Перевод: со всех языков на английский

с английского на все языки

reasoning+about+knowledge

  • 1 Knowledge

       It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and, in a word, all sensible objects, have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But, with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it into question may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. For, what are the forementioned objects but things we perceive by sense? and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations? and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived? (Berkeley, 1996, Pt. I, No. 4, p. 25)
       It seems to me that the only objects of the abstract sciences or of demonstration are quantity and number, and that all attempts to extend this more perfect species of knowledge beyond these bounds are mere sophistry and illusion. As the component parts of quantity and number are entirely similar, their relations become intricate and involved; and nothing can be more curious, as well as useful, than to trace, by a variety of mediums, their equality or inequality, through their different appearances.
       But as all other ideas are clearly distinct and different from each other, we can never advance farther, by our utmost scrutiny, than to observe this diversity, and, by an obvious reflection, pronounce one thing not to be another. Or if there be any difficulty in these decisions, it proceeds entirely from the undeterminate meaning of words, which is corrected by juster definitions. That the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the squares of the other two sides cannot be known, let the terms be ever so exactly defined, without a train of reasoning and enquiry. But to convince us of this proposition, that where there is no property, there can be no injustice, it is only necessary to define the terms, and explain injustice to be a violation of property. This proposition is, indeed, nothing but a more imperfect definition. It is the same case with all those pretended syllogistical reasonings, which may be found in every other branch of learning, except the sciences of quantity and number; and these may safely, I think, be pronounced the only proper objects of knowledge and demonstration. (Hume, 1975, Sec. 12, Pt. 3, pp. 163-165)
       Our knowledge springs from two fundamental sources of the mind; the first is the capacity of receiving representations (the ability to receive impressions), the second is the power to know an object through these representations (spontaneity in the production of concepts).
       Through the first, an object is given to us; through the second, the object is thought in relation to that representation.... Intuition and concepts constitute, therefore, the elements of all our knowledge, so that neither concepts without intuition in some way corresponding to them, nor intuition without concepts, can yield knowledge. Both may be either pure or empirical.... Pure intuitions or pure concepts are possible only a priori; empirical intuitions and empirical concepts only a posteriori. If the receptivity of our mind, its power of receiving representations in so far as it is in any way affected, is to be called "sensibility," then the mind's power of producing representations from itself, the spontaneity of knowledge, should be called "understanding." Our nature is so constituted that our intuitions can never be other than sensible; that is, it contains only the mode in which we are affected by objects. The faculty, on the other hand, which enables us to think the object of sensible intuition is the understanding.... Without sensibility, no object would be given to us; without understanding, no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind. It is therefore just as necessary to make our concepts sensible, that is, to add the object to them in intuition, as to make our intuitions intelligible, that is to bring them under concepts. These two powers or capacities cannot exchange their functions. The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through their union can knowledge arise. (Kant, 1933, Sec. 1, Pt. 2, B74-75 [p. 92])
       Metaphysics, as a natural disposition of Reason is real, but it is also, in itself, dialectical and deceptive.... Hence to attempt to draw our principles from it, and in their employment to follow this natural but none the less fallacious illusion can never produce science, but only an empty dialectical art, in which one school may indeed outdo the other, but none can ever attain a justifiable and lasting success. In order that, as a science, it may lay claim not merely to deceptive persuasion, but to insight and conviction, a Critique of Reason must exhibit in a complete system the whole stock of conceptions a priori, arranged according to their different sources-the Sensibility, the understanding, and the Reason; it must present a complete table of these conceptions, together with their analysis and all that can be deduced from them, but more especially the possibility of synthetic knowledge a priori by means of their deduction, the principles of its use, and finally, its boundaries....
       This much is certain: he who has once tried criticism will be sickened for ever of all the dogmatic trash he was compelled to content himself with before, because his Reason, requiring something, could find nothing better for its occupation. Criticism stands to the ordinary school metaphysics exactly in the same relation as chemistry to alchemy, or as astron omy to fortune-telling astrology. I guarantee that no one who has comprehended and thought out the conclusions of criticism, even in these Prolegomena, will ever return to the old sophistical pseudo-science. He will rather look forward with a kind of pleasure to a metaphysics, certainly now within his power, which requires no more preparatory discoveries, and which alone can procure for reason permanent satisfaction. (Kant, 1891, pp. 115-116)
       Knowledge is only real and can only be set forth fully in the form of science, in the form of system. Further, a so-called fundamental proposition or first principle of philosophy, even if it is true, it is yet none the less false, just because and in so far as it is merely a fundamental proposition, merely a first principle. It is for that reason easily refuted. The refutation consists in bringing out its defective character; and it is defective because it is merely the universal, merely a principle, the beginning. If the refutation is complete and thorough, it is derived and developed from the nature of the principle itself, and not accomplished by bringing in from elsewhere other counter-assurances and chance fancies. It would be strictly the development of the principle, and thus the completion of its deficiency, were it not that it misunderstands its own purport by taking account solely of the negative aspect of what it seeks to do, and is not conscious of the positive character of its process and result. The really positive working out of the beginning is at the same time just as much the very reverse: it is a negative attitude towards the principle we start from. Negative, that is to say, in its one-sided form, which consists in being primarily immediate, a mere purpose. It may therefore be regarded as a refutation of what constitutes the basis of the system; but more correctly it should be looked at as a demonstration that the basis or principle of the system is in point of fact merely its beginning. (Hegel, 1910, pp. 21-22)
       Knowledge, action, and evaluation are essentially connected. The primary and pervasive significance of knowledge lies in its guidance of action: knowing is for the sake of doing. And action, obviously, is rooted in evaluation. For a being which did not assign comparative values, deliberate action would be pointless; and for one which did not know, it would be impossible. Conversely, only an active being could have knowledge, and only such a being could assign values to anything beyond his own feelings. A creature which did not enter into the process of reality to alter in some part the future content of it, could apprehend a world only in the sense of intuitive or esthetic contemplation; and such contemplation would not possess the significance of knowledge but only that of enjoying and suffering. (Lewis, 1946, p. 1)
       "Evolutionary epistemology" is a branch of scholarship that applies the evolutionary perspective to an understanding of how knowledge develops. Knowledge always involves getting information. The most primitive way of acquiring it is through the sense of touch: amoebas and other simple organisms know what happens around them only if they can feel it with their "skins." The knowledge such an organism can have is strictly about what is in its immediate vicinity. After a huge jump in evolution, organisms learned to find out what was going on at a distance from them, without having to actually feel the environment. This jump involved the development of sense organs for processing information that was farther away. For a long time, the most important sources of knowledge were the nose, the eyes, and the ears. The next big advance occurred when organisms developed memory. Now information no longer needed to be present at all, and the animal could recall events and outcomes that happened in the past. Each one of these steps in the evolution of knowledge added important survival advantages to the species that was equipped to use it.
       Then, with the appearance in evolution of humans, an entirely new way of acquiring information developed. Up to this point, the processing of information was entirely intrasomatic.... But when speech appeared (and even more powerfully with the invention of writing), information processing became extrasomatic. After that point knowledge did not have to be stored in the genes, or in the memory traces of the brain; it could be passed on from one person to another through words, or it could be written down and stored on a permanent substance like stone, paper, or silicon chips-in any case, outside the fragile and impermanent nervous system. (Csikszentmihalyi, 1993, pp. 56-57)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Knowledge

  • 2 Philosophy

       And what I believe to be more important here is that I find in myself an infinity of ideas of certain things which cannot be assumed to be pure nothingness, even though they may have perhaps no existence outside of my thought. These things are not figments of my imagination, even though it is within my power to think of them or not to think of them; on the contrary, they have their own true and immutable natures. Thus, for example, when I imagine a triangle, even though there may perhaps be no such figure anywhere in the world outside of my thought, nor ever have been, nevertheless the figure cannot help having a certain determinate nature... or essence, which is immutable and eternal, which I have not invented and which does not in any way depend upon my mind. (Descartes, 1951, p. 61)
       Let us console ourselves for not knowing the possible connections between a spider and the rings of Saturn, and continue to examine what is within our reach. (Voltaire, 1961, p. 144)
       As modern physics started with the Newtonian revolution, so modern philosophy starts with what one might call the Cartesian Catastrophe. The catastrophe consisted in the splitting up of the world into the realms of matter and mind, and the identification of "mind" with conscious thinking. The result of this identification was the shallow rationalism of l'esprit Cartesien, and an impoverishment of psychology which it took three centuries to remedy even in part. (Koestler, 1964, p. 148)
       It has been made of late a reproach against natural philosophy that it has struck out on a path of its own, and has separated itself more and more widely from the other sciences which are united by common philological and historical studies. The opposition has, in fact, been long apparent, and seems to me to have grown up mainly under the influence of the Hegelian philosophy, or, at any rate, to have been brought out into more distinct relief by that philosophy.... The sole object of Kant's "Critical Philosophy" was to test the sources and the authority of our knowledge, and to fix a definite scope and standard for the researches of philosophy, as compared with other sciences.... [But Hegel's] "Philosophy of Identity" was bolder. It started with the hypothesis that not only spiritual phenomena, but even the actual world-nature, that is, and man-were the result of an act of thought on the part of a creative mind, similar, it was supposed, in kind to the human mind.... The philosophers accused the scientific men of narrowness; the scientific men retorted that the philosophers were crazy. And so it came about that men of science began to lay some stress on the banishment of all philosophic influences from their work; while some of them, including men of the greatest acuteness, went so far as to condemn philosophy altogether, not merely as useless, but as mischievous dreaming. Thus, it must be confessed, not only were the illegitimate pretensions of the Hegelian system to subordinate to itself all other studies rejected, but no regard was paid to the rightful claims of philosophy, that is, the criticism of the sources of cognition, and the definition of the functions of the intellect. (Helmholz, quoted in Dampier, 1966, pp. 291-292)
       Philosophy remains true to its classical tradition by renouncing it. (Habermas, 1972, p. 317)
       I have not attempted... to put forward any grand view of the nature of philosophy; nor do I have any such grand view to put forth if I would. It will be obvious that I do not agree with those who see philosophy as the history of "howlers" and progress in philosophy as the debunking of howlers. It will also be obvious that I do not agree with those who see philosophy as the enterprise of putting forward a priori truths about the world.... I see philosophy as a field which has certain central questions, for example, the relation between thought and reality.... It seems obvious that in dealing with these questions philosophers have formulated rival research programs, that they have put forward general hypotheses, and that philosophers within each major research program have modified their hypotheses by trial and error, even if they sometimes refuse to admit that that is what they are doing. To that extent philosophy is a "science." To argue about whether philosophy is a science in any more serious sense seems to me to be hardly a useful occupation.... It does not seem to me important to decide whether science is philosophy or philosophy is science as long as one has a conception of both that makes both essential to a responsible view of the world and of man's place in it. (Putnam, 1975, p. xvii)
       What can philosophy contribute to solving the problem of the relation [of] mind to body? Twenty years ago, many English-speaking philosophers would have answered: "Nothing beyond an analysis of the various mental concepts." If we seek knowledge of things, they thought, it is to science that we must turn. Philosophy can only cast light upon our concepts of those things.
       This retreat from things to concepts was not undertaken lightly. Ever since the seventeenth century, the great intellectual fact of our culture has been the incredible expansion of knowledge both in the natural and in the rational sciences (mathematics, logic).
       The success of science created a crisis in philosophy. What was there for philosophy to do? Hume had already perceived the problem in some degree, and so surely did Kant, but it was not until the twentieth century, with the Vienna Circle and with Wittgenstein, that the difficulty began to weigh heavily. Wittgenstein took the view that philosophy could do no more than strive to undo the intellectual knots it itself had tied, so achieving intellectual release, and even a certain illumination, but no knowledge. A little later, and more optimistically, Ryle saw a positive, if reduced role, for philosophy in mapping the "logical geography" of our concepts: how they stood to each other and how they were to be analyzed....
       Since that time, however, philosophers in the "analytic" tradition have swung back from Wittgensteinian and even Rylean pessimism to a more traditional conception of the proper role and tasks of philosophy. Many analytic philosophers now would accept the view that the central task of philosophy is to give an account, or at least play a part in giving an account, of the most general nature of things and of man. (Armstrong, 1990, pp. 37-38)
       8) Philosophy's Evolving Engagement with Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science
       In the beginning, the nature of philosophy's engagement with artificial intelligence and cognitive science was clear enough. The new sciences of the mind were to provide the long-awaited vindication of the most potent dreams of naturalism and materialism. Mind would at last be located firmly within the natural order. We would see in detail how the most perplexing features of the mental realm could be supported by the operations of solely physical laws upon solely physical stuff. Mental causation (the power of, e.g., a belief to cause an action) would emerge as just another species of physical causation. Reasoning would be understood as a kind of automated theorem proving. And the key to both was to be the depiction of the brain as the implementation of multiple higher level programs whose task was to manipulate and transform symbols or representations: inner items with one foot in the physical (they were realized as brain states) and one in the mental (they were bearers of contents, and their physical gymnastics were cleverly designed to respect semantic relationships such as truth preservation). (A. Clark, 1996, p. 1)
       Socrates of Athens famously declared that "the unexamined life is not worth living," and his motto aptly explains the impulse to philosophize. Taking nothing for granted, philosophy probes and questions the fundamental presuppositions of every area of human inquiry.... [P]art of the job of the philosopher is to keep at a certain critical distance from current doctrines, whether in the sciences or the arts, and to examine instead how the various elements in our world-view clash, or fit together. Some philosophers have tried to incorporate the results of these inquiries into a grand synoptic view of the nature of reality and our human relationship to it. Others have mistrusted system-building, and seen their primary role as one of clarifications, or the removal of obstacles along the road to truth. But all have shared the Socratic vision of using the human intellect to challenge comfortable preconceptions, insisting that every aspect of human theory and practice be subjected to continuing critical scrutiny....
       Philosophy is, of course, part of a continuing tradition, and there is much to be gained from seeing how that tradition originated and developed. But the principal object of studying the materials in this book is not to pay homage to past genius, but to enrich one's understanding of central problems that are as pressing today as they have always been-problems about knowledge, truth and reality, the nature of the mind, the basis of right action, and the best way to live. These questions help to mark out the territory of philosophy as an academic discipline, but in a wider sense they define the human predicament itself; they will surely continue to be with us for as long as humanity endures. (Cottingham, 1996, pp. xxi-xxii)
       In his study of ancient Greek culture, The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche drew what would become a famous distinction, between the Dionysian spirit, the untamed spirit of art and creativity, and the Apollonian, that of reason and self-control. The story of Greek civilization, and all civilizations, Nietzsche implied, was the gradual victory of Apollonian man, with his desire for control over nature and himself, over Dionysian man, who survives only in myth, poetry, music, and drama. Socrates and Plato had attacked the illusions of art as unreal, and had overturned the delicate cultural balance by valuing only man's critical, rational, and controlling consciousness while denigrating his vital life instincts as irrational and base. The result of this division is "Alexandrian man," the civilized and accomplished Greek citizen of the later ancient world, who is "equipped with the greatest forces of knowledge" but in whom the wellsprings of creativity have dried up. (Herman, 1997, pp. 95-96)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Philosophy

  • 3 Artificial Intelligence

       In my opinion, none of [these programs] does even remote justice to the complexity of human mental processes. Unlike men, "artificially intelligent" programs tend to be single minded, undistractable, and unemotional. (Neisser, 1967, p. 9)
       Future progress in [artificial intelligence] will depend on the development of both practical and theoretical knowledge.... As regards theoretical knowledge, some have sought a unified theory of artificial intelligence. My view is that artificial intelligence is (or soon will be) an engineering discipline since its primary goal is to build things. (Nilsson, 1971, pp. vii-viii)
       Most workers in AI [artificial intelligence] research and in related fields confess to a pronounced feeling of disappointment in what has been achieved in the last 25 years. Workers entered the field around 1950, and even around 1960, with high hopes that are very far from being realized in 1972. In no part of the field have the discoveries made so far produced the major impact that was then promised.... In the meantime, claims and predictions regarding the potential results of AI research had been publicized which went even farther than the expectations of the majority of workers in the field, whose embarrassments have been added to by the lamentable failure of such inflated predictions....
       When able and respected scientists write in letters to the present author that AI, the major goal of computing science, represents "another step in the general process of evolution"; that possibilities in the 1980s include an all-purpose intelligence on a human-scale knowledge base; that awe-inspiring possibilities suggest themselves based on machine intelligence exceeding human intelligence by the year 2000 [one has the right to be skeptical]. (Lighthill, 1972, p. 17)
       4) Just as Astronomy Succeeded Astrology, the Discovery of Intellectual Processes in Machines Should Lead to a Science, Eventually
       Just as astronomy succeeded astrology, following Kepler's discovery of planetary regularities, the discoveries of these many principles in empirical explorations on intellectual processes in machines should lead to a science, eventually. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)
       Many problems arise in experiments on machine intelligence because things obvious to any person are not represented in any program. One can pull with a string, but one cannot push with one.... Simple facts like these caused serious problems when Charniak attempted to extend Bobrow's "Student" program to more realistic applications, and they have not been faced up to until now. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 77)
       What do we mean by [a symbolic] "description"? We do not mean to suggest that our descriptions must be made of strings of ordinary language words (although they might be). The simplest kind of description is a structure in which some features of a situation are represented by single ("primitive") symbols, and relations between those features are represented by other symbols-or by other features of the way the description is put together. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)
       [AI is] the use of computer programs and programming techniques to cast light on the principles of intelligence in general and human thought in particular. (Boden, 1977, p. 5)
       The word you look for and hardly ever see in the early AI literature is the word knowledge. They didn't believe you have to know anything, you could always rework it all.... In fact 1967 is the turning point in my mind when there was enough feeling that the old ideas of general principles had to go.... I came up with an argument for what I called the primacy of expertise, and at the time I called the other guys the generalists. (Moses, quoted in McCorduck, 1979, pp. 228-229)
       9) Artificial Intelligence Is Psychology in a Particularly Pure and Abstract Form
       The basic idea of cognitive science is that intelligent beings are semantic engines-in other words, automatic formal systems with interpretations under which they consistently make sense. We can now see why this includes psychology and artificial intelligence on a more or less equal footing: people and intelligent computers (if and when there are any) turn out to be merely different manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon. Moreover, with universal hardware, any semantic engine can in principle be formally imitated by a computer if only the right program can be found. And that will guarantee semantic imitation as well, since (given the appropriate formal behavior) the semantics is "taking care of itself" anyway. Thus we also see why, from this perspective, artificial intelligence can be regarded as psychology in a particularly pure and abstract form. The same fundamental structures are under investigation, but in AI, all the relevant parameters are under direct experimental control (in the programming), without any messy physiology or ethics to get in the way. (Haugeland, 1981b, p. 31)
       There are many different kinds of reasoning one might imagine:
        Formal reasoning involves the syntactic manipulation of data structures to deduce new ones following prespecified rules of inference. Mathematical logic is the archetypical formal representation. Procedural reasoning uses simulation to answer questions and solve problems. When we use a program to answer What is the sum of 3 and 4? it uses, or "runs," a procedural model of arithmetic. Reasoning by analogy seems to be a very natural mode of thought for humans but, so far, difficult to accomplish in AI programs. The idea is that when you ask the question Can robins fly? the system might reason that "robins are like sparrows, and I know that sparrows can fly, so robins probably can fly."
        Generalization and abstraction are also natural reasoning process for humans that are difficult to pin down well enough to implement in a program. If one knows that Robins have wings, that Sparrows have wings, and that Blue jays have wings, eventually one will believe that All birds have wings. This capability may be at the core of most human learning, but it has not yet become a useful technique in AI.... Meta- level reasoning is demonstrated by the way one answers the question What is Paul Newman's telephone number? You might reason that "if I knew Paul Newman's number, I would know that I knew it, because it is a notable fact." This involves using "knowledge about what you know," in particular, about the extent of your knowledge and about the importance of certain facts. Recent research in psychology and AI indicates that meta-level reasoning may play a central role in human cognitive processing. (Barr & Feigenbaum, 1981, pp. 146-147)
       Suffice it to say that programs already exist that can do things-or, at the very least, appear to be beginning to do things-which ill-informed critics have asserted a priori to be impossible. Examples include: perceiving in a holistic as opposed to an atomistic way; using language creatively; translating sensibly from one language to another by way of a language-neutral semantic representation; planning acts in a broad and sketchy fashion, the details being decided only in execution; distinguishing between different species of emotional reaction according to the psychological context of the subject. (Boden, 1981, p. 33)
       Can the synthesis of Man and Machine ever be stable, or will the purely organic component become such a hindrance that it has to be discarded? If this eventually happens-and I have... good reasons for thinking that it must-we have nothing to regret and certainly nothing to fear. (Clarke, 1984, p. 243)
       The thesis of GOFAI... is not that the processes underlying intelligence can be described symbolically... but that they are symbolic. (Haugeland, 1985, p. 113)
        14) Artificial Intelligence Provides a Useful Approach to Psychological and Psychiatric Theory Formation
       It is all very well formulating psychological and psychiatric theories verbally but, when using natural language (even technical jargon), it is difficult to recognise when a theory is complete; oversights are all too easily made, gaps too readily left. This is a point which is generally recognised to be true and it is for precisely this reason that the behavioural sciences attempt to follow the natural sciences in using "classical" mathematics as a more rigorous descriptive language. However, it is an unfortunate fact that, with a few notable exceptions, there has been a marked lack of success in this application. It is my belief that a different approach-a different mathematics-is needed, and that AI provides just this approach. (Hand, quoted in Hand, 1985, pp. 6-7)
       We might distinguish among four kinds of AI.
       Research of this kind involves building and programming computers to perform tasks which, to paraphrase Marvin Minsky, would require intelligence if they were done by us. Researchers in nonpsychological AI make no claims whatsoever about the psychological realism of their programs or the devices they build, that is, about whether or not computers perform tasks as humans do.
       Research here is guided by the view that the computer is a useful tool in the study of mind. In particular, we can write computer programs or build devices that simulate alleged psychological processes in humans and then test our predictions about how the alleged processes work. We can weave these programs and devices together with other programs and devices that simulate different alleged mental processes and thereby test the degree to which the AI system as a whole simulates human mentality. According to weak psychological AI, working with computer models is a way of refining and testing hypotheses about processes that are allegedly realized in human minds.
    ... According to this view, our minds are computers and therefore can be duplicated by other computers. Sherry Turkle writes that the "real ambition is of mythic proportions, making a general purpose intelligence, a mind." (Turkle, 1984, p. 240) The authors of a major text announce that "the ultimate goal of AI research is to build a person or, more humbly, an animal." (Charniak & McDermott, 1985, p. 7)
       Research in this field, like strong psychological AI, takes seriously the functionalist view that mentality can be realized in many different types of physical devices. Suprapsychological AI, however, accuses strong psychological AI of being chauvinisticof being only interested in human intelligence! Suprapsychological AI claims to be interested in all the conceivable ways intelligence can be realized. (Flanagan, 1991, pp. 241-242)
        16) Determination of Relevance of Rules in Particular Contexts
       Even if the [rules] were stored in a context-free form the computer still couldn't use them. To do that the computer requires rules enabling it to draw on just those [ rules] which are relevant in each particular context. Determination of relevance will have to be based on further facts and rules, but the question will again arise as to which facts and rules are relevant for making each particular determination. One could always invoke further facts and rules to answer this question, but of course these must be only the relevant ones. And so it goes. It seems that AI workers will never be able to get started here unless they can settle the problem of relevance beforehand by cataloguing types of context and listing just those facts which are relevant in each. (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p. 80)
       Perhaps the single most important idea to artificial intelligence is that there is no fundamental difference between form and content, that meaning can be captured in a set of symbols such as a semantic net. (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)
        18) The Assumption That the Mind Is a Formal System
       Artificial intelligence is based on the assumption that the mind can be described as some kind of formal system manipulating symbols that stand for things in the world. Thus it doesn't matter what the brain is made of, or what it uses for tokens in the great game of thinking. Using an equivalent set of tokens and rules, we can do thinking with a digital computer, just as we can play chess using cups, salt and pepper shakers, knives, forks, and spoons. Using the right software, one system (the mind) can be mapped into the other (the computer). (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)
        19) A Statement of the Primary and Secondary Purposes of Artificial Intelligence
       The primary goal of Artificial Intelligence is to make machines smarter.
       The secondary goals of Artificial Intelligence are to understand what intelligence is (the Nobel laureate purpose) and to make machines more useful (the entrepreneurial purpose). (Winston, 1987, p. 1)
       The theoretical ideas of older branches of engineering are captured in the language of mathematics. We contend that mathematical logic provides the basis for theory in AI. Although many computer scientists already count logic as fundamental to computer science in general, we put forward an even stronger form of the logic-is-important argument....
       AI deals mainly with the problem of representing and using declarative (as opposed to procedural) knowledge. Declarative knowledge is the kind that is expressed as sentences, and AI needs a language in which to state these sentences. Because the languages in which this knowledge usually is originally captured (natural languages such as English) are not suitable for computer representations, some other language with the appropriate properties must be used. It turns out, we think, that the appropriate properties include at least those that have been uppermost in the minds of logicians in their development of logical languages such as the predicate calculus. Thus, we think that any language for expressing knowledge in AI systems must be at least as expressive as the first-order predicate calculus. (Genesereth & Nilsson, 1987, p. viii)
        21) Perceptual Structures Can Be Represented as Lists of Elementary Propositions
       In artificial intelligence studies, perceptual structures are represented as assemblages of description lists, the elementary components of which are propositions asserting that certain relations hold among elements. (Chase & Simon, 1988, p. 490)
       Artificial intelligence (AI) is sometimes defined as the study of how to build and/or program computers to enable them to do the sorts of things that minds can do. Some of these things are commonly regarded as requiring intelligence: offering a medical diagnosis and/or prescription, giving legal or scientific advice, proving theorems in logic or mathematics. Others are not, because they can be done by all normal adults irrespective of educational background (and sometimes by non-human animals too), and typically involve no conscious control: seeing things in sunlight and shadows, finding a path through cluttered terrain, fitting pegs into holes, speaking one's own native tongue, and using one's common sense. Because it covers AI research dealing with both these classes of mental capacity, this definition is preferable to one describing AI as making computers do "things that would require intelligence if done by people." However, it presupposes that computers could do what minds can do, that they might really diagnose, advise, infer, and understand. One could avoid this problematic assumption (and also side-step questions about whether computers do things in the same way as we do) by defining AI instead as "the development of computers whose observable performance has features which in humans we would attribute to mental processes." This bland characterization would be acceptable to some AI workers, especially amongst those focusing on the production of technological tools for commercial purposes. But many others would favour a more controversial definition, seeing AI as the science of intelligence in general-or, more accurately, as the intellectual core of cognitive science. As such, its goal is to provide a systematic theory that can explain (and perhaps enable us to replicate) both the general categories of intentionality and the diverse psychological capacities grounded in them. (Boden, 1990b, pp. 1-2)
       Because the ability to store data somewhat corresponds to what we call memory in human beings, and because the ability to follow logical procedures somewhat corresponds to what we call reasoning in human beings, many members of the cult have concluded that what computers do somewhat corresponds to what we call thinking. It is no great difficulty to persuade the general public of that conclusion since computers process data very fast in small spaces well below the level of visibility; they do not look like other machines when they are at work. They seem to be running along as smoothly and silently as the brain does when it remembers and reasons and thinks. On the other hand, those who design and build computers know exactly how the machines are working down in the hidden depths of their semiconductors. Computers can be taken apart, scrutinized, and put back together. Their activities can be tracked, analyzed, measured, and thus clearly understood-which is far from possible with the brain. This gives rise to the tempting assumption on the part of the builders and designers that computers can tell us something about brains, indeed, that the computer can serve as a model of the mind, which then comes to be seen as some manner of information processing machine, and possibly not as good at the job as the machine. (Roszak, 1994, pp. xiv-xv)
       The inner workings of the human mind are far more intricate than the most complicated systems of modern technology. Researchers in the field of artificial intelligence have been attempting to develop programs that will enable computers to display intelligent behavior. Although this field has been an active one for more than thirty-five years and has had many notable successes, AI researchers still do not know how to create a program that matches human intelligence. No existing program can recall facts, solve problems, reason, learn, and process language with human facility. This lack of success has occurred not because computers are inferior to human brains but rather because we do not yet know in sufficient detail how intelligence is organized in the brain. (Anderson, 1995, p. 2)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Artificial Intelligence

  • 4 Bibliography

     ■ Aitchison, J. (1987). Noam Chomsky: Consensus and controversy. New York: Falmer Press.
     ■ Anderson, J. R. (1980). Cognitive psychology and its implications. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.
     ■ Anderson, J. R. (1983). The architecture of cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
     ■ Anderson, J. R. (1995). Cognitive psychology and its implications (4th ed.). New York: W. H. Freeman.
     ■ Archilochus (1971). In M. L. West (Ed.), Iambi et elegi graeci (Vol. 1). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
     ■ Armstrong, D. M. (1990). The causal theory of the mind. In W. G. Lycan (Ed.), Mind and cognition: A reader (pp. 37-47). Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell. (Originally published in 1981 in The nature of mind and other essays, Ithaca, NY: University Press).
     ■ Atkins, P. W. (1992). Creation revisited. Oxford: W. H. Freeman & Company.
     ■ Austin, J. L. (1962). How to do things with words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
     ■ Bacon, F. (1878). Of the proficience and advancement of learning divine and human. In The works of Francis Bacon (Vol. 1). Cambridge, MA: Hurd & Houghton.
     ■ Bacon, R. (1928). Opus majus (Vol. 2). R. B. Burke (Trans.). Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
     ■ Bar-Hillel, Y. (1960). The present status of automatic translation of languages. In F. L. Alt (Ed.), Advances in computers (Vol. 1). New York: Academic Press.
     ■ Barr, A., & E. A. Feigenbaum (Eds.) (1981). The handbook of artificial intelligence (Vol. 1). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
     ■ Barr, A., & E. A. Feigenbaum (Eds.) (1982). The handbook of artificial intelligence (Vol. 2). Los Altos, CA: William Kaufman.
     ■ Barron, F. X. (1963). The needs for order and for disorder as motives in creative activity. In C. W. Taylor & F. X. Barron (Eds.), Scientific creativity: Its rec ognition and development (pp. 153-160). New York: Wiley.
     ■ Bartlett, F. C. (1932). Remembering: A study in experimental and social psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
     ■ Bartley, S. H. (1969). Principles of perception. London: Harper & Row.
     ■ Barzun, J. (1959). The house of intellect. New York: Harper & Row.
     ■ Beach, F. A., D. O. Hebb, C. T. Morgan & H. W. Nissen (Eds.) (1960). The neu ropsychology of Lashley. New York: McGraw-Hill.
     ■ Berkeley, G. (1996). Principles of human knowledge: Three Dialogues. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Originally published in 1710.)
     ■ Berlin, I. (1953). The hedgehog and the fox: An essay on Tolstoy's view of history. NY: Simon & Schuster.
     ■ Bierwisch, J. (1970). Semantics. In J. Lyons (Ed.), New horizons in linguistics. Baltimore: Penguin Books.
     ■ Black, H. C. (1951). Black's law dictionary. St. Paul, MN: West Publishing.
     ■ Bobrow, D. G., & D. A. Norman (1975). Some principles of memory schemata. In D. G. Bobrow & A. Collins (Eds.), Representation and understanding: Stud ies in Cognitive Science (pp. 131-149). New York: Academic Press.
     ■ Boden, M. A. (1977). Artificial intelligence and natural man. New York: Basic Books.
     ■ Boden, M. A. (1981). Minds and mechanisms. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
     ■ Boden, M. A. (1990a). The creative mind: Myths and mechanisms. London: Cardinal.
     ■ Boden, M. A. (1990b). The philosophy of artificial intelligence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
     ■ Boden, M. A. (1994). Precis of The creative mind: Myths and mechanisms. Behavioral and brain sciences 17, 519-570.
     ■ Boden, M. (1996). Creativity. In M. Boden (Ed.), Artificial Intelligence (2nd ed.). San Diego: Academic Press.
     ■ Bolter, J. D. (1984). Turing's man: Western culture in the computer age. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
     ■ Bolton, N. (1972). The psychology of thinking. London: Methuen.
     ■ Bourne, L. E. (1973). Some forms of cognition: A critical analysis of several papers. In R. Solso (Ed.), Contemporary issues in cognitive psychology (pp. 313324). Loyola Symposium on Cognitive Psychology (Chicago 1972). Washington, DC: Winston.
     ■ Bransford, J. D., N. S. McCarrell, J. J. Franks & K. E. Nitsch (1977). Toward unexplaining memory. In R. Shaw & J. D. Bransford (Eds.), Perceiving, acting, and knowing (pp. 431-466). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
     ■ Breger, L. (1981). Freud's unfinished journey. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
     ■ Brehmer, B. (1986). In one word: Not from experience. In H. R. Arkes & K. Hammond (Eds.), Judgment and decision making: An interdisciplinary reader (pp. 705-719). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
     ■ Bresnan, J. (1978). A realistic transformational grammar. In M. Halle, J. Bresnan & G. A. Miller (Eds.), Linguistic theory and psychological reality (pp. 1-59). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
     ■ Brislin, R. W., W. J. Lonner & R. M. Thorndike (Eds.) (1973). Cross- cultural research methods. New York: Wiley.
     ■ Bronowski, J. (1977). A sense of the future: Essays in natural philosophy. P. E. Ariotti with R. Bronowski (Eds.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
     ■ Bronowski, J. (1978). The origins of knowledge and imagination. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
     ■ Brown, R. O. (1973). A first language: The early stages. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
     ■ Brown, T. (1970). Lectures on the philosophy of the human mind. In R. Brown (Ed.), Between Hume and Mill: An anthology of British philosophy- 1749- 1843 (pp. 330-387). New York: Random House/Modern Library.
     ■ Bruner, J. S., J. Goodnow & G. Austin (1956). A study of thinking. New York: Wiley.
     ■ Campbell, J. (1982). Grammatical man: Information, entropy, language, and life. New York: Simon & Schuster.
     ■ Campbell, J. (1989). The improbable machine. New York: Simon & Schuster.
     ■ Carlyle, T. (1966). On heroes, hero- worship and the heroic in history. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. (Originally published in 1841.)
     ■ Carnap, R. (1959). The elimination of metaphysics through logical analysis of language [Ueberwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache]. In A. J. Ayer (Ed.), Logical positivism (pp. 60-81) A. Pap (Trans). New York: Free Press. (Originally published in 1932.)
     ■ Cassirer, E. (1946). Language and myth. New York: Harper and Brothers. Reprinted. New York: Dover Publications, 1953.
     ■ Cattell, R. B., & H. J. Butcher (1970). Creativity and personality. In P. E. Vernon (Ed.), Creativity. Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books.
     ■ Caudill, M., & C. Butler (1990). Naturally intelligent systems. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.
     ■ Chandrasekaran, B. (1990). What kind of information processing is intelligence? A perspective on AI paradigms and a proposal. In D. Partridge & R. Wilks (Eds.), The foundations of artificial intelligence: A sourcebook (pp. 14-46). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
     ■ Charniak, E., & McDermott, D. (1985). Introduction to artificial intelligence. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
     ■ Chase, W. G., & H. A. Simon (1988). The mind's eye in chess. In A. Collins & E. E. Smith (Eds.), Readings in cognitive science: A perspective from psychology and artificial intelligence (pp. 461-493). San Mateo, CA: Kaufmann.
     ■ Cheney, D. L., & R. M. Seyfarth (1990). How monkeys see the world: Inside the mind of another species. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
     ■ Chi, M.T.H., R. Glaser & E. Rees (1982). Expertise in problem solving. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), Advances in the psychology of human intelligence (pp. 7-73). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
     ■ Chomsky, N. (1957). Syntactic structures. The Hague: Mouton. Janua Linguarum.
     ■ Chomsky, N. (1964). A transformational approach to syntax. In J. A. Fodor & J. J. Katz (Eds.), The structure of language: Readings in the philosophy of lan guage (pp. 211-245). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
     ■ Chomsky, N. (1965). Aspects of the theory of syntax. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
     ■ Chomsky, N. (1972). Language and mind (enlarged ed.). New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
     ■ Chomsky, N. (1979). Language and responsibility. New York: Pantheon.
     ■ Chomsky, N. (1986). Knowledge of language: Its nature, origin and use. New York: Praeger Special Studies.
     ■ Churchland, P. (1979). Scientific realism and the plasticity of mind. New York: Cambridge University Press.
     ■ Churchland, P. M. (1989). A neurocomputational perspective: The nature of mind and the structure of science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
     ■ Churchland, P. S. (1986). Neurophilosophy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.
     ■ Clark, A. (1996). Philosophical Foundations. In M. A. Boden (Ed.), Artificial in telligence (2nd ed.). San Diego: Academic Press.
     ■ Clark, H. H., & T. B. Carlson (1981). Context for comprehension. In J. Long & A. Baddeley (Eds.), Attention and performance (Vol. 9, pp. 313-330). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
     ■ Clarke, A. C. (1984). Profiles of the future: An inquiry into the limits of the possible. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
     ■ Claxton, G. (1980). Cognitive psychology: A suitable case for what sort of treatment? In G. Claxton (Ed.), Cognitive psychology: New directions (pp. 1-25). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
     ■ Code, M. (1985). Order and organism. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
     ■ Collingwood, R. G. (1972). The idea of history. New York: Oxford University Press.
     ■ Coopersmith, S. (1967). The antecedents of self- esteem. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.
     ■ Copland, A. (1952). Music and imagination. London: Oxford University Press.
     ■ Coren, S. (1994). The intelligence of dogs. New York: Bantam Books.
     ■ Cottingham, J. (Ed.) (1996). Western philosophy: An anthology. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
     ■ Cox, C. (1926). The early mental traits of three hundred geniuses. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
     ■ Craik, K.J.W. (1943). The nature of explanation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
     ■ Cronbach, L. J. (1990). Essentials of psychological testing (5th ed.). New York: HarperCollins.
     ■ Cronbach, L. J., & R. E. Snow (1977). Aptitudes and instructional methods. New York: Irvington. Paperback edition, 1981.
     ■ Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1993). The evolving self. New York: Harper Perennial.
     ■ Culler, J. (1976). Ferdinand de Saussure. New York: Penguin Books.
     ■ Curtius, E. R. (1973). European literature and the Latin Middle Ages. W. R. Trask (Trans.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
     ■ D'Alembert, J.L.R. (1963). Preliminary discourse to the encyclopedia of Diderot. R. N. Schwab (Trans.). Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
     ■ Damasio, A. (1994). Descartes' error: Emotion, reason, and the human brain. New York: Avon.
     ■ Dampier, W. C. (1966). A history of modern science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
     ■ Darwin, C. (1911). The life and letters of Charles Darwin (Vol. 1). Francis Darwin (Ed.). New York: Appleton.
     ■ Davidson, D. (1970) Mental events. In L. Foster & J. W. Swanson (Eds.), Experience and theory (pp. 79-101). Amherst: University of Massachussetts Press.
     ■ Davies, P. (1995). About time: Einstein's unfinished revolution. New York: Simon & Schuster/Touchstone.
     ■ Davis, R., & J. J. King (1977). An overview of production systems. In E. Elcock & D. Michie (Eds.), Machine intelligence 8. Chichester, England: Ellis Horwood.
     ■ Davis, R., & D. B. Lenat (1982). Knowledge- based systems in artificial intelligence. New York: McGraw-Hill.
     ■ Dawkins, R. (1982). The extended phenotype: The gene as the unit of selection. Oxford: W. H. Freeman.
     ■ deKleer, J., & J. S. Brown (1983). Assumptions and ambiguities in mechanistic mental models (1983). In D. Gentner & A. L. Stevens (Eds.), Mental modes (pp. 155-190). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
     ■ Dennett, D. C. (1978a). Brainstorms: Philosophical essays on mind and psychology. Montgomery, VT: Bradford Books.
     ■ Dennett, D. C. (1978b). Toward a cognitive theory of consciousness. In D. C. Dennett, Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology. Montgomery, VT: Bradford Books.
     ■ Dennett, D. C. (1995). Darwin's dangerous idea: Evolution and the meanings of life. New York: Simon & Schuster/Touchstone.
     ■ Descartes, R. (1897-1910). Traite de l'homme. In Oeuvres de Descartes (Vol. 11, pp. 119-215). Paris: Charles Adam & Paul Tannery. (Originally published in 1634.)
     ■ Descartes, R. (1950). Discourse on method. L. J. Lafleur (Trans.). New York: Liberal Arts Press. (Originally published in 1637.)
     ■ Descartes, R. (1951). Meditation on first philosophy. L. J. Lafleur (Trans.). New York: Liberal Arts Press. (Originally published in 1641.)
     ■ Descartes, R. (1955). The philosophical works of Descartes. E. S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross (Trans.). New York: Dover. (Originally published in 1911 by Cambridge University Press.)
     ■ Descartes, R. (1967). Discourse on method (Pt. V). In E. S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross (Eds.), The philosophical works of Descartes (Vol. 1, pp. 106-118). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Originally published in 1637.)
     ■ Descartes, R. (1970a). Discourse on method. In E. S. Haldane & G.R.T. Ross (Eds.), The philosophical works of Descartes (Vol. 1, pp. 181-200). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Originally published in 1637.)
     ■ Descartes, R. (1970b). Principles of philosophy. In E. S. Haldane & G.R.T. Ross (Eds.), The philosophical works of Descartes (Vol. 1, pp. 178-291). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Originally published in 1644.)
     ■ Descartes, R. (1984). Meditations on first philosophy. In J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff & D. Murduch (Trans.), The philosophical works of Descartes (Vol. 2). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Originally published in 1641.)
     ■ Descartes, R. (1986). Meditations on first philosophy. J. Cottingham (Trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Originally published in 1641 as Med itationes de prima philosophia.)
     ■ deWulf, M. (1956). An introduction to scholastic philosophy. Mineola, NY: Dover Books.
     ■ Dixon, N. F. (1981). Preconscious processing. London: Wiley.
     ■ Doyle, A. C. (1986). The Boscombe Valley mystery. In Sherlock Holmes: The com plete novels and stories (Vol. 1). New York: Bantam.
     ■ Dreyfus, H., & S. Dreyfus (1986). Mind over machine. New York: Free Press.
     ■ Dreyfus, H. L. (1972). What computers can't do: The limits of artificial intelligence (revised ed.). New York: Harper & Row.
     ■ Dreyfus, H. L., & S. E. Dreyfus (1986). Mind over machine: The power of human intuition and expertise in the era of the computer. New York: Free Press.
     ■ Edelman, G. M. (1992). Bright air, brilliant fire: On the matter of the mind. New York: Basic Books.
     ■ Ehrenzweig, A. (1967). The hidden order of art. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
     ■ Einstein, A., & L. Infeld (1938). The evolution of physics. New York: Simon & Schuster.
     ■ Eisenstein, S. (1947). Film sense. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.
     ■ Everdell, W. R. (1997). The first moderns. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
     ■ Eysenck, M. W. (1977). Human memory: Theory, research and individual difference. Oxford: Pergamon.
     ■ Eysenck, M. W. (1982). Attention and arousal: Cognition and performance. Berlin: Springer.
     ■ Eysenck, M. W. (1984). A handbook of cognitive psychology. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
     ■ Fancher, R. E. (1979). Pioneers of psychology. New York: W. W. Norton.
     ■ Farrell, B. A. (1981). The standing of psychoanalysis. New York: Oxford University Press.
     ■ Feldman, D. H. (1980). Beyond universals in cognitive development. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
     ■ Fetzer, J. H. (1996). Philosophy and cognitive science (2nd ed.). New York: Paragon House.
     ■ Finke, R. A. (1990). Creative imagery: Discoveries and inventions in visualization. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
     ■ Flanagan, O. (1991). The science of the mind. Cambridge MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.
     ■ Fodor, J. (1983). The modularity of mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.
     ■ Frege, G. (1972). Conceptual notation. T. W. Bynum (Trans.). Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Originally published in 1879.)
     ■ Frege, G. (1979). Logic. In H. Hermes, F. Kambartel & F. Kaulbach (Eds.), Gottlob Frege: Posthumous writings. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Originally published in 1879-1891.)
     ■ Freud, S. (1959). Creative writers and day-dreaming. In J. Strachey (Ed.), The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 9, pp. 143-153). London: Hogarth Press.
     ■ Freud, S. (1966). Project for a scientific psychology. In J. Strachey (Ed.), The stan dard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 1, pp. 295-398). London: Hogarth Press. (Originally published in 1950 as Aus den AnfaЁngen der Psychoanalyse, in London by Imago Publishing.)
     ■ Freud, S. (1976). Lecture 18-Fixation to traumas-the unconscious. In J. Strachey (Ed.), The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 16, p. 285). London: Hogarth Press.
     ■ Galileo, G. (1990). Il saggiatore [The assayer]. In S. Drake (Ed.), Discoveries and opinions of Galileo. New York: Anchor Books. (Originally published in 1623.)
     ■ Gassendi, P. (1970). Letter to Descartes. In "Objections and replies." In E. S. Haldane & G.R.T. Ross (Eds.), The philosophical works of Descartes (Vol. 2, pp. 179-240). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Originally published in 1641.)
     ■ Gazzaniga, M. S. (1988). Mind matters: How mind and brain interact to create our conscious lives. Boston: Houghton Mifflin in association with MIT Press/Bradford Books.
     ■ Genesereth, M. R., & N. J. Nilsson (1987). Logical foundations of artificial intelligence. Palo Alto, CA: Morgan Kaufmann.
     ■ Ghiselin, B. (1952). The creative process. New York: Mentor.
     ■ Ghiselin, B. (1985). The creative process. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. (Originally published in 1952.)
     ■ Gilhooly, K. J. (1996). Thinking: Directed, undirected and creative (3rd ed.). London: Academic Press.
     ■ Glass, A. L., K. J. Holyoak & J. L. Santa (1979). Cognition. Reading, MA: AddisonWesley.
     ■ Goody, J. (1977). The domestication of the savage mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
     ■ Gruber, H. E. (1980). Darwin on man: A psychological study of scientific creativity (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
     ■ Gruber, H. E., & S. Davis (1988). Inching our way up Mount Olympus: The evolving systems approach to creative thinking. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), The nature of creativity: Contemporary psychological perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
     ■ Guthrie, E. R. (1972). The psychology of learning. New York: Harper. (Originally published in 1935.)
     ■ Habermas, J. (1972). Knowledge and human interests. Boston: Beacon Press.
     ■ Hadamard, J. (1945). The psychology of invention in the mathematical field. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
     ■ Hand, D. J. (1985). Artificial intelligence and psychiatry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
     ■ Harris, M. (1981). The language myth. London: Duckworth.
     ■ Haugeland, J. (Ed.) (1981). Mind design: Philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.
     ■ Haugeland, J. (1981a). The nature and plausibility of cognitivism. In J. Haugeland (Ed.), Mind design: Philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence (pp. 243-281). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
     ■ Haugeland, J. (1981b). Semantic engines: An introduction to mind design. In J. Haugeland (Ed.), Mind design: Philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence (pp. 1-34). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.
     ■ Haugeland, J. (1985). Artificial intelligence: The very idea. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
     ■ Hawkes, T. (1977). Structuralism and semiotics. Berkeley: University of California Press.
     ■ Hebb, D. O. (1949). The organisation of behaviour. New York: Wiley.
     ■ Hebb, D. O. (1958). A textbook of psychology. Philadelphia: Saunders.
     ■ Hegel, G.W.F. (1910). The phenomenology of mind. J. B. Baille (Trans.). London: Sonnenschein. (Originally published as Phaenomenologie des Geistes, 1807.)
     ■ Heisenberg, W. (1958). Physics and philosophy. New York: Harper & Row.
     ■ Hempel, C. G. (1966). Philosophy of natural science. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall.
     ■ Herman, A. (1997). The idea of decline in Western history. New York: Free Press.
     ■ Herrnstein, R. J., & E. G. Boring (Eds.) (1965). A source book in the history of psy chology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
     ■ Herzmann, E. (1964). Mozart's creative process. In P. H. Lang (Ed.), The creative world of Mozart (pp. 17-30). London: Oldbourne Press.
     ■ Hilgard, E. R. (1957). Introduction to psychology. London: Methuen.
     ■ Hobbes, T. (1651). Leviathan. London: Crooke.
     ■ Hofstadter, D. R. (1979). Goedel, Escher, Bach: An eternal golden braid. New York: Basic Books.
     ■ Holliday, S. G., & M. J. Chandler (1986). Wisdom: Explorations in adult competence. Basel, Switzerland: Karger.
     ■ Horn, J. L. (1986). In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), Advances in the psychology of human intelligence (Vol. 3). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
     ■ Hull, C. (1943). Principles of behavior. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
     ■ Hume, D. (1955). An inquiry concerning human understanding. New York: Liberal Arts Press. (Originally published in 1748.)
     ■ Hume, D. (1975). An enquiry concerning human understanding. In L. A. SelbyBigge (Ed.), Hume's enquiries (3rd. ed., revised P. H. Nidditch). Oxford: Clarendon. (Spelling and punctuation revised.) (Originally published in 1748.)
     ■ Hume, D. (1978). A treatise of human nature. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Ed.), Hume's enquiries (3rd. ed., revised P. H. Nidditch). Oxford: Clarendon. (With some modifications of spelling and punctuation.) (Originally published in 1690.)
     ■ Hunt, E. (1973). The memory we must have. In R. C. Schank & K. M. Colby (Eds.), Computer models of thought and language. (pp. 343-371) San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.
     ■ Husserl, E. (1960). Cartesian meditations. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
     ■ Inhelder, B., & J. Piaget (1958). The growth of logical thinking from childhood to adolescence. New York: Basic Books. (Originally published in 1955 as De la logique de l'enfant a` la logique de l'adolescent. [Paris: Presses Universitaire de France])
     ■ James, W. (1890a). The principles of psychology (Vol. 1). New York: Dover Books.
     ■ James, W. (1890b). The principles of psychology. New York: Henry Holt.
     ■ Jevons, W. S. (1900). The principles of science (2nd ed.). London: Macmillan.
     ■ Johnson, G. (1986). Machinery of the mind: Inside the new science of artificial intelli gence. New York: Random House.
     ■ Johnson, M. L. (1988). Mind, language, machine. New York: St. Martin's Press.
     ■ Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1983). Mental models: Toward a cognitive science of language, inference, and consciousness. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
     ■ Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1988). The computer and the mind: An introduction to cognitive science. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
     ■ Jones, E. (1961). The life and work of Sigmund Freud. L. Trilling & S. Marcus (Eds.). London: Hogarth.
     ■ Jones, R. V. (1985). Complementarity as a way of life. In A. P. French & P. J. Kennedy (Eds.), Niels Bohr: A centenary volume. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
     ■ Kant, I. (1933). Critique of Pure Reason (2nd ed.). N. K. Smith (Trans.). London: Macmillan. (Originally published in 1781 as Kritik der reinen Vernunft.)
     ■ Kant, I. (1891). Solution of the general problems of the Prolegomena. In E. Belfort (Trans.), Kant's Prolegomena. London: Bell. (With minor modifications.) (Originally published in 1783.)
     ■ Katona, G. (1940). Organizing and memorizing: Studies in the psychology of learning and teaching. New York: Columbia University Press.
     ■ Kaufman, A. S. (1979). Intelligent testing with the WISC-R. New York: Wiley.
     ■ Koestler, A. (1964). The act of creation. New York: Arkana (Penguin).
     ■ Kohlberg, L. (1971). From is to ought. In T. Mischel (Ed.), Cognitive development and epistemology. (pp. 151-235) New York: Academic Press.
     ■ KoЁhler, W. (1925). The mentality of apes. New York: Liveright.
     ■ KoЁhler, W. (1927). The mentality of apes (2nd ed.). Ella Winter (Trans.). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
     ■ KoЁhler, W. (1930). Gestalt psychology. London: G. Bell.
     ■ KoЁhler, W. (1947). Gestalt psychology. New York: Liveright.
     ■ KoЁhler, W. (1969). The task of Gestalt psychology. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
     ■ Kuhn, T. (1970). The structure of scientific revolutions (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
     ■ Langer, E. J. (1989). Mindfulness. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
     ■ Langer, S. (1962). Philosophical sketches. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
     ■ Langley, P., H. A. Simon, G. L. Bradshaw & J. M. Zytkow (1987). Scientific dis covery: Computational explorations of the creative process. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
     ■ Lashley, K. S. (1951). The problem of serial order in behavior. In L. A. Jeffress (Ed.), Cerebral mechanisms in behavior, the Hixon Symposium (pp. 112-146) New York: Wiley.
     ■ LeDoux, J. E., & W. Hirst (1986). Mind and brain: Dialogues in cognitive neuroscience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
     ■ Lehnert, W. (1978). The process of question answering. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
     ■ Leiber, J. (1991). Invitation to cognitive science. Oxford: Blackwell.
     ■ Lenat, D. B., & G. Harris (1978). Designing a rule system that searches for scientific discoveries. In D. A. Waterman & F. Hayes-Roth (Eds.), Pattern directed inference systems (pp. 25-52) New York: Academic Press.
     ■ Levenson, T. (1995). Measure for measure: A musical history of science. New York: Touchstone. (Originally published in 1994.)
     ■ Leґvi-Strauss, C. (1963). Structural anthropology. C. Jacobson & B. Grundfest Schoepf (Trans.). New York: Basic Books. (Originally published in 1958.)
     ■ Levine, M. W., & J. M. Schefner (1981). Fundamentals of sensation and perception. London: Addison-Wesley.
     ■ Lewis, C. I. (1946). An analysis of knowledge and valuation. LaSalle, IL: Open Court.
     ■ Lighthill, J. (1972). A report on artificial intelligence. Unpublished manuscript, Science Research Council.
     ■ Lipman, M., A. M. Sharp & F. S. Oscanyan (1980). Philosophy in the classroom. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
     ■ Lippmann, W. (1965). Public opinion. New York: Free Press. (Originally published in 1922.)
     ■ Locke, J. (1956). An essay concerning human understanding. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co. (Originally published in 1690.)
     ■ Locke, J. (1975). An essay concerning human understanding. P. H. Nidditch (Ed.). Oxford: Clarendon. (Originally published in 1690.) (With spelling and punctuation modernized and some minor modifications of phrasing.)
     ■ Lopate, P. (1994). The art of the personal essay. New York: Doubleday/Anchor Books.
     ■ Lorimer, F. (1929). The growth of reason. London: Kegan Paul. Machlup, F., & U. Mansfield (Eds.) (1983). The study of information. New York: Wiley.
     ■ Manguel, A. (1996). A history of reading. New York: Viking.
     ■ Margolis, H. (1987). Patterns, thinking, and cognition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
     ■ Markey, J. F. (1928). The symbolic process. London: Kegan Paul.
     ■ Martin, R. M. (1969). On Ziff's "Natural and formal languages." In S. Hook (Ed.), Language and philosophy: A symposium (pp. 249-263). New York: New York University Press.
     ■ Mazlish, B. (1993). The fourth discontinuity: the co- evolution of humans and machines. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
     ■ McCarthy, J., & P. J. Hayes (1969). Some philosophical problems from the standpoint of artificial intelligence. In B. Meltzer & D. Michie (Eds.), Machine intelligence 4. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
     ■ McClelland, J. L., D. E. Rumelhart & G. E. Hinton (1986). The appeal of parallel distributed processing. In D. E. Rumelhart, J. L. McClelland & the PDP Research Group (Eds.), Parallel distributed processing: Explorations in the mi crostructure of cognition (Vol. 1, pp. 3-40). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/ Bradford Books.
     ■ McCorduck, P. (1979). Machines who think. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.
     ■ McLaughlin, T. (1970). Music and communication. London: Faber & Faber.
     ■ Mednick, S. A. (1962). The associative basis of the creative process. Psychological Review 69, 431-436.
     ■ Meehl, P. E., & C. J. Golden (1982). Taxometric methods. In Kendall, P. C., & Butcher, J. N. (Eds.), Handbook of research methods in clinical psychology (pp. 127-182). New York: Wiley.
     ■ Mehler, J., E.C.T. Walker & M. Garrett (Eds.) (1982). Perspectives on mental rep resentation: Experimental and theoretical studies of cognitive processes and ca pacities. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
     ■ Mill, J. S. (1900). A system of logic, ratiocinative and inductive: Being a connected view of the principles of evidence and the methods of scientific investigation. London: Longmans, Green.
     ■ Miller, G. A. (1979, June). A very personal history. Talk to the Cognitive Science Workshop, Cambridge, MA.
     ■ Miller, J. (1983). States of mind. New York: Pantheon Books.
     ■ Minsky, M. (1975). A framework for representing knowledge. In P. H. Winston (Ed.), The psychology of computer vision (pp. 211-277). New York: McGrawHill.
     ■ Minsky, M., & S. Papert (1973). Artificial intelligence. Condon Lectures, Oregon State System of Higher Education, Eugene, Oregon.
     ■ Minsky, M. L. (1986). The society of mind. New York: Simon & Schuster.
     ■ Mischel, T. (1976). Psychological explanations and their vicissitudes. In J. K. Cole & W. J. Arnold (Eds.), Nebraska Symposium on motivation (Vol. 23). Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska Press.
     ■ Morford, M.P.O., & R. J. Lenardon (1995). Classical mythology (5th ed.). New York: Longman.
     ■ Murdoch, I. (1954). Under the net. New York: Penguin.
     ■ Nagel, E. (1959). Methodological issues in psychoanalytic theory. In S. Hook (Ed.), Psychoanalysis, scientific method, and philosophy: A symposium. New York: New York University Press.
     ■ Nagel, T. (1979). Mortal questions. London: Cambridge University Press.
     ■ Nagel, T. (1986). The view from nowhere. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
     ■ Neisser, U. (1967). Cognitive psychology. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
     ■ Neisser, U. (1972). Changing conceptions of imagery. In P. W. Sheehan (Ed.), The function and nature of imagery (pp. 233-251). London: Academic Press.
     ■ Neisser, U. (1976). Cognition and reality. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.
     ■ Neisser, U. (1978). Memory: What are the important questions? In M. M. Gruneberg, P. E. Morris & R. N. Sykes (Eds.), Practical aspects of memory (pp. 3-24). London: Academic Press.
     ■ Neisser, U. (1979). The concept of intelligence. In R. J. Sternberg & D. K. Detterman (Eds.), Human intelligence: Perspectives on its theory and measurement (pp. 179-190). Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
     ■ Nersessian, N. (1992). How do scientists think? Capturing the dynamics of conceptual change in science. In R. N. Giere (Ed.), Cognitive models of science (pp. 3-44). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
     ■ Newell, A. (1973a). Artificial intelligence and the concept of mind. In R. C. Schank & K. M. Colby (Eds.), Computer models of thought and language (pp. 1-60). San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.
     ■ Newell, A. (1973b). You can't play 20 questions with nature and win. In W. G. Chase (Ed.), Visual information processing (pp. 283-310). New York: Academic Press.
     ■ Newell, A., & H. A. Simon (1963). GPS: A program that simulates human thought. In E. A. Feigenbaum & J. Feldman (Eds.), Computers and thought (pp. 279-293). New York & McGraw-Hill.
     ■ Newell, A., & H. A. Simon (1972). Human problem solving. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
     ■ Nietzsche, F. (1966). Beyond good and evil. W. Kaufmann (Trans.). New York: Vintage. (Originally published in 1885.)
     ■ Nilsson, N. J. (1971). Problem- solving methods in artificial intelligence. New York: McGraw-Hill.
     ■ Nussbaum, M. C. (1978). Aristotle's Princeton University Press. De Motu Anamalium. Princeton, NJ:
     ■ Oersted, H. C. (1920). Thermo-electricity. In Kirstine Meyer (Ed.), H. C. Oersted, Natuurvidenskabelige Skrifter (Vol. 2). Copenhagen: n.p. (Originally published in 1830 in The Edinburgh encyclopaedia.)
     ■ Ong, W. J. (1982). Orality and literacy: The technologizing of the word. London: Methuen.
     ■ Onians, R. B. (1954). The origins of European thought. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
     ■ Osgood, C. E. (1960). Method and theory in experimental psychology. New York: Oxford University Press. (Originally published in 1953.)
     ■ Osgood, C. E. (1966). Language universals and psycholinguistics. In J. H. Greenberg (Ed.), Universals of language (2nd ed., pp. 299-322). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
     ■ Palmer, R. E. (1969). Hermeneutics. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
     ■ Peirce, C. S. (1934). Some consequences of four incapacities-Man, a sign. In C. Hartsborne & P. Weiss (Eds.), Collected papers of Charles Saunders Peirce (Vol. 5, pp. 185-189). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
     ■ Penfield, W. (1959). In W. Penfield & L. Roberts, Speech and brain mechanisms. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
     ■ Penrose, R. (1994). Shadows of the mind: A search for the missing science of conscious ness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
     ■ Perkins, D. N. (1981). The mind's best work. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
     ■ Peterfreund, E. (1986). The heuristic approach to psychoanalytic therapy. In
     ■ J. Reppen (Ed.), Analysts at work, (pp. 127-144). Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press.
     ■ Piaget, J. (1952). The origin of intelligence in children. New York: International Universities Press. (Originally published in 1936.)
     ■ Piaget, J. (1954). Le langage et les opeґrations intellectuelles. Proble` mes de psycho linguistique. Symposium de l'Association de Psychologie Scientifique de Langue Francёaise. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
     ■ Piaget, J. (1977). Problems of equilibration. In H. E. Gruber & J. J. Voneche (Eds.), The essential Piaget (pp. 838-841). London: Routlege & Kegan Paul. (Originally published in 1975 as L'eґquilibration des structures cognitives [Paris: Presses Universitaires de France].)
     ■ Piaget, J., & B. Inhelder. (1973). Memory and intelligence. New York: Basic Books.
     ■ Pinker, S. (1994). The language instinct. New York: Morrow.
     ■ Pinker, S. (1996). Facts about human language relevant to its evolution. In J.-P. Changeux & J. Chavaillon (Eds.), Origins of the human brain. A symposium of the Fyssen foundation (pp. 262-283). Oxford: Clarendon Press. Planck, M. (1949). Scientific autobiography and other papers. F. Gaynor (Trans.). New York: Philosophical Library.
     ■ Planck, M. (1990). Wissenschaftliche Selbstbiographie. W. Berg (Ed.). Halle, Germany: Deutsche Akademie der Naturforscher Leopoldina.
     ■ Plato (1892). Meno. In The Dialogues of Plato (B. Jowett, Trans.; Vol. 2). New York: Clarendon. (Originally published circa 380 B.C.)
     ■ Poincareґ, H. (1913). Mathematical creation. In The foundations of science. G. B. Halsted (Trans.). New York: Science Press.
     ■ Poincareґ, H. (1921). The foundations of science: Science and hypothesis, the value of science, science and method. G. B. Halstead (Trans.). New York: Science Press.
     ■ Poincareґ, H. (1929). The foundations of science: Science and hypothesis, the value of science, science and method. New York: Science Press.
     ■ Poincareґ, H. (1952). Science and method. F. Maitland (Trans.) New York: Dover.
     ■ Polya, G. (1945). How to solve it. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
     ■ Polanyi, M. (1958). Personal knowledge. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
     ■ Popper, K. (1968). Conjectures and refutations: The growth of scientific knowledge. New York: Harper & Row/Basic Books.
     ■ Popper, K., & J. Eccles (1977). The self and its brain. New York: Springer-Verlag.
     ■ Popper, K. R. (1959). The logic of scientific discovery. London: Hutchinson.
     ■ Putnam, H. (1975). Mind, language and reality: Philosophical papers (Vol. 2). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
     ■ Putnam, H. (1987). The faces of realism. LaSalle, IL: Open Court.
     ■ Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1981). The imagery debate: Analog media versus tacit knowledge. In N. Block (Ed.), Imagery (pp. 151-206). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
     ■ Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1984). Computation and cognition: Towards a foundation for cog nitive science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.
     ■ Quillian, M. R. (1968). Semantic memory. In M. Minsky (Ed.), Semantic information processing (pp. 216-260). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
     ■ Quine, W.V.O. (1960). Word and object. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
     ■ Rabbitt, P.M.A., & S. Dornic (Eds.). Attention and performance (Vol. 5). London: Academic Press.
     ■ Rawlins, G.J.E. (1997). Slaves of the Machine: The quickening of computer technology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.
     ■ Reid, T. (1970). An inquiry into the human mind on the principles of common sense. In R. Brown (Ed.), Between Hume and Mill: An anthology of British philosophy- 1749- 1843 (pp. 151-178). New York: Random House/Modern Library.
     ■ Reitman, W. (1970). What does it take to remember? In D. A. Norman (Ed.), Models of human memory (pp. 470-510). London: Academic Press.
     ■ Ricoeur, P. (1974). Structure and hermeneutics. In D. I. Ihde (Ed.), The conflict of interpretations: Essays in hermeneutics (pp. 27-61). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
     ■ Robinson, D. N. (1986). An intellectual history of psychology. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
     ■ Rorty, R. (1979). Philosophy and the mirror of nature. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
     ■ Rosch, E. (1977). Human categorization. In N. Warren (Ed.), Studies in cross cultural psychology (Vol. 1, pp. 1-49) London: Academic Press.
     ■ Rosch, E. (1978). Principles of categorization. In E. Rosch & B. B. Lloyd (Eds.), Cognition and categorization (pp. 27-48). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
     ■ Rosch, E., & B. B. Lloyd (1978). Principles of categorization. In E. Rosch & B. B. Lloyd (Eds.), Cognition and categorization. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
     ■ Rose, S. (1970). The chemistry of life. Baltimore: Penguin Books.
     ■ Rose, S. (1976). The conscious brain (updated ed.). New York: Random House.
     ■ Rose, S. (1993). The making of memory: From molecules to mind. New York: Anchor Books. (Originally published in 1992)
     ■ Roszak, T. (1994). The cult of information: A neo- Luddite treatise on high- tech, artificial intelligence, and the true art of thinking (2nd ed.). Berkeley: University of California Press.
     ■ Royce, J. R., & W. W. Rozeboom (Eds.) (1972). The psychology of knowing. New York: Gordon & Breach.
     ■ Rumelhart, D. E. (1977). Introduction to human information processing. New York: Wiley.
     ■ Rumelhart, D. E. (1980). Schemata: The building blocks of cognition. In R. J. Spiro, B. Bruce & W. F. Brewer (Eds.), Theoretical issues in reading comprehension. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
     ■ Rumelhart, D. E., & J. L. McClelland (1986). On learning the past tenses of English verbs. In J. L. McClelland & D. E. Rumelhart (Eds.), Parallel distributed processing: Explorations in the microstructure of cognition (Vol. 2). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
     ■ Rumelhart, D. E., P. Smolensky, J. L. McClelland & G. E. Hinton (1986). Schemata and sequential thought processes in PDP models. In J. L. McClelland, D. E. Rumelhart & the PDP Research Group (Eds.), Parallel Distributed Processing (Vol. 2, pp. 7-57). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
     ■ Russell, B. (1927). An outline of philosophy. London: G. Allen & Unwin.
     ■ Russell, B. (1961). History of Western philosophy. London: George Allen & Unwin.
     ■ Russell, B. (1965). How I write. In Portraits from memory and other essays. London: Allen & Unwin.
     ■ Russell, B. (1992). In N. Griffin (Ed.), The selected letters of Bertrand Russell (Vol. 1), The private years, 1884- 1914. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Ryecroft, C. (1966). Psychoanalysis observed. London: Constable.
     ■ Sagan, C. (1978). The dragons of Eden: Speculations on the evolution of human intel ligence. New York: Ballantine Books.
     ■ Salthouse, T. A. (1992). Expertise as the circumvention of human processing limitations. In K. A. Ericsson & J. Smith (Eds.), Toward a general theory of expertise: Prospects and limits (pp. 172-194). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
     ■ Sanford, A. J. (1987). The mind of man: Models of human understanding. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
     ■ Sapir, E. (1921). Language. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World.
     ■ Sapir, E. (1964). Culture, language, and personality. Berkeley: University of California Press. (Originally published in 1941.)
     ■ Sapir, E. (1985). The status of linguistics as a science. In D. G. Mandelbaum (Ed.), Selected writings of Edward Sapir in language, culture and personality (pp. 160166). Berkeley: University of California Press. (Originally published in 1929).
     ■ Scardmalia, M., & C. Bereiter (1992). Literate expertise. In K. A. Ericsson & J. Smith (Eds.), Toward a general theory of expertise: Prospects and limits (pp. 172-194). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
     ■ Schafer, R. (1954). Psychoanalytic interpretation in Rorschach testing. New York: Grune & Stratten.
     ■ Schank, R. C. (1973). Identification of conceptualizations underlying natural language. In R. C. Schank & K. M. Colby (Eds.), Computer models of thought and language (pp. 187-248). San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.
     ■ Schank, R. C. (1976). The role of memory in language processing. In C. N. Cofer (Ed.), The structure of human memory. (pp. 162-189) San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.
     ■ Schank, R. C. (1986). Explanation patterns: Understanding mechanically and creatively. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
     ■ Schank, R. C., & R. P. Abelson (1977). Scripts, plans, goals, and understanding. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
     ■ SchroЁdinger, E. (1951). Science and humanism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
     ■ Searle, J. R. (1981a). Minds, brains, and programs. In J. Haugeland (Ed.), Mind design: Philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence (pp. 282-306). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
     ■ Searle, J. R. (1981b). Minds, brains and programs. In D. Hofstadter & D. Dennett (Eds.), The mind's I (pp. 353-373). New York: Basic Books.
     ■ Searle, J. R. (1983). Intentionality. New York: Cambridge University Press.
     ■ Serres, M. (1982). The origin of language: Biology, information theory, and thermodynamics. M. Anderson (Trans.). In J. V. Harari & D. F. Bell (Eds.), Hermes: Literature, science, philosophy (pp. 71-83). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
     ■ Simon, H. A. (1966). Scientific discovery and the psychology of problem solving. In R. G. Colodny (Ed.), Mind and cosmos: Essays in contemporary science and philosophy (pp. 22-40). Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
     ■ Simon, H. A. (1979). Models of thought. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
     ■ Simon, H. A. (1989). The scientist as a problem solver. In D. Klahr & K. Kotovsky (Eds.), Complex information processing: The impact of Herbert Simon. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
     ■ Simon, H. A., & C. Kaplan (1989). Foundations of cognitive science. In M. Posner (Ed.), Foundations of cognitive science (pp. 1-47). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
     ■ Simonton, D. K. (1988). Creativity, leadership and chance. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), The nature of creativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
     ■ Skinner, B. F. (1974). About behaviorism. New York: Knopf.
     ■ Smith, E. E. (1988). Concepts and thought. In J. Sternberg & E. E. Smith (Eds.), The psychology of human thought (pp. 19-49). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
     ■ Smith, E. E. (1990). Thinking: Introduction. In D. N. Osherson & E. E. Smith (Eds.), Thinking. An invitation to cognitive science. (Vol. 3, pp. 1-2). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
     ■ Socrates. (1958). Meno. In E. H. Warmington & P. O. Rouse (Eds.), Great dialogues of Plato W.H.D. Rouse (Trans.). New York: New American Library. (Original publication date unknown.)
     ■ Solso, R. L. (1974). Theories of retrieval. In R. L. Solso (Ed.), Theories in cognitive psychology. Potomac, MD: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
     ■ Spencer, H. (1896). The principles of psychology. New York: Appleton-CenturyCrofts.
     ■ Steiner, G. (1975). After Babel: Aspects of language and translation. New York: Oxford University Press.
     ■ Sternberg, R. J. (1977). Intelligence, information processing, and analogical reasoning. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
     ■ Sternberg, R. J. (1994). Intelligence. In R. J. Sternberg, Thinking and problem solving. San Diego: Academic Press.
     ■ Sternberg, R. J., & J. E. Davidson (1985). Cognitive development in gifted and talented. In F. D. Horowitz & M. O'Brien (Eds.), The gifted and talented (pp. 103-135). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
     ■ Storr, A. (1993). The dynamics of creation. New York: Ballantine Books. (Originally published in 1972.)
     ■ Stumpf, S. E. (1994). Philosophy: History and problems (5th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.
     ■ Sulloway, F. J. (1996). Born to rebel: Birth order, family dynamics, and creative lives. New York: Random House/Vintage Books.
     ■ Thorndike, E. L. (1906). Principles of teaching. New York: A. G. Seiler.
     ■ Thorndike, E. L. (1970). Animal intelligence: Experimental studies. Darien, CT: Hafner Publishing Co. (Originally published in 1911.)
     ■ Titchener, E. B. (1910). A textbook of psychology. New York: Macmillan.
     ■ Titchener, E. B. (1914). A primer of psychology. New York: Macmillan.
     ■ Toulmin, S. (1957). The philosophy of science. London: Hutchinson.
     ■ Tulving, E. (1972). Episodic and semantic memory. In E. Tulving & W. Donaldson (Eds.), Organisation of memory. London: Academic Press.
     ■ Turing, A. (1946). In B. E. Carpenter & R. W. Doran (Eds.), ACE reports of 1946 and other papers. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
     ■ Turkle, S. (1984). Computers and the second self: Computers and the human spirit. New York: Simon & Schuster.
     ■ Tyler, S. A. (1978). The said and the unsaid: Mind, meaning, and culture. New York: Academic Press.
     ■ van Heijenoort (Ed.) (1967). From Frege to Goedel. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
     ■ Varela, F. J. (1984). The creative circle: Sketches on the natural history of circularity. In P. Watzlawick (Ed.), The invented reality (pp. 309-324). New York: W. W. Norton.
     ■ Voltaire (1961). On the Penseґs of M. Pascal. In Philosophical letters (pp. 119-146). E. Dilworth (Trans.). Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
     ■ Wagman, M. (1997a). Cognitive science and the symbolic operations of human and artificial intelligence: Theory and research into the intellective processes. Westport, CT: Praeger.
     ■ Wagman, M. (1997b). The general unified theory of intelligence: Central conceptions and specific application to domains of cognitive science. Westport, CT: Praeger.
     ■ Wagman, M. (1998a). Cognitive science and the mind- body problem: From philosophy to psychology to artificial intelligence to imaging of the brain. Westport, CT: Praeger.
     ■ Wagman, M. (1999). The human mind according to artificial intelligence: Theory, re search, and implications. Westport, CT: Praeger.
     ■ Wall, R. (1972). Introduction to mathematical linguistics. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
     ■ Wallas, G. (1926). The Art of Thought. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.
     ■ Wason, P. (1977). Self contradictions. In P. Johnson-Laird & P. Wason (Eds.), Thinking: Readings in cognitive science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
     ■ Wason, P. C., & P. N. Johnson-Laird. (1972). Psychology of reasoning: Structure and content. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
     ■ Watson, J. (1930). Behaviorism. New York: W. W. Norton.
     ■ Watzlawick, P. (1984). Epilogue. In P. Watzlawick (Ed.), The invented reality. New York: W. W. Norton, 1984.
     ■ Weinberg, S. (1977). The first three minutes: A modern view of the origin of the uni verse. New York: Basic Books.
     ■ Weisberg, R. W. (1986). Creativity: Genius and other myths. New York: W. H. Freeman.
     ■ Weizenbaum, J. (1976). Computer power and human reason: From judgment to cal culation. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.
     ■ Wertheimer, M. (1945). Productive thinking. New York: Harper & Bros.
     ■ Whitehead, A. N. (1925). Science and the modern world. New York: Macmillan.
     ■ Whorf, B. L. (1956). In J. B. Carroll (Ed.), Language, thought and reality: Selected writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
     ■ Whyte, L. L. (1962). The unconscious before Freud. New York: Anchor Books.
     ■ Wiener, N. (1954). The human use of human beings. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
     ■ Wiener, N. (1964). God & Golem, Inc.: A comment on certain points where cybernetics impinges on religion. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
     ■ Winograd, T. (1972). Understanding natural language. New York: Academic Press.
     ■ Winston, P. H. (1987). Artificial intelligence: A perspective. In E. L. Grimson & R. S. Patil (Eds.), AI in the 1980s and beyond (pp. 1-12). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
     ■ Winston, P. H. (Ed.) (1975). The psychology of computer vision. New York: McGrawHill.
     ■ Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical investigations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
     ■ Wittgenstein, L. (1958). The blue and brown books. New York: Harper Colophon.
     ■ Woods, W. A. (1975). What's in a link: Foundations for semantic networks. In D. G. Bobrow & A. Collins (Eds.), Representations and understanding: Studies in cognitive science (pp. 35-84). New York: Academic Press.
     ■ Woodworth, R. S. (1938). Experimental psychology. New York: Holt; London: Methuen (1939).
     ■ Wundt, W. (1904). Principles of physiological psychology (Vol. 1). E. B. Titchener (Trans.). New York: Macmillan.
     ■ Wundt, W. (1907). Lectures on human and animal psychology. J. E. Creighton & E. B. Titchener (Trans.). New York: Macmillan.
     ■ Young, J. Z. (1978). Programs of the brain. New York: Oxford University Press.
     ■ Ziman, J. (1978). Reliable knowledge: An exploration of the grounds for belief in science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Bibliography

  • 5 Thinking

       But what then am I? A thing which thinks. What is a thing which thinks? It is a thing which doubts, understands, [conceives], affirms, denies, wills, refuses, which also imagines and feels. (Descartes, 1951, p. 153)
       I have been trying in all this to remove the temptation to think that there "must be" a mental process of thinking, hoping, wishing, believing, etc., independent of the process of expressing a thought, a hope, a wish, etc.... If we scrutinize the usages which we make of "thinking," "meaning," "wishing," etc., going through this process rids us of the temptation to look for a peculiar act of thinking, independent of the act of expressing our thoughts, and stowed away in some particular medium. (Wittgenstein, 1958, pp. 41-43)
       Analyse the proofs employed by the subject. If they do not go beyond observation of empirical correspondences, they can be fully explained in terms of concrete operations, and nothing would warrant our assuming that more complex thought mechanisms are operating. If, on the other hand, the subject interprets a given correspondence as the result of any one of several possible combinations, and this leads him to verify his hypotheses by observing their consequences, we know that propositional operations are involved. (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958, p. 279)
       In every age, philosophical thinking exploits some dominant concepts and makes its greatest headway in solving problems conceived in terms of them. The seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophers construed knowledge, knower, and known in terms of sense data and their association. Descartes' self-examination gave classical psychology the mind and its contents as a starting point. Locke set up sensory immediacy as the new criterion of the real... Hobbes provided the genetic method of building up complex ideas from simple ones... and, in another quarter, still true to the Hobbesian method, Pavlov built intellect out of conditioned reflexes and Loeb built life out of tropisms. (S. Langer, 1962, p. 54)
       Experiments on deductive reasoning show that subjects are influenced sufficiently by their experience for their reasoning to differ from that described by a purely deductive system, whilst experiments on inductive reasoning lead to the view that an understanding of the strategies used by adult subjects in attaining concepts involves reference to higher-order concepts of a logical and deductive nature. (Bolton, 1972, p. 154)
       There are now machines in the world that think, that learn and create. Moreover, their ability to do these things is going to increase rapidly until-in the visible future-the range of problems they can handle will be coextensive with the range to which the human mind has been applied. (Newell & Simon, quoted in Weizenbaum, 1976, p. 138)
       But how does it happen that thinking is sometimes accompanied by action and sometimes not, sometimes by motion, and sometimes not? It looks as if almost the same thing happens as in the case of reasoning and making inferences about unchanging objects. But in that case the end is a speculative proposition... whereas here the conclusion which results from the two premises is an action.... I need covering; a cloak is a covering. I need a cloak. What I need, I have to make; I need a cloak. I have to make a cloak. And the conclusion, the "I have to make a cloak," is an action. (Nussbaum, 1978, p. 40)
       It is well to remember that when philosophy emerged in Greece in the sixth century, B.C., it did not burst suddenly out of the Mediterranean blue. The development of societies of reasoning creatures-what we call civilization-had been a process to be measured not in thousands but in millions of years. Human beings became civilized as they became reasonable, and for an animal to begin to reason and to learn how to improve its reasoning is a long, slow process. So thinking had been going on for ages before Greece-slowly improving itself, uncovering the pitfalls to be avoided by forethought, endeavoring to weigh alternative sets of consequences intellectually. What happened in the sixth century, B.C., is that thinking turned round on itself; people began to think about thinking, and the momentous event, the culmination of the long process to that point, was in fact the birth of philosophy. (Lipman, Sharp & Oscanyan, 1980, p. xi)
       The way to look at thought is not to assume that there is a parallel thread of correlated affects or internal experiences that go with it in some regular way. It's not of course that people don't have internal experiences, of course they do; but that when you ask what is the state of mind of someone, say while he or she is performing a ritual, it's hard to believe that such experiences are the same for all people involved.... The thinking, and indeed the feeling in an odd sort of way, is really going on in public. They are really saying what they're saying, doing what they're doing, meaning what they're meaning. Thought is, in great part anyway, a public activity. (Geertz, quoted in J. Miller, 1983, pp. 202-203)
       Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler. (Einstein, quoted in Minsky, 1986, p. 17)
       What, in effect, are the conditions for the construction of formal thought? The child must not only apply operations to objects-in other words, mentally execute possible actions on them-he must also "reflect" those operations in the absence of the objects which are replaced by pure propositions. Thus, "reflection" is thought raised to the second power. Concrete thinking is the representation of a possible action, and formal thinking is the representation of a representation of possible action.... It is not surprising, therefore, that the system of concrete operations must be completed during the last years of childhood before it can be "reflected" by formal operations. In terms of their function, formal operations do not differ from concrete operations except that they are applied to hypotheses or propositions [whose logic is] an abstract translation of the system of "inference" that governs concrete operations. (Piaget, quoted in Minsky, 1986, p. 237)
       [E]ven a human being today (hence, a fortiori, a remote ancestor of contemporary human beings) cannot easily or ordinarily maintain uninterrupted attention on a single problem for more than a few tens of seconds. Yet we work on problems that require vastly more time. The way we do that (as we can observe by watching ourselves) requires periods of mulling to be followed by periods of recapitulation, describing to ourselves what seems to have gone on during the mulling, leading to whatever intermediate results we have reached. This has an obvious function: namely, by rehearsing these interim results... we commit them to memory, for the immediate contents of the stream of consciousness are very quickly lost unless rehearsed.... Given language, we can describe to ourselves what seemed to occur during the mulling that led to a judgment, produce a rehearsable version of the reaching-a-judgment process, and commit that to long-term memory by in fact rehearsing it. (Margolis, 1987, p. 60)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Thinking

  • 6 आत्मन् _ātman

    आत्मन् m. [अत्-मनिण् Uṇ 4.152 said to be from अन् to breathe also] 'आत्मा यत्नो धृतिर्बुद्धिः स्वभावो ब्रह्मवर्ष्म च' इत्यमरः
    1 The soul, the individual soul, the breath, the principle of life and sensation; किमात्मना यो न जितेन्द्रियो भवेत् H.1; आत्मानं रथिनं विद्धि शरीरं रथमेव तु Kaṭh.3.3. (In आत्मा नदी संयमपुण्यतीर्था H.4.87 आत्मन् is compared to a river).
    -2 Self, oneself; in this sense mostly used reflexively for all three persons and in the singular number, masculine gender, whatever be the gender or number of the noun to which it refers; अनया चिन्तयात्मापि मे न प्रतिभाति Ratn.1; आश्रमदर्श- नेन आत्मानं पुनीमहे Ś.1; गुप्तं ददृशुरात्मानं सर्वाः स्वप्नेषु वामनैः R.1.6,4.35,14.57; Ku.6.2; देवी... प्राप्तप्रसवमात्मानं गङ्गादेव्यां विमुञ्चति U.7.2; गोपायन्ति कुलस्त्रिय आत्मानमात्मना Mb.; K.17; sometimes used in pl. also; आत्मनः स्तुवन्ति Śi.17.19; Māl.8.
    -3 Supreme deity and soul of the universe, Supreme Soul, Brahman; तस्माद्वा एतस्मादात्मन आकाशः संभूतः T. Up.2.1.1; Ms.1.15,12.24.
    -4 Essence, nature; काव्यस्यात्मा ध्वनिः S. D., see आत्मक below.
    -5 Character, peculiarity; आत्मा यक्ष्मस्य नश्यति Rv.1. 97.11.
    -6 The natural temperament or disposition; Bhāg.11.22.2.
    -7 The person or whole body (con- sidered as one and opposed to the separate members of it); स्थितः सर्वोन्नतेनोर्वीं क्रान्त्वा मेरुरिवात्मना R.1.14; योस्या- त्मनः कारयिता Ms.12.12; Ki.9.66.
    -8 Mind, intellect; मन्दात्मन्, नष्टात्मन्, महात्मन् &c. अथ रामः प्रसन्नात्मा श्रुत्वा वायु- सुतस्य ह Rām.6.18.1.
    -9 The understanding; cf. आत्म- संपन्न, आत्मवत् &c.
    -1 Thinking faculty, the faculty of thought and reason.
    -11 Spirit, vitality, courage; त्यक्त्वा$$त्मानमथाब्रवीत् Mb.12.18.6.
    -12 Form, image; आत्मानमाधाय Ku.3.24 assuming his own form; 2.61; संरोपिते$प्यात्मनि Ś.6.24 myself being implanted in her.
    -13 A son; 'आत्मा वै पुत्रनामासि' इति श्रुतेः । तस्यात्मा शितिकण्ठस्य Śi.2.61.
    -14 Care, efforts, pain.
    -15 The sun.
    -16 Fire.
    -17 Wind, air.
    -18 Mental quality; बाहुश्रुत्यं तपस्त्यागः श्रद्धा यज्ञक्रिया क्षमा । भावशुद्धिर्दया सत्यं संयमश्चात्मसंपदः ॥ Mb.12.167.5. आत्मन् is used as the last member of comp. in the sense of 'made or consisting of'; see आत्मक. The form त्मन् is also found to be used; कृतार्थं मन्यते त्मानं Mb. [cf. Gr. atmos, aitmen]
    -Comp. -अधीन a.
    1 dependent on oneself, independent.
    -2 sentient, existing.
    (-नः) 1 a son.
    -2 a wife's brother.
    -3 the jester or विदूषक (in dramatic literature).
    -अनुरूप a. worthy of oneself; तस्यामात्मानुरूपायामात्मजन्मसमुत्सुकः Ku. 1.18; R.1.33.
    -अनुगमनम् peronal attendance; शश्वदा- त्मानुगमनेन गाम् R.1.88.
    -अपहारः concealing oneself; कथं वा आत्मापहारं करोमि Ś.1.
    -अपहारकः one who pre- tends to belong to a higher class than his own, an impostor, a pretender; यो$न्यथा सन्तमात्मानमन्यथा सत्सु भाषते । स पापकृत्तमो लोके स्तेन आत्मापहारकः ॥ Ms.4.255.
    -आदिष्ट a. self-counselled. (
    -ष्टः) a treaty dictated by the party wishing it himself; स्वसैन्येन तु संघानमात्मादिष्ट उदाहृतः H.4.121.
    -आनन्द a. Rejoicing in the soul or Supreme Spirit; आत्ममिथुनः आत्मानन्दः Ch. Up.7.25.2.
    -आराम a.
    1 striving to get knowledge; (as an ascetic or योगिन्), seeking spiritual knowledge; आत्मारामा विहितरतयो निर्विकल्पे समाधौ Ve.1.23.
    -2 selfpleased, delighted in self; आत्मारामः फलाशी. see आत्मानन्द Bh.3.93; cf. Bg.5.24.
    -आशिन् m. a fish supposed to feed on its young, or on the weakest of its species; cf. मत्स्या इव जना नित्यं भक्षयन्ति परस्परम् Rām.
    -आश्रय a.
    1 dependent on oneself or on his own mind.
    -2 About or relating to oneself; कौलीनमात्माश्रयमाचचक्षे R.14.36.
    (-यः) 1 self dependence.
    -2 innate idea, abstract knowledge independent of the thing to be known.
    -ईश्वर a. Self-possessed, master of self; आत्मेश्वराणां न हि जातु विघ्नाः समाधिभेदप्रभवो भवन्ति Ku.3.4.
    -उदयः self-exaltation or elevation; आत्मोदयः परज्यानिर्द्वयं नीतिरितीयति Śi.2.3
    -उद्भव a. born or produced from oneself.
    (-वः) 1 a son; आत्मोद्भवे वर्णचतुष्टयस्य R.18.12.
    -2 Cupid.
    -3 sorrow, pain.
    (-वा) 1 daughter.
    -2 intellect.
    -3 N. of a plant (माषपर्णी; Mar. रानउडीद).
    -उपजीविन् m.
    1 one who lives by his own labour; Ms.7.138.
    -2 a day-labourer.
    -3 one who lives by his wife (Kull. on Ms.8.362).
    -4 an actor, public performer.
    -उपनिषद् f. N. of an उपनिषद् which treats of the Supreme Spirit.
    - उपम a. like oneself. (
    -मः) a son.
    -औपम्यम् Likeness to self. आत्मौपम्येन सर्वत्र Bg.6.32.
    -कर्मन् One's own duty; आत्मौपकर्मक्षमं देहं क्षात्रो धर्म इवाश्रितः R.
    -काम a.
    1 loving oneself, possessed of self-conceit, proud; आत्मकामा सदा चण्डी Rām.2.7.1.
    -2 loving Brahman or the Supreme Spirit only; भगवन् वयमात्मकामाः Maitr. Up.7.1.
    -कार्यम् one's own business, private affair.
    -कृत a.
    1 self-executed, done by oneself; पौरा ह्यात्मकृताद्दुःखाद्विप्रमोच्या नृपात्मजैः Rām.2.46.23.
    -2 done against one's own self; Vāj.8.13.
    -गत a. produced in one's mind; ˚तो मनोरथः Ś.1. (
    -तम्) ind. aside (to oneself) being considered to be spoken privately (opp. प्रकाशम् aloud); frequently used as a stage-direction in dramas; it is the same as स्वगतम् which is thus defined; अश्राव्यं खलु यद्वस्तु तदिह स्वगतं मतम् S. D.6.
    -गतिः f.
    1 course of the soul's existence.
    -2 one's own course; Bhāg.5.17.3. ˚गत्या by one's own act.
    -गुप्ता The plant Mucuna Pruritus Hook (Mar. कुयली).
    -गुप्तिः f. a cave, the hiding place of an animal, lair.
    -ग्राहिन् a. selfish, greedy.
    -घातः 1 suicide.
    -2 heresy.
    -घातकः, -घातिन् 1 a suicide, a self-destroyer; K.174; व्यापादयेद् वृथात्मानं स्वयं यो$गन्युदका- दिभिः । अवैधेनैव मार्गेण आत्मघाती स उच्यते ॥
    -2 a heretic.
    -घोषः 1 a cock (calling out to himself).
    -2 a crow.
    -3 One who flatters himself. cf. आत्मघोषो वायसे स्यादात्म- स्तुतिपरे$पि च Nm.
    -जः, -जन्मन् m.
    -जातः, -प्रभवः, -संभवः, -समुद्भवः 1 a son; यः स वासवनिर्जेता रावणस्यात्म- संभवः Rām.6.86.33; हतान्निहन्मेह नरर्षभेण वयं सुरेशात्मसमु- द्भवेन Mb.7.118.2; तमात्मजन्मानमजं चकार R.5.36; तस्यामात्मानुरूपायामात्मजन्मसमुत्सुकः R.1.33; Māl.1; Ku.6.28.
    -2 Cupid; ममायमात्मप्रभवो भूयस्त्वमुपयास्यति Rām.4.1.34.
    -3 a descendant; मृगयां वि<?>रन्काश्चिद्विजने जनकात्मजः Mb.12.39.1.
    -जा 1 a daughter; वन्द्यं युगं चरणयोर्जनकात्मजायाः R.13.78; cf. नगात्मजा &c.
    -2 the reasoning faculty, understanding.
    -जयः 1 one's own victory.
    -2 victory over oneself, self-denial or abnega- tion.
    -ज्योतिस् n. The light of the soul or Supreme Spirit (चैतन्य); कौस्तुभव्यपदेशेन स्वात्मज्योतिर्बिभर्त्यजः Bhāg. 12.11.1.
    -ज्ञः, -विद् m. a sage, one who knows himself; तस्मादात्मज्ञं ह्यर्चयेद्भूतिकामः Muṇḍ.3.1.1.
    -ज्ञानम् 1 self-knowledge.
    -2 spiritual knowledge, knowledge of the soul or the Supreme Spirit; सर्वेषामपि चैतेषामात्मज्ञानं परं स्मृतम् Ms.12.85,92.
    -3 true wisdom.
    -तत्त्वम् 1 the true nature of the soul or the supreme spirit; यदात्म- तत्त्वेन तु ब्रह्मतत्त्वं प्रपश्येत Śvet.2.15.
    -2 the highest thing. ˚ज्ञः a sage versed in the Vedānta doctrines.
    -तृप्त a. Self-satisfied; आत्मतृप्तश्च मानवः Bg.3.17.
    -तुष्टि a. self-satisfied. (
    -ष्टिः f.) self-satisfaction.
    -त्यागः 1 self-sacrifice.
    -2 suicide.
    -त्यागिन् m. a.
    1 suicide; आत्मत्यागिन्यो नाशौचोदकभाजनाः Y.3.6.
    -2 a heretic, an unbeliever.
    -त्राणम् 1 self-preservation.
    -2 a body-guard; Rām.5.
    -दर्शः a mirror; प्रसादमात्मीयमिवात्म- दर्शः R.7.68.
    -दर्शनम् 1 seeing oneself.
    -2 spiritual knowledge, true wisdom; सर्वभूतात्मदर्शनम् Y.3.157; cf. Ms.12.91. see आत्मयाजिन.
    -दा a. Ved. granting one's existence or life; य आत्मदा बलदा यस्य विश्व Rv.1.121.2.
    -दानम् self-sacrifice, resigning oneself.
    -दूषि a. Ved. corrupting the soul; self-destroying; Av.16.1.3.
    -देवता a tutelary deity.
    -द्रोहिन् a.
    1 self-tormenting, fretful.
    -2 suicide.
    -नित्य a. being constantly in the heart, greatly endeared to oneself.
    -निन्दा self-reproach.
    -निवेदनम् offering oneself (as a living sacrifice to the deity).
    -निष्ठ a. one who constantly seeks for spiritual knowledge.
    -पराजित a. one who has lost himself (Ved.) Av.5.18.2.
    -पुराणम् N. of a work elucidating the Upaniṣads (consisting of 18 chapters).
    -प्रत्ययिक a. knowing from one's experience; आत्मप्रत्ययिकं शास्त्रमिदम् Mb.12.246.13.
    -प्रबोधः 1 cognition of the soul; self-consciousness.
    -2 title of an उपनिषद्.
    -प्रभ a. self-illuminated.
    -प्रवादः 1 conversation about the Supreme Spirit.
    -2 N. of the seventh of the fourteen Pūrvas of the Jainas.
    -प्रशंसा self-praise.
    -बन्धुः, -बान्धवः 1 one's own kinsman; आत्ममातुः स्वसुः पुत्रा आत्मपितुः स्वसुः सुताः । आत्ममातुलपुत्राश्च विज्ञेया ह्यात्मबान्धवाः Śabdak. i. e. mother's sister's son, father's sister's son, and mother's brother's son.
    -2 the soul, the self.
    -बोधः 1 spiritual knowledge.
    -2 knowledge of self.
    -3 N. of a work of Śaṅkarāchārya.
    -भावः 1 existence of the soul; संयोग एषां न तु आत्मभावात् Śvet.1.2.
    -2 the self proper, peculiar nature.
    -3 the body.
    -भू a. self-born, self-existent. (
    -भूः) वचस्यवसिते तस्मिन् ससर्ज गिरमात्मभूः Ku.2.53,3.16,5.81.
    -योनिः 1 N. of Brahmā;
    -2 N. of Viṣṇu.
    -3 N. of Śiva; Ś.7.35.
    -4 Cupid, god of love.
    -5 a son. (
    -भूः f.)
    1 a daughter.
    -2 talent, understanding.
    -भूत a.
    1 self-produced; peculiar, belonging to.
    -2 attached, devoted, faithful; तत्रात्मभूतैः कालज्ञैरहार्यैः परिचारकैः Ms.7.217 (Kull. = आत्मतुल्य).
    (-तः) 1 a son.
    -2 Cupid.
    (-ता) 1 a daughter.
    -2 talent.
    -भूयम् 1 peculiarity, own nature.
    -2 Brahman.
    -मात्रा a portion of the Supreme Spirit.
    -मानिन् a. self-respecting, respectable.
    -2 arro- gant, proud; विवेकशून्यः प्रभुरात्ममानी, महाननर्थः सुहृदां बतायम् Bk.12.83.
    -मूर्तिः 1 a brother; भ्राता स्वमूर्तिरात्मनः
    -2 soul, Supreme Spirit.
    -मूल a. self-luminous, shining (God); स आत्ममूलो$वतु मां परात्परः Bhāg.8.3.4.
    -मूलि n. the universe.
    -मूली N. of a plant (दूरालभा; Mar. धमासा).
    -याजिन् 1 sacrificing for oneself or himself. m. a learned man who studies his own nature and that of the soul (of others) to secure eternal felicity, one who looks upon all beings as self; सर्व- भूतेषु चात्मानं सर्वभूतानि चात्मनि । समं पश्यन्नात्मयाजी स्वाराज्यम- धिगच्छति ॥ Ms.12.91.
    -योनिः = ˚भू m. a. v. ददर्श चक्रीकृतचारुचापं प्रहर्तुमभ्युद्यतमात्मयोनिम् Ku.3.7.
    -रक्षा 1 N. of a plant (इन्द्रवारुणीवृक्ष).
    -2 self protection.
    -लाभः birth, production, origin; यैरात्मलाभस्त्वया लब्धः Mu.3.1, 5.23; Ki.3.32,17.19,18.34; K.239.
    -लोमन् 1 the hair of the body.
    -2 the beard.
    -वञ्चक a. self-deceiver.
    -वञ्चना self-delusion; self-deception.
    -वधः, -वध्या, -हत्या suicide.
    -वर्ग्य a. of one's party or class; उद्बाहुना जुहुविरे मुहुरात्मवर्ग्याः Śi.5.15.
    -वश a. depending on one's own will; यद्यत्परवशं कर्म तत्तद्यत्नेन वर्जयेत् । यद्यदात्मवशं तु स्यात्तत्तत्सेवेत यत्नतः ॥ Ms.4.159, सर्वमात्मवशं सुखम् 16.
    (-शः) 1 self-control, self-government.
    -2 one's control, subjection; ˚शं नी, ˚वशीकृ to reduce to subjection, win over.
    -वश्य a. having control over self, self-possessed, self-restrained; आत्मवश्यैर्विधेयात्मा Bg.2.64.
    -विक्रयः sale of oneself or one's own liberty; Ms.11.59.
    -विद् m.
    1 a wise man, sage; as in तरति शोकमात्मवित्; सो$हं भगवो मन्त्रविदेवास्मि नात्मविच्छ्रुत<?>ह्येव Ch. Up.7.1.3.
    -2 knowing one's own self (family &c.); य इहात्मविदो विपक्षमध्ये Śi.2.116.
    -3 N. of Śiva.
    -विद्या knowledge of the soul, spiritual knowledge; आन्वीक्षिकीं चात्मविद्याम् Ms.7.43.
    -विवृद्धिः, -वृद्धिः f. self-exaltation.
    -वीर a.
    1 mighty, powerful, strong.
    -2 appropriate, suitable, good for oneself (as diet &c.).
    -3 existent, sentient.
    (-रः) 1 a son.
    -2 wife's brother.
    -3 a jester (in dramas); आत्मवीरः प्राणवति श्यालके च विदूषके.
    -वृत्तम्, -वृत्तान्तः account of one's own self, autobiography.
    -वृत्ति a. dwelling in Atman or soul. (
    -त्तिः f.)
    1 state of the heart; किमेभिराशोपहतात्मवृत्तिभिः Ku.5.76.
    -2 action as regards oneself, one's own state or circum- stance; विस्माययन् विस्मितमात्मवृत्तौ R.2.33.
    -3 practising one's own duties or occupation.
    -शक्तिः f. one's own power or ability, inherent power or effort; दैवं निहत्य कुरु पौरुषमात्मशक्त्या Pt.1.361 to the best of one's power.
    -2 illusion.
    -शल्या N. of a plant (शतावरी).
    -शुद्धिः f. self-purification; Ms.11.164; योगिनः कर्म कुर्वन्ति संगं त्यक्त्वा$त्मशुद्धये Bg.5.11.
    -श्लाघा, -स्तुतिः f. self-praise, boasting, bragging.
    -संयमः self-restraint; आत्मसंयमयो- गाग्नौ जुह्वति ज्ञानदीपिते Bg.4.27.
    -संस्थ a. Based upon or connected with the person; आत्मसंस्थं मनःकृत्वा Bg.6.25.
    -सतत्त्वम् See आत्मतत्त्वम्; आत्मसतत्त्वं विगणयतः Bhāg.5.13.24.
    -सद् a. Ved. dwelling in oneself; आत्मसदौ स्तं मा मा हिंसिष्टम् Av.5.9.8.
    -संतुष्ट a. self-sufficient.
    -सनि a. Ved. granting the breath of life.
    -सम a. worthy of oneself, equal to oneself; कार्ये गुरुण्यात्मसमं नियोक्ष्ये Ku.3.13.
    -संदेहः 1 internal or personal doubt.
    -2 risk of life, personal risk.
    -संभवः, -समुद्भवः 1 a son; चकार नाम्ना रघुमात्मसंभवम् R.3.21,11.57,17.8.
    -2 Cupid, god of love.
    -3 epi- thet of Brahmā, Viṣṇu, or Śiva.
    -4 the Supreme Being (परमात्मन्).
    (-वा) 1 a daughter.
    -2 understanding, intellect.
    -संपन्न a.
    1 self-possessed; Pt.1.49.
    -2 talented, intelligent; तमात्मसंपन्नमनिन्दितात्मा कृत्वा युवानं युवराजमेव R.18.18.
    -संभावना self-conceit; K.
    -सिद्धिः f. self-aggrandizement, attainment of object or purpose; आगच्छदात्मसिद्ध्यर्थं गोकर्णस्याश्रमं शुभम् Rām.7.9.47.
    -सुख a. self-delighted. (
    -खम्) the highest bliss.
    -स्थ a. At one's own disposal (स्वाधीन); तावदेव मया सार्धमात्मस्थं कुरु शासनम् Rām.2.21.8.
    -हन् a.
    1 one who kills his own soul (neglects its welfare &c.); ये के चात्महनो जनाः Śvet.3.
    -2 a suicide, self-destroyer.
    -3 a heretic, unbeliever.
    -4 a priest in a temple, a servant or attendant upon an idol.
    -हननम्, -हत्या suicide.
    -हित a. beneficial to oneself. (
    -तम्) one's own good or welfare.

    Sanskrit-English dictionary > आत्मन् _ātman

  • 7 ratio

    rătĭo, onis (abl. rationi, Lucr. 6, 66), f. [reor, ratus], a reckoning, account, calculation, computation.
    I.
    Lit.
    (α).
    Sing.: Les. Nequaquam argenti ratio conparet tamen. Sta. Ratio quidem hercle adparet: argentum oichetai, Plaut. Trin. 2, 4, 15 sq.:

    rationem putare... bene ratio accepti atque expensi inter nos convenit,

    id. Most. 1, 3, 141; 146; cf.: ad calculos vocare amicitiam, ut par sit ratio acceptorum et datorum, Cic. Lael. 16, 58:

    itur, putatur ratio cum argentario... Ubi disputata est ratio cum argentario,

    Plaut. Aul. 3, 5, 53 sq.:

    dextera digitis rationem computat,

    id. Mil. 2, 2, 49:

    magna ratio C. Verruci,

    Cic. Verr. 2, 2, 77, § 188:

    direptio ejus pecuniae, cujus ratio in aede Opis confecta est,

    id. Phil. 5, 6, 16; cf.:

    quibus in tabulis nominatim, ratio confecta erat, qui numerus domo exisset, etc.,... Quarum omnium rerum summa erat, etc.,

    Caes. B. G. 1, 29: auri ratio constat: aurum in aerario est, the account agrees, i. e. is correct, Cic. Fl. 28, 69 (v. consto):

    decumo post mense, ut rationem te dictare intellego,

    to make the reckoning, Plaut. Am. 2, 2, 38 (al. ductare):

    rationem ducere,

    to make a computation, to compute, calculate, reckon, Cic. Verr. 2, 2, 52, § 129; so, rationem habere, to take an account, make a computation:

    omnium proeliorum,

    Caes. B. C. 3, 53; cf.:

    hujus omnis pecuniae conjunctim ratio habetur,

    id. B. G. 6, 19; and:

    piratarum,

    Cic. Verr. 2, 5, 28, § 71:

    rationem inire,

    to cast up, reckon, calculate, Caes. B. G. 7, 71, 4:

    quattuor minae periere, ut ratio redditur,

    Plaut. Men. 1, 3, 23; cf.:

    tibi ego rationem reddam?

    id. Aul. 1, 1, 6; id. Trin. 2, 4, 114:

    rationem referre,

    Cic. Verr. 2, 1, 39, § 98:

    rationem repetere de pecuniis repetundis,

    id. Clu. 37, 104: Py. Quanta istaec hominum summa est? Ar. Septem millia. Py. Tantum esse oportet:

    recte rationem tenes,

    Plaut. Mil. 1, 1, 47 et saep.:

    drachumae, quas de ratione debuisti,

    according to the account, id. Trin. 2, 4, 24:

    grandem (pecuniam) quemadmodum in rationem inducerent, non videbant,

    how they should bring it into their accounts, Cic. Verr. 2, 1, 41, § 106.—
    (β).
    Plur.: rationes putare argentariam, frumentariam, pabuli causa quae parata sunt;

    rationem vinariam, oleariam, quid venierit, etc.,

    Cato, R. R. 2, 5:

    rationes ad aerarium continuo detuli... quas rationes si cognoris, intelleges, etc.,

    Cic. Pis. 25, 61:

    ut rationes cum publicanis putarent,

    id. Att. 4, 11, 1:

    rationes a colono accepit,

    id. Caecin. 32, 94:

    quid opus est? inquam. Rationes conferatis. Assidunt, subducunt, ad nummum convenit,

    id. Att. 5, 21, 12:

    rationes referre... rationes deferre,

    id. Fam. 5, 20, 2:

    Romani pueri longis rationibus assem Discunt in partes centum diducere,

    Hor. A. P. 325 et saep.:

    A RATIONIBVS,

    an accountant, Inscr. Orell. 1494; 2973; 2986; 4173 et saep. (cf. ab).—
    B.
    Transf.
    1.
    A list, roll, register (rare):

    cedo rationem carceris, quae diligentissime conficitur, quo quisque die datus in custodiam, quo mortuus, quo necatus sit,

    Cic. Verr. 2, 5, 57, § 147:

    rationes imperii, ab Augusto proponi solitas, sed a Tiberio intermissas, publicavit (sc. Caligula),

    Suet. Calig. 16 ( = breviarium) totius imperii, id. Aug. 101 fin.:

    rationarium imperii,

    id. ib. 28.—
    2.
    A sum, number (rare), Plaut. Trin. 2, 4, 11:

    nunc lenonum et scortorum plus est fere Quam olim muscarum est. Ea nimia est ratio,

    id. Truc. 1, 1, 49:

    pro ratione pecuniae liberalius est Brutus tractatus quam Pompeius,

    Cic. Att. 6, 3, 5; cf. II. B. 1. c. infra.—
    3.
    A business matter, transaction, business; also, a matter, affair, in gen. (a favorite word of Cicero):

    res rationesque eri Ballionis curo,

    Plaut. Ps. 2, 2, 31:

    res rationesque vestrorum omnium,

    id. Am. prol. 4:

    re ac ratione cum aliquo conjunctus,

    Cic. Verr. 2, 2, 70, § 172:

    de tota illa ratione atque re Gallicana inter se multa communicare,

    id. Quint. 4, 15:

    cum (Druides) in reliquis fere rebus, publicis privatisque rationibus, Graecis utantur litteris,

    Caes. B. G. 6, 14 (metaphrast. pragmasi):

    ratio nummaria,

    Cic. Att. 10, 11, 2:

    aeraria ratio,

    id. Quint. 4, 15:

    ratio domestica... bellica,

    id. Off. 1, 22, 76:

    quod ad popularem rationem attinet,

    id. Fam. 1, 2, 4:

    rationes familiares componere,

    Tac. A. 6, 16 fin.:

    fori judiciique rationem Messala suscepit,

    Cic. Rosc. Am. 51, 149; cf.:

    in explicandis rationibus rerum civilium,

    id. Rep. 1, 8, 13:

    rationes civitatis,

    id. ib. 1, 6, 11:

    quantos aestus habet ratio comitiorum... nihil fallacius ratione tota comitiorum,

    id. Mur. 17, 35:

    propter rationem Gallici belli,

    id. Prov. Cons. 8, 19; so id. ib. 8, 14, 35:

    ad omnem rationem humanitatis,

    id. Mur. 31, 66: in hac ratione quid res, quid causa, quid tempus ferat, tu facillime perspicies, id. Fam. 1, 7, 6 fin.:

    ad eam rationem existimabam satis aptam naturam meam,

    id. Att. 9, 11, A, 1.—
    b.
    Pregn.: meae (tuae, etc.) rationes, my ( thy, etc.) interest, my ( thy, etc.) advantage (cf. in Engl. to find one's account in any thing):

    me ad ejus rationes adjungo, quem tu in meis rationibus tibi esse adjungendum putasti,

    Cic. Fam. 1, 8, 2; cf.:

    exemplum meis alienissimum rationibus,

    id. Corn. Fragm. 1, 7 B. and K.:

    consideres, quid tuae rationes postulent,

    Sall. C. 44, 5: servitia repudiabat... alienum suis rationibus existimans videri causam civium cum servis fugitivis communicasse, inconsistent with his policy or interests, id. ib. 56, 5:

    si meas rationes unquam vestrae saluti anteposuissem,

    Cic. Red. ad Quir. 1, 1.
    II.
    Trop., a reckoning, account, computation:

    postquam hanc rationem cordi ventrique edidi,

    presented this reckoning, Plaut. Aul. 2, 7, 12:

    itidem hic ut Acheronti ratio accepti scribitur,

    i.e. things are taken only, nothing is given back, id. Truc. 4, 2, 36:

    nomen (comoediae) jam habetis, nunc rationes ceteras Accipite,

    an account of the rest, id. Poen. prol. 55; cf.:

    census quom sum, juratori recte rationem dedi,

    id. Trin. 4, 2, 30; so,

    rationem dare, for the more usual rationem reddere,

    Varr. L. L. 6, § 86 Mull.; Cic. Verr. 2, 1, 36, § 92 Zumpt:

    (argentarii) ratione utuntur,

    make a reckoning, settle up, Plaut. Cas. prol. 27:

    cum eam mecum rationem puto,

    go into that calculation, think over the matter, id. ib. 3, 2, 25; cf.:

    frustra egomet mecum has rationes puto,

    Ter. Ad. 2, 1, 54:

    (Medea et Atreus) inita subductaque ratione nefaria scelera meditantes,

    Cic. N. D. 3, 29, 71:

    quod posteaquam iste cognovit hanc rationem habere coepit,

    to make the following calculation, reflection, id. Verr. 2, 5, 39, § 101; cf.: totius rei consilium his rationibus explicavit, ut si, etc.,... si, etc.,... sin, etc., drew the plan of the whole undertaking according to the following calculation, that if, etc., Caes. B. C. 3, 78;

    and herewith cf.: rationem consilii mei accipite,

    id. ib. 3, 86:

    ut habere rationem possis, quo loco me convenias, etc.,

    that you may calculate, Cic. Fam. 3, 6, 6:

    semper ita vivamus, ut rationem reddendam nobis arbitremur,

    id. Verr. 2, 2, 11, § 28; cf.:

    nihil est, quod minus ferendum sit, quam rationem ab altero vitae reposcere eum, qui non possit suae reddere,

    id. Div. in Caecil. 9, 28;

    and with this cf.: si gravius quid acciderit, abs te rationem reposcent,

    will call you to account, Caes. B. G. 5, 30: clarorum virorum atque magnorum non minus otii, quam negotii rationem exstare oportere, an account must be capable of being given, Cato ap. Cic. Planc. 27, 66:

    tam otii quam negotii rationem reddere majores censuisse,

    Col. 11 fin.: eam condicionem esse imperandi, ut non aliter ratio constet, quam si uni reddatur, that the account is not correct unless, etc., Tac. A. 1, 6 fin.:

    mirum est quam singulis diebus in urbe ratio aut constet aut constare videatur,

    Plin. Ep. 1, 9, 1; 1, 5, 16 et saep.; cf. Just. praef. 5.—
    B.
    Transf.
    1.
    Relation, reference, respect to a thing:

    (agricolae) habent rationem cum terra, quae nunquam recusat imperium,

    have an account, have to do, have dealings with the earth, Cic. Sen. 15, 51; cf.:

    ubi ratio cum Orco habetur,

    Varr. R. R. 1, 4, 3;

    for which: ubi sit cum Orco ratio ponenda,

    Col. 1, 3, 2:

    cum omnibus Musis rationem habere cogito,

    Cic. Att. 2, 5, 2:

    cum hac (muliere) aliquid adulescentem hominem habuisse rationis,

    id. Cael. 20, 50; cf. id. Verr. 2, 2, 77, § 190. omnes, quibuscum ratio huic aut est aut fuit, assunt, defendunt, id. Quint. 23, 75; cf.

    . quae ratio tibi cum eo intercesserat?

    id. Rosc. Com. 14, 41:

    pacis vero quae potest esse cum eo ratio, in quo est incredibilis crudelitas, fides nulla?

    id. Phil. 4, 6, 14:

    quod si habenda cum M. Antonii latrocinio pacis ratio fuit, etc.,

    id. ib. 12, 7, 17:

    fontes ad nostrorum annalium rationem veteres, ad ipsorum sane recentes,

    in respect to our annals, id. Brut. 13, 49.—
    b.
    Pregn., a respect, regard, concern, consideration, care for a thing (usu. in the connection habere and ducere alicujus rei rationem): ad hanc rationem quoniam maximam vim natura habet, fortuna proximam: utriusque omnino habenda ratio est in deligendo genere vitae, Cic. Off. 1, 33, 120:

    quorum (civium Romanorum) nobis pro vestra sapientia, Quirites, habenda est ratio diligenter,

    id. Imp. Pomp. 7, 17:

    (deos) piorum et impiorum habere rationem,

    id. Leg. 2, 7, 15:

    cujus absentis rationem haberi proximis comitiis populus jussisset,

    Caes. B. C. 1, 9; so,

    absentis,

    id. ib. 1, 32; 3, 82 fin.:

    sauciorum et aegrorum habita ratione,

    id. ib. 3, 75:

    moneret, frumenti rationem esse habendam,

    Hirt. B. G. 8, 34;

    so (al. frumentandi), rationem habere,

    Caes. B. G. 7, 75 Oud.; cf. id. ib. 7, 71:

    alicujus vel dignitatis vel commodi rationem non habere,

    Cic. de Or. 2, 4, 17: ut summae rei publicae rationem habeamus, Pompeius ap. Cic. Att. 8, 12, c, 3:

    alicujus salutis rationem habere,

    i. e. to regard, care for, be concerned about, Caes. B. G. 7, 71; so id. B. C. 1, 20:

    turpissimae fugae rationem habere,

    id. ib. 2, 31:

    ut in ceteris habenda ratio non sui solum sed etiam aliorum, sic, etc.,

    Cic. Off. 1, 39, 139:

    proinde habeat rationem posteritatis et periculi sui,

    Caes. B. C. 1, 13:

    habere nunc se rationem officii pro beneficiis Caesaris,

    id. B. G. 5, 27:

    non ullius rationem sui commodi ducit,

    Cic. Rosc. Am. 44, 128:

    cum hujusce periculi tum ceterorum quoque officiorum et amicitiarum ratio,

    id. Clu. 42, 117:

    omnis hac in re habenda ratio et diligentia est, ut, etc.,

    id. Lael. 24, 89; cf.:

    didici ex tuis litteris, te omnibus in rebus habuisse rationem, ut mihi consuleres,

    id. Fam. 3, 5, 1:

    habeo rationem, quid a populo Romano acceperim,

    bring into consideration, consider, id. Verr. 2, 5, 14, § 36:

    ut habere rationem possis, quo loco me salva lege Cornelia convenias, ego veni, etc.,

    id. Fam. 3, 6, 6:

    neque illud rationis habuisti, eam provinciam ad summam stultitiam nequitiamque venisse,

    id. Verr. 2, 5, 15, § 38; cf.:

    hoc rationis habebant, facere eos nullo modo posse, ut, etc.,

    id. ib. 2, 2, 29, e70.—
    c.
    Relation to a thing, i. e.
    (α).
    Subject., course, conduct, procedure, mode, manner, method, fashion, plan, etc. (cf. consilium):

    nunc sic rationem incipissam, hanc instituam astutiam, ut, etc.,

    Plaut. Mil. 2, 2, 82; cf. id. ib. 3, 1, 175 sqq.:

    ubi cenas hodic, si hanc rationem instituis?

    Plaut. Stich. 3, 1, 26; id. Truc. 1, 1, 3:

    tua ratio est, ut secundum binos ludos mihi respondere incipias: mea, ut ante primos ludos comperendinem. Ita fiet, ut tua ista ratio existimetur astuta, meum hoc consilium necessarium,

    Cic. Verr. 1, 11, 34; cf.:

    ratio viaque defensionis,

    id. Verr. 2, 5, 1, § 4:

    itaque in praesentia Pompeii insequendi rationem omittit,

    Caes. B. C. 1, 30:

    mea autem ratio in dicendo haec esse solet, ut, etc.,

    Cic. de Or. 2, 72, 292:

    haec in philosophia ratio contra omnia disserendi,

    id. N. D. 1, 5, 11:

    dicendi,

    id. Or. 32, 114; id. de Or. 3, 15, 56; cf.:

    aliquot ante annis inita ratio est, ut, etc.,

    id. Rep. 2, 36, 61:

    ut, quo primum occurreretur, vix ratio iniri possit,

    Caes. B. G. 7, 24:

    quia reponendarum (tegularum) nemo artifex inire rationem potuerit,

    Liv. 42, 3 fin. —In plur.:

    hoc aditu laudis non mea me voluntas sed meae vitae rationes ab ineunte aetate susceptae prohibuerunt,

    plan of life, Cic. Imp. Pomp. 1, 1:

    de rationibus rerum publicarum aut constituendarum aut tuendarum,

    id. Rep. 1, 6, 11.—
    (β).
    Object., relation, condition, nature, kind, sort, fashion, way, etc. (cf. modus):

    sed ratio ordoque agminis aliter se habebat ac Belgae ad Nervios detulerant,

    Caes. B. G. 2, 19; cf.:

    ut rei militaris ratio atque ordo postulabat,

    id. ib. 2, 22; so,

    rei militaris,

    id. ib. 4, 23:

    ratio atque usus belli,

    the art and practice of war, id. ib. 4, 1; id. B. C. 1, 76 fin.; 2, 18; 3, 17 et saep. al.; cf.:

    novae rationes bellandi,

    id. ib. 3, 50:

    ratio equestris proelii,

    id. B. G. 5, 16:

    quorum operum haec erat ratio, etc.,

    id. B. C. 1, 25; cf.: rationem pontis hanc instituit;

    tigna bina, etc.,

    id. B. G. 4, 17:

    serpit per omnium vitas amicitia, nec ullam aetatis degendae rationem patitur esse expertem sui,

    Cic. Lael. 23, 87; cf.:

    ita ratio comparata est vitae naturaeque nostrae, ut, etc.,

    id. ib. 27, 101; id. Ac. 2, 43, 132:

    civitas (Platonis) non quae possit esse, sed in qua ratio rerum civilium perspici posset,

    id. Rep. 2, 30, 52 init.; cf.:

    reliqui disseruerunt de generibus et de rationibus civitatum,

    id. ib. 2, 11, 22;

    1, 8, 13: quam creberrimis litteris faciam ut tibi nota sit omnis ratio dierum atque itinerum meorum,

    id. Fam. 3, 5, 4: quoniam eadem est ratio juris in utroque, id. Rep. 3, 12, 21; cf.:

    haec eadem ratio est in summa totius Galliae,

    Caes. B. G. 6, 11 fin.:

    ab nostris eadem ratione, qua pridie, resistitur,

    id. ib. 5, 40; id. B. C. 3, 100; cf. id. ib. 3, 101:

    docet, longe alia ratione esse bellum gerendum atque antea sit gestum,

    id. B. G. 7, 14:

    hoc si Romae fieri posset, certe aliqua ratione expugnasset iste,

    Cic. Verr. 2, 2, 52, ee130:

    quid refert, qua me ratione cogatis?

    id. Lael. 8, 26:

    quod fuit illis conandum atque omni ratione efficiendum,

    Caes. B. C. 1, 65 fin.; 1, 67 fin.:

    simili ratione Pompeius in suis castris consedit,

    id. ib. 3, 76:

    auxilium ferri nulla ratione poterat,

    id. ib. 1, 70:

    nec quibus rationibus superare possent, sed quem ad modum uti victoria deberent, cogitabant,

    id. ib. 3, 83 fin.; 3, 58; 3, 18 fin. et saep.—
    (γ).
    With gen. of a subst. in circumlocution for the subst. itself (v. Zumpt, Gram. §

    678): vereor ne oratio mea aliena ab judiciorum ratione esse videatur,

    Cic. Verr. 2, 4, 49, ee109:

    multa autem propter rationem brevitatis praetermittenda,

    id. ib. 2, 1, 40, ee

    103: quantas perturbationes et quantos aestus habet ratio comitiorum?

    id. Mur. 17, 35:

    nihil fallacius ratione tota comitiorum,

    id. ib. 17, 36:

    praedicere tempestatum rationem et praedonum,

    id. ib. 2, 4:

    tota ratio talium largitionum genere vitiosa est,

    id. Off. 2, 17, 60.—
    2.
    Pregn., that faculty of the mind which forms the basis of computation and calculation, and hence of mental action in general, i. e. judgment, understanding, reason: duplex est vis animorum atque natura: una pars in appetitu posita est, quae est hormê Graece, quae hominem huc et illuc rapit;

    altera in ratione, quae docet et explanat, quid faciendum, quid fugiendum sit. Ita fit, ut ratio praesit, appetitus obtemperet,

    Cic. Off. 1, 28, 101:

    homo, quod rationis est particeps, per quam consequentia cernit, causas rerum videt earumque progressus et quasi antecessiones non ignorat, similitudines comparat rebusque praesentibus adjungit atque annectit futuras, facile totius vitae cursum videt ad eamque degendam praeparat res necessarias. Eademque natura vi rationis hominem concilia homini et ad orationis et ad vitae societatem, etc.,

    id. ib. 1, 4, 11 sq.:

    haud scio, an melius fuerit, humano generi motum istum celerem cogitationis, acumen, sollertiam, quam rationem vocamus, non dari omnino quam tam munifice et tam large dari, etc.,

    id. N. D. 2, 27, 69:

    lex est ratio summa, insita in natura, quae jubet ea, quae facienda sunt, prohibetque contraria. Eadem ratio, cum est in hominis mente confirmata et confecta, lex est,

    id. Leg. 1, 6, 18:

    ut, quos ratio non posset, eos ad officium religio duceret,

    id. N. D. 1, 42, 118:

    mens et ratio et consilium in senibus est,

    id. Sen. 19, 67; cf. Liv. 28, 28:

    si pudor quaeritur, si probitas, si fides, Mancinus haec attulit, si ratio, consilium, prudentia, Pompeius antistat,

    Cic. Rep. 3, 18, 28; cf. id. Quint. 16, 53; and:

    si ratio et prudentia curas aufert,

    Hor. Ep. 1, 11, 25:

    quibus in rebus temeritas et casus, non ratio nec consilium valet,

    Cic. Div. 2, 41, 85; cf.:

    illa de urbis situ revoces ad rationem quae a Romulo casu aut necessitate facta sunt,

    id. Rep. 2, 11, 22; and:

    moneo ut agentem te ratio ducat, non fortuna,

    Liv. 22, 39 fin.: mulier abundat audacia;

    consilio et ratione deficitur,

    Cic. Clu. 65, 184:

    Ariovistum magis ratione et consilio quam virtute vicisse. Cui rationi contra homines barbaros locus fuisset, etc.,

    Caes. B. G. 1, 40: arma amens capio;

    nec sat rationis in armis,

    Verg. A. 2, 314:

    rationis egens,

    id. ib. 8, 299 et saep.:

    iracundia dissidens a ratione,

    Cic. Rep. 1, 38, 60:

    majora quam hominum ratio consequi possit,

    id. ib. 1, 10, 15:

    quantum ratione provideri poterat,

    Caes. B. G. 7, 16 fin.:

    quantumque in ratione esset, exploratum habuit,

    Hirt. B. G. 8, 6 init.:

    nec majore ratione bellum administrari posse,

    Caes. B. C. 7, 21:

    minari divisoribus ratio non erat,

    it was not reasonable, was contrary to reason, Cic. Verr. 1, 9, 24; so, nulla ratio est, with an objectclause, id. Caecin. 5, 15; so,

    too, minime rationis est,

    Col. 3, 5, 3; cf. with dat.:

    Vitellianus exercitus, cui acquiescere Cremonae ratio fuit,

    which, as reason dictated, ought to have rested at Cremona, Tac. H. 3, 22:

    quod domi te inclusisti, ratione fecisti,

    reasonably, sensibly, judiciously, Cic. Att. 12, [p. 1527] 14, 3.—
    b.
    The reasonable cause of a thing, a ground, motive, reason:

    ratio est causa, quae demonstrat, verum esse id, quod intendimus, brevi subjectione. Rationis confirmatio est ea, quae pluribus argumentis corroborat breviter expositam rationem,

    Auct. Her. 2, 18, 28:

    quid tandem habuit argumenti aut rationis res, quamobrem, etc.,

    Cic. Verr. 2, 2, 47, § 115; cf.:

    nostra confirmare argumentis ac rationibus: deinde contraria refutare,

    id. de Or. 2, 19, 80:

    noverit orator argumentorum et rationum locos,

    id. Or. 14, 44 (v. also argumentum):

    si mei consilii causam rationemque cognoverit,

    id. Div. in Caecil. 1, 1; cf.:

    ad eam sententiam cum reliquis causis haec quoque ratio eos deduxit, quod, etc.,

    Caes. B. G. 2, 10 fin.:

    quam habet rationem, non quaero aequitatis, sed ipsius improbitatis atque impudentiae?... facti, si non bonam, at aliquam rationem afferre,

    Cic. Verr. 2, 3, 85, e196; cf.:

    deinde nihil rationis affert, quamobrem, etc.,

    id. Caecin. 33, 96:

    non deest hoc loco copia rationum, quibus docere velitis, humanas esse formas deorum: primum quod, etc.... deinde quod, etc.... tertiam rationem affertis, quod, etc.,

    id. N. D. 1, 27, 76:

    et quidem, cur sic opinetur, rationem subicit,

    id. Div. 2, 50, 104:

    idcirco minus existimo te nihil nisi summa ratione fecisse,

    id. Att. 8, 11, D, §

    5: nunc non modo agendi rationem nullam habeo, sed ne cogitandi quidem,

    id. Fam. 4, 13, 3:

    rationes in ea disputatione a te collectae vetabant me rei publicae penitus diffidere,

    id. Fam. 5, 13, 3; cf. id. Ac. 2, 36, 116:

    rationibus conquisitis de voluptate et dolore disputandum putant,

    id. Fin. 1, 9, 31; cf.:

    quod cum disputando rationibusque docuisset,

    id. Rep. 1, 16, 25:

    his rationibus tam certis tamque illustribus opponuntur ab his, qui contra disputant primum labores, etc.,

    id. ib. 1, 3, 4 et saep.:

    num parva causa aut prava ratio est?

    reason, excuse, Ter. Eun. 3, 5, 27.—
    (β).
    In rhet., a showing cause, argument, reasoning in support of a proposition:

    ratio est, quae continet causam, quae si sublata sit, nihil in causa controversiae relinquatur, hoc modo: Orestes si accusetur matricidii, nisi hoc dicat, Jure feci, illa enim patrem meum occiderat, non habet defensionem,

    Cic. Inv. 1, 13, 18:

    ad propositum subjecta ratio, et item in distributis supposita ratio,

    id. de Or. 3, 54, 207; cf. Quint. 3, 11, 4; 5, 14, 1; 16; 7, 8, 3.—
    c.
    Reasonableness, reason, propriety, law, rule, order, conformity, etc.:

    in omnibus, quae ratione docentur et via, primum constituendum est, quid quidque sit, etc.,

    in a reasonable, regular manner, Cic. Or. 33, 116; cf.:

    ut ratione et via procedat oratio,

    id. Fin. 1, 9, 29:

    modo et ratione aliquid facere (along with recte atque ordine facere),

    id. Quint. 7, 28; cf.:

    quae res Nec modum habet neque consilium, ratione modoque Tractari non vult,

    Hor. S. 2, 3, 266:

    nihil est, quod ratione et numero moveri possit sine consilio,

    Cic. N. D. 2, 16, 43:

    intervallis imparibus, sed tamen pro rata parte ratione distinctis,

    divided proportionally by rule, id. Rep. 6, 18, 18; cf.:

    ex summis et infimis et mediis interjectis ordinibus ut sonis moderata ratione civitas concinit,

    in symmetrical proportion, id. ib. 2, 42, 69:

    in quo defuit fortasse ratio, sed tamen vincit ipsa rerum publicarum natura saepe rationem,

    order, system, id. ib. 2, 33, 57;

    5, 5, 7: declinatio si cum ratione fiet,

    reasonably, id. Tusc. 4, 6, 13:

    ratio et distributio,

    a reasonable division, Q. Cic. Pet. Cons. 1, 1.—
    d.
    A theory, doctrine, or system based upon reason; science, and (less freq.), subject., knowledge:

    erat enim tunc haec nova et ignota ratio, solem lunae oppositum solere deficere,

    Cic. Rep. 1, 16, 25; cf.:

    nova et a nobis inventa ratio,

    id. ib. 1, 8, 13;

    2, 39, 66: si animum contulisti in istam rationem et quasi artem,

    id. ib. 1, 23, 37; cf.:

    omnes tacito quodam sensu sine ulla arte aut ratione, quae sint in artibus ac rationibus recta ac prava dijudicant,

    id. de Or. 3, 50, 195; id. Brut. 74, 258:

    continet enim totam hanc quaestionem ea ratio, quae est de natura deorum,

    id. Div. 1, 51, 117:

    Epicuri ratio, quae plerisque notissima est,

    doctrine, system, philosophy, id. Fin. 1, 5, 13; cf.:

    Stoicorum ratio disciplinaque,

    id. Off. 3, 4, 20:

    Cynicorum ratio,

    id. ib. 1, 41, 148; so id. Fin. 3, 20, 68: ratio vivendi... ratio civilis et disciplina populorum, the art of living... statesmanship, id. Rep. 3, 3, 4; cf.:

    etiamsi cui videbitur illa in optimis studiis et artibus quieta vitae ratio beatior, haec civilis laudabilior est certe et illustrior,

    id. ib. 3, 3, 4:

    improba navigii ratio tum caeca jacebat,

    Lucr. 5, 1004: saltationis ac musicae rationis studiosi, Col. prooem. e3 al.—Subject., knowledge:

    si qua (est in me) exercitatio dicendi aut si hujus rei ratio aliqua, ab optimarum artium studiis ac disciplina profecta,

    Cic. Arch. 1, 1.—
    e.
    A view or opinion resting upon reasonable grounds:

    mea sic est ratio,

    Ter. Ad. 1, 1, 43; cf.:

    inventus est nemo, cujus non haec et sententia esset et oratio, non esse metuendum, etc.... Haec cum omnes sentirent et cum in eam rationem pro suo quisque sensu ac dolore loqueretur,

    Cic. Verr. 2, 1, 27, § 68 sq.; and with this cf. id. Att. 1, 11, 1:

    cujus ratio etsi non valuit,

    Nep. Milt. 3, 6 (just before: hujus cum sententiam plurimi essent secuti).—
    f.
    In philos. lang., a production of proof, argumentation, reasoning: (Epicurus) tollit definitiones; nihil de dividendo ac partiendo docet;

    non, quo modo efficiatur concludaturque ratio, tradit,

    Cic. Fin. 1, 7, 22; cf. id. Div. 2, 10, 25; id. de Or. 2, 38, 158:

    ratio ipsa coget, et ex aeternitate quaedam esse vera et ea non esse nexa causis aeternis, etc.,

    id. Fat. 16, 38; cf.:

    ergo, ubi tyrannus est, ibi non vitiosam ut heri dicebam, sed, ut nunc ratio cogit, dicendum est, plane nullam esse rem publicam,

    id. Rep. 3, 31, 43.

    Lewis & Short latin dictionary > ratio

  • 8 expert system

    Gen Mgt
    a computer program that emulates the reasoning and decision making of a human expert in a particular field. The main components of an expert system are the knowledge base, which consists of facts and rules about appropriate courses of action based on the knowledge and experience of human experts; the inference engine, which simulates the inductive reasoning of a human expert; and the user interface, which enables users to interact with the system. Expert systems may be used by nonexperts to solve well-defined problems when human expertise is unavailable or expensive, or by experts seeking to find solutions to complex questions. They are used for a wide variety of tasks including medical diagnostics and financial decision making, and are an application of artificial intelligence.

    The ultimate business dictionary > expert system

  • 9 ezaguera

    iz.
    1.
    a. knowledge; azaleko \ezaguera superficial knowledge; giza \ezagueraren mugak the limits of human knowledge; gutxi dira gertakari horren \ezaguera dutenak few have knowledge of that event | few know about that event; gizonak berez \ezagueraz ezin uler dezakeena that which man cannot understand with his intrinsic knowledge
    b. gutxi dira gertakari horren \ezaguera dutenak there are not many who are aware of that event
    c. acquaintance; egun hartan egin genuen \ezaguera we made each other's acquaintance that day; elkarri \ezaguera eman zioten they introduced themselves to each other
    2.
    a. ( adindun batek) reason, judgement
    b. \ezaguerara iritsi to reach the age of {reason || discernment}; \ezagueran sartu to know right and wrong; \ezagueran sartu gabeko haurra a child who has not reached the age of {reasoning || discernment}; \ezaguerara errazago ekarriko zuelakoan in the belief that it would make him reason in an easier way
    c. ( bereizmena) discernment; ongiaren eta gaizkiaren \ezaguera the knowledge of right and wrong | discernment between right and wrong
    3. ( kordea) consciousness; \ezagueran egon to be conscious; \ezaguerarik gabe zegoen he was unconscious; \ezaguera galdu arte edan to drink to unconsciousness | to drink to a stupor
    4. ( zentzua) common sense, instinct

    Euskara Ingelesa hiztegiaren > ezaguera

  • 10 علم

    عِلْم \ knowledge: what one knows: His knowledge of radio is very wide. His general knowledge is slight. learning: knowledge that is gained by long serious study: He is a man of great learning. scholarship: the qualities of a very learned person: This writer on Shakespeare is famous for his scholarship. science: the careful study of any serious subject: political science; the science of language. \ بِغَير عِلْمِه \ behind sb.’s back: when someone is not present: He tells untrue stories about me behind my back. \ عِلْم الآثار القَديمة \ archaeology, archeology: the scientific study of life in the distant past by digging up ancient cities, examining buried objects, etc. \ عِلْم الاجْتِماع \ sociology: the study of society and human behaviour in groups. \ عِلْم الإِحْصَاء \ statistics: (with pl. verb) facts that are shown by numbers; (with sg. verb) the science of showing facts by numbers: National statistics of births and deaths are collected regularly. Statistics is a modern science. \ عِلْم الأَحْياء \ biology: the science of living things. \ عِلْم الأخلاق \ ethics: the study of good and bad in human behaviour. \ عِلْم الأرصاد الجوّيّة \ meteorology: the science of the weather. \ عِلْم الأساطير \ mythology: myths in general; the study of myths. \ عِلْم الاشْتِقاق (في علم اللُّغَة)‏ \ etymology: the study of the history of words. \ عِلْم الأصوات \ phonetics: (as subject of study; pl. as a practical activity) the science of speech sounds; the signs used for these sounds; the practical use of this science: Phonetics is a modern science. Are these phonetics correct? Phonetics help foreigners to pronounce words. \ عِلْم الاقتصاد \ economics: the science of national economy. \ عِلْم الإنْسَان \ anthropology: the scientific study of man, his way of life, religions, races, etc. \ عِلْم بالوُصُول \ acknowledg(e)ment: a note of receipt: I sent the money but I’ve had no acknowledgement. \ عِلْم التاريخ \ history: an orderly record or study of past events: a student of history; the history of Europe. \ عِلْم التَّحْليل النَّفْسي \ psychoanalysis: (the scientific study of) a way of treating disorders ot the mind by examination of all that sb. can remember of his past life, dreams, feelings, etc.. \ عِلْم التَّدْبِير المنزليّ \ domestic science: the study of cooking and other housekeeping skills. \ عِلْم التَّنْجيم \ astrology: the study of the stars in relation to human fate. \ عِلْم الجَبْر \ algebra: a branch of mathematics, using signs and letters as well as numbers. \ عِلْم الجُغْرافيا \ geography: the scientific study of the structure, produce and use of the earth’s surface. \ عِلْم الحَرْب \ warfare: the science of making war; fighting. \ عِلْم حَرَكة السوائل \ hydraulics: the science of controlling and using liquid pressure, esp. for engineering purposes. \ عِلْم الحَشَرات \ entomology: the study of insects. \ عِلْم الحَيَوان \ zoology: the scientific study of animal life. \ عِلْم الرِّياضيّات \ mathematics: the science of numbers and space; the practical use of this science: Mathematics is an exact science. maths: the usual shortening of mathematics. \ عِلْم الزراعة بدون تُربة \ hydroponics: the science of growing plants in water, without soil. \ عِلْم السِّيَاسَة \ politics: (sg. as an art or activity; pl. as personal beliefs, etc.) the art of government; the affairs of government; one’s opinions on government: Is politics an art or a science? My politics are my private concern. \ عِلْم الصحّة \ hygiene: the study and practice of how to keep good health, esp. by paying attention to cleaniness. \ عِلْم صيانة الأحراش \ forestry: the science of growing trees for man’s use as wood. \ عِلْم الطّبّ \ medicine: the science and the art of dealing with disease. \ عِلْم طَبَقات الأرض \ geology: the study of the rocks that make up the earth. \ عِلْم الطبيعة \ physics: the science of heat, light, sound, Motion, etc.: Physics is an important branch of science. \ See Also الفيزياء \ عِلْم طبيعيّ \ science: the study of the substances, forces, etc. found in nature (esp. Biology; Chemistry; Physics): Schools teach science. \ عِلْم الطُّيُور \ ornithology: the scientific study of birds. \ عِلْم الفَلَك \ astronomy: the scientific study of the stars. \ عِلْم الكِيمْياء \ chemistry: the science that studies the nature and behaviour of all substances. \ عِلْم المالية \ finance: the science of controlling money. \ See Also إدارة المال \ عِلْم المَنْطِق \ logic: the science of reasoning. \ عِلْم النَّبَات \ botany: the scientific study of plants. \ عِلْم النَّفْس \ psychology: the scientific study of the mind. \ عِلْم الهَنْدَسة \ geometry: the science of lines, angles, surfaces and solid figures, and of their measurements.

    Arabic-English dictionary > علم

  • 11 Gestalt Psychology

       The Gestaltists Demonstrate How Symbolic Reasoning Follows Their Principles of Perception
       The Gestaltists look for simple and fundamental principles about how perception is organized, and then attempt to show how symbolic reasoning can be seen as following the same principles, while we construct a complex theory of how knowledge is applied to solve intellectual problems and then attempt to show how the symbolic description that is what one "sees" is constructed according to similar processes. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 34)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Gestalt Psychology

  • 12 clarté

    clarté [klaʀte]
    feminine noun
       a. ( = lumière) light
       b. ( = luminosité) [de pièce, jour, ciel] brightness ; [d'eau, son, verre] clearness
       c. [d'explication, pensée, attitude, conférencier] clarity
    * * *
    klaʀte
    1) ( lumière) light
    2) (de l'eau, du verre) clarity; ( de teint) fairness
    3) fig (de style, d'exposé) clarity
    * * *
    klaʀte nf
    1) [pièce] brightness
    2) [son, eau] clearness
    3) [explication] clarity
    * * *
    A nf
    1 ( lumière) light; une douce clarté a soft light; manquer de clarté to lack light; à la clarté de by the light of [bougie, lampe];
    2 (de l'eau, du verre) clarity; ( de teint) fairness;
    3 (de raisonnement, style, d'exposé) clarity; avec clarté clearly; besoin de/manque de clarté need for/lack of clarity; faire (toute) la clarté sur qch to get to the bottom of sth.
    B clartés nfpl ( connaissances) knowledge ¢; avoir des clartés sur qch to be knowledgeable about sth.
    [klarte] nom féminin
    1. [lumière] light
    [luminosité] brightness
    2. [transparence] clarity, limpidness, clearness
    3. [intelligibilité] clarity, clearness
    ————————
    clartés nom féminin pluriel

    Dictionnaire Français-Anglais > clarté

См. также в других словарях:

  • Knowledge representation — is an area in artificial intelligence that is concerned with how to formally think , that is, how to use a symbol system to represent a domain of discourse that which can be talked about, along with functions that may or may not be within the… …   Wikipedia

  • Reasoning — is the cognitive process of looking for reasons for beliefs, conclusions, actions or feelings. [ Kirwin, Christopher. 1995. Reasoning . In Ted Honderich (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Philosophy . Oxford: Oxford University Press: p. 748] Humans… …   Wikipedia

  • Knowledge base — A knowledge base (abbreviated KB, kb or Δ[1][2]) is a special kind of database for knowledge management, providing the means for the computerized collection, organization, and retrieval of knowledge. Also a collection of data representing related …   Wikipedia

  • Common knowledge (logic) — For common knowledge in general, see Common knowledge. Common knowledge is a special kind of knowledge for a group of agents. There is common knowledge of p in a group of agents G when all the agents in G know p, they all know that they know p,… …   Wikipedia

  • Knowledge level modeling — is the process of theorizing over observations about a world and, to some extent, explaining the behavior of an agent as it interacts with its environment.Crucial to the understanding of knowledge level modeling are Allen Newell s notions of the… …   Wikipedia

  • Common knowledge — For the logical concept, see Common knowledge (logic). Common knowledge is knowledge that is known by everyone or nearly everyone, usually with reference to the community in which the term is used. Common knowledge need not concern one specific… …   Wikipedia

  • Distributed knowledge — is a term used in multi agent system research that refers to all the knowledge that a community of agents possesses and might apply in solving a problem. Distributed knowledge is approximately what a wise man knows or what someone who has… …   Wikipedia

  • Knowledge of Christ — Stained glass window of Christ, Peter and Paul Cathedral, St. Petersburg, Russia. The knowledge of …   Wikipedia

  • Knowledge Sharing Effort — The Knowledge Sharing Effort (KSE) was initiated in 1990 by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, an agency of the United States Department of Defense. It involved the participation of dozens of researchers from both academia and… …   Wikipedia

  • reasoning — Any process of drawing a conclusion from a set of premises may be called a process of reasoning. If the conclusion concerns what to do, the process is called practical reasoning, otherwise pure or theoretical reasoning. Evidently such processes… …   Philosophy dictionary

  • Knowledge Interchange Format — KIF is also the IATA code for Kingfisher Lake Airport. Knowledge Interchange Format (KIF) is a computer oriented language for the interchange of knowledge among disparate computer programs. It has declarative semantics (i.e. the meaning of… …   Wikipedia

Поделиться ссылкой на выделенное

Прямая ссылка:
… Нажмите правой клавишей мыши и выберите «Копировать ссылку»