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81 Unconscious
Prior to Descartes and his sharp definition of the dualism there was no cause to contemplate the possible existence of unconscious mentality as part of a separate realm of mind. Many religious and speculative thinkers had taken for granted factors lying outside but influencing immediate awareness.... Until an attempt had been made (with apparent success) to choose awareness as the defining characteristic of mind, there was no occasion to invent the idea of unconscious mind.... It is only after Descartes that we find, first the idea and then the term "unconscious mind" entering European thought. (Whyte, 1962, p. 25)If there are two realms, physical and mental, awareness cannot be taken as the criterion of mentality [because] the springs of human nature lie in the unconscious... as the realm which links the moments of human awareness with the background of organic processes within which they emerge. (Whyte, 1962, p. 63)he unconscious was no more invented by Freud than evolution was invented by Darwin, and has an equally impressive pedigree, reaching back to antiquity.... At the dawn of Christian Europe the dominant influence were the Neoplatonists; foremost among them Plotinus, who took it for granted that "feelings can be present without awareness of them," that "the absence of a conscious perception is no proof of the absence of mental activity," and who talked confidently of a "mirror" in the mind which, when correctly aimed, reflects the processes going on inside it, when aimed in another direction, fails to do so-but the process goes on all the same. Augustine marvelled at man's immense store of unconscious memories-"a spreading, limitless room within me-who can reach its limitless depth?"The knowledge of unconscious mentation had always been there, as can be shown by quotations from theologians like St. Thomas Aquinas, mystics like Jacob Boehme, physicians like Paracelsus, astronomers like Kepler, writers and poets as far apart as Dante, Cervantes, Shakespeare, and Montaigne. This in itself is in no way remarkable; what is remarkable is that this knowledge was lost during the scientific revolution, more particularly under the impact of its most influential philosopher, Rene Descartes. (Koestler, 1964, p. 148)4) The Constructive Nature of Automatic Cognitive Functioning Argues for the Existence of Unconscious ActivityThe constructive nature of the automatic functioning argues the existence of an activity analogous to consciousness though hidden from observation, and we have therefore termed it unconscious. The negative prefix suggests an opposition, but it is no more than verbal, not any sort of hostility or incompatibility being implied by it, but simply the absence of consciousness. Yet a real opposition between the conscious and the unconscious activity does subsist in the limitations which the former tends to impose on the latter. (Ghiselin, 1985, p. 7)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Unconscious
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82 декартов лист
1) Mathematics: Cartesian sheet, folium of Descartes, leaf of Descartes2) Physics: Cartesian folium, Cartesian leaf3) Makarov: Cartesian -
83 cartesiano
( femenino cartesiana) adjetivo1. [de Descartes] kartesianisch2. [metódico] systematisch————————( femenino cartesiana) sustantivo masculino y femenino -
84 Decartes
n. Descartes, Rene Descartes, (1596-1650) French philosopher and mathematician and the founder of modern rationalism -
85 dans
dans [dɑ̃]━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━a. (lieu: position) inb. (lieu: mouvement) intoc. (lieu: origine) out of• dans combien de temps serez-vous prêt ? how long will it be before you are ready?e. ( = dans des limites de) within• cela coûte dans les 50 € it costs about 50 euros• cette pièce fait dans les 8 m2 this room is about 8m2* * *dɑ̃Note: GénéralitésLa préposition dans est présentée ici dans ses grandes lignes. Les expressions courantes comme dans l'abondance, dans le genre, être dans le pétrin etc sont traitées respectivement dans les articles abondance, genre, pétrin etcOn trouvera ci-dessous des exemples illustrant les principales utilisations de la préposition mais il sera toujours prudent de consulter l'entrée du nom introduit par dansPar ailleurs, la consultation des notes d'usage dont la liste est donnée pourra apporter des réponses à certains problèmes bien précis1) (lieu, sans déplacement) indans un avion/bus — on a plane/bus
dans une voiture/un taxi — in a car/a taxi
qu'est-ce que je fais dans tout ça? — (colloq) what am I doing in all this?
3) ( temps)finir quelque chose dans les temps — (colloq) to finish something in time
4) ( domaine) in5) ( état)dans la misère/le silence — in poverty/silence
6) ( but)7) ( approximation) about* * *dɑ̃ prép1) (position) in, (à l'intérieur de) inC'est dans le tiroir. — It's in the drawer.
C'est dans la boîte. — It's in the box., It's inside the box.
C'est dans le salon. — It's in the lounge.
Il est dans sa chambre. — He's in his bedroom.
Je l'ai lu dans le journal. — I read it in the newspaper.
2) (direction) intoElle a couru dans le salon. — She ran into the lounge.
Il est entré dans mon bureau. — He came into my office.
Remets-le dans son coffret. — Put it back in its case.
3) (provenance) out of, fromJe l'ai pris dans le tiroir. — I took it out of the drawer., I took it from the drawer.
Je l'ai pris dans le salon. — I took it out of the lounge.
boire dans un verre — to drink out of a glass, to drink from a glass
On a bu dans des verres en plastique. — We drank out of plastic glasses.
4) (= parmi) amongIl est dans les meilleurs. — He's among the best., He's one of the best.
5) (temps) indans 2 mois — in 2 months, in 2 months' time
6) (approximation) aboutÇa va chercher dans les 20 euros. — It's about 20 euros.
* * *❢ La préposition dans est présentée ici dans ses grandes lignes. Les expressions courantes comme dans la pénombre, dans le monde entier, être dans le pétrin etc sont traitées respectivement dans les articles pénombre, monde, pétrin etc. On trouvera ci-dessous des exemples illustrant les principales utilisations de la préposition mais il sera toujours prudent de consulter l'entrée du nom introduit par dans. Par ailleurs, la consultation des notes d'usage pourra apporter des réponses à certains problèmes bien précis.prép1 (lieu, sans déplacement) être dans la cuisine/le tiroir/la forêt to be in the kitchen/the drawer/the forest; dans cette histoire/son discours/cette affaire fig in this story/his speech/this business; être dans le brouillard/l'eau to be in the fog/the water; dans cette région/ville in this region/town; être dans un avion/train/bus/bateau to be on a plane/train/bus/boat; être dans une voiture/un taxi to be in a car/a taxi; il y a des fleurs dans le vase there are some flowers in the vase; le paquet est dans le placard/la chambre the parcel is in the cupboard/the bedroom; l'histoire se passe dans un train/dans un pays lointain the story takes place on a train/in a distant country; il est en vacances dans le Cantal/les Alpes he's on vacation in the Cantal/the Alps; j'ai lu ça dans Proust/un magazine I read that in Proust/a magazine; boire dans un verre to drink out of a glass; fouiller dans un tiroir to rummage through a drawer ; prendre une casserole dans un placard to take a pan out of a cupboard; vider qch dans l'évier to pour sth down the sink; qu'est-ce que je fais dans tout ça○? what am I doing in all this?; ce n'est pas dans ton intérêt it's not in your interest; dans l'ensemble by and large; dans le fond in fact;2 ( avec des verbes de mouvement) aller dans la cuisine/le grenier to go to the kitchen/the attic; entrer dans une pièce to go into a room; voler dans les airs to fly in the air; descendre dans un puits to go down a well; monter dans un avion to get on a plane;3 ( temps) dans ma jeunesse/leur adolescence/le futur in my youth/their adolescence/the future; dans deux heures/jours/ans in two hours/days/years; je t'appellerai dans la journée I'll call you during the day; dans l'immédiat for the time being; dans la minute qui a suivi the next moment; dans l'heure qui suivit within the hour; finir qch dans les temps○ to finish sth in time;4 ( domaine) être dans les affaires/l'édition/la restauration to be in business/publishing/the catering business;5 ( état) dans la misère/le silence in poverty/silence;6 ( but) dans un esprit de vengeance in a spirit of revenge; dans l'espoir de in the hope of; dans l'intention de faire with the intention of doing; dans cette optique from this perspective;7 ( approximation) about, around; dans les 30 euros/20%/50 ans about ou around 30 euros/20%/50 years old; ça coûte dans les 1 000 euros it costs about ou around 1,000 euros.[dɑ̃] préposition1. [dans le temps - généralement] in ; [ - insistant sur la durée] during ; [ - dans le futur] in ; [ - indiquant un délai] withindans son enfance in ou during her childhood, when she was a childc'était à la mode dans les années 50 it was fashionable in ou during the 50'sdans dix ans, on ne parlera plus de son livre in ten years ou years' time, his book will be forgottenvous serez livré dans la semaine you'll get the delivery within the week ou some time this weekils ont cherché partout dans la maison they looked through the whole house, they looked everywhere in the housea. [wagon] on the undergroundb. [couloirs] in the undergrounddans le train/l'avion on the train/the planemonte dans la voiture get in ou into the carpartout dans le monde all over the world, the world overje suis bien dans ces chaussures I feel comfortable in these shoes, these shoes are comfortableils se sont couchés dans l'herbe they lay down in ou on the grassdans la brume/pénombre in the mist/darkboire dans un verre to drink out of ou from a glass4. [à travers] through5. [indiquant l'appartenance à un groupe]dans l'enseignement in ou within the teaching professionil est dans mon équipe he's on ou in my team6. [indiquant la manière, l'état]je ne suis pas dans le secret I haven't been let in on ou I'm not in on the secretdans le but de in order to, with the aim ofun contrat rédigé dans les formes légales a contract drawn out ou up in legal terms7. [indiquant une approximation] -
86 закон преломления
neng. formule de Descartes, formule de la réfraction, loi de Snell-Descartes -
87 Cartesian
adj. Cartesianisch (volgens Descartes, Franse filosoof)[ ka:tie:zjn]1 cartesiaans ⇒ van/zoals bij Descartes♦voorbeelden: -
88 latinizzazione
latinizzazione s.f. 1. latinisation. 2. ( forma latinizzata) forme latinisée: Cartesio è la latinizzazione di Descartes Cartesio est la forme latinisée de Descartes. -
89 système
système [siestem]〈m.〉♦voorbeelden:système de référence • referentiekadersystème électoral • kiesstelselsystème nerveux • zenuwstelselsystème philosophique de Descartes • (het) filosofisch denken van Descartespar système • uit gewoonte, systematischm1) systeem, stelsel2) inrichting3) methode -
90 Language
Philosophy is written in that great book, the universe, which is always open, right before our eyes. But one cannot understand this book without first learning to understand the language and to know the characters in which it is written. It is written in the language of mathematics, and the characters are triangles, circles, and other figures. Without these, one cannot understand a single word of it, and just wanders in a dark labyrinth. (Galileo, 1990, p. 232)It never happens that it [a nonhuman animal] arranges its speech in various ways in order to reply appropriately to everything that may be said in its presence, as even the lowest type of man can do. (Descartes, 1970a, p. 116)It is a very remarkable fact that there are none so depraved and stupid, without even excepting idiots, that they cannot arrange different words together, forming of them a statement by which they make known their thoughts; while, on the other hand, there is no other animal, however perfect and fortunately circumstanced it may be, which can do the same. (Descartes, 1967, p. 116)Human beings do not live in the object world alone, nor alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression for their society. It is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially without the use of language and that language is merely an incidental means of solving specific problems of communication or reflection. The fact of the matter is that the "real world" is to a large extent unconsciously built on the language habits of the group.... We see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do because the language habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation. (Sapir, 1921, p. 75)It powerfully conditions all our thinking about social problems and processes.... No two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the same social reality. The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same worlds with different labels attached. (Sapir, 1985, p. 162)[A list of language games, not meant to be exhaustive:]Giving orders, and obeying them- Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements- Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)Reporting an eventSpeculating about an eventForming and testing a hypothesisPresenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagramsMaking up a story; and reading itPlay actingSinging catchesGuessing riddlesMaking a joke; and telling itSolving a problem in practical arithmeticTranslating from one language into anotherLANGUAGE Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, and praying-. (Wittgenstein, 1953, Pt. I, No. 23, pp. 11 e-12 e)We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages.... The world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds-and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds.... No individual is free to describe nature with absolute impartiality but is constrained to certain modes of interpretation even while he thinks himself most free. (Whorf, 1956, pp. 153, 213-214)We dissect nature along the lines laid down by our native languages.The categories and types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do not find there because they stare every observer in the face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds-and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds.... We are thus introduced to a new principle of relativity, which holds that all observers are not led by the same physical evidence to the same picture of the universe, unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar or can in some way be calibrated. (Whorf, 1956, pp. 213-214)9) The Forms of a Person's Thoughts Are Controlled by Unperceived Patterns of His Own LanguageThe forms of a person's thoughts are controlled by inexorable laws of pattern of which he is unconscious. These patterns are the unperceived intricate systematizations of his own language-shown readily enough by a candid comparison and contrast with other languages, especially those of a different linguistic family. (Whorf, 1956, p. 252)It has come to be commonly held that many utterances which look like statements are either not intended at all, or only intended in part, to record or impart straightforward information about the facts.... Many traditional philosophical perplexities have arisen through a mistake-the mistake of taking as straightforward statements of fact utterances which are either (in interesting non-grammatical ways) nonsensical or else intended as something quite different. (Austin, 1962, pp. 2-3)In general, one might define a complex of semantic components connected by logical constants as a concept. The dictionary of a language is then a system of concepts in which a phonological form and certain syntactic and morphological characteristics are assigned to each concept. This system of concepts is structured by several types of relations. It is supplemented, furthermore, by redundancy or implicational rules..., representing general properties of the whole system of concepts.... At least a relevant part of these general rules is not bound to particular languages, but represents presumably universal structures of natural languages. They are not learned, but are rather a part of the human ability to acquire an arbitrary natural language. (Bierwisch, 1970, pp. 171-172)In studying the evolution of mind, we cannot guess to what extent there are physically possible alternatives to, say, transformational generative grammar, for an organism meeting certain other physical conditions characteristic of humans. Conceivably, there are none-or very few-in which case talk about evolution of the language capacity is beside the point. (Chomsky, 1972, p. 98)[It is] truth value rather than syntactic well-formedness that chiefly governs explicit verbal reinforcement by parents-which renders mildly paradoxical the fact that the usual product of such a training schedule is an adult whose speech is highly grammatical but not notably truthful. (R. O. Brown, 1973, p. 330)he conceptual base is responsible for formally representing the concepts underlying an utterance.... A given word in a language may or may not have one or more concepts underlying it.... On the sentential level, the utterances of a given language are encoded within a syntactic structure of that language. The basic construction of the sentential level is the sentence.The next highest level... is the conceptual level. We call the basic construction of this level the conceptualization. A conceptualization consists of concepts and certain relations among those concepts. We can consider that both levels exist at the same point in time and that for any unit on one level, some corresponding realizate exists on the other level. This realizate may be null or extremely complex.... Conceptualizations may relate to other conceptualizations by nesting or other specified relationships. (Schank, 1973, pp. 191-192)The mathematics of multi-dimensional interactive spaces and lattices, the projection of "computer behavior" on to possible models of cerebral functions, the theoretical and mechanical investigation of artificial intelligence, are producing a stream of sophisticated, often suggestive ideas.But it is, I believe, fair to say that nothing put forward until now in either theoretic design or mechanical mimicry comes even remotely in reach of the most rudimentary linguistic realities. (Steiner, 1975, p. 284)The step from the simple tool to the master tool, a tool to make tools (what we would now call a machine tool), seems to me indeed to parallel the final step to human language, which I call reconstitution. It expresses in a practical and social context the same understanding of hierarchy, and shows the same analysis by function as a basis for synthesis. (Bronowski, 1977, pp. 127-128)t is the language donn eґ in which we conduct our lives.... We have no other. And the danger is that formal linguistic models, in their loosely argued analogy with the axiomatic structure of the mathematical sciences, may block perception.... It is quite conceivable that, in language, continuous induction from simple, elemental units to more complex, realistic forms is not justified. The extent and formal "undecidability" of context-and every linguistic particle above the level of the phoneme is context-bound-may make it impossible, except in the most abstract, meta-linguistic sense, to pass from "pro-verbs," "kernals," or "deep deep structures" to actual speech. (Steiner, 1975, pp. 111-113)A higher-level formal language is an abstract machine. (Weizenbaum, 1976, p. 113)Jakobson sees metaphor and metonymy as the characteristic modes of binarily opposed polarities which between them underpin the two-fold process of selection and combination by which linguistic signs are formed.... Thus messages are constructed, as Saussure said, by a combination of a "horizontal" movement, which combines words together, and a "vertical" movement, which selects the particular words from the available inventory or "inner storehouse" of the language. The combinative (or syntagmatic) process manifests itself in contiguity (one word being placed next to another) and its mode is metonymic. The selective (or associative) process manifests itself in similarity (one word or concept being "like" another) and its mode is metaphoric. The "opposition" of metaphor and metonymy therefore may be said to represent in effect the essence of the total opposition between the synchronic mode of language (its immediate, coexistent, "vertical" relationships) and its diachronic mode (its sequential, successive, lineal progressive relationships). (Hawkes, 1977, pp. 77-78)It is striking that the layered structure that man has given to language constantly reappears in his analyses of nature. (Bronowski, 1977, p. 121)First, [an ideal intertheoretic reduction] provides us with a set of rules"correspondence rules" or "bridge laws," as the standard vernacular has it-which effect a mapping of the terms of the old theory (T o) onto a subset of the expressions of the new or reducing theory (T n). These rules guide the application of those selected expressions of T n in the following way: we are free to make singular applications of their correspondencerule doppelgangers in T o....Second, and equally important, a successful reduction ideally has the outcome that, under the term mapping effected by the correspondence rules, the central principles of T o (those of semantic and systematic importance) are mapped onto general sentences of T n that are theorems of Tn. (P. Churchland, 1979, p. 81)If non-linguistic factors must be included in grammar: beliefs, attitudes, etc. [this would] amount to a rejection of the initial idealization of language as an object of study. A priori such a move cannot be ruled out, but it must be empirically motivated. If it proves to be correct, I would conclude that language is a chaos that is not worth studying.... Note that the question is not whether beliefs or attitudes, and so on, play a role in linguistic behavior and linguistic judgments... [but rather] whether distinct cognitive structures can be identified, which interact in the real use of language and linguistic judgments, the grammatical system being one of these. (Chomsky, 1979, pp. 140, 152-153)23) Language Is Inevitably Influenced by Specific Contexts of Human InteractionLanguage cannot be studied in isolation from the investigation of "rationality." It cannot afford to neglect our everyday assumptions concerning the total behavior of a reasonable person.... An integrational linguistics must recognize that human beings inhabit a communicational space which is not neatly compartmentalized into language and nonlanguage.... It renounces in advance the possibility of setting up systems of forms and meanings which will "account for" a central core of linguistic behavior irrespective of the situation and communicational purposes involved. (Harris, 1981, p. 165)By innate [linguistic knowledge], Chomsky simply means "genetically programmed." He does not literally think that children are born with language in their heads ready to be spoken. He merely claims that a "blueprint is there, which is brought into use when the child reaches a certain point in her general development. With the help of this blueprint, she analyzes the language she hears around her more readily than she would if she were totally unprepared for the strange gabbling sounds which emerge from human mouths. (Aitchison, 1987, p. 31)Looking at ourselves from the computer viewpoint, we cannot avoid seeing that natural language is our most important "programming language." This means that a vast portion of our knowledge and activity is, for us, best communicated and understood in our natural language.... One could say that natural language was our first great original artifact and, since, as we increasingly realize, languages are machines, so natural language, with our brains to run it, was our primal invention of the universal computer. One could say this except for the sneaking suspicion that language isn't something we invented but something we became, not something we constructed but something in which we created, and recreated, ourselves. (Leiber, 1991, p. 8)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Language
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91 Mind-body Problem
From this I knew that I was a substance the whole essence or nature of which is to think, and that for its existence there is no need of any place, nor does it depend on any material thing; so that this "me," that is to say, the soul by which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from body, and is even more easy to know than is the latter; and even if body were not, the soul would not cease to be what it is. (Descartes, 1970a, p. 101)still remains to be explained how that union and apparent intermingling [of mind and body]... can be found in you, if you are incorporeal, unextended and indivisible.... How, at least, can you be united with the brain, or some minute part in it, which (as has been said) must yet have some magnitude or extension, however small it be? If you are wholly without parts how can you mix or appear to mix with its minute subdivisions? For there is no mixture unless each of the things to be mixed has parts that can mix with one another. (Gassendi, 1970, p. 201)here are... certain things which we experience in ourselves and which should be attributed neither to the mind nor body alone, but to the close and intimate union that exists between the body and the mind.... Such are the appetites of hunger, thirst, etc., and also the emotions or passions of the mind which do not subsist in mind or thought alone... and finally all the sensations. (Descartes, 1970b, p. 238)With any other sort of mind, absolute Intelligence, Mind unattached to a particular body, or Mind not subject to the course of time, the psychologist as such has nothing to do. (James, 1890, p. 183)[The] intention is to furnish a psychology that shall be a natural science: that is to represent psychical processes as quantitatively determinate states of specifiable material particles, thus making these processes perspicuous and free from contradiction. (Freud, 1966, p. 295)The thesis is that the mental is nomologically irreducible: there may be true general statements relating the mental and the physical, statements that have the logical form of a law; but they are not lawlike (in a strong sense to be described). If by absurdly remote chance we were to stumble on a non-stochastic true psychophysical generalization, we would have no reason to believe it more than roughly true. (Davidson, 1970, p. 90)We can divide those who uphold the doctrine that men are machines, or a similar doctrine, into two categories: those who deny the existence of mental events, or personal experiences, or of consciousness;... and those who admit the existence of mental events, but assert that they are "epiphenomena"-that everything can be explained without them, since the material world is causally closed. (Popper & Eccles, 1977, p. 5)Mind affects brain and brain affects mind. That is the message, and by accepting it you commit yourself to a special view of the world. It is a view that shows the limits of the genetic imperative on what we turn out to be, both intellectually and emotionally. It decrees that, while the secrets of our genes express themselves with force throughout our lives, the effect of that information on our bodies can be influenced by our psychological history and beliefs about the world. And, just as important, the other side of the same coin argues that what we construct in our minds as objective reality may simply be our interpretations of certain bodily states dictated by our genes and expressed through our physical brains and body. Put differently, various attributes of mind that seem to have a purely psychological origin are frequently a product of the brain's interpreter rationalizing genetically driven body states. Make no mistake about it: this two-sided view of mind-brain interactions, if adopted, has implications for the management of one's personal life. (Gazzaniga, 1988, p. 229)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Mind-body Problem
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92 Thinking
But what then am I? A thing which thinks. What is a thing which thinks? It is a thing which doubts, understands, [conceives], affirms, denies, wills, refuses, which also imagines and feels. (Descartes, 1951, p. 153)I have been trying in all this to remove the temptation to think that there "must be" a mental process of thinking, hoping, wishing, believing, etc., independent of the process of expressing a thought, a hope, a wish, etc.... If we scrutinize the usages which we make of "thinking," "meaning," "wishing," etc., going through this process rids us of the temptation to look for a peculiar act of thinking, independent of the act of expressing our thoughts, and stowed away in some particular medium. (Wittgenstein, 1958, pp. 41-43)Analyse the proofs employed by the subject. If they do not go beyond observation of empirical correspondences, they can be fully explained in terms of concrete operations, and nothing would warrant our assuming that more complex thought mechanisms are operating. If, on the other hand, the subject interprets a given correspondence as the result of any one of several possible combinations, and this leads him to verify his hypotheses by observing their consequences, we know that propositional operations are involved. (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958, p. 279)In every age, philosophical thinking exploits some dominant concepts and makes its greatest headway in solving problems conceived in terms of them. The seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophers construed knowledge, knower, and known in terms of sense data and their association. Descartes' self-examination gave classical psychology the mind and its contents as a starting point. Locke set up sensory immediacy as the new criterion of the real... Hobbes provided the genetic method of building up complex ideas from simple ones... and, in another quarter, still true to the Hobbesian method, Pavlov built intellect out of conditioned reflexes and Loeb built life out of tropisms. (S. Langer, 1962, p. 54)Experiments on deductive reasoning show that subjects are influenced sufficiently by their experience for their reasoning to differ from that described by a purely deductive system, whilst experiments on inductive reasoning lead to the view that an understanding of the strategies used by adult subjects in attaining concepts involves reference to higher-order concepts of a logical and deductive nature. (Bolton, 1972, p. 154)There are now machines in the world that think, that learn and create. Moreover, their ability to do these things is going to increase rapidly until-in the visible future-the range of problems they can handle will be coextensive with the range to which the human mind has been applied. (Newell & Simon, quoted in Weizenbaum, 1976, p. 138)But how does it happen that thinking is sometimes accompanied by action and sometimes not, sometimes by motion, and sometimes not? It looks as if almost the same thing happens as in the case of reasoning and making inferences about unchanging objects. But in that case the end is a speculative proposition... whereas here the conclusion which results from the two premises is an action.... I need covering; a cloak is a covering. I need a cloak. What I need, I have to make; I need a cloak. I have to make a cloak. And the conclusion, the "I have to make a cloak," is an action. (Nussbaum, 1978, p. 40)It is well to remember that when philosophy emerged in Greece in the sixth century, B.C., it did not burst suddenly out of the Mediterranean blue. The development of societies of reasoning creatures-what we call civilization-had been a process to be measured not in thousands but in millions of years. Human beings became civilized as they became reasonable, and for an animal to begin to reason and to learn how to improve its reasoning is a long, slow process. So thinking had been going on for ages before Greece-slowly improving itself, uncovering the pitfalls to be avoided by forethought, endeavoring to weigh alternative sets of consequences intellectually. What happened in the sixth century, B.C., is that thinking turned round on itself; people began to think about thinking, and the momentous event, the culmination of the long process to that point, was in fact the birth of philosophy. (Lipman, Sharp & Oscanyan, 1980, p. xi)The way to look at thought is not to assume that there is a parallel thread of correlated affects or internal experiences that go with it in some regular way. It's not of course that people don't have internal experiences, of course they do; but that when you ask what is the state of mind of someone, say while he or she is performing a ritual, it's hard to believe that such experiences are the same for all people involved.... The thinking, and indeed the feeling in an odd sort of way, is really going on in public. They are really saying what they're saying, doing what they're doing, meaning what they're meaning. Thought is, in great part anyway, a public activity. (Geertz, quoted in J. Miller, 1983, pp. 202-203)Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler. (Einstein, quoted in Minsky, 1986, p. 17)What, in effect, are the conditions for the construction of formal thought? The child must not only apply operations to objects-in other words, mentally execute possible actions on them-he must also "reflect" those operations in the absence of the objects which are replaced by pure propositions. Thus, "reflection" is thought raised to the second power. Concrete thinking is the representation of a possible action, and formal thinking is the representation of a representation of possible action.... It is not surprising, therefore, that the system of concrete operations must be completed during the last years of childhood before it can be "reflected" by formal operations. In terms of their function, formal operations do not differ from concrete operations except that they are applied to hypotheses or propositions [whose logic is] an abstract translation of the system of "inference" that governs concrete operations. (Piaget, quoted in Minsky, 1986, p. 237)[E]ven a human being today (hence, a fortiori, a remote ancestor of contemporary human beings) cannot easily or ordinarily maintain uninterrupted attention on a single problem for more than a few tens of seconds. Yet we work on problems that require vastly more time. The way we do that (as we can observe by watching ourselves) requires periods of mulling to be followed by periods of recapitulation, describing to ourselves what seems to have gone on during the mulling, leading to whatever intermediate results we have reached. This has an obvious function: namely, by rehearsing these interim results... we commit them to memory, for the immediate contents of the stream of consciousness are very quickly lost unless rehearsed.... Given language, we can describe to ourselves what seemed to occur during the mulling that led to a judgment, produce a rehearsable version of the reaching-a-judgment process, and commit that to long-term memory by in fact rehearsing it. (Margolis, 1987, p. 60)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Thinking
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93 декартов лист
Большой англо-русский и русско-английский словарь > декартов лист
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94 folium
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95 Декарт
p.n. Descartes -
96 лист
m. sheet, leaf; лист Мёбиуса, M декартов лист, folium of Descartes -
97 трезубец
m. trident; трезубец Ньютона, trident of Newton (or Descartes)Русско-английский словарь математических терминов > трезубец
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98 dans
1. prépcourir dans la rue — бежать по улицеse trouver dans la cour — находиться во двореlire dans un livre — читать в книгеêtre dans l'enseignement — быть преподавателемon trouve cela dans (l'œuvre de) Descartes — это можно найти у Декартаcaché dans l'ombre — скрытый в тениtomber dans la mer — упасть в мореs'introduire dans l'appartement — проникнуть в квартируil est entré dans la magistrature — он поступил служить в судебное ведомство3) действие и время его совершенияréveiller dans la nuit — разбудить ночью, среди ночиsoigner dans la maladie — ухаживать во время болезни4) действие и его совершение в определённый момент в будущемvenir dans un mois — приехать через месяц5) действие и его качественную характеристику или обстоятельства, при которых оно совершаетсяvivre dans de bons rapports — быть в хороших отношениях, жить в мире и согласииagir dans les règles — действовать по правиламil pèse dans les soixante — в нём около шестидесяти килограммовcela coûterait dans les 50 francs — это будет стоить примерно 50 франковpeindre dans les bleus — писать в синих тонах2. prép2) способ, характеристикуédifice dans le style du XVIII siècle — здание в стиле XVIII векаdans l'espoir de... — в надежде на... -
99 Cartesius
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100 deism
сущ.фил. деизм (религиозно-философская доктрина, которая признает бога как мировой разум, сконструировавший целесообразную "машину" природы и давший ей законы и движение, но отвергает дальнейшее вмешательство бога в самодвижение природы и не допускает иных путей к познанию бога кроме разума; получил распространение среди мыслителей Просвещения, сыграл значительную роль в развитии свободомыслия в 17-18 вв.)See:
См. также в других словарях:
DESCARTES (R.) — René Descartes est à la fois le plus célèbre et le plus grand des philosophes français. En France, cependant, sa célébrité ne tient pas toujours à son génie, mais à une simplification désastreuse de sa doctrine, où l’on ne voit qu’un rationalisme … Encyclopédie Universelle
Descartes — [de kart], René, latinisiert Renatus Cartesius, französischer Philosoph, Mathematiker und Naturwissenschaftler, * La Haye (heute Descartes, Département Indre et Loire) 31. 3. 1596, ✝ Stockholm 11. 2. 1650. Aus altem Adelsgeschlecht stammend,… … Universal-Lexikon
Descartes — (d[asl]*k[aum]rt ) prop. n. Ren[ e] Descartes, a French philosopher and mathematician, born 159, died 1650. See biography, below. Syn: Rene Descartes. [WordNet 1.5] Descartes, Ren[ e] (Latinized Renatus Cartesius). Born at La Haye, Touraine,… … The Collaborative International Dictionary of English
Descartes — V. «diablillo de Descartes, folio de Descartes». * * * Descartes. □ V. folio de Descartes. * * * Descartes, René … Enciclopedia Universal
Descartes — (René) (1596 1650) philosophe et savant français. Il fait ses études chez les jésuites au collège de La Flèche (1604 1612) puis étudie le droit, avant de s engager dans l armée hollandaise et au service de l électeur de Bavière. Après les Règles… … Encyclopédie Universelle
Descartes — (spr. däkart ), René (Renatus Cartesius), der Begründer der neuern dogmatisch rationalistischen Philosophie und der scharfsinnigste Denker der Franzosen, geb. 31. März 1596 zu La Haye in Touraine als Sohn eines Parlamentsrats, gest. 11. Febr.… … Meyers Großes Konversations-Lexikon
Descartes — (frz. Däkart), René, latinisirt Cartesius, Vater der neueren Philosophie und berühmter Mathematiker, wurde 1596 zu la Haye in Touraine aus reicher Adelsfamilie geb. und seit 1604 von den Jesuiten erzogen. Die Schrift De musica bewährte ihn als… … Herders Conversations-Lexikon
Descartes — ☛ V. folio de Descartes … Diccionario de la lengua española
Descartes — (spr. Däkart), René (Renatus Cartesius), geb. 31. März 1596 zu la Haye in Touraine, wendete Anfangs im Jesuitencollegium zu Laflèche großen Fleiß auf die Wissenschaften, allein bald glaubte er zu bemerken, daß sie, mit Ausnahme der Mathematik u.… … Pierer's Universal-Lexikon
Descartes — (spr. däkárt), René, gewöhnlich Renatus Cartesius genannt, Philosoph, geb. 31. März 1596 zu Lahaye in Touraine, 1629 49 in Holland; von der Königin Christine nach Stockholm berufen, gest. das. 11. Febr. 1650; der scharfsinnigste Denker der… … Kleines Konversations-Lexikon
Descartes — Descartes, René … Philosophy dictionary