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natural+philosopher

  • 41 физик

    3) Banking: (физлицо) individual, retail client (банковский сленг)

    Универсальный русско-английский словарь > физик

  • 42 натуралист

    naturalist, natural philosopher

    Македонско-англиски речник > натуралист

  • 43 mudrac

    • mattress; natural philosopher; oracle; sage; sholastic; wiseman

    Serbian-English dictionary > mudrac

  • 44 prirodnjak

    • biolog; natural philosopher; naturalist; scientist

    Serbian-English dictionary > prirodnjak

  • 45 فيلسوف الطبيعة

    n. natural philosopher

    Arabic-English dictionary > فيلسوف الطبيعة

  • 46 naturalist

    натуралист имя существительное: имя прилагательное:

    Англо-русский синонимический словарь > naturalist

  • 47 physicist

    физик имя существительное:

    Англо-русский синонимический словарь > physicist

  • 48 scientist

    ученый имя существительное:

    Англо-русский синонимический словарь > scientist

  • 49 естествоиспытатель

    naturalist имя существительное:
    natural philosopher (естествоиспытатель, физик)

    Русско-английский синонимический словарь > естествоиспытатель

  • 50 физик

    physicist имя существительное:

    Русско-английский синонимический словарь > физик

  • 51 Empedoclea

    Empĕdŏcles, is ( gen. -cli, Gell. 4, 11, 9; acc. -clem, Cic. Ac. 1, 12, 44;

    -clen,

    id. ib. 2, 5, 14 al.), m., = Empedoklês, a famous natural philosopher of Agrigentum, about 460 B. C., Lucr. 1, 716 sq.; Cic. N. D. 1, 12; id. de Or. 1, 50, 217; id. Tusc. 1, 9, 19; Quint. 1, 4, 4; 3, 1, 8; Plin. 29, 1, 4, § 5; Gell. 17, 21, 14; Hor. Ep. 1, 12, 20; id. A. P. 465.—Hence,
    II.
    Empĕdoclēus, a, um, adj., Empedoclean: sanguis (acc. to his doctrine, the soul), Cic. Tusc. 1, 17 fin.— Subst.: Empĕdoclēa, ōrum, n., Empedoclean doctrines, id. Q. Fr. 2, 11 fin.

    Lewis & Short latin dictionary > Empedoclea

  • 52 Empedocles

    Empĕdŏcles, is ( gen. -cli, Gell. 4, 11, 9; acc. -clem, Cic. Ac. 1, 12, 44;

    -clen,

    id. ib. 2, 5, 14 al.), m., = Empedoklês, a famous natural philosopher of Agrigentum, about 460 B. C., Lucr. 1, 716 sq.; Cic. N. D. 1, 12; id. de Or. 1, 50, 217; id. Tusc. 1, 9, 19; Quint. 1, 4, 4; 3, 1, 8; Plin. 29, 1, 4, § 5; Gell. 17, 21, 14; Hor. Ep. 1, 12, 20; id. A. P. 465.—Hence,
    II.
    Empĕdoclēus, a, um, adj., Empedoclean: sanguis (acc. to his doctrine, the soul), Cic. Tusc. 1, 17 fin.— Subst.: Empĕdoclēa, ōrum, n., Empedoclean doctrines, id. Q. Fr. 2, 11 fin.

    Lewis & Short latin dictionary > Empedocles

  • 53 Empedocleus

    Empĕdŏcles, is ( gen. -cli, Gell. 4, 11, 9; acc. -clem, Cic. Ac. 1, 12, 44;

    -clen,

    id. ib. 2, 5, 14 al.), m., = Empedoklês, a famous natural philosopher of Agrigentum, about 460 B. C., Lucr. 1, 716 sq.; Cic. N. D. 1, 12; id. de Or. 1, 50, 217; id. Tusc. 1, 9, 19; Quint. 1, 4, 4; 3, 1, 8; Plin. 29, 1, 4, § 5; Gell. 17, 21, 14; Hor. Ep. 1, 12, 20; id. A. P. 465.—Hence,
    II.
    Empĕdoclēus, a, um, adj., Empedoclean: sanguis (acc. to his doctrine, the soul), Cic. Tusc. 1, 17 fin.— Subst.: Empĕdoclēa, ōrum, n., Empedoclean doctrines, id. Q. Fr. 2, 11 fin.

    Lewis & Short latin dictionary > Empedocleus

  • 54 φυσικεύομαι

    A to be or speak like a natural philosopher, Julian. ap.Gal.18(1).255.

    Greek-English dictionary (Αγγλικά Ελληνικά-λεξικό) > φυσικεύομαι

  • 55 Porta, Giovanni Battista (Giambattista) della

    [br]
    b. between 3 October and 15 November 1535 Vico Equense, near Naples, Italy
    d. 4 February 1615 Naples, Italy
    [br]
    Italian natural philosopher who published many scientific books, one of which covered ideas for the use of steam.
    [br]
    Giambattista della Porta spent most of his life in Naples, where some time before 1580 he established the Accademia dei Segreti, which met at his house. In 1611 he was enrolled among the Oziosi in Naples, then the most renowned literary academy. He was examined by the Inquisition, which, although he had become a lay brother of the Jesuits by 1585, banned all further publication of his books between 1592 and 1598.
    His first book, the Magiae Naturalis, which covered the secrets of nature, was published in 1558. He had been collecting material for it since the age of 15 and he saw that science should not merely represent theory and contemplation but must arrive at practical and experimental expression. In this work he described the hardening of files and pieces of armour on quite a large scale, and it included the best sixteenth-century description of heat treatment for hardening steel. In the 1589 edition of this work he covered ways of improving vision at a distance with concave and convex lenses; although he may have constructed a compound microscope, the history of this instrument effectively begins with Galileo. His theoretical and practical work on lenses paved the way for the telescope and he also explored the properties of parabolic mirrors.
    In 1563 he published a treatise on cryptography, De Furtivis Liter arum Notis, which he followed in 1566 with another on memory and mnemonic devices, Arte del Ricordare. In 1584 and 1585 he published treatises on horticulture and agriculture based on careful study and practice; in 1586 he published De Humana Physiognomonia, on human physiognomy, and in 1588 a treatise on the physiognomy of plants. In 1593 he published his De Refractione but, probably because of the ban by the Inquisition, no more were produced until the Spiritali in 1601 and his translation of Ptolemy's Almagest in 1605. In 1608 two new works appeared: a short treatise on military fortifications; and the De Distillatione. There was an important work on meteorology in 1610. In 1601 he described a device similar to Hero's mechanisms which opened temple doors, only Porta used steam pressure instead of air to force the water out of its box or container, up a pipe to where it emptied out into a higher container. Under the lower box there was a small steam boiler heated by a fire. He may also have been the first person to realize that condensed steam would form a vacuum, for there is a description of another piece of apparatus where water is drawn up into a container at the top of a long pipe. The container was first filled with steam so that, when cooled, a vacuum would be formed and water drawn up into it. These are the principles on which Thomas Savery's later steam-engine worked.
    [br]
    Further Reading
    Dictionary of Scientific Biography, 1975, Vol. XI, New York: C.Scribner's Sons (contains a full biography).
    H.W.Dickinson, 1938, A Short History of the Steam Engine, Cambridge University Press (contains an account of his contributions to the early development of the steam-engine).
    C.Singer (ed.), 1957, A History of Technology, Vol. III, Oxford University Press (contains accounts of some of his other discoveries).
    I.Asimov (ed.), 1982, Biographical Encyclopaedia of Science and Technology, 2nd edn., New York: Doubleday.
    G.Sarton, 1957, Six wings: Men of Science in the Renaissance, London: Bodley Head, pp. 85–8.
    RLH / IMcN

    Biographical history of technology > Porta, Giovanni Battista (Giambattista) della

  • 56 Naturphilosoph

    m
    natural philosopher

    Deutsch-Englisches Wörterbuch > Naturphilosoph

  • 57 természettudós

    naturalist, natural philosopher

    Magyar-ingilizce szótár > természettudós

  • 58 lógico

    adj.
    1 logical, logically-founded, axiomatic.
    2 logical, logic, coherent, reasonable.
    m.
    logician.
    * * *
    1 (de la lógica) logical
    2 (natural) normal, to be expected
    ► nombre masculino,nombre femenino
    1 logician
    * * *
    (f. - lógica)
    adj.
    * * *
    lógico, -a
    1. ADJ
    1) [relativo a la lógica] [conclusión, razonamiento, planteamiento] logical
    2) (=normal) natural

    es lógico que... — it stands to reason that..., it's understandable that...

    -ayudaría a su hijo antes que al tuyo -¡lógico! — "I would help my son before yours" - "well, naturally!"

    lo más lógico sería... — + infin the most sensible thing would be to... + infin

    3) (Inform) logic antes de s
    2.
    SM / F logician
    lógica
    * * *
    I
    - ca adjetivo
    a) (normal, natural) natural, logical

    como es lógico,... — naturally o obviously,...

    b) <conclusión/consecuencia> logical
    c) (Fil) logical
    II
    adverbio (indep) (fam) of course
    III
    - ca masculino, femenino logician
    * * *
    I
    - ca adjetivo
    a) (normal, natural) natural, logical

    como es lógico,... — naturally o obviously,...

    b) <conclusión/consecuencia> logical
    c) (Fil) logical
    II
    adverbio (indep) (fam) of course
    III
    - ca masculino, femenino logician
    * * *
    lógico1

    Ex: This article recalls the memory of the Rumanian mathematician, logician and philosopher, Grigore C. Moisil = Este artículo es un homenaje a la memoria del matemático rumano, especialista en la lógica y filósofo, Grigore C. Moisil.

    lógico2
    2 = logical, reasonable, inferential.

    Ex: In an application where weighted term logic is the primary search logic, search profiles are framed by combining index terms in a simple logical sum.

    Ex: It is therefore reasonable to apply the principles of facet analysis in order to evaluate the schemes.
    Ex: Only in LIS were there more articles using descriptive techniques than articles using inferential techniques.
    * base lógica = rationale.
    * cumplir un enunciado lógico de búsqueda = satisfy + logic statement.
    * de forma lógica = in a meaningful way.
    * de manera lógica = in a meaningful way.
    * de una manera lógica = logically.
    * diferencia lógica = logical difference.
    * es por lo tanto lógico que = it therefore follows that.
    * estructura lógica = logical data structure.
    * nada lógico = counter-intuitive [counterintuitive].
    * operador lógico = logic operator, logical operator.
    * parecer lógico = make + sense.
    * registro lógico = logical record.
    * ser una consecuencia lógica de = go with + the territory (of), come with + the territory (of).

    * * *
    lógico1 -ca
    1 (normal, natural) natural, logical
    como es lógico, vendrá con ellos naturally o obviously he will come with them
    es lógico que quiera más libertad it's (only) natural that he should want more freedom
    es lógico que se haya ofendido it's understandable o not surprising that he should be offended
    lo lógico sería que se lo hubiera dicho antes a él the logical thing would have been to tell him first
    2 ‹conclusión/consecuencia› logical
    3 ( Fil) logical
    ( indep) ( fam); of course
    ¿tú también vienes? — ¡lógico! are you coming too? — naturally o of course!
    lógico3 -ca
    masculine, feminine
    logician
    * * *

    lógico 1
    ◊ -ca adjetivo

    a) (normal, natural) natural, logical;

    ◊ como es lógico naturally, obviously;

    es lógico que así sea it's (only) natural that it should be so;
    lo lógico sería … the logical thing would be …
    b) ‹conclusión/consecuencia› logical

    lógico 2 adverbio ( indep) (fam) of course
    lógico,-a adjetivo logical: es lógico que te enfades, it's natural for you to get angry
    ' lógico' also found in these entries:
    Spanish:
    lógica
    - natural
    English:
    follow
    - logical
    - natural
    - surprisingly
    - obviously
    - reason
    * * *
    lógico, -a
    ♦ adj
    1. [del pensamiento] logical
    2. [natural] logical;
    como es lógico, ellos también están invitados naturally, they are also invited;
    es lógico que se enfade it stands to reason that he should get angry;
    es lógico que tras la enfermedad se sienta débil it's only natural that she should feel weak after the illness;
    ¿te gustaría acompañarnos? – ¡lógico! would you like to come with us? – of course I would!
    ♦ nm,f
    logician
    * * *
    adj logical
    * * *
    lógico, -ca adj
    : logical
    ♦ lógicamente adv
    * * *
    lógico adj
    1. (de la lógica) logical
    2. (normal) natural

    Spanish-English dictionary > lógico

  • 59 Semantics

       There are people who maintain that there is no distinction between syntax and semantics, and there are others who lump the entire inference and "thought" component of an AI system under the label "semantics." Moreover, the philosophers, linguists, and programming language theorists have notions of semantics which are distinct from each other and from many of the notions of computational linguists and psychologists....
       First, let me set up two caricatures which I will call the Linguist and the Philosopher, without thereby asserting that all linguists fall into the first category or philosophers in the second. Both, however, represent strong traditions in their respective fields. The Linguist has the following view of semantics in linguistics: He is interested in characterizing the fact that the same sentence can sometimes mean different things, and some sentences mean nothing at all. He would like to find some notation in which to express the different things which a sentence can mean and some procedure for determining whether a sentence is "anomalous" (i.e., has no meanings). The Philosopher on the other hand is concerned with specifying the meaning of a formal notation rather than a natural language.... His notation is already unambiguous. What he is concerned with is determining when an expression in the notation is a "true" preposition (in some appropriate formal sense of truth) and when it is false.... Meaning for the Philosopher is not defined in terms of some other notation in which to represent different possible interpretations of a sentence, but he is interested in the conditions for truth of an already formal representation. (Woods, 1975, pp. 40-41)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Semantics

  • 60 Philosophy

       And what I believe to be more important here is that I find in myself an infinity of ideas of certain things which cannot be assumed to be pure nothingness, even though they may have perhaps no existence outside of my thought. These things are not figments of my imagination, even though it is within my power to think of them or not to think of them; on the contrary, they have their own true and immutable natures. Thus, for example, when I imagine a triangle, even though there may perhaps be no such figure anywhere in the world outside of my thought, nor ever have been, nevertheless the figure cannot help having a certain determinate nature... or essence, which is immutable and eternal, which I have not invented and which does not in any way depend upon my mind. (Descartes, 1951, p. 61)
       Let us console ourselves for not knowing the possible connections between a spider and the rings of Saturn, and continue to examine what is within our reach. (Voltaire, 1961, p. 144)
       As modern physics started with the Newtonian revolution, so modern philosophy starts with what one might call the Cartesian Catastrophe. The catastrophe consisted in the splitting up of the world into the realms of matter and mind, and the identification of "mind" with conscious thinking. The result of this identification was the shallow rationalism of l'esprit Cartesien, and an impoverishment of psychology which it took three centuries to remedy even in part. (Koestler, 1964, p. 148)
       It has been made of late a reproach against natural philosophy that it has struck out on a path of its own, and has separated itself more and more widely from the other sciences which are united by common philological and historical studies. The opposition has, in fact, been long apparent, and seems to me to have grown up mainly under the influence of the Hegelian philosophy, or, at any rate, to have been brought out into more distinct relief by that philosophy.... The sole object of Kant's "Critical Philosophy" was to test the sources and the authority of our knowledge, and to fix a definite scope and standard for the researches of philosophy, as compared with other sciences.... [But Hegel's] "Philosophy of Identity" was bolder. It started with the hypothesis that not only spiritual phenomena, but even the actual world-nature, that is, and man-were the result of an act of thought on the part of a creative mind, similar, it was supposed, in kind to the human mind.... The philosophers accused the scientific men of narrowness; the scientific men retorted that the philosophers were crazy. And so it came about that men of science began to lay some stress on the banishment of all philosophic influences from their work; while some of them, including men of the greatest acuteness, went so far as to condemn philosophy altogether, not merely as useless, but as mischievous dreaming. Thus, it must be confessed, not only were the illegitimate pretensions of the Hegelian system to subordinate to itself all other studies rejected, but no regard was paid to the rightful claims of philosophy, that is, the criticism of the sources of cognition, and the definition of the functions of the intellect. (Helmholz, quoted in Dampier, 1966, pp. 291-292)
       Philosophy remains true to its classical tradition by renouncing it. (Habermas, 1972, p. 317)
       I have not attempted... to put forward any grand view of the nature of philosophy; nor do I have any such grand view to put forth if I would. It will be obvious that I do not agree with those who see philosophy as the history of "howlers" and progress in philosophy as the debunking of howlers. It will also be obvious that I do not agree with those who see philosophy as the enterprise of putting forward a priori truths about the world.... I see philosophy as a field which has certain central questions, for example, the relation between thought and reality.... It seems obvious that in dealing with these questions philosophers have formulated rival research programs, that they have put forward general hypotheses, and that philosophers within each major research program have modified their hypotheses by trial and error, even if they sometimes refuse to admit that that is what they are doing. To that extent philosophy is a "science." To argue about whether philosophy is a science in any more serious sense seems to me to be hardly a useful occupation.... It does not seem to me important to decide whether science is philosophy or philosophy is science as long as one has a conception of both that makes both essential to a responsible view of the world and of man's place in it. (Putnam, 1975, p. xvii)
       What can philosophy contribute to solving the problem of the relation [of] mind to body? Twenty years ago, many English-speaking philosophers would have answered: "Nothing beyond an analysis of the various mental concepts." If we seek knowledge of things, they thought, it is to science that we must turn. Philosophy can only cast light upon our concepts of those things.
       This retreat from things to concepts was not undertaken lightly. Ever since the seventeenth century, the great intellectual fact of our culture has been the incredible expansion of knowledge both in the natural and in the rational sciences (mathematics, logic).
       The success of science created a crisis in philosophy. What was there for philosophy to do? Hume had already perceived the problem in some degree, and so surely did Kant, but it was not until the twentieth century, with the Vienna Circle and with Wittgenstein, that the difficulty began to weigh heavily. Wittgenstein took the view that philosophy could do no more than strive to undo the intellectual knots it itself had tied, so achieving intellectual release, and even a certain illumination, but no knowledge. A little later, and more optimistically, Ryle saw a positive, if reduced role, for philosophy in mapping the "logical geography" of our concepts: how they stood to each other and how they were to be analyzed....
       Since that time, however, philosophers in the "analytic" tradition have swung back from Wittgensteinian and even Rylean pessimism to a more traditional conception of the proper role and tasks of philosophy. Many analytic philosophers now would accept the view that the central task of philosophy is to give an account, or at least play a part in giving an account, of the most general nature of things and of man. (Armstrong, 1990, pp. 37-38)
       8) Philosophy's Evolving Engagement with Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science
       In the beginning, the nature of philosophy's engagement with artificial intelligence and cognitive science was clear enough. The new sciences of the mind were to provide the long-awaited vindication of the most potent dreams of naturalism and materialism. Mind would at last be located firmly within the natural order. We would see in detail how the most perplexing features of the mental realm could be supported by the operations of solely physical laws upon solely physical stuff. Mental causation (the power of, e.g., a belief to cause an action) would emerge as just another species of physical causation. Reasoning would be understood as a kind of automated theorem proving. And the key to both was to be the depiction of the brain as the implementation of multiple higher level programs whose task was to manipulate and transform symbols or representations: inner items with one foot in the physical (they were realized as brain states) and one in the mental (they were bearers of contents, and their physical gymnastics were cleverly designed to respect semantic relationships such as truth preservation). (A. Clark, 1996, p. 1)
       Socrates of Athens famously declared that "the unexamined life is not worth living," and his motto aptly explains the impulse to philosophize. Taking nothing for granted, philosophy probes and questions the fundamental presuppositions of every area of human inquiry.... [P]art of the job of the philosopher is to keep at a certain critical distance from current doctrines, whether in the sciences or the arts, and to examine instead how the various elements in our world-view clash, or fit together. Some philosophers have tried to incorporate the results of these inquiries into a grand synoptic view of the nature of reality and our human relationship to it. Others have mistrusted system-building, and seen their primary role as one of clarifications, or the removal of obstacles along the road to truth. But all have shared the Socratic vision of using the human intellect to challenge comfortable preconceptions, insisting that every aspect of human theory and practice be subjected to continuing critical scrutiny....
       Philosophy is, of course, part of a continuing tradition, and there is much to be gained from seeing how that tradition originated and developed. But the principal object of studying the materials in this book is not to pay homage to past genius, but to enrich one's understanding of central problems that are as pressing today as they have always been-problems about knowledge, truth and reality, the nature of the mind, the basis of right action, and the best way to live. These questions help to mark out the territory of philosophy as an academic discipline, but in a wider sense they define the human predicament itself; they will surely continue to be with us for as long as humanity endures. (Cottingham, 1996, pp. xxi-xxii)
       In his study of ancient Greek culture, The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche drew what would become a famous distinction, between the Dionysian spirit, the untamed spirit of art and creativity, and the Apollonian, that of reason and self-control. The story of Greek civilization, and all civilizations, Nietzsche implied, was the gradual victory of Apollonian man, with his desire for control over nature and himself, over Dionysian man, who survives only in myth, poetry, music, and drama. Socrates and Plato had attacked the illusions of art as unreal, and had overturned the delicate cultural balance by valuing only man's critical, rational, and controlling consciousness while denigrating his vital life instincts as irrational and base. The result of this division is "Alexandrian man," the civilized and accomplished Greek citizen of the later ancient world, who is "equipped with the greatest forces of knowledge" but in whom the wellsprings of creativity have dried up. (Herman, 1997, pp. 95-96)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Philosophy

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См. также в других словарях:

  • natural philosopher — noun : one that studies or is skilled in natural philosophy * * * natural philosopher noun • • • Main Entry: ↑natural * * * natural philosopher, 1. a student of natural philosophy. 2. = physicist. (Cf. ↑physicist) …   Useful english dictionary

  • natural philosopher — noun see natural philosophy …   New Collegiate Dictionary

  • John Gough (natural philosopher) — Infobox Scientist name = John Gough box width = 300px image width = caption = birth date = birth date|1757|01|15 birth place = Kendal, Westmorland, England death date = death date and age|1825|07|28|1757|01|15 death place = Kendal, Westmorland,… …   Wikipedia

  • natural philosophy — natural philosopher. 1. See natural science. 2. See physical science. [1425 75; late ME] * * * …   Universalium

  • Natural philosophy — For the current in the 19th century German idealism, see Naturphilosophie. A celestial map from the 17th century, by the Dutch cartographer Frederik De Wit. Natural philosophy or the philosophy of nature (from Latin philosophia naturalis), is a… …   Wikipedia

  • natural — adj. & n. adj. 1 a existing in or caused by nature; not artificial (natural landscape). b uncultivated; wild (existing in its natural state). 2 in the course of nature; not exceptional or miraculous (died of natural causes; a natural occurrence) …   Useful english dictionary

  • natural philosophy — noun Date: 14th century natural science; especially physical science • natural philosopher noun …   New Collegiate Dictionary

  • natural philosophy — noun archaic natural science, especially physical science. Derivatives natural philosopher noun …   English new terms dictionary

  • Natural theology — is a branch of theology based on reason and ordinary experience. Thus it is distinguished from revealed theology (or revealed religion) which is based on scripture and religious experiences of various kinds; and also from transcendental theology …   Wikipedia

  • Natural wine — is wine made with minimal chemical and technological intervention in growing grapes and making them into wine. The term is used to distinguish such wine from organic wine. Organic wine is organic in the sense of having been produced made from… …   Wikipedia

  • Natural law — For other uses, see Natural law (disambiguation). Natural law, or the law of nature (Latin: lex naturalis), is any system of law which is purportedly determined by nature, and thus universal.[1] Classically, natural law refers to the use of… …   Wikipedia

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