involve no conscious control: seeing things in sunlight and shadows, finding a path through cluttered terrain, fitting pegs into holes, speaking one's own native tongue, and using one's common sense. Because it covers AI research dealing with both these classes of mental capacity, this definition is preferable to one describing AI as making computers do "things that would require intelligence if done by people." However, it presupposes that computers could do what minds can do, that they might really diagnose, advise, infer, and understand. One could avoid this problematic assumption (and also side-step questions about whether computers do things in the same way as we do) by defining AI instead as "the development of computers whose observable performance has features which in humans we would attribute to mental processes." This bland characterization would be acceptable to some AI workers, especially amongst those focusing on the production of technological tools for commercial purposes. But many others would favour a more controversial definition, seeing AI as the science of intelligence in general-or, more accurately, as the intellectual core of cognitive science. As such, its goal is to provide a systematic theory that can explain (and perhaps enable us to replicate) both the general categories of intentionality and the diverse psychological capacities grounded in them. (Boden, 1990b, pp. 1-2)Because the ability to store data somewhat corresponds to what we call memory in human beings, and because the ability to follow logical procedures somewhat corresponds to what we call reasoning in human beings, many members of the cult have concluded that what computers do somewhat corresponds to what we call thinking. It is no great difficulty to persuade the general public of that conclusion since computers process data very fast in small spaces well below the level of visibility; they do not look like other machines when they are at work. They seem to be running along as smoothly and silently as the brain does when it remembers and reasons and thinks. On the other hand, those who design and build computers know exactly how the machines are working down in the hidden depths of their semiconductors. Computers can be taken apart, scrutinized, and put back together. Their activities can be tracked, analyzed, measured, and thus clearly understood-which is far from possible with the brain. This gives rise to the tempting assumption on the part of the builders and designers that computers can tell us something about brains, indeed, that the computer can serve as a model of the mind, which then comes to be seen as some manner of information processing machine, and possibly not as good at the job as the machine. (Roszak, 1994, pp. xiv-xv)The inner workings of the human mind are far more intricate than the most complicated systems of modern technology. Researchers in the field of artificial intelligence have been attempting to develop programs that will enable computers to display intelligent behavior. Although this field has been an active one for more than thirty-five years and has had many notable successes, AI researchers still do not know how to create a program that matches human intelligence. No existing program can recall facts, solve problems, reason, learn, and process language with human facility. This lack of success has occurred not because computers are inferior to human brains but rather because we do not yet know in sufficient detail how intelligence is organized in the brain. (Anderson, 1995, p. 2)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Artificial Intelligence
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28 Thinking
But what then am I? A thing which thinks. What is a thing which thinks? It is a thing which doubts, understands, [conceives], affirms, denies, wills, refuses, which also imagines and feels. (Descartes, 1951, p. 153)I have been trying in all this to remove the temptation to think that there "must be" a mental process of thinking, hoping, wishing, believing, etc., independent of the process of expressing a thought, a hope, a wish, etc.... If we scrutinize the usages which we make of "thinking," "meaning," "wishing," etc., going through this process rids us of the temptation to look for a peculiar act of thinking, independent of the act of expressing our thoughts, and stowed away in some particular medium. (Wittgenstein, 1958, pp. 41-43)Analyse the proofs employed by the subject. If they do not go beyond observation of empirical correspondences, they can be fully explained in terms of concrete operations, and nothing would warrant our assuming that more complex thought mechanisms are operating. If, on the other hand, the subject interprets a given correspondence as the result of any one of several possible combinations, and this leads him to verify his hypotheses by observing their consequences, we know that propositional operations are involved. (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958, p. 279)In every age, philosophical thinking exploits some dominant concepts and makes its greatest headway in solving problems conceived in terms of them. The seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophers construed knowledge, knower, and known in terms of sense data and their association. Descartes' self-examination gave classical psychology the mind and its contents as a starting point. Locke set up sensory immediacy as the new criterion of the real... Hobbes provided the genetic method of building up complex ideas from simple ones... and, in another quarter, still true to the Hobbesian method, Pavlov built intellect out of conditioned reflexes and Loeb built life out of tropisms. (S. Langer, 1962, p. 54)Experiments on deductive reasoning show that subjects are influenced sufficiently by their experience for their reasoning to differ from that described by a purely deductive system, whilst experiments on inductive reasoning lead to the view that an understanding of the strategies used by adult subjects in attaining concepts involves reference to higher-order concepts of a logical and deductive nature. (Bolton, 1972, p. 154)There are now machines in the world that think, that learn and create. Moreover, their ability to do these things is going to increase rapidly until-in the visible future-the range of problems they can handle will be coextensive with the range to which the human mind has been applied. (Newell & Simon, quoted in Weizenbaum, 1976, p. 138)But how does it happen that thinking is sometimes accompanied by action and sometimes not, sometimes by motion, and sometimes not? It looks as if almost the same thing happens as in the case of reasoning and making inferences about unchanging objects. But in that case the end is a speculative proposition... whereas here the conclusion which results from the two premises is an action.... I need covering; a cloak is a covering. I need a cloak. What I need, I have to make; I need a cloak. I have to make a cloak. And the conclusion, the "I have to make a cloak," is an action. (Nussbaum, 1978, p. 40)It is well to remember that when philosophy emerged in Greece in the sixth century, B.C., it did not burst suddenly out of the Mediterranean blue. The development of societies of reasoning creatures-what we call civilization-had been a process to be measured not in thousands but in millions of years. Human beings became civilized as they became reasonable, and for an animal to begin to reason and to learn how to improve its reasoning is a long, slow process. So thinking had been going on for ages before Greece-slowly improving itself, uncovering the pitfalls to be avoided by forethought, endeavoring to weigh alternative sets of consequences intellectually. What happened in the sixth century, B.C., is that thinking turned round on itself; people began to think about thinking, and the momentous event, the culmination of the long process to that point, was in fact the birth of philosophy. (Lipman, Sharp & Oscanyan, 1980, p. xi)The way to look at thought is not to assume that there is a parallel thread of correlated affects or internal experiences that go with it in some regular way. It's not of course that people don't have internal experiences, of course they do; but that when you ask what is the state of mind of someone, say while he or she is performing a ritual, it's hard to believe that such experiences are the same for all people involved.... The thinking, and indeed the feeling in an odd sort of way, is really going on in public. They are really saying what they're saying, doing what they're doing, meaning what they're meaning. Thought is, in great part anyway, a public activity. (Geertz, quoted in J. Miller, 1983, pp. 202-203)Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler. (Einstein, quoted in Minsky, 1986, p. 17)What, in effect, are the conditions for the construction of formal thought? The child must not only apply operations to objects-in other words, mentally execute possible actions on them-he must also "reflect" those operations in the absence of the objects which are replaced by pure propositions. Thus, "reflection" is thought raised to the second power. Concrete thinking is the representation of a possible action, and formal thinking is the representation of a representation of possible action.... It is not surprising, therefore, that the system of concrete operations must be completed during the last years of childhood before it can be "reflected" by formal operations. In terms of their function, formal operations do not differ from concrete operations except that they are applied to hypotheses or propositions [whose logic is] an abstract translation of the system of "inference" that governs concrete operations. (Piaget, quoted in Minsky, 1986, p. 237)[E]ven a human being today (hence, a fortiori, a remote ancestor of contemporary human beings) cannot easily or ordinarily maintain uninterrupted attention on a single problem for more than a few tens of seconds. Yet we work on problems that require vastly more time. The way we do that (as we can observe by watching ourselves) requires periods of mulling to be followed by periods of recapitulation, describing to ourselves what seems to have gone on during the mulling, leading to whatever intermediate results we have reached. This has an obvious function: namely, by rehearsing these interim results... we commit them to memory, for the immediate contents of the stream of consciousness are very quickly lost unless rehearsed.... Given language, we can describe to ourselves what seemed to occur during the mulling that led to a judgment, produce a rehearsable version of the reaching-a-judgment process, and commit that to long-term memory by in fact rehearsing it. (Margolis, 1987, p. 60)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Thinking
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29 line
I 1.[laɪn]noun[fishing-]line — [Angel]schnur, die
2) (telephone or telegraph cable) Leitung, dieour company has 20 lines — unsere Firma hat 20 Anschlüsse
get me a line to Washington — verbinden Sie mich mit Washington
3) (long mark; also Math., Phys.) Linie, die; (less precise or shorter) Strich, der; (Telev.) Zeile, die5) (boundary) Linie, dielay something on the line [for somebody] — [jemandem] etwas rundheraus sagen
line of trees — Baumreihe, die
bring somebody into line — dafür sorgen, dass jmd. nicht aus der Reihe tanzt (ugs.)
come or fall into line — sich in die Reihe stellen; [Gruppe:] sich in einer Reihe aufstellen; (fig.) nicht mehr aus der Reihe tanzen (ugs.)
be in line [with something] — [mit etwas] in einer Linie liegen
be in/out of line with something — (fig.) mit etwas in/nicht in Einklang stehen
7) (row of words on a page) Zeile, diehe gave the boy 100 lines — (Sch.) er ließ den Jungen 100 Zeilen abschreiben
8) (system of transport) Linie, die[shipping] line — Schifffahrtslinie, die
on the lines of — nach Art (+ Gen.)
be on the right/wrong lines — in die richtige/falsche Richtung gehen
along or on the same lines — in der gleichen Richtung
line of thought — Gedankengang, der
take a strong line with somebody — jemandem gegenüber bestimmt od. energisch auftreten
line of action — Vorgehensweise, die
the Waterloo line, the line to Waterloo — die Linie nach Waterloo
this is the end of the line [for you] — (fig.) dies ist das Aus [für dich]
12) (wrinkle) Falte, diewhat's your line? — in welcher Branche sind Sie?/was ist Ihre Fachrichtung?
be in the line of duty/business — zu den Pflichten/zum Geschäft gehören
15) (Fashion) Linie, die2. transitive verbenemy lines — feindliche Stellungen od. Linien
1) (mark with lines) linieren [Papier]2) (stand at intervals along) säumen (geh.) [Straße, Strecke]Phrasal Verbs:- line upII transitive verbfüttern [Kleidungsstück]; auskleiden [Magen, Nest]; ausschlagen [Schublade usw.]line one's pockets — (fig.) sich (Dat.) die Taschen füllen
* * *I 1. noun1) ((a piece of) thread, cord, rope etc: She hung the washing on the line; a fishing-rod and line.) die Leine2) (a long, narrow mark, streak or stripe: She drew straight lines across the page; a dotted/wavy line.) die Linie3) (outline or shape especially relating to length or direction: The ship had very graceful lines; A dancer uses a mirror to improve his line.) die Konturen (pl.)4) (a groove on the skin; a wrinkle.) die Falte5) (a row or group of objects or persons arranged side by side or one behind the other: The children stood in a line; a line of trees.) die Reihe6) (a short letter: I'll drop him a line.) einige Zeilen7) (a series or group of persons which come one after the other especially in the same family: a line of kings.) die Abstammungslinie8) (a track or direction: He pointed out the line of the new road; a new line of research.) die Richtung9) (the railway or a single track of the railway: Passengers must cross the line by the bridge only.) die Eisenbahnlinie, das Gleis10) (a continuous system (especially of pipes, electrical or telephone cables etc) connecting one place with another: a pipeline; a line of communication; All( telephone) lines are engaged.) die Leitung11) (a row of written or printed words: The letter contained only three lines; a poem of sixteen lines.) die Zeile12) (a regular service of ships, aircraft etc: a shipping line.) die Linie13) (a group or class (of goods for sale) or a field of activity, interest etc: This has been a very popular new line; Computers are not really my line.) das Tätigkeitsfeld14) (an arrangement of troops, especially when ready to fight: fighting in the front line.) die Linie2. verb1) (to form lines along: Crowds lined the pavement to see the Queen.) säumen2) (to mark with lines.) linieren•- lineage- linear- lined- liner- lines- linesman
- hard lines! - in line for
- in
- out of line with
- line up
- read between the lines II verb1) (to cover on the inside: She lined the box with newspaper.) auskleiden2) (to put a lining in: She lined the dress with silk.) füttern•- lined- liner- lining* * *line1[laɪn]I. NOUNdividing \line Trennungslinie fstraight \line gerade Linieto draw a \line eine Linie ziehen3. MATHstraight \line Gerade f7. (equator)▪ the L\line die Linie, der Äquatorthe thin \line between love and hate der schmale Grat zwischen Liebe und Hassto cross the \line die Grenze überschreiten fig, zu weit gehen[clothes] \line Wäscheleine f[fishing] \line Angelschnur f\lines will be open from eight o'clock die Leitungen werden ab acht Uhr frei[geschaltet] seincan you get me a \line to New York? können Sie mir bitte eine Verbindung nach New York geben?the \line is engaged/busy die Leitung ist besetztplease hold the \line! bitte bleiben Sie am Apparat!get off the \line! geh aus der Leitung!bad \line schlechte Verbindungto be/stay on the \line am Apparat sein/bleibenthe end of the \line die Endstationrail \line Eisenbahnlinie f13. (row of words, also in poem) Zeile fto drop sb a \line jdm ein paar Zeilen schreibento read between the \lines ( fig) zwischen den Zeilen lesen14. (for actor)▪ \lines pl Text mto forget/learn one's \lines seinen Text lernen/vergessento get a \line on sb/sth etwas über jdn/etw herausfindento give sb a \line on sb jdm Informationen über jdn besorgen16. (false account, talk)he keeps giving me that \line about his computer not working properly er kommt mir immer wieder mit dem Spruch, dass sein Computer nicht richtig funktioniereI've heard that \line before die Platte kenne ich schon in- und auswendig! fam▪ \lines pl Strafarbeit fshe got 100 \lines for swearing at her teacher da sie ihren Lehrer beschimpft hatte, musste sie zur Strafe 100 mal... schreibento be first in \line an erster Stelle stehen; ( fig) ganz vorne dabei seinto be next in \line als Nächster/Nächste dran seinto be in a \line in einer Reihe stehenthe cans on the shelf were in a \line die Büchsen waren im Regal aufgereihtto form a \line sich akk in einer Reihe aufstellento get into \line sich akk hintereinander aufstellen; (next to each other) sich akk in einer Reihe aufstellento move into \line sich akk einreihenin \line with (level with) auf der gleichen Höhe wiein \line with demand bedarfsgerecht, bedarfsadäquatin \line with maturity FIN laufzeitbezogen, laufzeitabhängigin \line with requirements bedürfnisorientiertin \line with the market marktnah, marktgerecht, marktkonformthe salaries of temporary employees were brought into \line with those of permanent staff die Gehälter Teilzeitbeschäftigter wurden an die der Vollzeitbeschäftigten angeglichenI want to have children to prevent the family \line dying out ich möchte Kinder, damit die Familie nicht ausstirbtthis institute has had a long \line of prestigious physicists working here dieses Institut kann auf eine lange Tradition angesehener Physiker zurückblickenhe is the latest in a long \line of Nobel Prize winners to come from that country er ist der jüngste einer ganzen Reihe von Nobelpreisträgern aus diesem Landto get in \line sich akk anstellento stand in \line anstehenthey are thinking about a new \line of vehicles sie denken über eine neue Kraftfahrzeugserie nach; BRIT, AUSthey do an excellent \line in TVs and videos sie stellen erstklassige Fernseher und Videogeräte herspring/summer/fall/winter \line Frühjahrs-/Sommer-/Herbst-/Winterkollektion ffootball's never really been my \line mit Fußball konnte ich noch nie besonders viel anfangenwhat's your \line? was machen Sie beruflich?\line of business Branche f\line of research Forschungsgebiet nt\line of work Arbeitsgebiet ntto be in sb's \line jdm liegen23. (course)\line of argument Argumentation fto be in the \line of duty zu jds Pflichten gehören\line of reasoning Gedankengang mto take a strong \line with sb jdm gegenüber sehr bestimmt auftretento take a strong \line with sth gegen etw akk energisch vorgehenthey did not reveal their \line of inquiry sie teilten nicht mit, in welcher Richtung sie ermitteltenwhat \line shall we take? wie sollen wir vorgehen?24. (direction)▪ along the \lines of...:she said something along the \lines that he would lose his job if he didn't work harder sie sagte irgendetwas in der Richtung davon, dass er seine Stelle verlieren würde, wenn er nicht härter arbeiten würdemy sister works in publishing and I'm hoping to do something along the same \lines meine Schwester arbeitet im Verlagswesen und ich würde gerne etwas Ähnliches tunto try a new \line of approach to sth versuchen, etw anders anzugehenthe \line of least resistence der Weg des geringsten Widerstandes\line of vision Blickrichtung fto be on the right \lines auf dem richtigen Weg seindo you think his approach to the problem is on the right \lines? glauben Sie, dass er das Problem richtig angeht?party \line Parteilinie fto bring sb/sth into \line [with sth] jdn/etw auf gleiche Linie [wie etw akk] bringento fall into \line with sth mit etw dat konform gehento keep sb in \line dafür sorgen, dass jd nicht aus der Reihe tanztto move into \line sich akk anpassento step out of \line aus der Reihe tanzen\line of battle Kampflinie fbehind enemy \lines hinter den feindlichen Stellungenfront \line Front f29.▶ all along the \line auf der ganzen Linie▶ to bring sb into \line jdn in seine Schranken weisen▶ in/out of \line with sb/sth mit jdm/etw im/nicht im Einklang▶ to lay it on the \line die Karten offen auf den Tisch legen▶ to be on the \line auf dem Spiel stehen▶ to put sth on the \line etw aufs Spiel setzen▶ it was stepping out of \line to tell him that es stand dir nicht zu, ihm das zu sagenII. TRANSITIVE VERB1. (mark)her face was \lined with agony ihr Gesicht war von tiefem Schmerz gezeichnet2. (stand at intervals)to \line the streets die Straßen säumen gehthe streets were \lined with cheering people jubelnde Menschenmengen säumten die Straßenline2[laɪn]vt1. (cover)to \line shelves Regale füllen* * *line1 [laın]A sdown the line (Tennis) die Linie entlang, longline;2. a) (Hand- etc) Linie f:line of fate Schicksalslinieb) Falte f, Runzel f:lines of worry Sorgenfaltenc) Zug m (im Gesicht)3. Zeile f:5. a) Vers mc) pl SCHULE Br Strafarbeit f, -aufgabe f6. pl (meist als sg konstruiert) besonders Br umg Trauschein m8. US umga) Platte f (Geschwätz)b) Tour f, Masche f (Trick)9. Linie f, Richtung f:a) MIL Angriffsrichtung,b) fig Taktik f;get into sb’s line of fire jemandem in die Schusslinie geraten;a) Blickrichtung,hung on the line in Augenhöhe aufgehängt (Bild);10. pl Grundsätze pl, Richtlinie(n) f(pl):the lines of his policy die Grundlinien seiner Politik;I would like to have sth on ( oder along) the lines of what you have ich möchte etwas von der Art wie Sie haben;a) nach diesen Grundsätzen,b) folgendermaßen;along general lines ganz allgemein, in großen Zügen;along similar lines ähnlich;it is out of line for sb to do sth es entspricht nicht jemandes Art, etwas zu tun11. Art f und Weise f, Methode f, Verfahren n:line of approach (to) Art und Weise (etwas) anzupacken, Methode;line of argument (Art der) Beweisführung f;line of reasoning Denkweise;a) Auffassung f,b) Gedankengang m;take a tougher line toward(s) härter vorgehen gegen, eine härtere Gangart einschlagen gegenüber;take the line that … den Standpunkt vertreten, dass …;don’t take that line with me! komm mir ja nicht so!;in the line of nach Art von (od gen);on strictly commercial lines auf streng geschäftlicher Grundlage, auf rein kommerzieller Basis; → hard line 112. Grenze f (auch fig), Grenzlinie f:overstep the line of good taste über die Grenzen des guten Geschmacks hinausgehen;there’s a very fine line between winning and losing Sieg und Niederlage liegen ganz dicht beieinander;be on the line auf dem Spiel stehen;your job is on the line auch es geht um deinen Job;draw the line die Grenze ziehen, haltmachen ( beide:at bei);I draw the line at that da hört es bei mir auf;lay it on the line that … in aller Deutlichkeit sagen, dass …;I’ll lay it on the line for you! umg das kann ich Ihnen genau sagen!;13. pla) Linien(führung) pl(f), Konturen pl, Form fb) Entwurf mc) TECH Riss m14. a) Reihe f, Kette f:a line of poplars eine Pappelreiheb) besonders US (Menschen-, auch Auto) Schlange f:stand in line anstehen, Schlange stehen ( beide:for um, nach);drive in line AUTO Kolonne fahren;be second in line for the throne an zweiter Stelle der Thronfolge stehen15. Reihe f, Linie f:out of line aus der Flucht, nicht in einer Linie;a) in Einklang bringen ( with mit),b) auf Vordermann bringen umg;a) sich einordnen,b) MIL (in Reih und Glied) antreten,keep sb in line fig jemanden bei der Stange halten;b) (Ahnen- etc) Reihe fd) Familie f, Stamm m, Geschlecht n:the male line die männliche Linie;in the direct line in direkter Linie;line of succession Erbfolge f18. Fach n, Gebiet n, Sparte f:in the banking line im Bankfach oder -wesen;that’s not in my linea) das schlägt nicht in mein Fach,b) das liegt mir nicht;that’s more in my line das liegt mir schon eher19. (Verkehrs-, Eisenbahn- etc) Linie f, Strecke f, Route f, engS. BAHN Gleis n:the end of the line fig das (bittere) Ende;that’s the end of the line! fig Endstation!;he was at the end of the line fig er war am Ende20. (Flug- etc) Gesellschaft fget off the line aus der Leitung gehen;c) TEL Amt n:can I have a line, please?oil line Ölleitung24. WIRTSCHa) Sorte f, Warengattung fb) Posten m, Partie fc) Sortiment nd) Artikel m oder pl, Artikelserie f25. MILa) Linie f:behind the enemy lines hinter den feindlichen Linien;line of battle Schlacht-, Gefechtslinie;line of communications rückwärtige Verbindungen pl;b) Front f:go up the line nach vorn oder an die Front gehen;go down the line for US umg sich voll einsetzen fürc) Fronttruppe(n) f(pl)the Line der Äquator;cross the Line den Äquator überqueren27. SCHIFF Linie f:line abreast Dwarslinie;line ahead Kiellinie28. a) Leine f:hang the washing up on the line die Wäsche auf die Leine hängenb) Schnur fc) Seil n29. TEL etca) Draht mb) Kabel nC v/t1. Papier linieren, liniieren3. zeichnen4. skizzieren5. das Gesicht (zer)furchen6. (ein)säumen:lined with trees von Bäumen (ein)gesäumt;thousands of people lined the streets Tausende von Menschen säumten die Straßen;soldiers lined the street Soldaten bildeten an der Straße Spalierline2 [laın] v/t1. ein Kleid etc füttern2. besonders TECH (auf der Innenseite) überziehen oder belegen, ausfüttern, -gießen, -kleiden, -schlagen ( alle:with mit), Bremsen, eine Kupplung belegen3. als Futter oder Überzug dienen für4. (an)füllen:line one’s pocket(s) ( oder purse) in die eigene Tasche arbeiten, sich bereichern, sich die Taschen füllen;line one’s stomach sich den Bauch vollschlagen umgL., l. abk1. lake2. law3. league4. left li.5. line* * *I 1.[laɪn]noun1) (string, cord, rope, etc.) Leine, die[fishing-]line — [Angel]schnur, die
2) (telephone or telegraph cable) Leitung, die3) (long mark; also Math., Phys.) Linie, die; (less precise or shorter) Strich, der; (Telev.) Zeile, die4) in pl. (outline of car, ship, etc.) Linien Pl.5) (boundary) Linie, dielay something on the line [for somebody] — [jemandem] etwas rundheraus sagen
line of trees — Baumreihe, die
bring somebody into line — dafür sorgen, dass jmd. nicht aus der Reihe tanzt (ugs.)
come or fall into line — sich in die Reihe stellen; [Gruppe:] sich in einer Reihe aufstellen; (fig.) nicht mehr aus der Reihe tanzen (ugs.)
be in line [with something] — [mit etwas] in einer Linie liegen
be in/out of line with something — (fig.) mit etwas in/nicht in Einklang stehen
7) (row of words on a page) Zeile, dielines — (actor's part) Text, der
he gave the boy 100 lines — (Sch.) er ließ den Jungen 100 Zeilen abschreiben
8) (system of transport) Linie, die[shipping] line — Schifffahrtslinie, die
10) (direction, course) Richtung, dieon the lines of — nach Art (+ Gen.)
be on the right/wrong lines — in die richtige/falsche Richtung gehen
along or on the same lines — in der gleichen Richtung
line of thought — Gedankengang, der
take a strong line with somebody — jemandem gegenüber bestimmt od. energisch auftreten
line of action — Vorgehensweise, die
the Waterloo line, the line to Waterloo — die Linie nach Waterloo
this is the end of the line [for you] — (fig.) dies ist das Aus [für dich]
12) (wrinkle) Falte, diewhat's your line? — in welcher Branche sind Sie?/was ist Ihre Fachrichtung?
be in the line of duty/business — zu den Pflichten/zum Geschäft gehören
15) (Fashion) Linie, die2. transitive verbenemy lines — feindliche Stellungen od. Linien
1) (mark with lines) linieren [Papier]2) (stand at intervals along) säumen (geh.) [Straße, Strecke]Phrasal Verbs:- line upII transitive verbfüttern [Kleidungsstück]; auskleiden [Magen, Nest]; ausschlagen [Schublade usw.]line one's pockets — (fig.) sich (Dat.) die Taschen füllen
* * *(US) n.Schlange -n f.Schlange -n f.(Menschen-, Auto (<-s>)-)Warteschlange f. (railway) n.Gleis -e n. n.Branche -n f.Furche -n f.Leine -n f.Linie -n f.Reihe -n f.Richtung -en f.Runzel -n f.Strecke -n f.Strich -e m.Vers -e m.Zeile -n f. v.Spalier bilden ausdr.auskleiden v. -
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Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Bibliography
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31 sound
I
adjective1) (strong or in good condition: The foundations of the house are not very sound; He's 87, but he's still sound in mind and body.) sano, sólido, firme2) ((of sleep) deep: She's a very sound sleeper.) profundo3) (full; thorough: a sound basic training.) completo, severo4) (accurate; free from mistakes: a sound piece of work.) bueno, sólido5) (having or showing good judgement or good sense: His advice is always very sound.) juicioso, sensato, acertado, consistente•- soundly- soundness
- sound asleep
II
1. noun1) (the impressions transmitted to the brain by the sense of hearing: a barrage of sound; (also adjective) sound waves.) sonido2) (something that is, or can be, heard: The sounds were coming from the garage.) ruido, sonido, voces3) (the impression created in the mind by a piece of news, a description etc: I didn't like the sound of her hairstyle at all!) idea
2. verb1) (to (cause something to) make a sound: Sound the bell!; The bell sounded.) tocar, hacer sonar2) (to signal (something) by making a sound: Sound the alarm!) sonar, resonar3) ((of something heard or read) to make a particular impression; to seem; to appear: Your singing sounded very good; That sounds like a train.) sonar, parecer4) (to pronounce: In the word `pneumonia', the letter p is not sounded.) pronunciar(se)5) (to examine by tapping and listening carefully: She sounded the patient's chest.) auscultar•- soundlessly
- sound effects
- soundproof
3. verb(to make (walls, a room etc) soundproof.) insonorizar
III
verb(to measure the depth of (water etc).) sondar- sounding- sound out
sound1 adj sólido / bueno / fuerte / segurosound2 n1. sonido2. ruido3. volumencan you turn the sound up? ¿puedes subir el volumen?sound3 vb1. parecerfrom what he says it sounds like a wonderful hotel por lo que dice, parece un hotel maravilloso2. sonarif the alarm sounds, leave the building si suena la alarma, abandona el edificiotr[saʊnd]1 (healthy) sano,-a■ of sound mind en su sano juicio, en pleno uso de sus facultades■ safe and sound sano,-a y salvo,-a2 (solid) sólido,-a, firme; (in good condition) en buen estado3 (sensible) sensato,-a, acertado,-a; (valid) sólido,-a, lógico,-a, razonable; (responsible) responsable, formal, de fiar; (reliable, safe) seguro,-a4 (thorough) completo,-a; (severe) severo,-a5 (of sleep) profundo,-a\SMALLIDIOMATIC EXPRESSION/SMALLto be as sound as a bell (person) estar sano,-a 2 (thing) estar en perfectas condiciones, estar en perfecto estadoto be sound asleep estar profundamente dormido,-a————————tr[saʊnd]1 SMALLGEOGRAPHY/SMALL estrecho, brazo de mar————————tr[saʊnd]■ I was born within the sound of Bow bells desde donde nací se oyen las campanas de la iglesia de Bow■ turn the sound up/down sube/baja el volumen3 (impression, idea) idea■ I don't like the sound of this esto se está poniendo feo, esto me da mala espina■ by/from the sound of it, he's getting on fine por lo visto las cosas le van bien2 SMALLLINGUISTICS/SMALL pronunciar1 (bell, horn, alarm, etc) sonar, resonar2 (seem) parecer; (give impression) sonar■ how does that sound? ¿qué te parece eso?■ does this sentence sound right to you? ¿te suena bien esta frase?3 SMALLLINGUISTICS/SMALL pronunciarse, sonar\SMALLIDIOMATIC EXPRESSION/SMALLsound barrier barrera del sonidosound card tarjeta de sonidosound check prueba de sonidosound effects efectos nombre masculino plural sonorossound engineer ingeniero,-a de sonidosound wave onda sonora————————tr[saʊnd]1 SMALLMARITIME/SMALL sondar1 SMALLMEDICINE/SMALL sondasound ['saʊnd] vt1) : sondar (en navegación)3) : hacer sonar, tocar (una trompeta, etc.)sound vi1) : sonarthe alarm sounded: la alarma sonó2) seem: parecersound adj1) healthy: sanosafe and sound: sano y salvoof sound mind and body: en pleno uso de sus facultades2) firm, solid: sólido3) sensible: lógico, sensato4) deep: profundoa sound sleep: un sueño profundosound n1) : sonido mthe speed of sound: la velocidad del sonido2) noise: sonido m, ruido mI heard a sound: oí un sonido3) channel: brazo m de mar, canal m (ancho)adj.• confiable adj.• firme adj.• ileso, -a adj.• macizo, -a adj.• razonable adj.• sano, -a adj.• sonido, -a adj.• sólido, -a adj.n.• ruido s.m.• son s.m.• sonda s.f.• sonido s.m.• tañido s.m.• toque s.m.v.• fondear v.• hondear v.• sonar v.• sondear v.• tocar v.
I saʊnd1) noun2) u ca) ( noise) sonido m; (unpleasant, disturbing) ruido mb) (of music, instrument) sonido mc) ( Ling) sonido m3) ua) ( Phys) sonido m; (before n)b) (Audio, Rad, TV) sonido mturn the sound up/down — sube/baja el volumen; (before n)
sound effects — efectos mpl sonoros
4) ( impression conveyed) (colloq) (no pl)by o from the sound of it, everything's going very well — parece que or por lo visto todo marcha muy bien
5) ca) ( channel) paso m, estrecho mb) ( inlet) brazo m
II
1.
1)a) ( give impression) sonar*your voice sounds o you sound different on the phone — tu voz suena distinta por teléfono
you sound as if o as though you could do with a rest — me da la impresión de que no te vendría mal un descanso
it sounds as if o as though they're here now — (por el ruido) parece que ya están aquí
b) ( seem) parecer*we'll leave at ten; how does that sound to you? — saldremos a las diez ¿qué te parece?
it sounds as if o as though you had a great time — parece que lo pasaste fenomenal
sounds like fun! — (colloq) qué divertido!
2) (make noise, resound) \<\<bell/alarm\>\> sonar*
2.
vt1)a) \<\<trumpet/horn\>\> tocar*, hacer* sonarthe chairman sounded a note of warning in his speech — en su discurso, el presidente llamó a la cautela
b) ( articulate) \<\<letter/consonant\>\> pronunciar2) sound out•Phrasal Verbs:
III
adjective -er, -est1)a) ( healthy) sanoI, Peter Smith, being of sound mind... — (frml) yo, Peter Smith, (estando) en pleno uso de mis facultades... (frml)
b) ( in good condition) <basis/foundation> sólido, firme; < timber> en buenas condiciones2)a) ( valid) <reasoning/knowledge> sólido; <advice/decision> sensatob) ( reliable) <colleague/staff> responsable, formal3)b) (hard, thorough)
IV
adverb -er, -est
I [saʊnd]1. N1) (Phys) sonido m2) (=noise) ruido mthe sound of breaking glass — el ruido de cristales que se rompen/rompían
•
I didn't hear a sound — no oí ni un ruido•
don't make a sound! — ¡no hagas el menor ruido!•
not a sound was to be heard — no se oía or (esp LAm) sentía ruido alguno•
to the sound of the national anthem — al son del himno nacional•
they were within sound of the camp — el campamento estaba al alcance del oído•
he opened the door without a sound — abrió la puerta sin hacer nada de ruido3) (=volume) volumen mcan I turn the sound down? — ¿puedo bajar el volumen?
4) (=musical style)5) (fig) (=impression)•
by the sound of it — según parece•
I don't like the sound of it — (film etc) por lo que he oído, no me gusta nada; (situation) me preocupa, me da mala espina2. VT1) [+ horn, trumpet] tocar, hacer sonar; [+ bell] tocar; [+ alarm, warning] dar; [+ praises] cantar, entonar•
to sound the charge — (Mil) tocar la carga•
sound your horn! — (Aut) ¡toca el claxon!•
to sound a note of warning — (fig) dar la señal de alarma•
to sound the retreat — (Mil) tocar la retirada2) (=pronounce) pronunciarsound your "r"s more — pronuncia más claro la "r"
to sound the "d" in "hablado" — pronunciar la "d" en "hablado"
3. VI1) (=emit sound) sonara cannon sounded a long way off — se oyó un cañón a lo lejos, sonó or resonó un cañón a lo lejos
2) (=appear to be)a) (from aural clues) sonarhe sounds Italian to me — por la voz, diría que es italiano
•
it sounds like French — suena a francésb) (from available information) sonar, parecer•
it sounds as if or as though she won't be coming — parece que no va a venir•
how does it sound to you? — ¿qué te parece?•
that sounds like a good idea — eso parece buena idea4.CPDsound archive N — archivo m de sonido
sound barrier N — barrera f del sonido
sound bite N — cita f jugosa
sound card N — (Comput) tarjeta f de sonido
sound effect N — efecto m sonoro
sound engineer N — ingeniero(-a) m / f de sonido
sound file N — (Comput) fichero m de sonido
sound library N — fonoteca f
sound mixer N — (=engineer) ingeniero(-a) m / f de sonido
sound recording N — grabación f sonora
sound recordist N — (TV) registrador(a) m / f de sonido
sound shift N — cambio m de pronunciación
sound system N — (Ling) sistema m fonológico; (=hi-fi) cadena f de sonido
sound truck N — (US) furgón m publicitario
sound wave N — (Phys) onda f sonora
II
[saʊnd]VT1) (Naut) sondar2) (Med) [+ chest] auscultar; [+ cavity, passage] sondar
III [saʊnd]1. ADJ(compar sounder) (superl soundest)1) (=in good condition) sano; [constitution] robusto; [structure] sólido, firme- be as sound as a bellsafe 1., 1)2) (=well-founded) [argument] bien fundado, sólido; [ideas, opinions] válido, razonable; [investment] bueno, seguro; [training] sólido; [decision, choice] acertado3) (=dependable) [person] formal, digno de confianzahe's a very sound man — es un hombre formal or digno de confianza
he's a sound worker — es buen trabajador, trabaja con seriedad
4) (=thorough)5) (=deep, untroubled) [sleep] profundo2.ADV
IV
[saʊnd]N (Geog) estrecho m, brazo m de mar* * *
I [saʊnd]1) noun2) u ca) ( noise) sonido m; (unpleasant, disturbing) ruido mb) (of music, instrument) sonido mc) ( Ling) sonido m3) ua) ( Phys) sonido m; (before n)b) (Audio, Rad, TV) sonido mturn the sound up/down — sube/baja el volumen; (before n)
sound effects — efectos mpl sonoros
4) ( impression conveyed) (colloq) (no pl)by o from the sound of it, everything's going very well — parece que or por lo visto todo marcha muy bien
5) ca) ( channel) paso m, estrecho mb) ( inlet) brazo m
II
1.
1)a) ( give impression) sonar*your voice sounds o you sound different on the phone — tu voz suena distinta por teléfono
you sound as if o as though you could do with a rest — me da la impresión de que no te vendría mal un descanso
it sounds as if o as though they're here now — (por el ruido) parece que ya están aquí
b) ( seem) parecer*we'll leave at ten; how does that sound to you? — saldremos a las diez ¿qué te parece?
it sounds as if o as though you had a great time — parece que lo pasaste fenomenal
sounds like fun! — (colloq) qué divertido!
2) (make noise, resound) \<\<bell/alarm\>\> sonar*
2.
vt1)a) \<\<trumpet/horn\>\> tocar*, hacer* sonarthe chairman sounded a note of warning in his speech — en su discurso, el presidente llamó a la cautela
b) ( articulate) \<\<letter/consonant\>\> pronunciar2) sound out•Phrasal Verbs:
III
adjective -er, -est1)a) ( healthy) sanoI, Peter Smith, being of sound mind... — (frml) yo, Peter Smith, (estando) en pleno uso de mis facultades... (frml)
b) ( in good condition) <basis/foundation> sólido, firme; < timber> en buenas condiciones2)a) ( valid) <reasoning/knowledge> sólido; <advice/decision> sensatob) ( reliable) <colleague/staff> responsable, formal3)b) (hard, thorough)
IV
adverb -er, -est -
32 Knowledge
It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and, in a word, all sensible objects, have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But, with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it into question may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. For, what are the forementioned objects but things we perceive by sense? and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations? and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived? (Berkeley, 1996, Pt. I, No. 4, p. 25)It seems to me that the only objects of the abstract sciences or of demonstration are quantity and number, and that all attempts to extend this more perfect species of knowledge beyond these bounds are mere sophistry and illusion. As the component parts of quantity and number are entirely similar, their relations become intricate and involved; and nothing can be more curious, as well as useful, than to trace, by a variety of mediums, their equality or inequality, through their different appearances.But as all other ideas are clearly distinct and different from each other, we can never advance farther, by our utmost scrutiny, than to observe this diversity, and, by an obvious reflection, pronounce one thing not to be another. Or if there be any difficulty in these decisions, it proceeds entirely from the undeterminate meaning of words, which is corrected by juster definitions. That the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the squares of the other two sides cannot be known, let the terms be ever so exactly defined, without a train of reasoning and enquiry. But to convince us of this proposition, that where there is no property, there can be no injustice, it is only necessary to define the terms, and explain injustice to be a violation of property. This proposition is, indeed, nothing but a more imperfect definition. It is the same case with all those pretended syllogistical reasonings, which may be found in every other branch of learning, except the sciences of quantity and number; and these may safely, I think, be pronounced the only proper objects of knowledge and demonstration. (Hume, 1975, Sec. 12, Pt. 3, pp. 163-165)Our knowledge springs from two fundamental sources of the mind; the first is the capacity of receiving representations (the ability to receive impressions), the second is the power to know an object through these representations (spontaneity in the production of concepts).Through the first, an object is given to us; through the second, the object is thought in relation to that representation.... Intuition and concepts constitute, therefore, the elements of all our knowledge, so that neither concepts without intuition in some way corresponding to them, nor intuition without concepts, can yield knowledge. Both may be either pure or empirical.... Pure intuitions or pure concepts are possible only a priori; empirical intuitions and empirical concepts only a posteriori. If the receptivity of our mind, its power of receiving representations in so far as it is in any way affected, is to be called "sensibility," then the mind's power of producing representations from itself, the spontaneity of knowledge, should be called "understanding." Our nature is so constituted that our intuitions can never be other than sensible; that is, it contains only the mode in which we are affected by objects. The faculty, on the other hand, which enables us to think the object of sensible intuition is the understanding.... Without sensibility, no object would be given to us; without understanding, no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind. It is therefore just as necessary to make our concepts sensible, that is, to add the object to them in intuition, as to make our intuitions intelligible, that is to bring them under concepts. These two powers or capacities cannot exchange their functions. The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through their union can knowledge arise. (Kant, 1933, Sec. 1, Pt. 2, B74-75 [p. 92])Metaphysics, as a natural disposition of Reason is real, but it is also, in itself, dialectical and deceptive.... Hence to attempt to draw our principles from it, and in their employment to follow this natural but none the less fallacious illusion can never produce science, but only an empty dialectical art, in which one school may indeed outdo the other, but none can ever attain a justifiable and lasting success. In order that, as a science, it may lay claim not merely to deceptive persuasion, but to insight and conviction, a Critique of Reason must exhibit in a complete system the whole stock of conceptions a priori, arranged according to their different sources-the Sensibility, the understanding, and the Reason; it must present a complete table of these conceptions, together with their analysis and all that can be deduced from them, but more especially the possibility of synthetic knowledge a priori by means of their deduction, the principles of its use, and finally, its boundaries....This much is certain: he who has once tried criticism will be sickened for ever of all the dogmatic trash he was compelled to content himself with before, because his Reason, requiring something, could find nothing better for its occupation. Criticism stands to the ordinary school metaphysics exactly in the same relation as chemistry to alchemy, or as astron omy to fortune-telling astrology. I guarantee that no one who has comprehended and thought out the conclusions of criticism, even in these Prolegomena, will ever return to the old sophistical pseudo-science. He will rather look forward with a kind of pleasure to a metaphysics, certainly now within his power, which requires no more preparatory discoveries, and which alone can procure for reason permanent satisfaction. (Kant, 1891, pp. 115-116)Knowledge is only real and can only be set forth fully in the form of science, in the form of system. Further, a so-called fundamental proposition or first principle of philosophy, even if it is true, it is yet none the less false, just because and in so far as it is merely a fundamental proposition, merely a first principle. It is for that reason easily refuted. The refutation consists in bringing out its defective character; and it is defective because it is merely the universal, merely a principle, the beginning. If the refutation is complete and thorough, it is derived and developed from the nature of the principle itself, and not accomplished by bringing in from elsewhere other counter-assurances and chance fancies. It would be strictly the development of the principle, and thus the completion of its deficiency, were it not that it misunderstands its own purport by taking account solely of the negative aspect of what it seeks to do, and is not conscious of the positive character of its process and result. The really positive working out of the beginning is at the same time just as much the very reverse: it is a negative attitude towards the principle we start from. Negative, that is to say, in its one-sided form, which consists in being primarily immediate, a mere purpose. It may therefore be regarded as a refutation of what constitutes the basis of the system; but more correctly it should be looked at as a demonstration that the basis or principle of the system is in point of fact merely its beginning. (Hegel, 1910, pp. 21-22)Knowledge, action, and evaluation are essentially connected. The primary and pervasive significance of knowledge lies in its guidance of action: knowing is for the sake of doing. And action, obviously, is rooted in evaluation. For a being which did not assign comparative values, deliberate action would be pointless; and for one which did not know, it would be impossible. Conversely, only an active being could have knowledge, and only such a being could assign values to anything beyond his own feelings. A creature which did not enter into the process of reality to alter in some part the future content of it, could apprehend a world only in the sense of intuitive or esthetic contemplation; and such contemplation would not possess the significance of knowledge but only that of enjoying and suffering. (Lewis, 1946, p. 1)"Evolutionary epistemology" is a branch of scholarship that applies the evolutionary perspective to an understanding of how knowledge develops. Knowledge always involves getting information. The most primitive way of acquiring it is through the sense of touch: amoebas and other simple organisms know what happens around them only if they can feel it with their "skins." The knowledge such an organism can have is strictly about what is in its immediate vicinity. After a huge jump in evolution, organisms learned to find out what was going on at a distance from them, without having to actually feel the environment. This jump involved the development of sense organs for processing information that was farther away. For a long time, the most important sources of knowledge were the nose, the eyes, and the ears. The next big advance occurred when organisms developed memory. Now information no longer needed to be present at all, and the animal could recall events and outcomes that happened in the past. Each one of these steps in the evolution of knowledge added important survival advantages to the species that was equipped to use it.Then, with the appearance in evolution of humans, an entirely new way of acquiring information developed. Up to this point, the processing of information was entirely intrasomatic.... But when speech appeared (and even more powerfully with the invention of writing), information processing became extrasomatic. After that point knowledge did not have to be stored in the genes, or in the memory traces of the brain; it could be passed on from one person to another through words, or it could be written down and stored on a permanent substance like stone, paper, or silicon chips-in any case, outside the fragile and impermanent nervous system. (Csikszentmihalyi, 1993, pp. 56-57)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Knowledge
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33 induction
1. n лог. индуктивный метод2. n лог. официальное введение в должность3. n лог. вступление, пролог4. n лог. введение5. n лог. амер. призыв на военную службу6. n тех. индукция; наведение7. n тех. всасывание; впуск; стимулирование, индуцирование8. n тех. работа с новичками, вновь принятыми рабочимиСинонимический ряд:1. draft (noun) conscription; draft; levy2. initiation (noun) being drafted; entrance into service; inaugural; inauguration; initiation; installation; instatement; investiture; recruitment; selection3. making electricity (noun) electric induction; electromagnetic action; electron excitation; electrostatic induction; magnetic induction; making electricity4. reasoning (noun) conjecture; deduction; drawing a conclusion; inference; judgement; rationalisation; rationalization; reason; reasoning -
34 coherence
noun* * *noun der Zusammenhang* * *co·her·ence[kə(ʊ)ˈhɪərən(t)s, AM koʊˈhɪr-]* * *[k\@U'hIərəns]n2) (of community) Zusammenhalt m; (of essay, symphony etc) Geschlossenheit f; (of argument, reasoning, style) Kohärenz fhis speech lacked coherence — seiner Rede (dat) fehlte der Zusammenhang
3) (fig= comprehensibility)
after five whiskies he lacked coherence — nach fünf Whiskys gab er nur noch unzusammenhängendes Zeug von sich* * *1. Zusammenhalt m (auch fig):2. PHYS Kohärenz f (Eigenschaft von Wellen, eine feste Phasenbezeichnung zu besitzen)3. fig (logischer) Zusammenhang:coherence of speech Klarheit f der Rede4. fig Übereinstimmung f* * *nounZusammenhang, der; Kohärenz, die (geh.); (in work, system, form) Geschlossenheit, die* * *n.Zusammenhang m. -
35 coherent
adjective1) (cohering) zusammenhängend2) (fig.) zusammenhängend; kohärent (geh.); in sich (Dat.) geschlossen [System, Ganzes, Werk, Aufsatz, Form]* * *[kə'hiərənt](clear and logical: He was able to give a coherent account of what had happened.) zusammenhängend- academic.ru/85484/coherently">coherently- coherence* * *co·her·ent[kə(ʊ)ˈhɪərənt, AM koʊˈhɪr-]\coherent argument schlüssiges Argument\coherent speech/story zusammenhängende Rede/Geschichte\coherent bundle PHYS kohärentes Bündel* * *[k\@U'hIərənt]adj1) (= comprehensible) zusammenhängendincapable of coherent speech — unfähig, zusammenhängend zu sprechen
* * *coherent adj (adv coherently)1. zusammenhängend2. PHYS kohärent3. fig (logisch) zusammenhängend, einheitlich, verständlich:be coherent in one’s speech sich klar ausdrücken (können)4. fig übereinstimmend, zusammenpassend* * *adjective1) (cohering) zusammenhängend2) (fig.) zusammenhängend; kohärent (geh.); in sich (Dat.) geschlossen [System, Ganzes, Werk, Aufsatz, Form]* * *adj.zusammen hängend adj.zusammen hängende adj.zusammenhängend (alt.Rechtschreibung) adj.zusammenhängende (alt.Rechtschreibung) adj. -
36 TIRS
1) Военный термин: tactical information retrieval system, thermal/infrared scanner2) Техника: tracking and illumination radar system3) Автоматика: the integrated reasoning shell -
37 tirs
1) Военный термин: tactical information retrieval system, thermal/infrared scanner2) Техника: tracking and illumination radar system3) Автоматика: the integrated reasoning shell -
38 fault
fo:lt
1. noun1) (a mistake; something for which one is to blame: The accident was your fault.) culpa2) (an imperfection; something wrong: There is a fault in this machine; a fault in his character.) defecto, tara3) (a crack in the rock surface of the earth: faults in the earth's crust.) falla
2. verb(to find fault with: I couldn't fault him / his piano-playing.) criticar, encontrar defectos a- faultlessly
- faulty
- at fault
- find fault with
- to a fault
fault n1. culpa2. fallo / defectotr[fɔːlt]1 (in character, system etc) defecto2 (in merchandise) defecto, desperfecto, tara3 (blame) culpa4 (mistake) error nombre masculino, falta5 (in earth) falla6 (in tennis etc) falta1 criticar, encontrar defectos a\SMALLIDIOMATIC EXPRESSION/SMALLto a fault en excesoto be at fault tener la culpato find fault with somebody/something poner reparos a alguien/algofault ['fɔlt] vt: encontrar defectos afault n1) shortcoming: defecto m, falta f2) defect: falta f, defecto m, falla f3) blame: culpa f4) fracture: falla f (geológica)n.• avería (Aparato) (•Informática•) s.f.• culpa s.f.• defecto s.m.• error (Programa) s.m.• falla s.f.• fallo (Informática) s.m.• falta (p.e. en un deporte)(Deporte) s.f.• imperfección s.f.• mal s.m.• tacha s.f.• transgresión (Jurisprudencia) s.f.• vicio s.m.• yerro s.m.v.• encontrar defectos en v.
I fɔːlt1) u (responsibility, blame) culpa fit's your fault — tú tienes la culpa, la culpa es tuya
they're always finding fault with me — todo lo que hago les parece mal, siempre me están criticando
2) ca) (failing, flaw) defecto m, falta fb) ( in machine) avería f; ( in goods) defecto m, falla fc) ( error) error m, falta f3) c ( Geol) falla f4) c (in tennis, show jumping) falta f
II
transitive verb encontrarle* defectos a[fɔːlt]his behavior cannot be faulted — su comportamiento es intachable or impecable
1. N1) (=defect) (in character) defecto m ; (in manufacture) defecto m, falla f (LAm); (in supply, machine) avería fto find fault with sth/sb — criticar algo/a algn
2) (=blame, responsibility) culpa fwhose fault is it (if...)? — ¿quién tiene la culpa (si...)?
3) (Tennis) falta f4) (Geol) falla f2.VT criticar3.CPDfault line N — (Geol) línea f de falla; (in system, process) debilitamiento m
* * *
I [fɔːlt]1) u (responsibility, blame) culpa fit's your fault — tú tienes la culpa, la culpa es tuya
they're always finding fault with me — todo lo que hago les parece mal, siempre me están criticando
2) ca) (failing, flaw) defecto m, falta fb) ( in machine) avería f; ( in goods) defecto m, falla fc) ( error) error m, falta f3) c ( Geol) falla f4) c (in tennis, show jumping) falta f
II
transitive verb encontrarle* defectos ahis behavior cannot be faulted — su comportamiento es intachable or impecable
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39 procedure
1) процедура; процесс2) методика; образ действий3) механизм; алгоритм•- analytical procedure
- antithetical procedure
- antithetic procedure
- auditing procedure
- bivariate procedure
- built-in procedure
- bypass procedure
- cataloged procedure
- certification procedure
- checking procedure
- command procedure
- compile time procedure
- computational procedure
- control procedure
- decision procedure
- design procedure
- diagnostic procedure
- error recovery procedure
- error-handling procedure
- error procedure
- external procedure
- fact-invoked procedure
- fallback procedure
- function procedure
- goal-invoked procedure
- in-line procedure
- in-stream procedure
- internal procedure
- interruption procedure
- interrupt procedure
- invoked procedure
- invoking procedure
- loading procedure
- logoff procedure
- logon procedure
- masking procedure
- mixed numerical procedure
- model solution procedure
- nested procedure
- office procedure
- open and sequential procedure
- packet transfer procedure
- pencil-and-paper multiplication procedure
- pure procedure
- randomized procedure
- reasoning procedure
- recovery procedure
- reducible procedure
- reenterable procedure
- resolution procedure
- self-contained computing procedure
- semidecision procedure
- service procedure
- spot-check procedure
- standardized procedure
- system integrity procedure
- system setup procedure
- test procedure
- updating procedure
- validation procedure
- value returning procedureEnglish-Russian dictionary of computer science and programming > procedure
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40 model
модель, макет, моделировать, макетировать, тип, образец, эталон
– model behavior
– model data
– model database
– model experiment
– model formulation
– model identification
– model knowledge
– model library
– model matching
– model production
– model reference adaptive control
– model refinement
– model shop
– model structure
– model study
– model synthesis
– model test
– model validation
– model validity
– model-based
– model-based compensation
– model-based reasoning
– model-based system
– model-based vision system
– model-following control
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