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41 provided that

1. при условии если; при условии что; если только

to state authoritatively that … — авторитетно заявить, что …

the theory prevails that … — существует теория о том, что …

the story goes that he was murdered — говорят, что его убили

it is my considered opinion that … — я твёрдо убеждён, что …

I happen to know that … — мне случайно стало известно, что …

2. при условии что

fact that — то; что

is that — в том что

such that — так что

what's that — что это

so that — с тем; чтобы

Синонимический ряд:

providing that (other) as long as; if; if and only if; only if; providing that; with the proviso that

English-Russian base dictionary > provided that
42 blink the fact

expr infml esp BrE

There is no blinking the fact that secondary education has so far failed to develop as a going concern — Нельзя отрицать того факта, что среднее образование пока не получило должного развития

Our business is on the decline and we can't blink the fact any longer — Дела нашей фирмы идут плохо, и мы не можем больше закрывать глаза на это

The new dictionary of modern spoken language > blink the fact
43 guns and butter

амер.; полит.

политика "пушек и масла" (политика, основанная на стремлении осуществить как военную, так и внутриэкономическую программы) [выражение появилось в 60-х г. XX в., когда США вели войну во Вьетнаме и одновременно пытались осуществить программу "Великое общество" президента Л. Джонсона. Выражение является видоизменением оборота guns before butter]

...while it may be true technically and from a monetary point of view that you can have guns and butter, it is a fact of life that where your heart is there your money will go, and the heart of Administration is in the war in Vietnam. (D. Martin Luther King, Jr, ‘The New York Times’, DNE) —...технически и с финансовой точки зрения, может быть, и возможно совместить пушки и масло, но факт остается фактом, что деньги идут на то, к чему лежит ваша душа, а душа американской администрации лежит к войне во Вьетнаме.

President Johnson is finding it hard to keep Congress sold on the idea of "guns and butter" in this war period. (‘US News and World Report’) — Во время войны президенту Джонсону было нелегко все время убеждать конгресс в правильности правительственной политики "пушек и масла"

Large English-Russian phrasebook > guns and butter
44 well and good

разг.

ну что же, ну и прекрасно, ну и ладно; тем лучше

Liconda (with some acerbity): "You have done what you thought your duty, Miss Wayland. Well and good. If now you have other things to do, I don't think we need take up any more of your time." (W. S. Maugham, ‘The Sacred Flame’, act III) — Ликонда (резко): "Вы, мисс Уэйланд, считаете, что выполнили свой долг. Ну и прекрасно. Если у вас нет других дел, мы вас больше не задерживаем."

‘If you want me to stay - well and good,’ Dinny said. ‘You don't have to worry about me, ma'am. I'll always be standin' by if you need me.’ (K. S. Prichard, ‘Golden Miles’, ch. 54) — - Раз вы хотите, чтобы я остался, - ладно, - сказал Динни. - Не надо огорчаться из-за меня, мэм. Я всегда буду рядом на случай, если понадоблюсь вам.

All you can say for this place is that it's a long way from anywhere, and if that fact keeps you excited, well and good. But it wouldn't me. (J. B. Priestley, ‘Faraway’, ch. VII) — Одно можно сказать об этом острове - то, что он расположен на краю света. Если вас это волнует, тем лучше. Но мне это все равно.

Large English-Russian phrasebook > well and good
45 the sum and substance of smth.

самая суть чего-л., квинтэссенция чего-л.

The sum and substance of the letter was that there was no hope... (Th. Dreiser, ‘Sister Carrie’, ch. XXIX) — Смысл письма был вполне ясен: больше Герствуду надеяться не на что...

In fact, the sum and substance of all those years and efforts was that she lived alone was visited by no true friend. (Th. Dreiser, ‘The Stoic’, ch. 75) — В самом деле, к чему свелся смысл ее существования в эти годы? Она жила одна, и у нее не было настоящих друзей.

Large English-Russian phrasebook > the sum and substance of smth.
46 providing that

при условии что

it is a truism that … — общеизвестно, что …

on the grounds that — на том основании, что

the court held that … — суд признал, что …

by reason of the fact that — из-за того, что

my submission is that … — я утверждаю, что …

Синонимический ряд:

as long as (other) as long as; if; if and only if; only if; provided that; with the proviso that

English-Russian base dictionary > providing that
47 serve God and Mammon

книжн.

служить Богу и мамоне [этим. библ. Matthew VI, 24]

It was indeed a cause for rejoicing that in disposing of their personal enemies they had done an important service to the Church. They proved thus that it was in point of fact possible to serve God and Mammon. (W. S. Maugham, ‘Then and Now’, ch. XXXI) — Было чему радоваться: ведь избавившись от своих личных врагов, они оказали большую услугу церкви, доказав тем самым, что можно и впрямь одновременно служить Богу и мамоне.

Large English-Russian phrasebook > serve God and Mammon
48 right and left

1) везде, повсюду; во все стороны; со всех сторон, отовсюду; направо и налево, без разбору

I have been borrowing money right and left. (U. Sinclair, ‘The Moneychangers’, ch. XXIII) — Я занимал деньги у кого только мог.

The trusts made enemies right and left... (W. Lippman, ‘Drift and Mastery’, ch. VII) — Тресты везде создавали себе врагов...

As for the big motor firms, they aim to put the entire burden of the crises on the soulders of the workers. They have made hundreds of millions of pounds in profits since the war. Yet at the first sign of difficulties they sack workers right and left. (‘Daily Worker’) — Что касается крупных автомобильных фирм, то они стремятся переложить все бремя кризисов на плечи рабочих. Владельцы этих фирм заработали после войны сотни миллионов фунтов. Тем не менее, как только возникают трудности, рабочих повсеместно увольняют.

2) направо и налево, безрассудно, не считаясь ни с кем и ни с чем, без зазрения совести

I've known you seven year [= years], and you've always seemed sensible till now. And now you're just letting them rob you right and left. (J. London, ‘Burning Daylight’, part I, ch. XI) —...я тебя знал семь лет, и до сего дня ты мне всегда казался человеком разумным. А теперь ты даешь себя грабить всем, кому не лень.

But I found he was robbing us right and left, so I had to turn him out. (W. S. Maugham, ‘Complete Short Stories’, ‘A Man from Glasgow’) — Когда я узнал, что испанец без зазрения совести обкрадывал меня, мне пришлось его выставить.

Police made much of the fact that for the past eighteen months Arlene Duvall had been living a life of leisure, spending money right and left with carefree abandon, money which she certainly had not earned and the possession of which she ‘could not explain.’ (E. S. Gardner, ‘The Case of the Sunbather's Diary’, ch. 2) — Полиция придавала большое значение тому, что за последние полтора года Арлин Дюваль вела праздную жизнь, сорила деньгами направо и налево, хотя сама ничего не заработала и не могла объяснить, откуда у нее эти деньги.

Large English-Russian phrasebook > right and left
49 hot and bothered

adj infml

1)

Now don't just get all that hot and bothered — Только, пожалуйста, не нервничай

2)

He gets hot and bothered whenever this girl is around — В присутствии этой девушки он начинает смущаться

3)

She seems to be hot and bothered and you should know the reason why — Она в последнее время какая-то нервная - наверное, у нее давно не было мужчины

This book is more than a little naughty - in fact it's quite steamy and sensual, and may very well get the customs officials all hot and bothered — Эта книга не просто игривая, а довольно чувственная и эротическая, так что у таможенников может возникнуть определенное чувство, когда они ее полистают

The new dictionary of modern spoken language > hot and bothered
50 right and left

   1) нaпpaвo и нaлeвo, вeздe, пoвcюду; вo вce cтopoны; co вcex cтopoн, oтoвcюду

    The trusts made enemies right and left (W. Lippmann). I have been borrowing money right and left (U. Sinchair)

   2) нaпpaвo и нaлeвo, бeзpaccуднo, нe cчитaяcь ни c кeм и ни c чeм, бeз зaзpeния coвecти

    Police made much of the fact that for the past eighteen months Arlene Duvall had been living a life of leisure, spending money right and left with carefree abandon, money which she certainly had not earned and the possession of which she could not explain (E. S. Gardner). But I found he was robbing us right and left, so I had to turn him out (W. S. Maugham)

Concise English-Russian phrasebook > right and left
51 it follows from the fact that f is a polynomial and

Математика: это следует из факта, что (...)

Универсальный англо-русский словарь > it follows from the fact that f is a polynomial and
52 Believe that life is worth living, and your belief will help create the fact.

<01> Поверь в тот факт, что есть ради чего жить, и твоя вера поможет этому факту свершиться. James (Джемс).

Англо-русский словарь цитат, пословиц, поговорок и идиом > Believe that life is worth living, and your belief will help create the fact.
53 all these complexities and apparent difficulties ... are offset by the fact that ...

• все эти сложности и очевидные трудности являются компенсацией тому, что...

English-Russian dictionary of phrases and cliches for a specialist researcher > all these complexities and apparent difficulties ... are offset by the fact that ...
54 Language

   1) The Book of Nature Is Written in the Language of Mathematics

   Philosophy is written in that great book, the universe, which is always open, right before our eyes. But one cannot understand this book without first learning to understand the language and to know the characters in which it is written. It is written in the language of mathematics, and the characters are triangles, circles, and other figures. Without these, one cannot understand a single word of it, and just wanders in a dark labyrinth. (Galileo, 1990, p. 232)

   2) Arranging Speech so as to Reply Appropriately

   It never happens that it [a nonhuman animal] arranges its speech in various ways in order to reply appropriately to everything that may be said in its presence, as even the lowest type of man can do. (Descartes, 1970a, p. 116)

   3) No Other Animal Has the Language Capacity of the Human

   It is a very remarkable fact that there are none so depraved and stupid, without even excepting idiots, that they cannot arrange different words together, forming of them a statement by which they make known their thoughts; while, on the other hand, there is no other animal, however perfect and fortunately circumstanced it may be, which can do the same. (Descartes, 1967, p. 116)

   4) Human Beings Do Not Live Only in the World of Objects

   Human beings do not live in the object world alone, nor alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression for their society. It is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially without the use of language and that language is merely an incidental means of solving specific problems of communication or reﬂection. The fact of the matter is that the "real world" is to a large extent unconsciously built on the language habits of the group.... We see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do because the language habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation. (Sapir, 1921, p. 75)

   5) Language Powerfully Conditions All Our Thinking

   It powerfully conditions all our thinking about social problems and processes.... No two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the same social reality. The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same worlds with different labels attached. (Sapir, 1985, p. 162)

   6) A List of Language Games

   [A list of language games, not meant to be exhaustive:]

   Giving orders, and obeying them- Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements- Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)Reporting an eventSpeculating about an eventForming and testing a hypothesisPresenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagramsMaking up a story; and reading itPlay actingSinging catchesGuessing riddlesMaking a joke; and telling it

   Solving a problem in practical arithmeticTranslating from one language into another

   LANGUAGE Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, and praying-. (Wittgenstein, 1953, Pt. I, No. 23, pp. 11 e-12 e)

   7) Language Constrains Certain Modes of Interpretation

   We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages.... The world is presented in a kaleidoscopic ﬂux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds-and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds.... No individual is free to describe nature with absolute impartiality but is constrained to certain modes of interpretation even while he thinks himself most free. (Whorf, 1956, pp. 153, 213-214)

   8) We Dissect Nature in Accordance with Our Native Languages

   We dissect nature along the lines laid down by our native languages.

   The categories and types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do not find there because they stare every observer in the face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic ﬂux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds-and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds.... We are thus introduced to a new principle of relativity, which holds that all observers are not led by the same physical evidence to the same picture of the universe, unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar or can in some way be calibrated. (Whorf, 1956, pp. 213-214)

   9) The Forms of a Person's Thoughts Are Controlled by Unperceived Patterns of His Own Language

   The forms of a person's thoughts are controlled by inexorable laws of pattern of which he is unconscious. These patterns are the unperceived intricate systematizations of his own language-shown readily enough by a candid comparison and contrast with other languages, especially those of a different linguistic family. (Whorf, 1956, p. 252)

    10) The Analysis of Certain Types of Utterances

   It has come to be commonly held that many utterances which look like statements are either not intended at all, or only intended in part, to record or impart straightforward information about the facts.... Many traditional philosophical perplexities have arisen through a mistake-the mistake of taking as straightforward statements of fact utterances which are either (in interesting non-grammatical ways) nonsensical or else intended as something quite different. (Austin, 1962, pp. 2-3)

    11) The Dictionary of a Language Is a System of Concepts

   In general, one might define a complex of semantic components connected by logical constants as a concept. The dictionary of a language is then a system of concepts in which a phonological form and certain syntactic and morphological characteristics are assigned to each concept. This system of concepts is structured by several types of relations. It is supplemented, furthermore, by redundancy or implicational rules..., representing general properties of the whole system of concepts.... At least a relevant part of these general rules is not bound to particular languages, but represents presumably universal structures of natural languages. They are not learned, but are rather a part of the human ability to acquire an arbitrary natural language. (Bierwisch, 1970, pp. 171-172)

    12) Talk about the Evolution of the Language Capacity is Beside the Point

   In studying the evolution of mind, we cannot guess to what extent there are physically possible alternatives to, say, transformational generative grammar, for an organism meeting certain other physical conditions characteristic of humans. Conceivably, there are none-or very few-in which case talk about evolution of the language capacity is beside the point. (Chomsky, 1972, p. 98)

    13) The Development of Language

   [It is] truth value rather than syntactic well-formedness that chieﬂy governs explicit verbal reinforcement by parents-which renders mildly paradoxical the fact that the usual product of such a training schedule is an adult whose speech is highly grammatical but not notably truthful. (R. O. Brown, 1973, p. 330)

    14) Sentential and Conceptual Levels in Language

   he conceptual base is responsible for formally representing the concepts underlying an utterance.... A given word in a language may or may not have one or more concepts underlying it.... On the sentential level, the utterances of a given language are encoded within a syntactic structure of that language. The basic construction of the sentential level is the sentence.

   The next highest level... is the conceptual level. We call the basic construction of this level the conceptualization. A conceptualization consists of concepts and certain relations among those concepts. We can consider that both levels exist at the same point in time and that for any unit on one level, some corresponding realizate exists on the other level. This realizate may be null or extremely complex.... Conceptualizations may relate to other conceptualizations by nesting or other specified relationships. (Schank, 1973, pp. 191-192)

    15) Linguistic Realities Have Not Yet Been Captured by Theoretical Models

   The mathematics of multi-dimensional interactive spaces and lattices, the projection of "computer behavior" on to possible models of cerebral functions, the theoretical and mechanical investigation of artificial intelligence, are producing a stream of sophisticated, often suggestive ideas.

   But it is, I believe, fair to say that nothing put forward until now in either theoretic design or mechanical mimicry comes even remotely in reach of the most rudimentary linguistic realities. (Steiner, 1975, p. 284)

    16) The Final Steps to Human Language

   The step from the simple tool to the master tool, a tool to make tools (what we would now call a machine tool), seems to me indeed to parallel the final step to human language, which I call reconstitution. It expresses in a practical and social context the same understanding of hierarchy, and shows the same analysis by function as a basis for synthesis. (Bronowski, 1977, pp. 127-128)

    17) The Inadequacy of Formal Linguistic Models for Ordinary Language Usage

    t is the language donn eґ in which we conduct our lives.... We have no other. And the danger is that formal linguistic models, in their loosely argued analogy with the axiomatic structure of the mathematical sciences, may block perception.... It is quite conceivable that, in language, continuous induction from simple, elemental units to more complex, realistic forms is not justified. The extent and formal "undecidability" of context-and every linguistic particle above the level of the phoneme is context-bound-may make it impossible, except in the most abstract, meta-linguistic sense, to pass from "pro-verbs," "kernals," or "deep deep structures" to actual speech. (Steiner, 1975, pp. 111-113)

    18) When a Language Is an Abstract Machine

   A higher-level formal language is an abstract machine. (Weizenbaum, 1976, p. 113)

    19) Metaphor and Metonymy Underpin the Formation of Linguistic Signs

   Jakobson sees metaphor and metonymy as the characteristic modes of binarily opposed polarities which between them underpin the two-fold process of selection and combination by which linguistic signs are formed.... Thus messages are constructed, as Saussure said, by a combination of a "horizontal" movement, which combines words together, and a "vertical" movement, which selects the particular words from the available inventory or "inner storehouse" of the language. The combinative (or syntagmatic) process manifests itself in contiguity (one word being placed next to another) and its mode is metonymic. The selective (or associative) process manifests itself in similarity (one word or concept being "like" another) and its mode is metaphoric. The "opposition" of metaphor and metonymy therefore may be said to represent in effect the essence of the total opposition between the synchronic mode of language (its immediate, coexistent, "vertical" relationships) and its diachronic mode (its sequential, successive, lineal progressive relationships). (Hawkes, 1977, pp. 77-78)

    20) Language and the Analysis of Nature

   It is striking that the layered structure that man has given to language constantly reappears in his analyses of nature. (Bronowski, 1977, p. 121)

    21) Correspondence Rules for Mapping Old Theory into Subsets of New Theory

   First, [an ideal intertheoretic reduction] provides us with a set of rules"correspondence rules" or "bridge laws," as the standard vernacular has it-which effect a mapping of the terms of the old theory (T o) onto a subset of the expressions of the new or reducing theory (T n). These rules guide the application of those selected expressions of T n in the following way: we are free to make singular applications of their correspondencerule doppelgangers in T o....

   Second, and equally important, a successful reduction ideally has the outcome that, under the term mapping effected by the correspondence rules, the central principles of T o (those of semantic and systematic importance) are mapped onto general sentences of T n that are theorems of Tn. (P. Churchland, 1979, p. 81)

    22) The Inclusion of Non- linguistic Factors in a Theory of Grammar

   If non-linguistic factors must be included in grammar: beliefs, attitudes, etc. [this would] amount to a rejection of the initial idealization of language as an object of study. A priori such a move cannot be ruled out, but it must be empirically motivated. If it proves to be correct, I would conclude that language is a chaos that is not worth studying.... Note that the question is not whether beliefs or attitudes, and so on, play a role in linguistic behavior and linguistic judgments... [but rather] whether distinct cognitive structures can be identified, which interact in the real use of language and linguistic judgments, the grammatical system being one of these. (Chomsky, 1979, pp. 140, 152-153)

    23) Language Is Inevitably Inﬂuenced by Specific Contexts of Human Interaction

   Language cannot be studied in isolation from the investigation of "rationality." It cannot afford to neglect our everyday assumptions concerning the total behavior of a reasonable person.... An integrational linguistics must recognize that human beings inhabit a communicational space which is not neatly compartmentalized into language and nonlanguage.... It renounces in advance the possibility of setting up systems of forms and meanings which will "account for" a central core of linguistic behavior irrespective of the situation and communicational purposes involved. (Harris, 1981, p. 165)

    24) The Genetic Blueprints of Language

   By innate [linguistic knowledge], Chomsky simply means "genetically programmed." He does not literally think that children are born with language in their heads ready to be spoken. He merely claims that a "blueprint is there, which is brought into use when the child reaches a certain point in her general development. With the help of this blueprint, she analyzes the language she hears around her more readily than she would if she were totally unprepared for the strange gabbling sounds which emerge from human mouths. (Aitchison, 1987, p. 31)

    25) Languages Are Machines

   Looking at ourselves from the computer viewpoint, we cannot avoid seeing that natural language is our most important "programming language." This means that a vast portion of our knowledge and activity is, for us, best communicated and understood in our natural language.... One could say that natural language was our first great original artifact and, since, as we increasingly realize, languages are machines, so natural language, with our brains to run it, was our primal invention of the universal computer. One could say this except for the sneaking suspicion that language isn't something we invented but something we became, not something we constructed but something in which we created, and recreated, ourselves. (Leiber, 1991, p. 8)

Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Language
55 Economy

   Portugal's economy, under the influence of the European Economic Community (EEC), and later with the assistance of the European Union (EU), grew rapidly in 1985-86; through 1992, the average annual growth was 4-5 percent. While such growth rates did not last into the late 1990s, portions of Portugal's society achieved unprecedented prosperity, although poverty remained entrenched. It is important, however, to place this current growth, which includes some not altogether desirable developments, in historical perspective. On at least three occasions in this century, Portugal's economy has experienced severe dislocation and instability: during the turbulent First Republic (1911-25); during the Estado Novo, when the world Depression came into play (1930-39); and during the aftermath of the Revolution of 25 April, 1974. At other periods, and even during the Estado Novo, there were eras of relatively steady growth and development, despite the fact that Portugal's weak economy lagged behind industrialized Western Europe's economies, perhaps more than Prime Minister Antônio de Oliveira Salazar wished to admit to the public or to foreigners.

   For a number of reasons, Portugal's backward economy underwent considerable growth and development following the beginning of the colonial wars in Africa in early 1961. Recent research findings suggest that, contrary to the "stagnation thesis" that states that the Estado Novo economy during the last 14 years of its existence experienced little or no growth, there were important changes, policy shifts, structural evolution, and impressive growth rates. In fact, the average annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate (1961-74) was about 7 percent. The war in Africa was one significant factor in the post-1961 economic changes. The new costs of finance and spending on the military and police actions in the African and Asian empires in 1961 and thereafter forced changes in economic policy.

   Starting in 1963-64, the relatively closed economy was opened up to foreign investment, and Lisbon began to use deficit financing and more borrowing at home and abroad. Increased foreign investment, residence, and technical and military assistance also had effects on economic growth and development. Salazar's government moved toward greater trade and integration with various international bodies by signing agreements with the European Free Trade Association and several international finance groups. New multinational corporations began to operate in the country, along with foreign-based banks. Meanwhile, foreign tourism increased massively from the early 1960s on, and the tourism industry experienced unprecedented expansion. By 1973-74, Portugal received more than 8 million tourists annually for the first time.

   Under Prime Minister Marcello Caetano, other important economic changes occurred. High annual economic growth rates continued until the world energy crisis inflation and a recession hit Portugal in 1973. Caetano's system, through new development plans, modernized aspects of the agricultural, industrial, and service sectors and linked reform in education with plans for social change. It also introduced cadres of forward-looking technocrats at various levels. The general motto of Caetano's version of the Estado Novo was "Evolution with Continuity," but he was unable to solve the key problems, which were more political and social than economic. As the boom period went "bust" in 1973-74, and growth slowed greatly, it became clear that Caetano and his governing circle had no way out of the African wars and could find no easy compromise solution to the need to democratize Portugal's restive society. The economic background of the Revolution of 25 April 1974 was a severe energy shortage caused by the world energy crisis and Arab oil boycott, as well as high general inflation, increasing debts from the African wars, and a weakening currency. While the regime prescribed greater Portuguese investment in Africa, in fact Portuguese businesses were increasingly investing outside of the escudo area in Western Europe and the United States.

   During the two years of political and social turmoil following the Revolution of 25 April 1974, the economy weakened. Production, income, reserves, and annual growth fell drastically during 1974-76. Amidst labor-management conflict, there was a burst of strikes, and income and productivity plummeted. Ironically, one factor that cushioned the economic impact of the revolution was the significant gold reserve supply that the Estado Novo had accumulated, principally during Salazar's years. Another factor was emigration from Portugal and the former colonies in Africa, which to a degree reduced pressures for employment. The sudden infusion of more than 600,000 refugees from Africa did increase the unemployment rate, which in 1975 was 10-15 percent. But, by 1990, the unemployment rate was down to about 5-6 percent.

   After 1985, Portugal's economy experienced high growth rates again, which averaged 4-5 percent through 1992. Substantial economic assistance from the EEC and individual countries such as the United States, as well as the political stability and administrative continuity that derived from majority Social Democratic Party (PSD) governments starting in mid-1987, supported new growth and development in the EEC's second poorest country. With rapid infrastruc-tural change and some unregulated development, Portugal's leaders harbored a justifiable concern that a fragile environment and ecology were under new, unacceptable pressures. Among other improvements in the standard of living since 1974 was an increase in per capita income. By 1991, the average minimum monthly wage was about 40,000 escudos, and per capita income was about $5,000 per annum. By the end of the 20th century, despite continuing poverty at several levels in Portugal, Portugal's economy had made significant progress. In the space of 15 years, Portugal had halved the large gap in living standards between itself and the remainder of the EU. For example, when Portugal joined the EU in 1986, its GDP, in terms of purchasing power-parity, was only 53 percent of the EU average. By 2000, Portugal's GDP had reached 75 percent of the EU average, a considerable achievement. Whether Portugal could narrow this gap even further in a reasonable amount of time remained a sensitive question in Lisbon. Besides structural poverty and the fact that, in 2006, the EU largesse in structural funds (loans and grants) virtually ceased, a major challenge for Portugal's economy will be to reduce the size of the public sector (about 50 percent of GDP is in the central government) to increase productivity, attract outside investment, and diversify the economy. For Portugal's economic planners, the 21st century promises to be challenging.

    See also Empire, Portuguese overseas.

Historical dictionary of Portugal > Economy
56 Artificial Intelligence

   1) Programs and the Complexity of Human Mental Processes

   In my opinion, none of [these programs] does even remote justice to the complexity of human mental processes. Unlike men, "artificially intelligent" programs tend to be single minded, undistractable, and unemotional. (Neisser, 1967, p. 9)

   2) Artificial Intelligence Is an Engineering Discipline

   Future progress in [artificial intelligence] will depend on the development of both practical and theoretical knowledge.... As regards theoretical knowledge, some have sought a unified theory of artificial intelligence. My view is that artificial intelligence is (or soon will be) an engineering discipline since its primary goal is to build things. (Nilsson, 1971, pp. vii-viii)

   3) A Sceptical View of Artificial Intelligence

   Most workers in AI [artificial intelligence] research and in related fields confess to a pronounced feeling of disappointment in what has been achieved in the last 25 years. Workers entered the field around 1950, and even around 1960, with high hopes that are very far from being realized in 1972. In no part of the field have the discoveries made so far produced the major impact that was then promised.... In the meantime, claims and predictions regarding the potential results of AI research had been publicized which went even farther than the expectations of the majority of workers in the field, whose embarrassments have been added to by the lamentable failure of such inﬂated predictions....

   When able and respected scientists write in letters to the present author that AI, the major goal of computing science, represents "another step in the general process of evolution"; that possibilities in the 1980s include an all-purpose intelligence on a human-scale knowledge base; that awe-inspiring possibilities suggest themselves based on machine intelligence exceeding human intelligence by the year 2000 [one has the right to be skeptical]. (Lighthill, 1972, p. 17)

   4) Just as Astronomy Succeeded Astrology, the Discovery of Intellectual Processes in Machines Should Lead to a Science, Eventually

   Just as astronomy succeeded astrology, following Kepler's discovery of planetary regularities, the discoveries of these many principles in empirical explorations on intellectual processes in machines should lead to a science, eventually. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)

   5) Problems in Machine Intelligence Arise Because Things Obvious to Any Person Are Not Represented in the Program

   Many problems arise in experiments on machine intelligence because things obvious to any person are not represented in any program. One can pull with a string, but one cannot push with one.... Simple facts like these caused serious problems when Charniak attempted to extend Bobrow's "Student" program to more realistic applications, and they have not been faced up to until now. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 77)

   6) The Meaning of a Symbolic Description

   What do we mean by [a symbolic] "description"? We do not mean to suggest that our descriptions must be made of strings of ordinary language words (although they might be). The simplest kind of description is a structure in which some features of a situation are represented by single ("primitive") symbols, and relations between those features are represented by other symbols-or by other features of the way the description is put together. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)

   7) The Principle of Artificial Intelligence

   [AI is] the use of computer programs and programming techniques to cast light on the principles of intelligence in general and human thought in particular. (Boden, 1977, p. 5)

   8) Artificial Intelligence Recognizes the Need for Knowledge in Its Systems

   The word you look for and hardly ever see in the early AI literature is the word knowledge. They didn't believe you have to know anything, you could always rework it all.... In fact 1967 is the turning point in my mind when there was enough feeling that the old ideas of general principles had to go.... I came up with an argument for what I called the primacy of expertise, and at the time I called the other guys the generalists. (Moses, quoted in McCorduck, 1979, pp. 228-229)

   9) Artificial Intelligence Is Psychology in a Particularly Pure and Abstract Form

   The basic idea of cognitive science is that intelligent beings are semantic engines-in other words, automatic formal systems with interpretations under which they consistently make sense. We can now see why this includes psychology and artificial intelligence on a more or less equal footing: people and intelligent computers (if and when there are any) turn out to be merely different manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon. Moreover, with universal hardware, any semantic engine can in principle be formally imitated by a computer if only the right program can be found. And that will guarantee semantic imitation as well, since (given the appropriate formal behavior) the semantics is "taking care of itself" anyway. Thus we also see why, from this perspective, artificial intelligence can be regarded as psychology in a particularly pure and abstract form. The same fundamental structures are under investigation, but in AI, all the relevant parameters are under direct experimental control (in the programming), without any messy physiology or ethics to get in the way. (Haugeland, 1981b, p. 31)

    10) There Are Many Types of Reasoning

   There are many different kinds of reasoning one might imagine:

    Formal reasoning involves the syntactic manipulation of data structures to deduce new ones following prespecified rules of inference. Mathematical logic is the archetypical formal representation. Procedural reasoning uses simulation to answer questions and solve problems. When we use a program to answer What is the sum of 3 and 4? it uses, or "runs," a procedural model of arithmetic. Reasoning by analogy seems to be a very natural mode of thought for humans but, so far, difficult to accomplish in AI programs. The idea is that when you ask the question Can robins ﬂy? the system might reason that "robins are like sparrows, and I know that sparrows can ﬂy, so robins probably can ﬂy."

    Generalization and abstraction are also natural reasoning process for humans that are difficult to pin down well enough to implement in a program. If one knows that Robins have wings, that Sparrows have wings, and that Blue jays have wings, eventually one will believe that All birds have wings. This capability may be at the core of most human learning, but it has not yet become a useful technique in AI.... Meta- level reasoning is demonstrated by the way one answers the question What is Paul Newman's telephone number? You might reason that "if I knew Paul Newman's number, I would know that I knew it, because it is a notable fact." This involves using "knowledge about what you know," in particular, about the extent of your knowledge and about the importance of certain facts. Recent research in psychology and AI indicates that meta-level reasoning may play a central role in human cognitive processing. (Barr & Feigenbaum, 1981, pp. 146-147)

    11) Programs Are Beginning to Do Things That Critics Have Asserted to Be Impossible

   Suffice it to say that programs already exist that can do things-or, at the very least, appear to be beginning to do things-which ill-informed critics have asserted a priori to be impossible. Examples include: perceiving in a holistic as opposed to an atomistic way; using language creatively; translating sensibly from one language to another by way of a language-neutral semantic representation; planning acts in a broad and sketchy fashion, the details being decided only in execution; distinguishing between different species of emotional reaction according to the psychological context of the subject. (Boden, 1981, p. 33)

    12) The Synthesis of Man and Machine

   Can the synthesis of Man and Machine ever be stable, or will the purely organic component become such a hindrance that it has to be discarded? If this eventually happens-and I have... good reasons for thinking that it must-we have nothing to regret and certainly nothing to fear. (Clarke, 1984, p. 243)

    13) The Thesis of Good Old-Fashioned Artificial Intelligence (GOFAI)

   The thesis of GOFAI... is not that the processes underlying intelligence can be described symbolically... but that they are symbolic. (Haugeland, 1985, p. 113)

    14) Artificial Intelligence Provides a Useful Approach to Psychological and Psychiatric Theory Formation

   It is all very well formulating psychological and psychiatric theories verbally but, when using natural language (even technical jargon), it is difficult to recognise when a theory is complete; oversights are all too easily made, gaps too readily left. This is a point which is generally recognised to be true and it is for precisely this reason that the behavioural sciences attempt to follow the natural sciences in using "classical" mathematics as a more rigorous descriptive language. However, it is an unfortunate fact that, with a few notable exceptions, there has been a marked lack of success in this application. It is my belief that a different approach-a different mathematics-is needed, and that AI provides just this approach. (Hand, quoted in Hand, 1985, pp. 6-7)

    15) Four Kinds of Artificial Intelligence

   We might distinguish among four kinds of AI.

   ♦ Nonpsychological AI

   Research of this kind involves building and programming computers to perform tasks which, to paraphrase Marvin Minsky, would require intelligence if they were done by us. Researchers in nonpsychological AI make no claims whatsoever about the psychological realism of their programs or the devices they build, that is, about whether or not computers perform tasks as humans do.

   ♦ Weak Psychological AI

   Research here is guided by the view that the computer is a useful tool in the study of mind. In particular, we can write computer programs or build devices that simulate alleged psychological processes in humans and then test our predictions about how the alleged processes work. We can weave these programs and devices together with other programs and devices that simulate different alleged mental processes and thereby test the degree to which the AI system as a whole simulates human mentality. According to weak psychological AI, working with computer models is a way of refining and testing hypotheses about processes that are allegedly realized in human minds.

   ♦ Strong Psychological AI

... According to this view, our minds are computers and therefore can be duplicated by other computers. Sherry Turkle writes that the "real ambition is of mythic proportions, making a general purpose intelligence, a mind." (Turkle, 1984, p. 240) The authors of a major text announce that "the ultimate goal of AI research is to build a person or, more humbly, an animal." (Charniak & McDermott, 1985, p. 7)

   ♦ Suprapsychological AI

   Research in this field, like strong psychological AI, takes seriously the functionalist view that mentality can be realized in many different types of physical devices. Suprapsychological AI, however, accuses strong psychological AI of being chauvinisticof being only interested in human intelligence! Suprapsychological AI claims to be interested in all the conceivable ways intelligence can be realized. (Flanagan, 1991, pp. 241-242)

    16) Determination of Relevance of Rules in Particular Contexts

   Even if the [rules] were stored in a context-free form the computer still couldn't use them. To do that the computer requires rules enabling it to draw on just those [ rules] which are relevant in each particular context. Determination of relevance will have to be based on further facts and rules, but the question will again arise as to which facts and rules are relevant for making each particular determination. One could always invoke further facts and rules to answer this question, but of course these must be only the relevant ones. And so it goes. It seems that AI workers will never be able to get started here unless they can settle the problem of relevance beforehand by cataloguing types of context and listing just those facts which are relevant in each. (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p. 80)

    17) Form and Content Are Not Fundamentally Different

   Perhaps the single most important idea to artificial intelligence is that there is no fundamental difference between form and content, that meaning can be captured in a set of symbols such as a semantic net. (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)

    18) The Assumption That the Mind Is a Formal System

   Artificial intelligence is based on the assumption that the mind can be described as some kind of formal system manipulating symbols that stand for things in the world. Thus it doesn't matter what the brain is made of, or what it uses for tokens in the great game of thinking. Using an equivalent set of tokens and rules, we can do thinking with a digital computer, just as we can play chess using cups, salt and pepper shakers, knives, forks, and spoons. Using the right software, one system (the mind) can be mapped into the other (the computer). (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)

    19) A Statement of the Primary and Secondary Purposes of Artificial Intelligence

   The primary goal of Artificial Intelligence is to make machines smarter.

   The secondary goals of Artificial Intelligence are to understand what intelligence is (the Nobel laureate purpose) and to make machines more useful (the entrepreneurial purpose). (Winston, 1987, p. 1)

    20) Mathematical Logic Provides the Basis for Theory in AI

   The theoretical ideas of older branches of engineering are captured in the language of mathematics. We contend that mathematical logic provides the basis for theory in AI. Although many computer scientists already count logic as fundamental to computer science in general, we put forward an even stronger form of the logic-is-important argument....

   AI deals mainly with the problem of representing and using declarative (as opposed to procedural) knowledge. Declarative knowledge is the kind that is expressed as sentences, and AI needs a language in which to state these sentences. Because the languages in which this knowledge usually is originally captured (natural languages such as English) are not suitable for computer representations, some other language with the appropriate properties must be used. It turns out, we think, that the appropriate properties include at least those that have been uppermost in the minds of logicians in their development of logical languages such as the predicate calculus. Thus, we think that any language for expressing knowledge in AI systems must be at least as expressive as the first-order predicate calculus. (Genesereth & Nilsson, 1987, p. viii)

    21) Perceptual Structures Can Be Represented as Lists of Elementary Propositions

   In artificial intelligence studies, perceptual structures are represented as assemblages of description lists, the elementary components of which are propositions asserting that certain relations hold among elements. (Chase & Simon, 1988, p. 490)

    22) Definitions of Artificial Intelligence

   Artificial intelligence (AI) is sometimes defined as the study of how to build and/or program computers to enable them to do the sorts of things that minds can do. Some of these things are commonly regarded as requiring intelligence: offering a medical diagnosis and/or prescription, giving legal or scientific advice, proving theorems in logic or mathematics. Others are not, because they can be done by all normal adults irrespective of educational background (and sometimes by non-human animals too), and typically involve no conscious control: seeing things in sunlight and shadows, finding a path through cluttered terrain, fitting pegs into holes, speaking one's own native tongue, and using one's common sense. Because it covers AI research dealing with both these classes of mental capacity, this definition is preferable to one describing AI as making computers do "things that would require intelligence if done by people." However, it presupposes that computers could do what minds can do, that they might really diagnose, advise, infer, and understand. One could avoid this problematic assumption (and also side-step questions about whether computers do things in the same way as we do) by defining AI instead as "the development of computers whose observable performance has features which in humans we would attribute to mental processes." This bland characterization would be acceptable to some AI workers, especially amongst those focusing on the production of technological tools for commercial purposes. But many others would favour a more controversial definition, seeing AI as the science of intelligence in general-or, more accurately, as the intellectual core of cognitive science. As such, its goal is to provide a systematic theory that can explain (and perhaps enable us to replicate) both the general categories of intentionality and the diverse psychological capacities grounded in them. (Boden, 1990b, pp. 1-2)

    23) The Computer Can Not Be a Model of the Mind

   Because the ability to store data somewhat corresponds to what we call memory in human beings, and because the ability to follow logical procedures somewhat corresponds to what we call reasoning in human beings, many members of the cult have concluded that what computers do somewhat corresponds to what we call thinking. It is no great difficulty to persuade the general public of that conclusion since computers process data very fast in small spaces well below the level of visibility; they do not look like other machines when they are at work. They seem to be running along as smoothly and silently as the brain does when it remembers and reasons and thinks. On the other hand, those who design and build computers know exactly how the machines are working down in the hidden depths of their semiconductors. Computers can be taken apart, scrutinized, and put back together. Their activities can be tracked, analyzed, measured, and thus clearly understood-which is far from possible with the brain. This gives rise to the tempting assumption on the part of the builders and designers that computers can tell us something about brains, indeed, that the computer can serve as a model of the mind, which then comes to be seen as some manner of information processing machine, and possibly not as good at the job as the machine. (Roszak, 1994, pp. xiv-xv)

    24) Computers Will Not Always Be Inferior to Human Brains

   The inner workings of the human mind are far more intricate than the most complicated systems of modern technology. Researchers in the field of artificial intelligence have been attempting to develop programs that will enable computers to display intelligent behavior. Although this field has been an active one for more than thirty-five years and has had many notable successes, AI researchers still do not know how to create a program that matches human intelligence. No existing program can recall facts, solve problems, reason, learn, and process language with human facility. This lack of success has occurred not because computers are inferior to human brains but rather because we do not yet know in sufficient detail how intelligence is organized in the brain. (Anderson, 1995, p. 2)

Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Artificial Intelligence
57 Psychoanalysis

   1) The Ego Is Not Even Master in Its Own House

   [Psychoanalysis] seeks to prove to the ego that it is not even master in its own house, but must content itself with scanty information of what is going on unconsciously in the mind. (Freud, 1953-1974, Vol. 16, pp. 284-285)

   2) Methodological Problems of Psychoanalysis

   Although in the interview the analyst is supposedly a "passive" auditor of the "free association" narration by the subject, in point of fact the analyst does direct the course of the narrative. This by itself does not necessarily impair the evidential worth of the outcome, for even in the most meticulously conducted laboratory experiment the experimenter intervenes to obtain the data he is after. There is nevertheless the difficulty that in the nature of the case the full extent of the analyst's intervention is not a matter that is open to public scrutiny, so that by and large one has only his own testimony as to what transpires in the consulting room. It is perhaps unnecessary to say that this is not a question about the personal integrity of psychoanalytic practitioners. The point is the fundamental one that no matter how firmly we may resolve to make explicit our biases, no human being is aware of all of them, and that objectivity in science is achieved through the criticism of publicly accessible material by a community of independent inquirers.... Moreover, unless data are obtained under carefully standardized circumstances, or under different circumstances whose dependence on known variables is nevertheless established, even an extensive collection of data is an unreliable basis for inference. To be sure, analysts apparently do attempt to institute standard conditions for the conduct of interviews. But there is not much information available on the extent to which the standardization is actually enforced, or whether it relates to more than what may be superficial matters. (E. Nagel, 1959, pp. 49-50)

   3) No Necessary Incompatibility between Psychoanalysis and Certain Religious Formulations

   here would seem to be no necessary incompatibility between psychoanalysis and those religious formulations which locate God within the self. One could, indeed, argue that Freud's Id (and even more Groddeck's It), the impersonal force within which is both the core of oneself and yet not oneself, and from which in illness one become[s] alienated, is a secular formation of the insight which makes religious people believe in an immanent God. (Ryecroft, 1966, p. 22)

   4) The Problem of Verifying Psychoanalytic Theory

   Freudian analysts emphasized that their theories were constantly verified by their "clinical observations."... It was precisely this fact-that they always fitted, that they were always confirmed-which in the eyes of their admirers constituted the strongest argument in favour of these theories. It began to dawn on me that this apparent strength was in fact their weakness.... It is easy to obtain confirmations or verifications, for nearly every theory-if we look for confirmation. (Popper, 1968, pp. 3435)

   5) Psychoanalysis Is Not a Science But Rather the Interpretation of a Narrated History

   Psychoanalysis does not satisfy the standards of the sciences of observation, and the "facts" it deals with are not verifiable by multiple, independent observers.... There are no "facts" nor any observation of "facts" in psychoanalysis but rather the interpretation of a narrated history. (Ricoeur, 1974, p. 186)

   6) Some of the Qualities of a Scientific Approach Are Possessed by Psychoanalysis

   In sum: psychoanalysis is not a science, but it shares some of the qualities associated with a scientific approach-the search for truth, understanding, honesty, openness to the import of the observation and evidence, and a skeptical stance toward authority. (Breger, 1981, p. 50)

   7) Major Attributes of Psychoanalysis

   [Attributes of Psychoanalysis:]

   1. Psychic Determinism. No item in mental life and in conduct and behavior is "accidental"; it is the outcome of antecedent conditions.

   2. Much mental activity and behavior is purposive or goal-directed in character.

   3. Much of mental activity and behavior, and its determinants, is unconscious in character. 4. The early experience of the individual, as a child, is very potent, and tends to be pre-potent over later experience. (Farrell, 1981, p. 25)

   8) The Scientific and Rational Are Not Co- extensive

   Our sceptic may be unwise enough... to maintain that, because analytic theory is unscientific on his criterion, it is not worth discussing. This step is unwise, because it presupposes that, if a study is not scientific on his criterion, it is not a rational enterprise... an elementary and egregious mistake. The scientific and the rational are not co-extensive. Scientific work is only one form that rational inquiry can take: there are many others. (Farrell, 1981, p. 46)

   9) The Validity of Psychoanalytic Therapy

   Psychoanalysts have tended to write as though the term analysis spoke for itself, as if the statement "analysis revealed" or "it was analyzed as" preceding a clinical assertion was sufficient to establish the validity of what was being reported. An outsider might easily get the impression from reading the psychoanalytic literature that some standardized, generally accepted procedure existed for both inference and evidence. Instead, exactly the opposite has been true. Clinical material in the hands of one analyst can lead to totally different "findings" in the hands of another. (Peterfreund, 1986, p. 128)

    10) The Issues of Inference and Evidence in Psychoanalysis

   The analytic process-the means by which we arrive at psychoanalytic understanding-has been largely neglected and is poorly understood, and there has been comparatively little interest in the issues of inference and evidence. Indeed, psychoanalysts as a group have not recognized the importance of being bound by scientific constraints. They do not seem to understand that a possibility is only that-a possibility-and that innumerable ways may exist to explain the same data. Psychoanalysts all too often do not seem to distinguish hypotheses from facts, nor do they seem to understand that hypotheses must be tested in some way, that criteria for evidence must exist, and that any given test for any hypothesis must allow for the full range of substantiation/refutation. (Peterfreund, 1986, p. 129)

Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Psychoanalysis
58 Philosophy

   1) There Are Ideas That Have Their Own True and Immutable Nature

   And what I believe to be more important here is that I find in myself an infinity of ideas of certain things which cannot be assumed to be pure nothingness, even though they may have perhaps no existence outside of my thought. These things are not figments of my imagination, even though it is within my power to think of them or not to think of them; on the contrary, they have their own true and immutable natures. Thus, for example, when I imagine a triangle, even though there may perhaps be no such figure anywhere in the world outside of my thought, nor ever have been, nevertheless the figure cannot help having a certain determinate nature... or essence, which is immutable and eternal, which I have not invented and which does not in any way depend upon my mind. (Descartes, 1951, p. 61)

   2) Examine What Is within Our Reach

   Let us console ourselves for not knowing the possible connections between a spider and the rings of Saturn, and continue to examine what is within our reach. (Voltaire, 1961, p. 144)

   3) Modern Philosophy Starts with the Cartesian Catastrophe

   As modern physics started with the Newtonian revolution, so modern philosophy starts with what one might call the Cartesian Catastrophe. The catastrophe consisted in the splitting up of the world into the realms of matter and mind, and the identification of "mind" with conscious thinking. The result of this identification was the shallow rationalism of l'esprit Cartesien, and an impoverishment of psychology which it took three centuries to remedy even in part. (Koestler, 1964, p. 148)

   4) The Rightful Claims of Philosophy

   It has been made of late a reproach against natural philosophy that it has struck out on a path of its own, and has separated itself more and more widely from the other sciences which are united by common philological and historical studies. The opposition has, in fact, been long apparent, and seems to me to have grown up mainly under the inﬂuence of the Hegelian philosophy, or, at any rate, to have been brought out into more distinct relief by that philosophy.... The sole object of Kant's "Critical Philosophy" was to test the sources and the authority of our knowledge, and to fix a definite scope and standard for the researches of philosophy, as compared with other sciences.... [But Hegel's] "Philosophy of Identity" was bolder. It started with the hypothesis that not only spiritual phenomena, but even the actual world-nature, that is, and man-were the result of an act of thought on the part of a creative mind, similar, it was supposed, in kind to the human mind.... The philosophers accused the scientific men of narrowness; the scientific men retorted that the philosophers were crazy. And so it came about that men of science began to lay some stress on the banishment of all philosophic inﬂuences from their work; while some of them, including men of the greatest acuteness, went so far as to condemn philosophy altogether, not merely as useless, but as mischievous dreaming. Thus, it must be confessed, not only were the illegitimate pretensions of the Hegelian system to subordinate to itself all other studies rejected, but no regard was paid to the rightful claims of philosophy, that is, the criticism of the sources of cognition, and the definition of the functions of the intellect. (Helmholz, quoted in Dampier, 1966, pp. 291-292)

   5) The Philosophy of Philosophy

   Philosophy remains true to its classical tradition by renouncing it. (Habermas, 1972, p. 317)

   6) Philosophy Is a Field Which Has Certain Central Questions

   I have not attempted... to put forward any grand view of the nature of philosophy; nor do I have any such grand view to put forth if I would. It will be obvious that I do not agree with those who see philosophy as the history of "howlers" and progress in philosophy as the debunking of howlers. It will also be obvious that I do not agree with those who see philosophy as the enterprise of putting forward a priori truths about the world.... I see philosophy as a field which has certain central questions, for example, the relation between thought and reality.... It seems obvious that in dealing with these questions philosophers have formulated rival research programs, that they have put forward general hypotheses, and that philosophers within each major research program have modified their hypotheses by trial and error, even if they sometimes refuse to admit that that is what they are doing. To that extent philosophy is a "science." To argue about whether philosophy is a science in any more serious sense seems to me to be hardly a useful occupation.... It does not seem to me important to decide whether science is philosophy or philosophy is science as long as one has a conception of both that makes both essential to a responsible view of the world and of man's place in it. (Putnam, 1975, p. xvii)

   7) The Central Task of Philosophy

   What can philosophy contribute to solving the problem of the relation [of] mind to body? Twenty years ago, many English-speaking philosophers would have answered: "Nothing beyond an analysis of the various mental concepts." If we seek knowledge of things, they thought, it is to science that we must turn. Philosophy can only cast light upon our concepts of those things.

   This retreat from things to concepts was not undertaken lightly. Ever since the seventeenth century, the great intellectual fact of our culture has been the incredible expansion of knowledge both in the natural and in the rational sciences (mathematics, logic).

   The success of science created a crisis in philosophy. What was there for philosophy to do? Hume had already perceived the problem in some degree, and so surely did Kant, but it was not until the twentieth century, with the Vienna Circle and with Wittgenstein, that the difficulty began to weigh heavily. Wittgenstein took the view that philosophy could do no more than strive to undo the intellectual knots it itself had tied, so achieving intellectual release, and even a certain illumination, but no knowledge. A little later, and more optimistically, Ryle saw a positive, if reduced role, for philosophy in mapping the "logical geography" of our concepts: how they stood to each other and how they were to be analyzed....

   Since that time, however, philosophers in the "analytic" tradition have swung back from Wittgensteinian and even Rylean pessimism to a more traditional conception of the proper role and tasks of philosophy. Many analytic philosophers now would accept the view that the central task of philosophy is to give an account, or at least play a part in giving an account, of the most general nature of things and of man. (Armstrong, 1990, pp. 37-38)

   8) Philosophy's Evolving Engagement with Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science

   In the beginning, the nature of philosophy's engagement with artificial intelligence and cognitive science was clear enough. The new sciences of the mind were to provide the long-awaited vindication of the most potent dreams of naturalism and materialism. Mind would at last be located firmly within the natural order. We would see in detail how the most perplexing features of the mental realm could be supported by the operations of solely physical laws upon solely physical stuff. Mental causation (the power of, e.g., a belief to cause an action) would emerge as just another species of physical causation. Reasoning would be understood as a kind of automated theorem proving. And the key to both was to be the depiction of the brain as the implementation of multiple higher level programs whose task was to manipulate and transform symbols or representations: inner items with one foot in the physical (they were realized as brain states) and one in the mental (they were bearers of contents, and their physical gymnastics were cleverly designed to respect semantic relationships such as truth preservation). (A. Clark, 1996, p. 1)

   9) The Enduring Value of Philosophy

   Socrates of Athens famously declared that "the unexamined life is not worth living," and his motto aptly explains the impulse to philosophize. Taking nothing for granted, philosophy probes and questions the fundamental presuppositions of every area of human inquiry.... [P]art of the job of the philosopher is to keep at a certain critical distance from current doctrines, whether in the sciences or the arts, and to examine instead how the various elements in our world-view clash, or fit together. Some philosophers have tried to incorporate the results of these inquiries into a grand synoptic view of the nature of reality and our human relationship to it. Others have mistrusted system-building, and seen their primary role as one of clarifications, or the removal of obstacles along the road to truth. But all have shared the Socratic vision of using the human intellect to challenge comfortable preconceptions, insisting that every aspect of human theory and practice be subjected to continuing critical scrutiny....

   Philosophy is, of course, part of a continuing tradition, and there is much to be gained from seeing how that tradition originated and developed. But the principal object of studying the materials in this book is not to pay homage to past genius, but to enrich one's understanding of central problems that are as pressing today as they have always been-problems about knowledge, truth and reality, the nature of the mind, the basis of right action, and the best way to live. These questions help to mark out the territory of philosophy as an academic discipline, but in a wider sense they define the human predicament itself; they will surely continue to be with us for as long as humanity endures. (Cottingham, 1996, pp. xxi-xxii)

    10) The Distinction between Dionysian Man and Apollonian Man, between Art and Creativity and Reason and Self- Control

   In his study of ancient Greek culture, The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche drew what would become a famous distinction, between the Dionysian spirit, the untamed spirit of art and creativity, and the Apollonian, that of reason and self-control. The story of Greek civilization, and all civilizations, Nietzsche implied, was the gradual victory of Apollonian man, with his desire for control over nature and himself, over Dionysian man, who survives only in myth, poetry, music, and drama. Socrates and Plato had attacked the illusions of art as unreal, and had overturned the delicate cultural balance by valuing only man's critical, rational, and controlling consciousness while denigrating his vital life instincts as irrational and base. The result of this division is "Alexandrian man," the civilized and accomplished Greek citizen of the later ancient world, who is "equipped with the greatest forces of knowledge" but in whom the wellsprings of creativity have dried up. (Herman, 1997, pp. 95-96)

Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Philosophy
59 hecho

Del verbo hacer: ( conjugate hacer) \ \
hecho es: \ \
el participio
Multiple Entries: hacer hecho
hacer ( conjugate hacer) verbo transitivo 1
a) ( crear) ‹mueble/vestido› to make;
‹casa/carretera› to build; ‹ nido› to build, make; ‹ túnel› to make, dig; ‹dibujo/plano› to do, draw; ‹ lista› to make, draw up; ‹ resumen› to do, make; ‹ película› to make; ‹nudo/lazo› to tie; ‹pan/pastel› to make, bake; ‹vino/café/tortilla› to make; ‹ cerveza› to make, brew;
◊ me hizo un lugar en la mesa he made room for me at the table;
hacen buena pareja they make a lovely couple
b) (producir, causar) ‹ ruido› to make;

◊ los chistes no me hacen gracia I don't find jokes funny;
estos zapatos me hacen daño these shoes hurt my feet 2
a) (efectuar, llevar a cabo) ‹ sacrificio› to make;
‹ milagro› to work, perform; ‹deberes/ejercicios/limpieza› to do; ‹ mandado› to run; ‹transacción/investigación› to carry out; ‹ experimento› to do, perform; ‹ entrevista› to conduct; ‹gira/viaje› to do; ‹ regalo› to give; ‹ favor› to do; ‹ trato› to make;
◊ me hicieron una visita they paid me a visit;
aún queda mucho por hecho there is still a lot (left) to do; dar que hecho to make a lot of work
b) ‹cheque/factura› to make out, write out
3 (formular, expresar) ‹declaración/promesa/oferta› to make; ‹proyecto/plan› to make, draw up; ‹crítica/comentario› to make, voice; ‹ pregunta› to ask;
◊ nadie hizo ninguna objeción nobody raised any objections
4
a) ( refiriéndose a necesidades fisiológicas):

◊ hecho caca (fam) to do a poop (AmE) o (BrE) a pooh (colloq);
hecho pis or pipí (fam) to have a pee (colloq); hecho sus necesidades (euf) to go to the bathroom o toilet (euph)
b) ( refiriéndose a sonidos onomatopéyicos) to go;

◊ las vacas hacen `mu' cows go `moo'
5 ( adquirir) ‹dinero/fortuna› to make; ‹ amigo› to make 6 (preparar, arreglar) ‹ cama› to make; ‹ maleta› to pack;
◊ hice el pescado al horno I did o cooked the fish in the oven;
tengo que hecho la comida I must make lunch; ver tb comida b 7 ( recorrer) ‹trayecto/distancia› to do, cover 8 (en cálculos, enumeraciones):
◊ son 180 … y 320 hacen 500 that's 180 … and 320 is o makes 500
1
a) ( ocuparse en actividad) to do;

◊ hecho la(s) compra(s) to do the shopping;
¿hacemos algo esta noche? shall we do something tonight?; hecho ejercicio to do (some) exercise; ¿hace algún deporte? do you play o do any sports?; See Also→ amor 1b
b) (como profesión, ocupación) to do;

◊ ¿qué hace tu padre? what does your father do?

c) ( estudiar) to do
2 (realizar cierta acción, actuar de cierta manera) to do;
◊ ¡eso no se hace! you shouldn't do that!;
¡qué le vamos a hecho! what can you o (frml) one do?; toca bien el piano — antes lo hacía mejor she plays the piano well — she used to play better; hechola buena (fam): ¡ahora sí que la hice! now I've really done it!; See Also→ tonto sustantivo masculino, femenino 1 (transformar en, volver) to make;
◊ ella lo hizo posible she made it possible;
hizo pedazos la carta she tore the letter into tiny pieces; ese vestido te hace más delgada that dress makes you look thinner; hecho algo de algo to turn sth into sth; quiero hecho de ti un gran actor I want to make a great actor of you 2
a) (obligar a, ser causa de que)

◊ hecho a algn hacer algo to make sb do sth;
me hizo abrirla he made me open it; me hizo llorar it made me cry; hágalo pasar tell him to come in; me hizo esperar tres horas she kept me waiting for three hours; hecho que algo/algn haga algo to make sth/sb do sth
b)

◊ hacer hacer algo to have o get sth done/made;
hice acortar las cortinas I had o got the curtains shortened verbo intransitivo 1 (obrar, actuar):
◊ déjame hecho a mí just let me handle this o take care of this;
¿cómo se hace para que te den la beca? what do you have to do to get the scholarship?; hiciste bien en decírmelo you did o were right to tell me; haces mal en mentir it's wrong of you to lie 2 (fingir, simular):
◊ hice como que no oía I pretended not to hear;
haz como si no lo conocieras act as if o pretend you don't know him 3 ( servir):
◊ esta sábana hará de toldo this sheet will do for o as an awning;
la escuela hizo de hospital the school served as o was used as a hospital 4 ( interpretar personaje) hecho de algo/algn to play (the part of) sth/sb (+ compl) ( sentar):
◊ tanto sol hace mal (AmL) too much sun is not good for you;
(+ me/te/le etc)
◊ el descanso le hizo bien the rest did him good;
la trucha me hizo mal (AmL) the trout didn't agree with me hecho v impers 1 ( refiriéndose al tiempo atmosférico):
◊ hace frío/sol it's cold/sunny;
hace tres grados it's three degrees; (nos) hizo un tiempo espantoso the weather was terrible 2 ( expresando tiempo transcurrido):
◊ hace dos años que murió he's been dead for two years;
hace mucho que lo conozco I've known him for a long time; hacía años que no lo veía I hadn't seen him for o in years; ¿cuánto hace que se fue? how long ago did she leave?; hace poco/un año a short time/a year ago; hasta hace poco until recently hacerse verbo pronominal 1 ( producirse) (+ me/te/le etc):
◊ se me hizo un nudo en el hilo I got a knot in the thread;
se le hizo una ampolla she got a blister; hacérsele algo a algn (Méx): por fin se le hizo ganar el premio she finally got to win the award 2
a) ( refl) ( hacer para sí) ‹café/falda› to make oneself;

◊ se hicieron una casita they built themselves a little house

b) ( caus) ( hacer que otro haga):

◊ se hicieron una casita they had a little house built;
se hizo la cirugía estética she had plastic surgery 3 ( causarse):
◊ ¿qué te hiciste en el brazo? what did you do to your arm?;
¿te hiciste daño? did you hurt yourself? 4 ( refiriéndose a necesidades fisiológicas):
◊ todavía se hace pis/caca (fam) she still wets/messes herself
5 ( refl) ( adquirir) to make;
◊ hechose un nombre to make a name for oneself
1
a) (volverse, convertirse en) to become;

◊ se hicieron amigos they became friends;
se están haciendo viejos they are getting o growing old
b) ( resultar):

◊ se hace muy pesado it gets very boring;
(+ me/te/le etc)
◊ se me hizo interminable it seemed interminable;
se me hace difícil creerlo I find it very hard to believe
c) ( impers):

◊ se hace de noche muy pronto it gets dark very early;
se está haciendo tarde it's getting late
d) ( cocinarse) [pescado/guiso] to cook

e) (AmL) ( pasarle a):

◊ ¿qué se habrá hecho María? what can have happened to María?
2 ( acostumbrarse) hechose a algo to get used to sth 3 ( fingirse):
◊ no te hagas el inocente don't act the innocent;
¿es bobo o se (lo) hace? (fam) is he stupid or just a good actor? (colloq); hechose pasar por algn (por periodista, doctor) to pass oneself off as sb 4 ( moverse) (+ compl) to move;
◊ hechose a un lado to move to one side
5
◊ hacerse de (AmL) (de fortuna, dinero) to get;
( de amigos) to make
hecho 1

◊ - cha pp [ ver tb hacer]
1 ( manufacturado) made;
◊ hecho a mano handmade;
un traje hecho a (la) medida a made-to-measure suit; bien/mal hecho well/badly made 2 ( refiriéndose a acción):
◊ ¡bien hecho! well done!;
no le avisé — pues mal hecho I didn't let him know — well you should have (done); lo hecho, hecho está what's done is done 3 ( convertido en):
◊ estaba hecho una fiera he was furious;
tú estás hecho un vago you've become o turned into a lazy devil ■ adjetivo
a) ‹ ropa› ready-to-wear

b) ( terminado) ‹ trabajo› done

c) (esp Esp) ‹ carne› done;

◊ un filete muy/poco hecho a well-done/rare steak

hecho 2 sustantivo masculino 1
a) (acto, acción):

◊ yo quiero hechos I want action, I want something done;
demuéstramelo con hechos prove it to me by doing something about it
b) (suceso, acontecimiento) event;

◊ el lugar de los hechos the scene of the crime
2 (realidad, verdad) fact;
◊ de hecho in fact

hacer
I verbo transitivo
1 (crear, fabricar, construir) to make
hacer un jersey, to make a sweater
hacer un puente, to build a bridge
2 (una acción) to do: eso no se hace, it isn't done
haz lo que quieras, do what you want
¿qué estás haciendo?, (en este momento) what are you doing? (para vivir) what do you do (for a living)?
hace atletismo, he does athletics
hacer una carrera/ medicina, to do a degree/ medicine
3 (amigos, dinero) to make
4 (obligar, forzar) to make: hazle entrar en razón, make him see reason
5 (causar, provocar) to make: ese hombre me hace reír, that man makes me laugh
estos zapatos me hacen daño, these shoes are hurting me
no hagas llorar a tu hermana, don't make your sister cry
6 (arreglar) to make
hacer la cama, to make the bed
hacer la casa, to do the housework
7 Mat (sumar, dar como resultado) to make: y con éste hacen cincuenta, and that makes fifty
8 (producir una impresión) to make... look: ese vestido la hace mayor, that dress makes her look older
9 (en sustitución de otro verbo) to do: cuido mi jardín, me gusta hacerlo, I look after my garden, I like doing it
10 (representar) to play: Juan hizo un papel en Fuenteovejuna, Juan played a part in Fuenteovejuna
11 (actuar como) to play: no hagas el tonto, don't play the fool
12 (suponer) te hacía en casa, I thought you were at home
II verbo intransitivo
1 (en el teatro, etc) to play: hizo de Electra, she played Electra
2 ( hacer por + infinitivo) to try to: hice por ayudar, I tried to help
3 (simular) to pretend: hice como si no lo conociera, I acted as if I didn't know him
4 fam (venir bien, convenir) to be suitable: si te hace, nos vamos a verle mañana, if it's all right for you, we'll visit him tomorrow
III verbo impersonal
1 (tiempo transcurrido) ago: hace mucho (tiempo), a long time ago
hace tres semanas que no veo la televisión, I haven't watched TV for three weeks
hace tres años que comenzaron las obras, the building works started three years ago
2 (condición atmosférica) hacía mucho frío, it was very cold
¿To make o to do?
El significado básico del verbo to make es construir, fabricar algo juntando los componentes (aquí hacen unos pasteles maravillosos, they make marvellous cakes here), obligar (hazle callar, make him shut up) o convertir: Te hará más fuerte. It'll make you stronger. También se emplea en expresiones compuestas por palabras tales como dinero ( money), ruido ( a noise), cama ( the bed), esfuerzo ( an effort), promesa ( a promise), c omentario ( a comment), amor ( love), guerra ( war). El significado del verbo to do es cumplir o ejecutar una tarea o actividad, especialmente tratándose de los deportes y las tareas domésticas: Hago mis deberes por la noche. I do my homework in the evening. ¿Quién hace la plancha en tu casa? Who does the ironing in your house? También se emplea con palabras tales como deber ( duty), deportes ( sports), examen ( an exam), favor ( a favour), sumas ( sums).
hecho,-a
I adjetivo
1 (realizado) made, done: está muy bien hecho, it's really well done
2 (acostumbrado) used: está hecho a trabajar en este clima, he's used to working in this climate
3 (cocinado, cocido) done
un filete muy/poco hecho, a well-cooked/rare steak
4 (persona) mature
5 (frase) set (ropa) ready-made
II sustantivo masculino
1 (suceso real) fact
el hecho es que..., the fact is that...
de hecho, in fact ➣ Ver nota en actually 2 (obra, acción) act, deed
3 (acontecimiento, caso) event, incident
III interj ¡hecho!, it's a deal! o all right! ' hecho' also found in these entries: Spanish: acontecer - actual - asesinar - braga - bribón - bribona - buena - bueno - casera - casero - chapucera - chapucero - chapuza - chaval - chavala - como - conmoverse - considerable - consumada - consumado - Cristo - de - despeluchar - desvarío - dicha - dicho - documentalista - elemento - encubrir - entrar - exquisita - exquisito - fideo - fiera - flan - furia - haber - habilidosa - habilidoso - hallar - hecha - higo - hojalata - humanamente - incidencia - interdisciplinaria - interdisciplinario - jirón - jugarreta - lástima English: accept - action - actual - actually - adjust - admission - admit - advance - angry - appease - asbestos - bandwagon - bargain - basis - beat - by - challenge - cock-up - collar - come - confirm - cry - custom - cut out - damage - deal - decree - delay - deliberately - done - dream - effect - effectively - enforce - established - fact - failure - fait accompli - find out - fitted - freshly - fully-fledged - good - grown - gumbo - hand - handmade - however - hurried - in

English-spanish dictionary > hecho
60 Introduction

   Portugal is a small Western European nation with a large, distinctive past replete with both triumph and tragedy. One of the continent's oldest nation-states, Portugal has frontiers that are essentially unchanged since the late 14th century. The country's unique character and 850-year history as an independent state present several curious paradoxes. As of 1974, when much of the remainder of the Portuguese overseas empire was decolonized, Portuguese society appeared to be the most ethnically homogeneous of the two Iberian states and of much of Europe. Yet, Portuguese society had received, over the course of 2,000 years, infusions of other ethnic groups in invasions and immigration: Phoenicians, Greeks, Celts, Romans, Suevi, Visigoths, Muslims (Arab and Berber), Jews, Italians, Flemings, Burgundian French, black Africans, and Asians. Indeed, Portugal has been a crossroads, despite its relative isolation in the western corner of the Iberian Peninsula, between the West and North Africa, Tropical Africa, and Asia and America. Since 1974, Portugal's society has become less homogeneous, as there has been significant immigration of former subjects from its erstwhile overseas empire.

   Other paradoxes should be noted as well. Although Portugal is sometimes confused with Spain or things Spanish, its very national independence and national culture depend on being different from Spain and Spaniards. Today, Portugal's independence may be taken for granted. Since 1140, except for 1580-1640 when it was ruled by Philippine Spain, Portugal has been a sovereign state. Nevertheless, a recurring theme of the nation's history is cycles of anxiety and despair that its freedom as a nation is at risk. There is a paradox, too, about Portugal's overseas empire(s), which lasted half a millennium (1415-1975): after 1822, when Brazil achieved independence from Portugal, most of the Portuguese who emigrated overseas never set foot in their overseas empire, but preferred to immigrate to Brazil or to other countries in North or South America or Europe, where established Portuguese overseas communities existed.

   Portugal was a world power during the period 1415-1550, the era of the Discoveries, expansion, and early empire, and since then the Portuguese have experienced periods of decline, decadence, and rejuvenation. Despite the fact that Portugal slipped to the rank of a third- or fourth-rate power after 1580, it and its people can claim rightfully an unusual number of "firsts" or distinctions that assure their place both in world and Western history. These distinctions should be kept in mind while acknowledging that, for more than 400 years, Portugal has generally lagged behind the rest of Western Europe, although not Southern Europe, in social and economic developments and has remained behind even its only neighbor and sometime nemesis, Spain.

   Portugal's pioneering role in the Discoveries and exploration era of the 15th and 16th centuries is well known. Often noted, too, is the Portuguese role in the art and science of maritime navigation through the efforts of early navigators, mapmakers, seamen, and fishermen. What are often forgotten are the country's slender base of resources, its small population largely of rural peasants, and, until recently, its occupation of only 16 percent of the Iberian Peninsula. As of 1139—10, when Portugal emerged first as an independent monarchy, and eventually a sovereign nation-state, England and France had not achieved this status. The Portuguese were the first in the Iberian Peninsula to expel the Muslim invaders from their portion of the peninsula, achieving this by 1250, more than 200 years before Castile managed to do the same (1492).

   Other distinctions may be noted. Portugal conquered the first overseas empire beyond the Mediterranean in the early modern era and established the first plantation system based on slave labor. Portugal's empire was the first to be colonized and the last to be decolonized in the 20th century. With so much of its scattered, seaborne empire dependent upon the safety and seaworthiness of shipping, Portugal was a pioneer in initiating marine insurance, a practice that is taken for granted today. During the time of Pombaline Portugal (1750-77), Portugal was the first state to organize and hold an industrial trade fair. In distinctive political and governmental developments, Portugal's record is more mixed, and this fact suggests that maintaining a government with a functioning rule of law and a pluralist, representative democracy has not been an easy matter in a country that for so long has been one of the poorest and least educated in the West. Portugal's First Republic (1910-26), only the third republic in a largely monarchist Europe (after France and Switzerland), was Western Europe's most unstable parliamentary system in the 20th century. Finally, the authoritarian Estado Novo or "New State" (1926-74) was the longest surviving authoritarian system in modern Western Europe. When Portugal departed from its overseas empire in 1974-75, the descendants, in effect, of Prince Henry the Navigator were leaving the West's oldest empire.

   Portugal's individuality is based mainly on its long history of distinc-tiveness, its intense determination to use any means — alliance, diplomacy, defense, trade, or empire—to be a sovereign state, independent of Spain, and on its national pride in the Portuguese language. Another master factor in Portuguese affairs deserves mention. The country's politics and government have been influenced not only by intellectual currents from the Atlantic but also through Spain from Europe, which brought new political ideas and institutions and novel technologies. Given the weight of empire in Portugal's past, it is not surprising that public affairs have been hostage to a degree to what happened in her overseas empire. Most important have been domestic responses to imperial affairs during both imperial and internal crises since 1415, which have continued to the mid-1970s and beyond. One of the most important themes of Portuguese history, and one oddly neglected by not a few histories, is that every major political crisis and fundamental change in the system—in other words, revolution—since 1415 has been intimately connected with a related imperial crisis. The respective dates of these historical crises are: 1437, 1495, 1578-80, 1640, 1820-22, 1890, 1910, 1926-30, 1961, and 1974. The reader will find greater detail on each crisis in historical context in the history section of this introduction and in relevant entries.

   LAND AND PEOPLE

   The Republic of Portugal is located on the western edge of the Iberian Peninsula. A major geographical dividing line is the Tagus River: Portugal north of it has an Atlantic orientation; the country to the south of it has a Mediterranean orientation. There is little physical evidence that Portugal is clearly geographically distinct from Spain, and there is no major natural barrier between the two countries along more than 1,214 kilometers (755 miles) of the Luso-Spanish frontier. In climate, Portugal has a number of microclimates similar to the microclimates of Galicia, Estremadura, and Andalusia in neighboring Spain. North of the Tagus, in general, there is an Atlantic-type climate with higher rainfall, cold winters, and some snow in the mountainous areas. South of the Tagus is a more Mediterranean climate, with hot, dry, often rainless summers and cool, wet winters. Lisbon, the capital, which has a fifth of the country's population living in its region, has an average annual mean temperature about 16° C (60° F).

   For a small country with an area of 92,345 square kilometers (35,580 square miles, including the Atlantic archipelagos of the Azores and the Madeiras), which is about the size of the state of Indiana in the United States, Portugal has a remarkable diversity of regional topography and scenery. In some respects, Portugal resembles an island within the peninsula, embodying a unique fusion of European and non-European cultures, akin to Spain yet apart. Its geography is a study in contrasts, from the flat, sandy coastal plain, in some places unusually wide for Europe, to the mountainous Beira districts or provinces north of the Tagus, to the snow-capped mountain range of the Estrela, with its unique ski area, to the rocky, barren, remote Trás-os-Montes district bordering Spain. There are extensive forests in central and northern Portugal that contrast with the flat, almost Kansas-like plains of the wheat belt in the Alentejo district. There is also the unique Algarve district, isolated somewhat from the Alentejo district by a mountain range, with a microclimate, topography, and vegetation that resemble closely those of North Africa.

   Although Portugal is small, just 563 kilometers (337 miles) long and from 129 to 209 kilometers (80 to 125 miles) wide, it is strategically located on transportation and communication routes between Europe and North Africa, and the Americas and Europe. Geographical location is one key to the long history of Portugal's three overseas empires, which stretched once from Morocco to the Moluccas and from lonely Sagres at Cape St. Vincent to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. It is essential to emphasize the identity of its neighbors: on the north and east Portugal is bounded by Spain, its only neighbor, and by the Atlantic Ocean on the south and west. Portugal is the westernmost country of Western Europe, and its shape resembles a face, with Lisbon below the nose, staring into the

   Atlantic. No part of Portugal touches the Mediterranean, and its Atlantic orientation has been a response in part to turning its back on Castile and Léon (later Spain) and exploring, traveling, and trading or working in lands beyond the peninsula. Portugal was the pioneering nation in the Atlantic-born European discoveries during the Renaissance, and its diplomatic and trade relations have been dominated by countries that have been Atlantic powers as well: Spain; England (Britain since 1707); France; Brazil, once its greatest colony; and the United States.

   Today Portugal and its Atlantic islands have a population of roughly 10 million people. While ethnic homogeneity has been characteristic of it in recent history, Portugal's population over the centuries has seen an infusion of non-Portuguese ethnic groups from various parts of Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. Between 1500 and 1800, a significant population of black Africans, brought in as slaves, was absorbed in the population. And since 1950, a population of Cape Verdeans, who worked in menial labor, has resided in Portugal. With the influx of African, Goan, and Timorese refugees and exiles from the empire—as many as three quarters of a million retornados ("returned ones" or immigrants from the former empire) entered Portugal in 1974 and 1975—there has been greater ethnic diversity in the Portuguese population. In 2002, there were 239,113 immigrants legally residing in Portugal: 108,132 from Africa; 24,806 from Brazil; 15,906 from Britain; 14,617 from Spain; and 11,877 from Germany. In addition, about 200,000 immigrants are living in Portugal from eastern Europe, mainly from Ukraine. The growth of Portugal's population is reflected in the following statistics:

   1527 1,200,000 (estimate only)

   1768 2,400,000 (estimate only)

   1864 4,287,000 first census

   1890 5,049,700

   1900 5,423,000

   1911 5,960,000

   1930 6,826,000

   1940 7,185,143

   1950 8,510,000

   1960 8,889,000

   1970 8,668,000* note decrease

   1980 9,833,000

   1991 9,862,540

   1996 9,934,100

   2006 10,642,836

   2010 10,710,000 (estimated)

Historical dictionary of Portugal > Introduction

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And the Band Played On — Infobox book name = And the Band Played On: Politics, People and the AIDS Epidemic title orig = translator = image caption = Paperback Edition of the Book author = Randy Shilts country = United States language = English subject = genre =… … Wikipedia
And Be a Villain — infobox Book | name = And Be a Villain title orig = translator = image caption = author = Rex Stout cover artist = Bill English country = United States language = English series = Nero Wolfe genre = Detective fiction publisher = Viking Press… … Wikipedia
Fact sheet — A fact sheet is a presentation of data on any subject in a format emphasizing brevity, key points of interest or concern, a fairly minimalist design aesthetic, and a general desire to convey the most relevant information in the least amount of… … Wikipedia
And Then There Were None (1945 film) — Infobox Film name = And Then There Were None caption = Theatrical release poster. imdb id = 0037515 director = René Clair writer = Novel: Agatha Christie Screenplay: Dudley Nichols starring = Barry Fitzgerald Walter Huston Louis Hayward Roland… … Wikipedia

Словари и энциклопедии на Академике

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and+that's+a+fact

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Словари и энциклопедии на Академике

Перевод: с английского на все языки

and+that's+a+fact

См. также в других словарях:

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