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1 field programs
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2 American Field Service
сокр AFSОбщественная организация, ставящая целью содействие развитию международного взаимопонимания путем организации обменов школьников с 80 странами мира. Программы [AFS Intercultural Programs] направлены на то, чтобы американский школьник получил возможность провести учебный год за рубежом, проживая в "приемной" семье, а его семья должна принять иностранного школьника. Основана в 1914. Штаб-квартира в г. Нью-ЙоркеEnglish-Russian dictionary of regional studies > American Field Service
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3 program
1. nto administer a program — выполнять / осуществлять программу
to apply a program — использовать / применять программу
to approve a program — утверждать / одобрять программу
to carry out a program — выполнять / осуществлять программу
to contribute to a program — способствовать выполнению программы; вносить вклад в программу
to expand / to extend a program — расширять программу
to lay out a program — излагать / намечать программу
to map out a program — намечать / составлять программу
to outline a program — излагать / намечать программу
to profess a program — придерживаться программы; отстаивать программу
to set out a program — излагать / намечать программу
to slash a program — урезать ассигнования на какую-л. программу
to unfreeze one's nuclear program — размораживать свою ядерную программу
- action-oriented programto water down one's program — ослаблять свою программу
- activated program
- ad hoc program
- advanced technical training programs
- aerospace program
- agrarian program
- agrarian reform program
- aid program
- all-embracing program
- alternative program
- ambitious program
- anti-inflation program
- anti-marine pollution programs
- armament program
- assistance program
- atomic energy program
- atoms-for-peace program
- austerity program
- ballot-counting program
- bilateral program
- black programs
- broad program
- broad-ranging program
- budget program
- categorical assistance program
- civil nuclear program
- civil nuclear-power program
- clear-cut program
- coherent program
- component program
- comprehensive program
- compromise program
- concerted program
- concrete program
- consolidated program
- constructive program
- coordinator of a program
- country programs
- crash program
- daily program of sittings
- detailed program
- development program
- diminution in a program
- disarmament program
- disease control programs
- domestic assaults on a program
- dormant program
- draft program
- economic development program
- economic recovery program
- economic reform program
- election program
- energy program
- established program
- European Recovery Program
- execution of a program
- expanded program
- export promotion program
- family planning program
- famine relief program
- feasible program
- feed-back program
- fellowship program
- field programs
- fiscal program
- flight program
- follow-on program
- follow-up program
- food program
- foreign policy program
- general democratic program
- global program
- government program
- halt to the program
- health program
- home-policy program
- housing program
- implementation of a program
- industrial development program
- innovative program
- in-plant training program
- integrated program
- interdisciplinary program of research
- intergovernmental program
- investment promotion program
- job-training program
- joint program
- land reform program
- large-scale program
- live program
- long-range program
- long-term program
- major program
- manned program
- marine program
- massive program
- maximum program
- medium-term programs
- militant program
- military-political program
- military-space programs
- minimum program
- modernization program
- monitoring and evaluating programs
- multilateral aid program
- national program
- nation-wide program
- natural resources development program
- negotiating program
- nondefense program
- non-nuclear defense program
- nuclear program
- nuclear test program
- nuclear-power program
- nuclear-weapons program
- operational program
- optional program
- party program
- Peace Program
- peaceful program
- performance of a program
- phased program
- pilot program
- political program
- population program
- power program
- price support program
- priority program
- privatization program
- production program
- program aimed at smth
- program for economic cooperation
- program for peace and international cooperation
- program has begun its most difficult period
- program has raised objections
- program of action
- program of activities
- program of consolidation
- program of general and complete disarmament
- program of gradual change
- program of measures
- program of militarization
- program of national rebirth
- program of research
- program of revival
- program of work
- promotion program
- public investment program
- public program
- reconstruction program
- recovery program
- reform program
- regional program
- regular program
- rehabilitation program
- research program
- resettlement program
- restructured program
- retraining program
- revised program
- revision of a program
- rural development program
- safeguards program
- safety standards program
- scientific program
- social program
- social welfare program
- sound program
- space exploration program
- space program
- special-purpose program
- Star Wars program
- Strategic Defense Initiative Program
- study program
- systematic assessment of the relevance, adequacy, progress, efficiency, effectiveness and impact of a program
- target program
- technical aid program
- terrorism reward program
- tough program
- training program
- unconstructive program
- under the program
- unemployment insurance program
- UNEP
- United Nations Environment Program
- utopian program
- vast program
- viable program
- war program
- wasteful program
- welfare program
- well-balanced program
- well-planned program
- well-thought-out program
- wide-ranging program
- work program
- world food program
- youth exchange program 2. vсоставлять программу, разрабатывать программу; программировать -
4 TDD
1) Общая лексика: тел (Telecommunication Device for the Deaf (allows a person to transmit typed messages over the phone lines to another person with a TDD. Most TDD's include a keyboard for typing messages to send and a display and/or printer to receive messages.)), Technical Directorate, Subsurface Team (SEIC), Training & Development Department2) Военный термин: Tactical Display Device, Target DBZ Designator, target detecting device, task description document, technical data digest, technical document division, test and development director, test definition document, training developments directorate3) Техника: time division duplex techniques4) Шутливое выражение: Trick Daddy Dollars5) Телекоммуникации: дуплексная связь с временным разделением6) Сокращение: Target Detection Device, Time Division Duplexing, Training and Development Department (includes Field Programs Training Branch), telemetry data digitizer7) Университет: Tight Dangerous Debaters8) Электроника: Telecommunications Device for the Deaf, Total Demand Distortion9) Вычислительная техника: Telecommunications Device for Deaf, Time Division Duplex (Mobile-Systems), time division duplex10) Глоссарий компании Сахалин Энерджи: technical directorate11) Программирование: test driven development, test-driven development12) Медицинская техника: Telecommunication Device for the Deaf, телекоммуникационный прибор для глухих13) Химическое оружие: Technical design document14) Фармация: Total daily dose15) Майкрософт: текстовый телефон -
5 Artificial Intelligence
In my opinion, none of [these programs] does even remote justice to the complexity of human mental processes. Unlike men, "artificially intelligent" programs tend to be single minded, undistractable, and unemotional. (Neisser, 1967, p. 9)Future progress in [artificial intelligence] will depend on the development of both practical and theoretical knowledge.... As regards theoretical knowledge, some have sought a unified theory of artificial intelligence. My view is that artificial intelligence is (or soon will be) an engineering discipline since its primary goal is to build things. (Nilsson, 1971, pp. vii-viii)Most workers in AI [artificial intelligence] research and in related fields confess to a pronounced feeling of disappointment in what has been achieved in the last 25 years. Workers entered the field around 1950, and even around 1960, with high hopes that are very far from being realized in 1972. In no part of the field have the discoveries made so far produced the major impact that was then promised.... In the meantime, claims and predictions regarding the potential results of AI research had been publicized which went even farther than the expectations of the majority of workers in the field, whose embarrassments have been added to by the lamentable failure of such inflated predictions....When able and respected scientists write in letters to the present author that AI, the major goal of computing science, represents "another step in the general process of evolution"; that possibilities in the 1980s include an all-purpose intelligence on a human-scale knowledge base; that awe-inspiring possibilities suggest themselves based on machine intelligence exceeding human intelligence by the year 2000 [one has the right to be skeptical]. (Lighthill, 1972, p. 17)4) Just as Astronomy Succeeded Astrology, the Discovery of Intellectual Processes in Machines Should Lead to a Science, EventuallyJust as astronomy succeeded astrology, following Kepler's discovery of planetary regularities, the discoveries of these many principles in empirical explorations on intellectual processes in machines should lead to a science, eventually. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)5) Problems in Machine Intelligence Arise Because Things Obvious to Any Person Are Not Represented in the ProgramMany problems arise in experiments on machine intelligence because things obvious to any person are not represented in any program. One can pull with a string, but one cannot push with one.... Simple facts like these caused serious problems when Charniak attempted to extend Bobrow's "Student" program to more realistic applications, and they have not been faced up to until now. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 77)What do we mean by [a symbolic] "description"? We do not mean to suggest that our descriptions must be made of strings of ordinary language words (although they might be). The simplest kind of description is a structure in which some features of a situation are represented by single ("primitive") symbols, and relations between those features are represented by other symbols-or by other features of the way the description is put together. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)[AI is] the use of computer programs and programming techniques to cast light on the principles of intelligence in general and human thought in particular. (Boden, 1977, p. 5)The word you look for and hardly ever see in the early AI literature is the word knowledge. They didn't believe you have to know anything, you could always rework it all.... In fact 1967 is the turning point in my mind when there was enough feeling that the old ideas of general principles had to go.... I came up with an argument for what I called the primacy of expertise, and at the time I called the other guys the generalists. (Moses, quoted in McCorduck, 1979, pp. 228-229)9) Artificial Intelligence Is Psychology in a Particularly Pure and Abstract FormThe basic idea of cognitive science is that intelligent beings are semantic engines-in other words, automatic formal systems with interpretations under which they consistently make sense. We can now see why this includes psychology and artificial intelligence on a more or less equal footing: people and intelligent computers (if and when there are any) turn out to be merely different manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon. Moreover, with universal hardware, any semantic engine can in principle be formally imitated by a computer if only the right program can be found. And that will guarantee semantic imitation as well, since (given the appropriate formal behavior) the semantics is "taking care of itself" anyway. Thus we also see why, from this perspective, artificial intelligence can be regarded as psychology in a particularly pure and abstract form. The same fundamental structures are under investigation, but in AI, all the relevant parameters are under direct experimental control (in the programming), without any messy physiology or ethics to get in the way. (Haugeland, 1981b, p. 31)There are many different kinds of reasoning one might imagine:Formal reasoning involves the syntactic manipulation of data structures to deduce new ones following prespecified rules of inference. Mathematical logic is the archetypical formal representation. Procedural reasoning uses simulation to answer questions and solve problems. When we use a program to answer What is the sum of 3 and 4? it uses, or "runs," a procedural model of arithmetic. Reasoning by analogy seems to be a very natural mode of thought for humans but, so far, difficult to accomplish in AI programs. The idea is that when you ask the question Can robins fly? the system might reason that "robins are like sparrows, and I know that sparrows can fly, so robins probably can fly."Generalization and abstraction are also natural reasoning process for humans that are difficult to pin down well enough to implement in a program. If one knows that Robins have wings, that Sparrows have wings, and that Blue jays have wings, eventually one will believe that All birds have wings. This capability may be at the core of most human learning, but it has not yet become a useful technique in AI.... Meta- level reasoning is demonstrated by the way one answers the question What is Paul Newman's telephone number? You might reason that "if I knew Paul Newman's number, I would know that I knew it, because it is a notable fact." This involves using "knowledge about what you know," in particular, about the extent of your knowledge and about the importance of certain facts. Recent research in psychology and AI indicates that meta-level reasoning may play a central role in human cognitive processing. (Barr & Feigenbaum, 1981, pp. 146-147)Suffice it to say that programs already exist that can do things-or, at the very least, appear to be beginning to do things-which ill-informed critics have asserted a priori to be impossible. Examples include: perceiving in a holistic as opposed to an atomistic way; using language creatively; translating sensibly from one language to another by way of a language-neutral semantic representation; planning acts in a broad and sketchy fashion, the details being decided only in execution; distinguishing between different species of emotional reaction according to the psychological context of the subject. (Boden, 1981, p. 33)Can the synthesis of Man and Machine ever be stable, or will the purely organic component become such a hindrance that it has to be discarded? If this eventually happens-and I have... good reasons for thinking that it must-we have nothing to regret and certainly nothing to fear. (Clarke, 1984, p. 243)The thesis of GOFAI... is not that the processes underlying intelligence can be described symbolically... but that they are symbolic. (Haugeland, 1985, p. 113)14) Artificial Intelligence Provides a Useful Approach to Psychological and Psychiatric Theory FormationIt is all very well formulating psychological and psychiatric theories verbally but, when using natural language (even technical jargon), it is difficult to recognise when a theory is complete; oversights are all too easily made, gaps too readily left. This is a point which is generally recognised to be true and it is for precisely this reason that the behavioural sciences attempt to follow the natural sciences in using "classical" mathematics as a more rigorous descriptive language. However, it is an unfortunate fact that, with a few notable exceptions, there has been a marked lack of success in this application. It is my belief that a different approach-a different mathematics-is needed, and that AI provides just this approach. (Hand, quoted in Hand, 1985, pp. 6-7)We might distinguish among four kinds of AI.Research of this kind involves building and programming computers to perform tasks which, to paraphrase Marvin Minsky, would require intelligence if they were done by us. Researchers in nonpsychological AI make no claims whatsoever about the psychological realism of their programs or the devices they build, that is, about whether or not computers perform tasks as humans do.Research here is guided by the view that the computer is a useful tool in the study of mind. In particular, we can write computer programs or build devices that simulate alleged psychological processes in humans and then test our predictions about how the alleged processes work. We can weave these programs and devices together with other programs and devices that simulate different alleged mental processes and thereby test the degree to which the AI system as a whole simulates human mentality. According to weak psychological AI, working with computer models is a way of refining and testing hypotheses about processes that are allegedly realized in human minds.... According to this view, our minds are computers and therefore can be duplicated by other computers. Sherry Turkle writes that the "real ambition is of mythic proportions, making a general purpose intelligence, a mind." (Turkle, 1984, p. 240) The authors of a major text announce that "the ultimate goal of AI research is to build a person or, more humbly, an animal." (Charniak & McDermott, 1985, p. 7)Research in this field, like strong psychological AI, takes seriously the functionalist view that mentality can be realized in many different types of physical devices. Suprapsychological AI, however, accuses strong psychological AI of being chauvinisticof being only interested in human intelligence! Suprapsychological AI claims to be interested in all the conceivable ways intelligence can be realized. (Flanagan, 1991, pp. 241-242)16) Determination of Relevance of Rules in Particular ContextsEven if the [rules] were stored in a context-free form the computer still couldn't use them. To do that the computer requires rules enabling it to draw on just those [ rules] which are relevant in each particular context. Determination of relevance will have to be based on further facts and rules, but the question will again arise as to which facts and rules are relevant for making each particular determination. One could always invoke further facts and rules to answer this question, but of course these must be only the relevant ones. And so it goes. It seems that AI workers will never be able to get started here unless they can settle the problem of relevance beforehand by cataloguing types of context and listing just those facts which are relevant in each. (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p. 80)Perhaps the single most important idea to artificial intelligence is that there is no fundamental difference between form and content, that meaning can be captured in a set of symbols such as a semantic net. (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)Artificial intelligence is based on the assumption that the mind can be described as some kind of formal system manipulating symbols that stand for things in the world. Thus it doesn't matter what the brain is made of, or what it uses for tokens in the great game of thinking. Using an equivalent set of tokens and rules, we can do thinking with a digital computer, just as we can play chess using cups, salt and pepper shakers, knives, forks, and spoons. Using the right software, one system (the mind) can be mapped into the other (the computer). (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)19) A Statement of the Primary and Secondary Purposes of Artificial IntelligenceThe primary goal of Artificial Intelligence is to make machines smarter.The secondary goals of Artificial Intelligence are to understand what intelligence is (the Nobel laureate purpose) and to make machines more useful (the entrepreneurial purpose). (Winston, 1987, p. 1)The theoretical ideas of older branches of engineering are captured in the language of mathematics. We contend that mathematical logic provides the basis for theory in AI. Although many computer scientists already count logic as fundamental to computer science in general, we put forward an even stronger form of the logic-is-important argument....AI deals mainly with the problem of representing and using declarative (as opposed to procedural) knowledge. Declarative knowledge is the kind that is expressed as sentences, and AI needs a language in which to state these sentences. Because the languages in which this knowledge usually is originally captured (natural languages such as English) are not suitable for computer representations, some other language with the appropriate properties must be used. It turns out, we think, that the appropriate properties include at least those that have been uppermost in the minds of logicians in their development of logical languages such as the predicate calculus. Thus, we think that any language for expressing knowledge in AI systems must be at least as expressive as the first-order predicate calculus. (Genesereth & Nilsson, 1987, p. viii)21) Perceptual Structures Can Be Represented as Lists of Elementary PropositionsIn artificial intelligence studies, perceptual structures are represented as assemblages of description lists, the elementary components of which are propositions asserting that certain relations hold among elements. (Chase & Simon, 1988, p. 490)Artificial intelligence (AI) is sometimes defined as the study of how to build and/or program computers to enable them to do the sorts of things that minds can do. Some of these things are commonly regarded as requiring intelligence: offering a medical diagnosis and/or prescription, giving legal or scientific advice, proving theorems in logic or mathematics. Others are not, because they can be done by all normal adults irrespective of educational background (and sometimes by non-human animals too), and typically involve no conscious control: seeing things in sunlight and shadows, finding a path through cluttered terrain, fitting pegs into holes, speaking one's own native tongue, and using one's common sense. Because it covers AI research dealing with both these classes of mental capacity, this definition is preferable to one describing AI as making computers do "things that would require intelligence if done by people." However, it presupposes that computers could do what minds can do, that they might really diagnose, advise, infer, and understand. One could avoid this problematic assumption (and also side-step questions about whether computers do things in the same way as we do) by defining AI instead as "the development of computers whose observable performance has features which in humans we would attribute to mental processes." This bland characterization would be acceptable to some AI workers, especially amongst those focusing on the production of technological tools for commercial purposes. But many others would favour a more controversial definition, seeing AI as the science of intelligence in general-or, more accurately, as the intellectual core of cognitive science. As such, its goal is to provide a systematic theory that can explain (and perhaps enable us to replicate) both the general categories of intentionality and the diverse psychological capacities grounded in them. (Boden, 1990b, pp. 1-2)Because the ability to store data somewhat corresponds to what we call memory in human beings, and because the ability to follow logical procedures somewhat corresponds to what we call reasoning in human beings, many members of the cult have concluded that what computers do somewhat corresponds to what we call thinking. It is no great difficulty to persuade the general public of that conclusion since computers process data very fast in small spaces well below the level of visibility; they do not look like other machines when they are at work. They seem to be running along as smoothly and silently as the brain does when it remembers and reasons and thinks. On the other hand, those who design and build computers know exactly how the machines are working down in the hidden depths of their semiconductors. Computers can be taken apart, scrutinized, and put back together. Their activities can be tracked, analyzed, measured, and thus clearly understood-which is far from possible with the brain. This gives rise to the tempting assumption on the part of the builders and designers that computers can tell us something about brains, indeed, that the computer can serve as a model of the mind, which then comes to be seen as some manner of information processing machine, and possibly not as good at the job as the machine. (Roszak, 1994, pp. xiv-xv)The inner workings of the human mind are far more intricate than the most complicated systems of modern technology. Researchers in the field of artificial intelligence have been attempting to develop programs that will enable computers to display intelligent behavior. Although this field has been an active one for more than thirty-five years and has had many notable successes, AI researchers still do not know how to create a program that matches human intelligence. No existing program can recall facts, solve problems, reason, learn, and process language with human facility. This lack of success has occurred not because computers are inferior to human brains but rather because we do not yet know in sufficient detail how intelligence is organized in the brain. (Anderson, 1995, p. 2)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Artificial Intelligence
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6 director
начальник (управления, службы, отдела) ; руководитель; директор; ( центральный) прибор управления огнем; прибор управления артиллерийским зенитным огнем, ПУАЗО; целеуказатель; оператор наведения; пункт [самолет, корабль] наведения; ретранслятор; буссольAssistant director, Review and Analysis — помощник начальника управления по проверке и анализу (контрактов) (МО)
Deputy CIA director, Essential Elements of Information — заместитель директора ЦРУ по постановке основных задач сбора разведывательной информации
Deputy director of Defense Research and Engineering for Administration, Evaluation and Management — заместитель начальника управления НИОКР МО по административным вопросам, вопросам оценки и управления
Deputy director, Contract Administration Services — заместитель начальника службы по контролю за исполнением контрактов (МО)
Deputy director, Strategic and Naval Warfare Systems — заместитель начальника управления по стратегическим и морским системам оружия (МО)
Deputy director, Tactical Air and Land Warfare Systems — заместитель начальника управления по тактическим авиационным и наземным системам оружия (МО)
Deputy director, Test Facilities and Resources — заместитель начальника управления по испытательному оборудованию и ресурсам (МО)
director EW and C3 Countermeasures — начальник управления РЭБ и мер противодействия системам руководства, управления и связи (МО)
director for C3 Policy — начальник управления разработки программ руководства, управления и связи (МО)
director for Operations, Joint Staff — начальник оперативного управления объединенного штаба (КНШ)
director for Plans and Policy, Joint Staff — начальник управления планирования и строительства ВС объединенного штаба;
director of Administrative Services, Joint Staff — начальник административного управления объединенного штаба
director of Civilian Marksmanship, National Board for the Promotion of Rifle Practice — начальник управления стрелковой подготовки гражданского персонала Национального комитета содействия развитию стрелкового спорта (СВ)
director of Manning (Army) — Бр. начальник управления комплектования (СВ)
director of Research, Development, Test and Evaluation — начальник управления НИОКР, испытаний и оценок
director, Acquisition and Support Planning — начальник управления закупок (военной техники) и планирования МТО (МО)
director, Administrative Support Group — начальник группы административного обеспечения (СВ)
director, Admiralty Marine Technology Establishment — Бр. начальник управления разработки боевой техники МП
director, Admiralty Surface Weapons Establishment — Бр. начальник управления разработки систем надводного оружия ВМС
director, African Region — начальник управления стран Африки (МО)
director, Air National Guard — директор штаба НГ ВВС
director, Air Vehicles Technology — начальник управления разработки авиационных транспортных систем (МО)
director, Air Warfare — начальник управления авиационных систем оружия (МО)
director, Army Air Corps — Бр. начальник управления армейской авиации СВ
director, Army Aviation — начальник управления армейской авиации
director, Army Council of Review Boards — председатель совета СВ по контролю за деятельностью апелляционных комиссий
director, Army Medical Services — Бр. начальник медицинской службы СВ
director, Army National Guard — директор штаба НГ СВ
director, Army Programs — начальник управления разработки программ СВ
director, C3 Resources — начальник управления разработки систем руководства, управления и связи (МО)
director, Chemical Defence Establishment — Бр. директор НИЦ средств химической защиты
director, Civil Affairs — начальник управления по связям с гражданской администрацией и населением
director, Civilian Employees Security Program — начальник службы контрразведывательной проверки гражданского персонала (СВ)
director, Combat Support — начальник управления боевого обеспечения (МО)
director, Communications Systems — начальник управления систем связи (МО)
director, Contracts and Systems Acquisition — начальник управления заключения контрактов и закупок систем оружия и военной техники (МО)
director, Coordination and Analysis — начальник управления координации и анализа
director, Counterintelligence and Investigative Programs — начальник управления программ контрразведки и специальных расследований (МО)
director, Cruise Missile Systems — начальник управления систем КР (МО)
director, Defence Operational Analysis Establishment — Бр. начальник военнонаучного управления МО
director, Defense Research and Engineering — начальник управления НИОКР МО
director, Defense Sciences — начальник научно-исследовательского управления МО
director, Defense Supply Service-Washington — начальник службы снабжения зоны Вашингтона в МО
director, Defense Telephone Service-Washington — начальник телефонной службы зоны Вашингтона в МО
director, Defense Test and Evaluation — начальник управления МО по испытанию и оценке (оружия и военной техники)
director, DIA — начальник разведывательного управления МО
director, Directed Energy Programs — начальник управления программ использования направленной энергии (МО)
director, Doctrine, Organization and Training — начальник управления разработки доктрин, вопросов организации и боевой подготовки
director, DOD SALT Task Force — председатель рабочей группы МО по вопросам переговоров в рамках ОС В
director, East Asia and Pacific Region — начальник управления стран Восточной Азии и Тихого океана (МО)
director, Electronics and Physical Sciences — начальник управления по электронике и естественным наукам (МО)
director, Engineering Technology — начальник управления проектно-конструкторских работ (МО)
director, Environmental and Life Sciences — начальник управления экологических и биологических наук (МО)
director, Equipment Applications — начальник управления по изучению применения техники (в войсках)
director, Facilities Engineering — начальник инженерно-строительного управления
director, Far East/Middle East/Southern Hemisphere Affairs — начальник управления стран Дальнего Востока, Среднего Востока и Южного полушария (МО)
director, Federal Bureau of Investigation — директор ФБР
director, Field Maintenance — начальник службы полевого технического обслуживания и ремонта
director, Foreign Military Rights Affairs — начальник управления по делам прав иностранных государств в военной области (МО)
director, General Purpose Forces Policy — начальник управления разработки вопросов строительства сил общего назначения
director, Health Resources — начальник управления ресурсов здравоохранения
director, Information Processing Technique — начальник управления систем обработки информации (МО)
director, Information Security — начальник управления обеспечения секретности информации (МО)
director, Information Systems — начальник управления АИС
director, Installations — начальник управления строительства
director, Intelligence Resources — начальник управления изучения ресурсов разведки (МО)
director, Inter-American Region — начальник управления по межамериканским делам
director, International Economic Affairs — начальник управления по международным экономическим делам (МО)
director, International Military Staff — начальник международного объединенного штаба (НАТО)
director, Joint Staff — начальник секретариата объединенного штаба (КНШ)
director, Joint Tactical Communications (TRI-TAC) Program — начальник отдела работ по программе использования единой тактической системы связи (ТРИ-ТАК)
director, Judge Advocate Division — начальник отдела военно-юридической службы (МП)
director, Land Warfare — начальник управления наземных систем оружия (МО)
director, Legislative Liaison — начальник отдела по связям с законодательными органами (ВВС)
director, Legislative Reference Service — начальник справочной юридической службы (МО)
director, Major Weapon Systems Acquisition — начальник управления закупок основных систем оружия (МО)
director, Marine Corps Reserve — начальник отдела по вопросам резерва МП
director, Materiel Acquisition Policy — начальник управления разработки планов закупок оружия и военной техники (МО)
director, Materiel Requirements — начальник отдела определения потребностей в оружии и военной технике
director, Medical Plans and Resources — начальник управления ресурсов и планов медицинского обеспечения (ВВС)
director, Military Assistance Office — Бр. начальник управления по оказанию военной помощи иностранным государствам (СВ)
director, Military Survey — Бр. начальник топографического управления (СВ)
director, Military Technology — начальник управления военной технологии (МО)
director, Military Vehicles and Engineering Establishment — Бр. начальник управления БМ и инженерной техники
director, National Intelligence Systems — начальник управления национальных систем разведки (МО)
director, NATO/European Affairs — начальник управления по делам НАТО и стран Европы (МО)
director, Naval Laboratories — начальник управления научно-исследовательских лабораторий ВМС
director, Near Eastern and South Asian Region — начальник управления стран Ближнего Востока и Южной Азии (МО)
director, Negotiations Policy — начальник управления разработки планов ведения переговоров (МО)
director, Net Assessment — начальник управления всесторонней оценки программ (МО)
director, NSA — директор АНБ
director, Offensive and Space Systems — начальник управления космических средств и систем наступательного оружия (МО)
director, Office of Congressional Travel/Security Clearances — начальник отдела организации поездок членов Конгресса и оформления допуска к секретным материалам (МО)
director, Office of Dependents Schools — начальник отдела по вопросам воспитания и образования детей военнослужащих (МО)
director, Office of Research and Administration — начальник управления НИР и административного обеспечения (МО)
director, Operations — начальник оперативного управления [отдела]
director, Personnel and Employment Service-Washington — начальник отдела кадров для гражданских служащих зоны Вашингтона (СВ)
director, Personnel Council — председатель совета по делам ЛС (ВВС)
director, Personnel Plans — начальник управления планирования подготовки ЛС (ВВС)
director, Personnel Programs — начальник управления разработки программ использования ЛС (ВВС)
director, Planning and Health Policy Analysis — начальник управления планирования и развития здравоохранения (МО)
director, Planning and Requirements Review — начальник управления планирования и анализа потребностей (МО)
director, Planning — начальник управления планирования (МО)
director, Plans and Programs — начальник управления разработки планов и программ
director, Policy Research — начальник управления политических исследований (МО)
director, Program Control and Administration — начальник управления по административным вопросам и контролю за выполнением программ
director, Program Management — начальник управления по руководству разработкой программ (МО)
director, R&D and Procurement — начальник отдела НИОКР и заготовок
director, Religious Education — руководитель отделения [секции] религиозного образования (СВ)
director, Resource Management Office — начальник отдела управления ресурсами (СВ)
director, Royal Aircraft Establishment — Бр. директор НИЦ авиационной техники
director, Royal Armament R&D Establishment — Бр. директор НИЦ вооружений
director, Royal Armored Corps — Бр. начальник бронетанковых войск
director, Royal Artillery — Бр. начальник артиллерийского управления
director, Royal Signals and Radar Establishments — Бр. директор НИЦ средств связи и РЛ техники
director, SALT/Arms Control Support Group — начальник группы обеспечения переговоров в рамках ОСВ по контролю над вооружениями
director, Security Assistance Plans and Programs — начальник управления разработки планов и программ военной помощи иностранным государствам
director, Security Plans and Programs — начальник управления разработки планов и программ обеспечения безопасности (МО)
director, Space Activities Office — начальник управления космических программ (МО)
director, Space and Building Management Service-Washington — начальник службы эксплуатации объектов зоны Вашингтона (СВ)
director, Space Systems — начальник управления космических систем (ВВС)
director, Special Projects — начальник управления специальных проектов (МО)
director, Special Studies — начальник управления специальных НИР
director, Special Weapons — начальник управления специальных видов оружия
director, Strategic and Theater C2 Systems — начальник управления разработки систем руководства и управления ВС в стратегическом масштабе и на ТВД
director, Strategic Forces Policy — начальник управления разработки вопросов развития стратегических сил
director, Strategic Planning — начальник отдела стратегического планирования
director, Strategic Plans — начальник отдела стратегического планирования
director, Strategic Policy — начальник управления разработки стратегических проблем (МО)
director, Strategic Technology — начальник управления разработки стратегических систем оружия (МО)
director, Studies and Analyses Staff — начальник отдела исследований и анализа (СВ)
director, Surveillance and Warning — начальник управления систем наблюдения и оповещения (МО)
director, Tactical Intelligence Systems — начальник управления тактических систем разведки (МО)
director, Tactical Technology — начальник управления разработки тактических систем оружия (МО)
director, Technology and Arms Transfer Policy — начальник управления разработки основ передачи военной технологии и вооружений
director, Technology Trade — начальник управления по торговым операциям в области технологии
director, Territorial Army and Cadets — Бр. начальник управления территориальной армии и кадетских организаций
director, Theater Nuclear Force Policy — начальник управления разработки программ развития ядерных сил на ТВД
director, Underwater Weapons Projects — Бр. начальник отдела разработки проектов подводного оружия
director, USAF Judiciary — начальник отдела судопроизводства ВВС США
director, Washington Headquarters Services — начальник административноштабной службы зоны Вашингтона
director, Weapons (Production) — Бр. начальник управления по производству систем оружия
director, Women's RAF — Бр. начальник женской вспомогательной службы ВВС
director, Women's Royal Naval Service — Бр. начальник женской вспомогательной службы ВМС
Executive director, Industrial Security — начальник управления обеспечения сохранения военной тайны на промышленных предприятиях (МО)
Executive director, Quality Assurance — начальник управления обеспечения качества (продукции МО)
Executive director, Technical and Logistics Services — начальник управления служб МТО (МО)
Managing director, Royal Ordnance Factories — Бр. начальник управления военных заводов
Principal director Office of the Deputy Under-Secretary, Policy Planning — начальник управления [первый помощник заместителя МО] по планированию военно-политических программ
Staff director, Installation Services and Environmental Protection — начальник управления обслуживания объектов и защиты окружающей среды (МО)
Staff director, Management Review — начальник управления анализа организационных проблем (МО)
Staff director, Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization — начальник управления по связям с мелкими и льготными предприятиями (МО)
Vice director, Management and Operations Defense Intelligence Agency — первый заместитель начальника разведывательного управления МО по вопросам руководства операциями
— fire control director -
7 office
управление; департамент; комитет; отдел; бюро; секретариат, канцелярия; разг. кабина экипажаJoint Service Cruise Missile Program [Project] office — объединенное управление разработки КР (для ВВС и ВМС)
office of Information, Navy — информационное управление ВМС
office of Research, Development and Evaluation — управление НИОКР ВМС
office of the Chief, Army Reserve — управление резерва СВ
office of the Comptroller, Navy — управление главного финансового инспектора ВМС
office of the Deputy COFS for Research, Development and Acquisition — управление заместителя НШ по НИОКР и закупкам (СВ)
office, Aerospace Research — управление воздушно-космических исследований
office, Analysis and Review — управление анализа и контроля потребностей
office, Armor Force Management and Standardization — управление по вопросам администрации и стандартизации бронетанковых войск
office, Assistant COFS for Force Development — управление ПНШ по строительству ВС
office, Assistant COFS for Intelligence — управление ПНШ по разведке
office, Assistant COFS — управление [отдел] ПНШ
office, Assistant Secretary of Defense — аппарат [секретариат] ПМО
office, Chief of Chaplains — управление начальника службы военных священников (СВ)
office, Chief of Civil Affairs — управление по связям с гражданской администрацией и населением
office, Chief of Engineers — управление начальника инженерных войск
office, Chief of Finance (and Accounting) — управление начальника финансовой службы (СВ)
office, Chief of Legislative Liaison — отдел связи с законодательными органами
office, Chief of Ordnance — управление начальника артиллерийско-технической службы (СВ)
office, Chief of R&D — управление НИОКР (СВ)
office, Chief of Transportation — управление [отдел] начальника транспортной службы
office, Chief, Chemical Corps — управление начальника химической службы
office, COFS for Operations — оперативное управление НШ
office, COFS, Army — аппарат НШ СВ
office, Consolidated Personnel — управление гражданских рабочих и служащих
office, Coordinator of Army Studies — управление координатора разработок СВ
office, Defense Transportation — управление военно-транспортной службы
office, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Air Warfare — управление заместителя НШ ВМС по боевому применению авиации
office, Deputy COFS for Aviation — отдел заместителя НШ по авиации (МП)
office, Deputy COFS for Installations and Logistics — управление заместителя НШ по расквартированию и тыловому обеспечению
office, Deputy COFS for Manpower — управление заместителя НШ по людским ресурсам
office, Deputy COFS for Operations and Training — управление заместителя НШ по оперативной и боевой подготовке
office, Deputy COFS for Plans and Logistics — управление заместителя НШ по планированию тылового обеспечения
office, Development and Engineering — отдел технических разработок (ЦРУ)
office, Development and Weapon Systems Analysis — управление разработки и анализа систем вооружения
office, Director of Development Planning — управление планирования строительства (ВВС)
office, Director of Foreign Intelligence — управление начальника внешней разведки
office, Distribution Services — отдел распределения и рассылки картографических изданий (МО)
office, Economic Research — отдел экономических исследований (ЦРУ)
office, Emergency Transportation — управление чрезвычайных перевозок
office, Employment Policy and Grievance Review — отдел по вопросам занятости и рассмотрению жалоб (СВ)
office, Federal Procurement Policy — управление разработки федеральной политики в области закупок
office, Force Planning and Analysis — управление планирования и анализа строительства ВС
office, General Council — управление генерального юрисконсульта
office, Geographic and Cartographic Research — отдел географических и картографических исследований (ЦРУ)
office, Imagery Analysis — отдел анализа видовой информации (ЦРУ)
office, Information and Legal Affairs — управление информации и права (МО)
office, Information for. the Armed Forces — управление информации ВС
office, JCS — аппарат КНШ
office, Judge Advocate General — управление начальника военно-юридической службы
office, Management and Budget — административно-бюджетное управление
office, Military Assistance — управление по оказанию военной помощи
office, Personnel Manager — отдел кадров (СВ)
office, Services and Information Agency — отдел управления информационного обеспечения
office, Special Assistant for Logistical Support of Army Aircraft — отдел специального помощника по вопросам МТО армейской авиации
office, Special Assistant for Logistical Support of Tactical Communications — отдел специального помощника по вопросам МТО тактических систем связи
office, the Inspector General — управление генерального инспектора
office, the Legislative Affairs — управление военного законодательства
office, Under Secretary of Navy — аппарат заместителя министра ВМС
office, Under Secretary of the Air Force — аппарат заместителя министра ВВС
Personnel, Plans and Training office — отдел по вопросам ЛС, планирования и боевой подготовки
Strategic Objectives [Targets] Planning office — управление планирования стратегических задач (КНШ)
Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Night Observation System office — управление разработки систем наблюдения, засечки целей и ПНВ
— Resources Management office -
8 Philosophy
And what I believe to be more important here is that I find in myself an infinity of ideas of certain things which cannot be assumed to be pure nothingness, even though they may have perhaps no existence outside of my thought. These things are not figments of my imagination, even though it is within my power to think of them or not to think of them; on the contrary, they have their own true and immutable natures. Thus, for example, when I imagine a triangle, even though there may perhaps be no such figure anywhere in the world outside of my thought, nor ever have been, nevertheless the figure cannot help having a certain determinate nature... or essence, which is immutable and eternal, which I have not invented and which does not in any way depend upon my mind. (Descartes, 1951, p. 61)Let us console ourselves for not knowing the possible connections between a spider and the rings of Saturn, and continue to examine what is within our reach. (Voltaire, 1961, p. 144)As modern physics started with the Newtonian revolution, so modern philosophy starts with what one might call the Cartesian Catastrophe. The catastrophe consisted in the splitting up of the world into the realms of matter and mind, and the identification of "mind" with conscious thinking. The result of this identification was the shallow rationalism of l'esprit Cartesien, and an impoverishment of psychology which it took three centuries to remedy even in part. (Koestler, 1964, p. 148)It has been made of late a reproach against natural philosophy that it has struck out on a path of its own, and has separated itself more and more widely from the other sciences which are united by common philological and historical studies. The opposition has, in fact, been long apparent, and seems to me to have grown up mainly under the influence of the Hegelian philosophy, or, at any rate, to have been brought out into more distinct relief by that philosophy.... The sole object of Kant's "Critical Philosophy" was to test the sources and the authority of our knowledge, and to fix a definite scope and standard for the researches of philosophy, as compared with other sciences.... [But Hegel's] "Philosophy of Identity" was bolder. It started with the hypothesis that not only spiritual phenomena, but even the actual world-nature, that is, and man-were the result of an act of thought on the part of a creative mind, similar, it was supposed, in kind to the human mind.... The philosophers accused the scientific men of narrowness; the scientific men retorted that the philosophers were crazy. And so it came about that men of science began to lay some stress on the banishment of all philosophic influences from their work; while some of them, including men of the greatest acuteness, went so far as to condemn philosophy altogether, not merely as useless, but as mischievous dreaming. Thus, it must be confessed, not only were the illegitimate pretensions of the Hegelian system to subordinate to itself all other studies rejected, but no regard was paid to the rightful claims of philosophy, that is, the criticism of the sources of cognition, and the definition of the functions of the intellect. (Helmholz, quoted in Dampier, 1966, pp. 291-292)Philosophy remains true to its classical tradition by renouncing it. (Habermas, 1972, p. 317)I have not attempted... to put forward any grand view of the nature of philosophy; nor do I have any such grand view to put forth if I would. It will be obvious that I do not agree with those who see philosophy as the history of "howlers" and progress in philosophy as the debunking of howlers. It will also be obvious that I do not agree with those who see philosophy as the enterprise of putting forward a priori truths about the world.... I see philosophy as a field which has certain central questions, for example, the relation between thought and reality.... It seems obvious that in dealing with these questions philosophers have formulated rival research programs, that they have put forward general hypotheses, and that philosophers within each major research program have modified their hypotheses by trial and error, even if they sometimes refuse to admit that that is what they are doing. To that extent philosophy is a "science." To argue about whether philosophy is a science in any more serious sense seems to me to be hardly a useful occupation.... It does not seem to me important to decide whether science is philosophy or philosophy is science as long as one has a conception of both that makes both essential to a responsible view of the world and of man's place in it. (Putnam, 1975, p. xvii)What can philosophy contribute to solving the problem of the relation [of] mind to body? Twenty years ago, many English-speaking philosophers would have answered: "Nothing beyond an analysis of the various mental concepts." If we seek knowledge of things, they thought, it is to science that we must turn. Philosophy can only cast light upon our concepts of those things.This retreat from things to concepts was not undertaken lightly. Ever since the seventeenth century, the great intellectual fact of our culture has been the incredible expansion of knowledge both in the natural and in the rational sciences (mathematics, logic).The success of science created a crisis in philosophy. What was there for philosophy to do? Hume had already perceived the problem in some degree, and so surely did Kant, but it was not until the twentieth century, with the Vienna Circle and with Wittgenstein, that the difficulty began to weigh heavily. Wittgenstein took the view that philosophy could do no more than strive to undo the intellectual knots it itself had tied, so achieving intellectual release, and even a certain illumination, but no knowledge. A little later, and more optimistically, Ryle saw a positive, if reduced role, for philosophy in mapping the "logical geography" of our concepts: how they stood to each other and how they were to be analyzed....Since that time, however, philosophers in the "analytic" tradition have swung back from Wittgensteinian and even Rylean pessimism to a more traditional conception of the proper role and tasks of philosophy. Many analytic philosophers now would accept the view that the central task of philosophy is to give an account, or at least play a part in giving an account, of the most general nature of things and of man. (Armstrong, 1990, pp. 37-38)8) Philosophy's Evolving Engagement with Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive ScienceIn the beginning, the nature of philosophy's engagement with artificial intelligence and cognitive science was clear enough. The new sciences of the mind were to provide the long-awaited vindication of the most potent dreams of naturalism and materialism. Mind would at last be located firmly within the natural order. We would see in detail how the most perplexing features of the mental realm could be supported by the operations of solely physical laws upon solely physical stuff. Mental causation (the power of, e.g., a belief to cause an action) would emerge as just another species of physical causation. Reasoning would be understood as a kind of automated theorem proving. And the key to both was to be the depiction of the brain as the implementation of multiple higher level programs whose task was to manipulate and transform symbols or representations: inner items with one foot in the physical (they were realized as brain states) and one in the mental (they were bearers of contents, and their physical gymnastics were cleverly designed to respect semantic relationships such as truth preservation). (A. Clark, 1996, p. 1)Socrates of Athens famously declared that "the unexamined life is not worth living," and his motto aptly explains the impulse to philosophize. Taking nothing for granted, philosophy probes and questions the fundamental presuppositions of every area of human inquiry.... [P]art of the job of the philosopher is to keep at a certain critical distance from current doctrines, whether in the sciences or the arts, and to examine instead how the various elements in our world-view clash, or fit together. Some philosophers have tried to incorporate the results of these inquiries into a grand synoptic view of the nature of reality and our human relationship to it. Others have mistrusted system-building, and seen their primary role as one of clarifications, or the removal of obstacles along the road to truth. But all have shared the Socratic vision of using the human intellect to challenge comfortable preconceptions, insisting that every aspect of human theory and practice be subjected to continuing critical scrutiny....Philosophy is, of course, part of a continuing tradition, and there is much to be gained from seeing how that tradition originated and developed. But the principal object of studying the materials in this book is not to pay homage to past genius, but to enrich one's understanding of central problems that are as pressing today as they have always been-problems about knowledge, truth and reality, the nature of the mind, the basis of right action, and the best way to live. These questions help to mark out the territory of philosophy as an academic discipline, but in a wider sense they define the human predicament itself; they will surely continue to be with us for as long as humanity endures. (Cottingham, 1996, pp. xxi-xxii)10) The Distinction between Dionysian Man and Apollonian Man, between Art and Creativity and Reason and Self- ControlIn his study of ancient Greek culture, The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche drew what would become a famous distinction, between the Dionysian spirit, the untamed spirit of art and creativity, and the Apollonian, that of reason and self-control. The story of Greek civilization, and all civilizations, Nietzsche implied, was the gradual victory of Apollonian man, with his desire for control over nature and himself, over Dionysian man, who survives only in myth, poetry, music, and drama. Socrates and Plato had attacked the illusions of art as unreal, and had overturned the delicate cultural balance by valuing only man's critical, rational, and controlling consciousness while denigrating his vital life instincts as irrational and base. The result of this division is "Alexandrian man," the civilized and accomplished Greek citizen of the later ancient world, who is "equipped with the greatest forces of knowledge" but in whom the wellsprings of creativity have dried up. (Herman, 1997, pp. 95-96)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Philosophy
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9 Bibliography
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Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Bibliography
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10 section
секция; отдел, отделение; расчет; участок; сечение; профиль; разрез; часть; звено; отсек; орудие; ( авиационный) отрядair movement (traffic) section — Бр. отделение воздушных перевозок
collection, identification and evacuation section — секция сбора, опознания и эвакуации раненых и убитых
works section, RE — Бр. инженерно-строительная секция
— ammunition supply section— cable-laying section— chemical warfare section— countermortar radar section— launching section— light armor section* * *• секция -
11 Cognitive Science
The basic idea of cognitive science is that intelligent beings are semantic engines-in other words, automatic formal systems with interpretations under which they consistently make sense.... [P]eople and intelligent computers turn out to be merely different manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon. (Haugeland, 1981b, p. 31)2) Experimental Psychology, Theoretical Linguistics, and Computational Simulation of Cognitive Processes Are All Components of Cognitive ScienceI went away from the Symposium with a strong conviction, more intuitive than rational, that human experimental psychology, theoretical linguistics, and computer simulation of cognitive processes were all pieces of a larger whole, and that the future would see progressive elaboration and coordination of their shared concerns.... I have been working toward a cognitive science for about twenty years beginning before I knew what to call it. (G. A. Miller, 1979, p. 9)Cognitive Science studies the nature of cognition in human beings, other animals, and inanimate machines (if such a thing is possible). While computers are helpful within cognitive science, they are not essential to its being. A science of cognition could still be pursued even without these machines.Computer Science studies various kinds of problems and the use of computers to solve them, without concern for the means by which we humans might otherwise resolve them. There could be no computer science if there were no machines of this kind, because they are indispensable to its being. Artificial Intelligence is a special branch of computer science that investigates the extent to which the mental powers of human beings can be captured by means of machines.There could be cognitive science without artificial intelligence but there could be no artificial intelligence without cognitive science. One final caveat: In the case of an emerging new discipline such as cognitive science there is an almost irresistible temptation to identify the discipline itself (as a field of inquiry) with one of the theories that inspired it (such as the computational conception...). This, however, is a mistake. The field of inquiry (or "domain") stands to specific theories as questions stand to possible answers. The computational conception should properly be viewed as a research program in cognitive science, where "research programs" are answers that continue to attract followers. (Fetzer, 1996, pp. xvi-xvii)What is the nature of knowledge and how is this knowledge used? These questions lie at the core of both psychology and artificial intelligence.The psychologist who studies "knowledge systems" wants to know how concepts are structured in the human mind, how such concepts develop, and how they are used in understanding and behavior. The artificial intelligence researcher wants to know how to program a computer so that it can understand and interact with the outside world. The two orientations intersect when the psychologist and the computer scientist agree that the best way to approach the problem of building an intelligent machine is to emulate the human conceptual mechanisms that deal with language.... The name "cognitive science" has been used to refer to this convergence of interests in psychology and artificial intelligence....This working partnership in "cognitive science" does not mean that psychologists and computer scientists are developing a single comprehensive theory in which people are no different from machines. Psychology and artificial intelligence have many points of difference in methods and goals.... We simply want to work on an important area of overlapping interest, namely a theory of knowledge systems. As it turns out, this overlap is substantial. For both people and machines, each in their own way, there is a serious problem in common of making sense out of what they hear, see, or are told about the world. The conceptual apparatus necessary to perform even a partial feat of understanding is formidable and fascinating. (Schank & Abelson, 1977, pp. 1-2)Within the last dozen years a general change in scientific outlook has occurred, consonant with the point of view represented here. One can date the change roughly from 1956: in psychology, by the appearance of Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin's Study of Thinking and George Miller's "The Magical Number Seven"; in linguistics, by Noam Chomsky's "Three Models of Language"; and in computer science, by our own paper on the Logic Theory Machine. (Newell & Simon, 1972, p. 4)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Cognitive Science
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12 History of volleyball
________________________________________William G. Morgan (1870-1942) inventor of the game of volleyball________________________________________William G. Morgan (1870-1942), who was born in the State of New York, has gone down in history as the inventor of the game of volleyball, to which he originally gave the name "Mintonette".The young Morgan carried out his undergraduate studies at the Springfield College of the YMCA (Young Men's Christian Association) where he met James Naismith who, in 1891, had invented basketball. After graduating, Morgan spent his first year at the Auburn (Maine) YMCA after which, during the summer of 1896, he moved to the YMCA at Holyoke (Massachusetts) where he became Director of Physical Education. In this role he had the opportunity to establish, develop, and direct a vast programme of exercises and sports classes for male adults.His leadership was enthusiastically accepted, and his classes grew in numbers. He came to realise that he needed a certain type of competitive recreational game in order to vary his programme. Basketball, which sport was beginning to develop, seemed to suit young people, but it was necessary to find a less violent and less intense alternative for the older members.________________________________________________________________________________In 1995, the sport of Volleyball was 100 years old!The sport originated in the United States, and is now just achieving the type of popularity in the U.S. that it has received on a global basis, where it ranks behind only soccer among participation sports.Today there are more than 46 million Americans who play volleyball. There are 800 million players worldwide who play Volleyball at least once a week.In 1895, William G. Morgan, an instructor at the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) in Holyoke, Mass., decided to blend elements of basketball, baseball, tennis, and handball to create a game for his classes of businessmen which would demand less physical contact than basketball. He created the game of Volleyball (at that time called mintonette). Morgan borrowed the net from tennis, and raised it 6 feet 6 inches above the floor, just above the average man's head.During a demonstration game, someone remarked to Morgan that the players seemed to be volleying the ball back and forth over the net, and perhaps "volleyball" would be a more descriptive name for the sport.On July 7, 1896 at Springfield College the first game of "volleyball" was played.In 1900, a special ball was designed for the sport.1900 - YMCA spread volleyball to Canada, the Orient, and the Southern Hemisphere.1905 - YMCA spread volleyball to Cuba1907 Volleyball was presented at the Playground of America convention as one of the most popular sports1909 - YMCA spread volleyball to Puerto Rico1912 - YMCA spread volleyball to Uruguay1913 - Volleyball competition held in Far Eastern Games1917 - YMCA spread volleyball to BrazilIn 1916, in the Philippines, an offensive style of passing the ball in a high trajectory to be struck by another player (the set and spike) were introduced. The Filipinos developed the "bomba" or kill, and called the hitter a "bomberino".1916 - The NCAA was invited by the YMCA to aid in editing the rules and in promoting the sport. Volleyball was added to school and college physical education and intramural programs.In 1917, the game was changed from 21 to 15 points.1919 American Expeditionary Forces distributed 16,000 volleyballs to it's troops and allies. This provided a stimulus for the growth of volleyball in foreign lands.In 1920, three hits per side and back row attack rules were instituted.In 1922, the first YMCA national championships were held in Brooklyn, NY. 27 teams from 11 states were represented.In 1928, it became clear that tournaments and rules were needed, the United States Volleyball Association (USVBA, now USA Volleyball) was formed. The first U.S. Open was staged, as the field was open to non-YMCA squads.1930's Recreational sports programs became an important part of American lifeIn 1930, the first two-man beach game was played.In 1934, the approval and recognition of national volleyball referees.In 1937, at the AAU convention in Boston, action was taken to recognize the U.S. Volleyball Association as the official national governing body in the U.S.Late 1940s Forearm pass introduced to the game (as a desperation play) Most balls played with overhand pass1946 A study of recreation in the United States showed that volleyball ranked fifth among team sports being promoted and organizedIn 1947, the Federation Internationale De Volley-Ball (FIVB) was founded in Paris.In 1948, the first two-man beach tournament was held.In 1949, the first World Championships were held in Prague, Czechoslovakia.1949 USVBA added a collegiate division, for competitive college teams. For the first ten years collegiate competition was sparse. Teams formed only through the efforts of interested students and instructors. Many teams dissolved when the interested individuals left the college. Competitive teams were scattered, with no collegiate governing bodies providing leadership in the sport.1951 - Volleyball was played by over 50 million people each year in over 60 countries1955 - Pan American Games included volleyball1957 - The International Olympic Committee (IOC) designated volleyball as an Olympic team sport, to be included in the 1964 Olympic Games.1959 - International University Sports Federation (FISU) held the first University Games in Turin, Italy. Volleyball was one of the eight competitions held.1960 Seven midwestern institutions formed the Midwest Intercollegiate Volleyball Association (MIVA)1964Southern California Intercollegiate Volleyball Association (SCVIA) was formed in California1960's new techniques added to the game included - the soft spike (dink), forearm pass (bump), blocking across the net, and defensive diving and rolling.In 1964, Volleyball was introduced to the Olympic Games in Tokyo.The Japanese volleyball used in the 1964 Olympics, consisted of a rubber carcass with leather panelling. A similarly constructed ball is used in most modern competition.In 1965, the California Beach Volleyball Association (CBVA) was formed.1968 National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics (NAIA) made volleyball their fifteenth competitive sport.1969 The Executive Committee of the NCAA proposed addition of volleyball to its program.In 1974, the World Championships in Mexico were telecast in Japan.In 1975, the US National Women's team began a year-round training regime in Pasadena, Texas (moved to Colorado Springs in 1979, Coto de Caza and Fountain Valley, CA in 1980, and San Diego, CA in 1985).In 1977, the US National Men's team began a year-round training regime in Dayton, Ohio (moved to San Diego, CA in 1981).In 1983, the Association of Volleyball Professionals (AVP) was formed.In 1984, the US won their first medals at the Olympics in Los Angeles. The Men won the Gold, and the Women the Silver.In 1986, the Women's Professional Volleyball Association (WPVA) was formed.In 1987, the FIVB added a Beach Volleyball World Championship Series.In 1988, the US Men repeated the Gold in the Olympics in Korea.In 1989, the FIVB Sports Aid Program was created.In 1990, the World League was created.In 1992, the Four Person Pro Beach League was started in the United States.In 1994, Volleyball World Wide, created.In 1995, the sport of Volleyball was 100 years old!In 1996, 2-person beach volleyball was added to the OlympicsThere is a good book, "Volleyball Centennial: The First 100 Years", available on the history of the sport.________________________________________Copyright (c)Volleyball World WideVolleyball World Wide on the Computer Internet/WWWhttp://www.Volleyball.ORG/ -
13 division
дивизия; отдел; управление; мор. дивизия ( крупных кораблей), дивизион ( малых кораблей) ; дивизион ( как боевое подразделение на корабле) ; факультет; кафедра ( в вузе)C3 and Computer Systems division — отдел систем руководства, управления, связи и ЭВМ (МП)
division of Military Application, Department of Energy — отдел министерства энергетики по вопросам военного применения ядерной энергии
division of Naval Reactors, Department of Energy — отдел министерства энергетики по вопросам ЯЭУ для ВМС
Junior division, ROTC — младшее [начальное] отделение корпуса вневойсковой подготовки офицеров резерва (из числа школьников)
Plans, Policy and Operations division — оперативно-плановое управление (НАТО)
Senior division, ROTC — старшее отделение корпуса вневойсковой подготовки офицеров резерва (из числа студентов)
US Army Engineer division, Europe — военно-инженерный округ СВ США в Европейской зоне
— transport air division -
14 Creativity
Put in this bald way, these aims sound utopian. How utopian they areor rather, how imminent their realization-depends on how broadly or narrowly we interpret the term "creative." If we are willing to regard all human complex problem solving as creative, then-as we will point out-successful programs for problem solving mechanisms that simulate human problem solvers already exist, and a number of their general characteristics are known. If we reserve the term "creative" for activities like discovery of the special theory of relativity or the composition of Beethoven's Seventh Symphony, then no example of a creative mechanism exists at the present time. (Simon, 1979, pp. 144-145)Among the questions that can now be given preliminary answers in computational terms are the following: how can ideas from very different sources be spontaneously thought of together? how can two ideas be merged to produce a new structure, which shows the influence of both ancestor ideas without being a mere "cut-and-paste" combination? how can the mind be "primed," so that one will more easily notice serendipitous ideas? why may someone notice-and remember-something fairly uninteresting, if it occurs in an interesting context? how can a brief phrase conjure up an entire melody from memory? and how can we accept two ideas as similar ("love" and "prove" as rhyming, for instance) in respect of a feature not identical in both? The features of connectionist AI models that suggest answers to these questions are their powers of pattern completion, graceful degradation, sensitization, multiple constraint satisfaction, and "best-fit" equilibration.... Here, the important point is that the unconscious, "insightful," associative aspects of creativity can be explained-in outline, at least-by AI methods. (Boden, 1996, p. 273)There thus appears to be an underlying similarity in the process involved in creative innovation and social independence, with common traits and postures required for expression of both behaviors. The difference is one of product-literary, musical, artistic, theoretical products on the one hand, opinions on the other-rather than one of process. In both instances the individual must believe that his perceptions are meaningful and valid and be willing to rely upon his own interpretations. He must trust himself sufficiently that even when persons express opinions counter to his own he can proceed on the basis of his own perceptions and convictions. (Coopersmith, 1967, p. 58)he average level of ego strength and emotional stability is noticeably higher among creative geniuses than among the general population, though it is possibly lower than among men of comparable intelligence and education who go into administrative and similar positions. High anxiety and excitability appear common (e.g. Priestley, Darwin, Kepler) but full-blown neurosis is quite rare. (Cattell & Butcher, 1970, p. 315)he insight that is supposed to be required for such work as discovery turns out to be synonymous with the familiar process of recognition; and other terms commonly used in the discussion of creative work-such terms as "judgment," "creativity," or even "genius"-appear to be wholly dispensable or to be definable, as insight is, in terms of mundane and well-understood concepts. (Simon, 1989, p. 376)From the sketch material still in existence, from the condition of the fragments, and from the autographs themselves we can draw definite conclusions about Mozart's creative process. To invent musical ideas he did not need any stimulation; they came to his mind "ready-made" and in polished form. In contrast to Beethoven, who made numerous attempts at shaping his musical ideas until he found the definitive formulation of a theme, Mozart's first inspiration has the stamp of finality. Any Mozart theme has completeness and unity; as a phenomenon it is a Gestalt. (Herzmann, 1964, p. 28)Great artists enlarge the limits of one's perception. Looking at the world through the eyes of Rembrandt or Tolstoy makes one able to perceive aspects of truth about the world which one could not have achieved without their aid. Freud believed that science was adaptive because it facilitated mastery of the external world; but was it not the case that many scientific theories, like works of art, also originated in phantasy? Certainly, reading accounts of scientific discovery by men of the calibre of Einstein compelled me to conclude that phantasy was not merely escapist, but a way of reaching new insights concerning the nature of reality. Scientific hypotheses require proof; works of art do not. Both are concerned with creating order, with making sense out of the world and our experience of it. (Storr, 1993, p. xii)The importance of self-esteem for creative expression appears to be almost beyond disproof. Without a high regard for himself the individual who is working in the frontiers of his field cannot trust himself to discriminate between the trivial and the significant. Without trust in his own powers the person seeking improved solutions or alternative theories has no basis for distinguishing the significant and profound innovation from the one that is merely different.... An essential component of the creative process, whether it be analysis, synthesis, or the development of a new perspective or more comprehensive theory, is the conviction that one's judgment in interpreting the events is to be trusted. (Coopersmith, 1967, p. 59)In the daily stream of thought these four different stages [preparation; incubation; illumination or inspiration; and verification] constantly overlap each other as we explore different problems. An economist reading a Blue Book, a physiologist watching an experiment, or a business man going through his morning's letters, may at the same time be "incubating" on a problem which he proposed to himself a few days ago, be accumulating knowledge in "preparation" for a second problem, and be "verifying" his conclusions to a third problem. Even in exploring the same problem, the mind may be unconsciously incubating on one aspect of it, while it is consciously employed in preparing for or verifying another aspect. (Wallas, 1926, p. 81)he basic, bisociative pattern of the creative synthesis [is] the sudden interlocking of two previously unrelated skills, or matrices of thought. (Koestler, 1964, p. 121)11) The Earliest Stages in the Creative Process Involve a Commerce with DisorderEven to the creator himself, the earliest effort may seem to involve a commerce with disorder. For the creative order, which is an extension of life, is not an elaboration of the established, but a movement beyond the established, or at least a reorganization of it and often of elements not included in it. The first need is therefore to transcend the old order. Before any new order can be defined, the absolute power of the established, the hold upon us of what we know and are, must be broken. New life comes always from outside our world, as we commonly conceive that world. This is the reason why, in order to invent, one must yield to the indeterminate within him, or, more precisely, to certain illdefined impulses which seem to be of the very texture of the ungoverned fullness which John Livingston Lowes calls "the surging chaos of the unexpressed." (Ghiselin, 1985, p. 4)New life comes always from outside our world, as we commonly conceive our world. This is the reason why, in order to invent, one must yield to the indeterminate within him, or, more precisely, to certain illdefined impulses which seem to be of the very texture of the ungoverned fullness which John Livingston Lowes calls "the surging chaos of the unexpressed." Chaos and disorder are perhaps the wrong terms for that indeterminate fullness and activity of the inner life. For it is organic, dynamic, full of tension and tendency. What is absent from it, except in the decisive act of creation, is determination, fixity, and commitment to one resolution or another of the whole complex of its tensions. (Ghiselin, 1952, p. 13)[P]sychoanalysts have principally been concerned with the content of creative products, and with explaining content in terms of the artist's infantile past. They have paid less attention to examining why the artist chooses his particular activity to express, abreact or sublimate his emotions. In short, they have not made much distinction between art and neurosis; and, since the former is one of the blessings of mankind, whereas the latter is one of the curses, it seems a pity that they should not be better differentiated....Psychoanalysis, being fundamentally concerned with drive and motive, might have been expected to throw more light upon what impels the creative person that in fact it has. (Storr, 1993, pp. xvii, 3)A number of theoretical approaches were considered. Associative theory, as developed by Mednick (1962), gained some empirical support from the apparent validity of the Remote Associates Test, which was constructed on the basis of the theory.... Koestler's (1964) bisociative theory allows more complexity to mental organization than Mednick's associative theory, and postulates "associative contexts" or "frames of reference." He proposed that normal, non-creative, thought proceeds within particular contexts or frames and that the creative act involves linking together previously unconnected frames.... Simonton (1988) has developed associative notions further and explored the mathematical consequences of chance permutation of ideas....Like Koestler, Gruber (1980; Gruber and Davis, 1988) has based his analysis on case studies. He has focused especially on Darwin's development of the theory of evolution. Using piagetian notions, such as assimilation and accommodation, Gruber shows how Darwin's system of ideas changed very slowly over a period of many years. "Moments of insight," in Gruber's analysis, were the culminations of slow long-term processes.... Finally, the information-processing approach, as represented by Simon (1966) and Langley et al. (1987), was considered.... [Simon] points out the importance of good problem representations, both to ensure search is in an appropriate problem space and to aid in developing heuristic evaluations of possible research directions.... The work of Langley et al. (1987) demonstrates how such search processes, realized in computer programs, can indeed discover many basic laws of science from tables of raw data.... Boden (1990a, 1994) has stressed the importance of restructuring the problem space in creative work to develop new genres and paradigms in the arts and sciences. (Gilhooly, 1996, pp. 243-244; emphasis in original)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Creativity
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15 center
центр; пункт; пост; узел; середина; научпо-иселсдовагсльскпй центр, НИЦ; выводить на середину; арт. корректировать; центрировать;air C3 center — центр руководства, управления и связи ВВС
general supply (commodity) center — центр [пункт] снабжения предметами общего предназначения
hard launch (operations) control center — ркт. центр [пункт] управления пуском, защищенный от (поражающих факторов) ЯВ
launch (operations) control center — ркт. пункт управления стартового комплекса [пуском ракет]
tactical fighter weapons (employment development) center — центр разработки способов боевого применения оружия истребителей ТА
— all-sources intelligence center— C center— combat control center— educational center— logistical operations center— logistics services center— operational center— secured communications center— skill development center -
16 supply
снабжение, поставка; подвоз; подача; питание; pl. предметы снабжения; материальные средства, материалы; запас(ы) ( материальных средств) ; снабженческий груз; снабжать, поставлять; подавать; доставлятьclass I A supplies (Air/inflight rations) — предметы снабжения подкласса I A (летные пайки)
class I R supplies (Refrigerated subsistence) — предметы снабжения подкласса I R (замороженные продукты питания)
class I S supplies (Nonrefrigerated subsistence less combat rations) — предметы снабжения подкласса I S (незамороженные продукты питания, исключая боевые пайки)
class I supplies (Subsistence and health and welfare items) — предметы снабжения класса I (продовольствие и санитарно-хозяйственные предметы)
class II B supplies (Ground support materiel) — предметы снабжения подкласса II B (наземное вспомогательное имущество)
class II E supplies (General supplies) — предметы снабжения подкласса II E (общие виды предметов снабжения)
class II F supplies (Clothing and textiles) — предметы снабжения подкласса II F (обмундирование и текстильные изделия)
class II T supplies (Industrial Supplies) — предметы снабжения подкласса II T (промышленная продукция)
class III W supplies (Ground/surface) — предметы снабжения подкласса III W (ГСМ для наземных и надводных средств)
class IX supplies (Repair parts and components) — предметы снабжения класса IX (запасные части и компоненты)
class VI supplies (Personal demand items) — предметы снабжения класса VI (предметы личного пользования)
class VII B supplies (Ground support materiel) — предметы снабжения подкласса VII B (наземное вспомогательное оборудование и имущество)
class VII D supplies (Administrative vehicles) — предметы снабжения подкласса VII D (автотранспортные средства административно-хозяйственного назначения)
class VII K supplies (Tactical vehicles) — предметы снабжения подкласса VII K (военные транспортные средства)
class VII N supplies (Special weapons) — предметы снабжения подкласса VII N (специальные виды оружия)
class X supplies (Materiel to support nonmilitary programs) — предметы снабжения класса X (материальные средства для невоенных программ)
common, compatible, operational interchangeable supplies — общие, совместные и взаимозаменяемые предметы текущего снабжения
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17 identify
(ЛДП)1) указывать; приводить; называть; обозначать (напр., в ТУ, руководстве и т.д.)2) выявлять (напр., закономерность); (матем.) выделятьLet us identify a differential segment on... Выделим бесконечно малый элемент...3) выбирать (из какой-л. совокупности)4) отмечать5) определяться с чем-л.; устанавливать6) обнаруживать / обнаруживатьсяIn most instances, oil identified at these sites has not originated from the export pipeline Во многих случаях нефть, обнаруженная на этих участках, никак не связана с работой магистрального трубопровода (см. комментарий)7) формулировать8) обозначать / обозначаться9) называть10) расписывать11) фиксировать; зафиксировать (напр., о термометрии)12) обнаруживать13) подбиратьAssessment centers allow identify high-potential people Центры профессиональной оценки позволяют отбирать / подбирать самые перспективные кадры14) ( контекстуально) отсеивать (что-л., кого-л.)15) (перен.) закладывать вAdequate contingency has been identified in the cost estimate В смету заложены достаточные ассигнования на непредвиденные расходы16) распознаватьcompetent person who is capable of identifying existing and predictable hazards in the surrounding квалифицированный сотрудник, который способен / умеет распознавать реальные и потенциальные факторы опасности в рабочей зоне17) признавать в качестве18) identify to относить к (классу, виду и т.д.)19) identify with отождествлять с20) квалифицировать что-л. в качестве чего-л.Several National Environmental Action Programs ( NEAP) identified air pollution as apriority area for policy-makers'attention В некоторых национальных программах действий по охране окружающей среды загрязнение воздуха [ в городах] квалифицируется как проблема первостепенной важности для высших должностных лиц-----КОММЕНТАРИЙ: identify (ЛДП) 6) обнаруживать / обнаруживаться In most instances, oil identified at these sites has not originated from the export pipeline Во многих случаях нефть, обнаруженная на этих участках, никак не связана с работой магистрального трубопровода. Хотя словосочетание export pipeline относится к категории «терминология», а не «лексика», у некоторых переводчиков может вызвать возражение его предлагаемый русский эквивалент магистральный трубопровод. Ну, так и хочется написать экспортный. Но, увы, это - еще один «переводизм». Правда, на этот раз - терминологический. Чтобы не утомлять читателя подробным описанием технологии нефтедобычи, скажу лишь вкратце, что добываемая из скважин нефть по промысловым (field pipelines) и сборным (gathering pipelines) трубопроводам поступает на узел подготовки (processing facility), где из нее удаляют воду, газ и мехпримеси (главным образом - песок). И только после этого нефть (которая теперь стала называться товарной) по магистральному трубопроводу (EXPORT pipeline) поступает к покупателю. И export здесь вовсе не означает, что она идет на экспорт в русском понимании этого слова. Она просто с месторождения отгружается потребителю (например, на нефтеперерабатывающий завод). Составитель более двух лет проработал вахтовым методом в компании KomiArcticOil в Усинске (Республика Коми), и все это время нефть, которая добывалась этой компанией, по export pipeline отправлялась в... Ярославль, а вовсе не за границу. Так сказать, из России в Россию.English-Russian dictionary of scientific and technical difficulties vocabulary > identify
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18 historic
•• historic, historical, historically
•• * Существование в английском языке двух слов – historic и historical – имеет два противоречащих друг другу следствия. Во-первых, в устной речи нередко смешение этих слов. Мне приходилось слышать, как о событии, еще не «ушедшем в историю» и даже еще не состоявшемся, говорили It is/ will be a/ an historical event. Конечно, правильнее в данном случае historic или history-making. Но и historical event тоже правильно в определенных контекстах:
•• What historical event do you wish you could stop? If you could go back in time and prevent anything in history from having happened ( as opposed to just passively watching it happen), what particular incident in history would you most want to stop from happening and is there any reason why? (c сайта http://uplink.space.com).
•• С другой стороны, иногда различие между этими словами существенно и должно учитываться переводчиком. Слово historical, как мне кажется, шире русского исторический, так как охватывает все, что имеет отношение к прошлому, а русское слово – только то, что говорящий интуитивно относит к «истории», т.е. к историческому процессу, «историческим судьбам» и т.п. Русское слово часто, хотя и не всегда, «возвышенней». Среди исключений – например, словосочетание историческая справка. И все же более «бытовой» характер английского слова позволяет употреблять его в тех ситуациях, где говорящий по-русски скорее всего скажет иначе.
•• В выступлении Кондолисы Райс перед комиссией по расследованию событий 11 сентября это слово встретилось пять раз, плюс historically в значении, о котором будет сказано ниже:
•• Historically, democratic societies have been slow to react to gathering threats, tending instead to wait to confront threats until they are too dangerous to ignore or until it is too late. – Исторический опыт (или просто опыт) свидетельствует о том, что...
•• Далее Райс трижды употребляет это слово в отношении документа, представленного президенту Бушу 6 августа 2001 года (о возможных действиях «Аль-Каиды»):
•• I was in a press conference to try and describe the Aug. 6 memo, which I’ve talked about here in the – my opening remarks and which I talked about with you in the private session. And I said at one point that this was a historical memo, that it was not based on new threat information. <...>
•• It was not a particular threat report. And there was historical information in there about – about various aspects of al Qaeda’s operations. <...> It did not warn of attacks inside the United States. It was historical information based on old reporting. There was no new threat information. And it did not, in fact, warn of any coming attacks inside the United States.
•• Один из членов комиссии (демократ) ухватился за эту формулировку:
•• Well, did you not – you have indicated here that this was some historical document. And I am asking you whether it is not the case that you learned in the P.D.B. memo of Aug. 6 that the F.B.I. was saying that it had information suggesting that preparations, not historically, but ongoing, along with these numerous full field investigations against al Qaeda cells, that preparations were being made consistent with hijackings within the United States.
•• Конечно, по-русски в данном случае просто невозможно сказать исторический документ, хотя можно – историческая справка, но предпочтительно все же, по-моему, справочный материал, справочная информация. В вопросе – not historically, but ongoing – возможен вариант не в историческом разрезе, а в текущем плане.
•• Далее у Райс интересная оговорка, тут же исправленная:
•• This was a historic memo – historical memo prepared by the agency because the president was asking questions about what we knew about the inside.
•• Исправление оговорки – признак существенного различия двух слов. (Кстати, в качестве антонима historical появляется слово, неоднократно всплывавшее в ходе слушаний и не поддающееся однословному переводу, – actionable:
•• The president was told this is historical information. I am told he was told this is historical information. And there was nothing actionable in this. The president knew that the F.B.I. was pursuing this issue. The president knew that the director of central intelligence was pursuing this issue. And there was no new threat information in this document to pursue.
•• Actionable information – пока не могу предложить ничего кроме информация, требующая/ дающая основания для конкретных действий. Длинно.)
•• Конечно, «оппозиция Его Величества» не замедлила поиграть со словом historical. Из редакционной статьи New York Times:
•• The administration argument that it had only gotten intelligence about potential terrorist attacks abroad in the summer of 2001 was rather drastically undermined when Ms. Rice revealed, under questioning, that the briefing given Mr. Bush by the C.I.A. on Aug. 6, 2001, was titled “Bin Laden Determined to Attack Inside the United States.” Ms. Rice continues to insist that the information was “ historical” rather than a warning of something likely to occur.
•• Еще более хлестко (но абсолютно неизбежно, удержаться от игры слов невозможно):
•• What should have made Condi hysterical, she deemed “historical.” (Maureen Dowd)
•• Последний пример, кстати, заставляет все-таки выбрать в переводе вариант историческая справка, чтобы попробовать передать игру слов, но все равно сделать это непросто:
•• Информация, способная вызвать истерическую реакцию, для Конди – не более чем историческая справка.
•• А теперь о наречии historically. Словари – как толковые, так и переводные, – как правило, не дают отдельного определения или перевода наречий с - ly, считая, что все и так ясно – их смысл и перевод вытекают из соответствующего прилагательного. Но это далеко не всегда так. В статье из New York Times, попавшей в обзор зарубежной прессы на радио «Эхо Москвы», встретилось: Iran has historically denied that it is pursuing a nuclear weapons program. Ведущая так и сказала: Иран исторически отрицал (и т.д.). Здесь, конечно, нужно просто всегда или неизменно. В некоторых случаях хорошо подойдет русское наречие традиционно: historically black colleges – традиционно негритянские колледжи (здесь это прилагательное, по-моему, вполне приемлемо), historically underutilized businesses – компании, традиционно недопредставленные среди подрядчиков, historically disadvantaged – традиционно находящиеся в тяжелом положении. Иногда подходящее русское соответствие – по многолетним наблюдениям ( This is not uncommon historically for the month of April). Наконец, контекст может подсказать и такой вариант, как беспрецедентно: Historically high growth in employment.
•• Интересный пример из статьи У. Пфаффа в International Herald Tribune:
•• Historically, in joint ventures with U.S. government and industry, U.S. security and proprietary restraints nearly always have forced the European partners into subordinate roles.
•• Здесь самый лучший перевод – просто раньше, прежде.
•• Слово historically, на мой взгляд, не является многозначным, у него одно довольно широкое и несколько расплывчатое значение, но в переводе оно начинает играть своими различными гранями. Разумеется, в приведенном выше примере возможен и перевод Исторически сложилось так, что...
•• В отличие от historically наречие indefinitely дается в большинстве словарей (например, в БАРСе и ABBYY Lingvo) как отдельная словарная статья. Но упущено довольно частое употребление indefinitely в значении, близком к until further notice. Пример из New York Times:
•• Thomas Krens, the foundation director, acknowledged as unrealistic the prospect of financing the $950 million project at a time when the museum is cutting budget, staff and programs. Beginning Sunday, for example, the Guggenheim Las Vegas is to go dark indefinitely.
•• Перевод напрашивается: на неопределенный срок. Кстати, to go dark – есть ли это в словарях? Обычно так говорят, когда, скажем, музей, театр или web-сайт прерывают работу на некоторое время – с возможностью ее возобновления.
•• Еще один пример интересного с точки зрения перевода и лексикографии употребления наречия (для контекста даю несколько предшествующих фраз):
•• After months of inaction, I finally turned to former President Bush, who immediately interceded with Crown Prince Abdallah on the FBI’s behalf. <...> The Saudis immediately acceded. <...> Mr. Bush typically disclaimed any credit for his critical intervention, but he earned the gratitude of many FBI agents and the Khobar families. (American Justice for Khobar Heroes. By Louis J. Freeh. Wall Street Journal)
•• Typically здесь нельзя переводить как типично или даже что для него типично. В каких-то случаях может подойти разговорное что характерно. Но лучше, конечно, в свойственной ему манере или как обычно. Думаю, в двуязычном словаре для такого примера должно найтись место. Во-первых, он показывает идиоматичное употребление английского наречия. Во-вторых, подсказывает перевод.
•• Наречия типа confusingly обычно не включаются в словари в качестве отдельной статьи. Считается, что перевод таких слов, как amazingly или startlingly, не должен вызывать трудностей, но это не всегда так. На конференции по товарным знакам встретилось выражение confusingly similar. В юридическом словаре есть confusion in trademarks – смешение товарных знаков. Соответственно confusingly similar – схожий/ аналогичный до степени смешения (принятый практиками перевод). Пожалуй, это стоит включить не только в специальный словарь.
-
19 historical
•• historic, historical, historically
•• * Существование в английском языке двух слов – historic и historical – имеет два противоречащих друг другу следствия. Во-первых, в устной речи нередко смешение этих слов. Мне приходилось слышать, как о событии, еще не «ушедшем в историю» и даже еще не состоявшемся, говорили It is/ will be a/ an historical event. Конечно, правильнее в данном случае historic или history-making. Но и historical event тоже правильно в определенных контекстах:
•• What historical event do you wish you could stop? If you could go back in time and prevent anything in history from having happened ( as opposed to just passively watching it happen), what particular incident in history would you most want to stop from happening and is there any reason why? (c сайта http://uplink.space.com).
•• С другой стороны, иногда различие между этими словами существенно и должно учитываться переводчиком. Слово historical, как мне кажется, шире русского исторический, так как охватывает все, что имеет отношение к прошлому, а русское слово – только то, что говорящий интуитивно относит к «истории», т.е. к историческому процессу, «историческим судьбам» и т.п. Русское слово часто, хотя и не всегда, «возвышенней». Среди исключений – например, словосочетание историческая справка. И все же более «бытовой» характер английского слова позволяет употреблять его в тех ситуациях, где говорящий по-русски скорее всего скажет иначе.
•• В выступлении Кондолисы Райс перед комиссией по расследованию событий 11 сентября это слово встретилось пять раз, плюс historically в значении, о котором будет сказано ниже:
•• Historically, democratic societies have been slow to react to gathering threats, tending instead to wait to confront threats until they are too dangerous to ignore or until it is too late. – Исторический опыт (или просто опыт) свидетельствует о том, что...
•• Далее Райс трижды употребляет это слово в отношении документа, представленного президенту Бушу 6 августа 2001 года (о возможных действиях «Аль-Каиды»):
•• I was in a press conference to try and describe the Aug. 6 memo, which I’ve talked about here in the – my opening remarks and which I talked about with you in the private session. And I said at one point that this was a historical memo, that it was not based on new threat information. <...>
•• It was not a particular threat report. And there was historical information in there about – about various aspects of al Qaeda’s operations. <...> It did not warn of attacks inside the United States. It was historical information based on old reporting. There was no new threat information. And it did not, in fact, warn of any coming attacks inside the United States.
•• Один из членов комиссии (демократ) ухватился за эту формулировку:
•• Well, did you not – you have indicated here that this was some historical document. And I am asking you whether it is not the case that you learned in the P.D.B. memo of Aug. 6 that the F.B.I. was saying that it had information suggesting that preparations, not historically, but ongoing, along with these numerous full field investigations against al Qaeda cells, that preparations were being made consistent with hijackings within the United States.
•• Конечно, по-русски в данном случае просто невозможно сказать исторический документ, хотя можно – историческая справка, но предпочтительно все же, по-моему, справочный материал, справочная информация. В вопросе – not historically, but ongoing – возможен вариант не в историческом разрезе, а в текущем плане.
•• Далее у Райс интересная оговорка, тут же исправленная:
•• This was a historic memo – historical memo prepared by the agency because the president was asking questions about what we knew about the inside.
•• Исправление оговорки – признак существенного различия двух слов. (Кстати, в качестве антонима historical появляется слово, неоднократно всплывавшее в ходе слушаний и не поддающееся однословному переводу, – actionable:
•• The president was told this is historical information. I am told he was told this is historical information. And there was nothing actionable in this. The president knew that the F.B.I. was pursuing this issue. The president knew that the director of central intelligence was pursuing this issue. And there was no new threat information in this document to pursue.
•• Actionable information – пока не могу предложить ничего кроме информация, требующая/ дающая основания для конкретных действий. Длинно.)
•• Конечно, «оппозиция Его Величества» не замедлила поиграть со словом historical. Из редакционной статьи New York Times:
•• The administration argument that it had only gotten intelligence about potential terrorist attacks abroad in the summer of 2001 was rather drastically undermined when Ms. Rice revealed, under questioning, that the briefing given Mr. Bush by the C.I.A. on Aug. 6, 2001, was titled “Bin Laden Determined to Attack Inside the United States.” Ms. Rice continues to insist that the information was “ historical” rather than a warning of something likely to occur.
•• Еще более хлестко (но абсолютно неизбежно, удержаться от игры слов невозможно):
•• What should have made Condi hysterical, she deemed “historical.” (Maureen Dowd)
•• Последний пример, кстати, заставляет все-таки выбрать в переводе вариант историческая справка, чтобы попробовать передать игру слов, но все равно сделать это непросто:
•• Информация, способная вызвать истерическую реакцию, для Конди – не более чем историческая справка.
•• А теперь о наречии historically. Словари – как толковые, так и переводные, – как правило, не дают отдельного определения или перевода наречий с - ly, считая, что все и так ясно – их смысл и перевод вытекают из соответствующего прилагательного. Но это далеко не всегда так. В статье из New York Times, попавшей в обзор зарубежной прессы на радио «Эхо Москвы», встретилось: Iran has historically denied that it is pursuing a nuclear weapons program. Ведущая так и сказала: Иран исторически отрицал (и т.д.). Здесь, конечно, нужно просто всегда или неизменно. В некоторых случаях хорошо подойдет русское наречие традиционно: historically black colleges – традиционно негритянские колледжи (здесь это прилагательное, по-моему, вполне приемлемо), historically underutilized businesses – компании, традиционно недопредставленные среди подрядчиков, historically disadvantaged – традиционно находящиеся в тяжелом положении. Иногда подходящее русское соответствие – по многолетним наблюдениям ( This is not uncommon historically for the month of April). Наконец, контекст может подсказать и такой вариант, как беспрецедентно: Historically high growth in employment.
•• Интересный пример из статьи У. Пфаффа в International Herald Tribune:
•• Historically, in joint ventures with U.S. government and industry, U.S. security and proprietary restraints nearly always have forced the European partners into subordinate roles.
•• Здесь самый лучший перевод – просто раньше, прежде.
•• Слово historically, на мой взгляд, не является многозначным, у него одно довольно широкое и несколько расплывчатое значение, но в переводе оно начинает играть своими различными гранями. Разумеется, в приведенном выше примере возможен и перевод Исторически сложилось так, что...
•• В отличие от historically наречие indefinitely дается в большинстве словарей (например, в БАРСе и ABBYY Lingvo) как отдельная словарная статья. Но упущено довольно частое употребление indefinitely в значении, близком к until further notice. Пример из New York Times:
•• Thomas Krens, the foundation director, acknowledged as unrealistic the prospect of financing the $950 million project at a time when the museum is cutting budget, staff and programs. Beginning Sunday, for example, the Guggenheim Las Vegas is to go dark indefinitely.
•• Перевод напрашивается: на неопределенный срок. Кстати, to go dark – есть ли это в словарях? Обычно так говорят, когда, скажем, музей, театр или web-сайт прерывают работу на некоторое время – с возможностью ее возобновления.
•• Еще один пример интересного с точки зрения перевода и лексикографии употребления наречия (для контекста даю несколько предшествующих фраз):
•• After months of inaction, I finally turned to former President Bush, who immediately interceded with Crown Prince Abdallah on the FBI’s behalf. <...> The Saudis immediately acceded. <...> Mr. Bush typically disclaimed any credit for his critical intervention, but he earned the gratitude of many FBI agents and the Khobar families. (American Justice for Khobar Heroes. By Louis J. Freeh. Wall Street Journal)
•• Typically здесь нельзя переводить как типично или даже что для него типично. В каких-то случаях может подойти разговорное что характерно. Но лучше, конечно, в свойственной ему манере или как обычно. Думаю, в двуязычном словаре для такого примера должно найтись место. Во-первых, он показывает идиоматичное употребление английского наречия. Во-вторых, подсказывает перевод.
•• Наречия типа confusingly обычно не включаются в словари в качестве отдельной статьи. Считается, что перевод таких слов, как amazingly или startlingly, не должен вызывать трудностей, но это не всегда так. На конференции по товарным знакам встретилось выражение confusingly similar. В юридическом словаре есть confusion in trademarks – смешение товарных знаков. Соответственно confusingly similar – схожий/ аналогичный до степени смешения (принятый практиками перевод). Пожалуй, это стоит включить не только в специальный словарь.
-
20 historically
•• historic, historical, historically
•• * Существование в английском языке двух слов – historic и historical – имеет два противоречащих друг другу следствия. Во-первых, в устной речи нередко смешение этих слов. Мне приходилось слышать, как о событии, еще не «ушедшем в историю» и даже еще не состоявшемся, говорили It is/ will be a/ an historical event. Конечно, правильнее в данном случае historic или history-making. Но и historical event тоже правильно в определенных контекстах:
•• What historical event do you wish you could stop? If you could go back in time and prevent anything in history from having happened ( as opposed to just passively watching it happen), what particular incident in history would you most want to stop from happening and is there any reason why? (c сайта http://uplink.space.com).
•• С другой стороны, иногда различие между этими словами существенно и должно учитываться переводчиком. Слово historical, как мне кажется, шире русского исторический, так как охватывает все, что имеет отношение к прошлому, а русское слово – только то, что говорящий интуитивно относит к «истории», т.е. к историческому процессу, «историческим судьбам» и т.п. Русское слово часто, хотя и не всегда, «возвышенней». Среди исключений – например, словосочетание историческая справка. И все же более «бытовой» характер английского слова позволяет употреблять его в тех ситуациях, где говорящий по-русски скорее всего скажет иначе.
•• В выступлении Кондолисы Райс перед комиссией по расследованию событий 11 сентября это слово встретилось пять раз, плюс historically в значении, о котором будет сказано ниже:
•• Historically, democratic societies have been slow to react to gathering threats, tending instead to wait to confront threats until they are too dangerous to ignore or until it is too late. – Исторический опыт (или просто опыт) свидетельствует о том, что...
•• Далее Райс трижды употребляет это слово в отношении документа, представленного президенту Бушу 6 августа 2001 года (о возможных действиях «Аль-Каиды»):
•• I was in a press conference to try and describe the Aug. 6 memo, which I’ve talked about here in the – my opening remarks and which I talked about with you in the private session. And I said at one point that this was a historical memo, that it was not based on new threat information. <...>
•• It was not a particular threat report. And there was historical information in there about – about various aspects of al Qaeda’s operations. <...> It did not warn of attacks inside the United States. It was historical information based on old reporting. There was no new threat information. And it did not, in fact, warn of any coming attacks inside the United States.
•• Один из членов комиссии (демократ) ухватился за эту формулировку:
•• Well, did you not – you have indicated here that this was some historical document. And I am asking you whether it is not the case that you learned in the P.D.B. memo of Aug. 6 that the F.B.I. was saying that it had information suggesting that preparations, not historically, but ongoing, along with these numerous full field investigations against al Qaeda cells, that preparations were being made consistent with hijackings within the United States.
•• Конечно, по-русски в данном случае просто невозможно сказать исторический документ, хотя можно – историческая справка, но предпочтительно все же, по-моему, справочный материал, справочная информация. В вопросе – not historically, but ongoing – возможен вариант не в историческом разрезе, а в текущем плане.
•• Далее у Райс интересная оговорка, тут же исправленная:
•• This was a historic memo – historical memo prepared by the agency because the president was asking questions about what we knew about the inside.
•• Исправление оговорки – признак существенного различия двух слов. (Кстати, в качестве антонима historical появляется слово, неоднократно всплывавшее в ходе слушаний и не поддающееся однословному переводу, – actionable:
•• The president was told this is historical information. I am told he was told this is historical information. And there was nothing actionable in this. The president knew that the F.B.I. was pursuing this issue. The president knew that the director of central intelligence was pursuing this issue. And there was no new threat information in this document to pursue.
•• Actionable information – пока не могу предложить ничего кроме информация, требующая/ дающая основания для конкретных действий. Длинно.)
•• Конечно, «оппозиция Его Величества» не замедлила поиграть со словом historical. Из редакционной статьи New York Times:
•• The administration argument that it had only gotten intelligence about potential terrorist attacks abroad in the summer of 2001 was rather drastically undermined when Ms. Rice revealed, under questioning, that the briefing given Mr. Bush by the C.I.A. on Aug. 6, 2001, was titled “Bin Laden Determined to Attack Inside the United States.” Ms. Rice continues to insist that the information was “ historical” rather than a warning of something likely to occur.
•• Еще более хлестко (но абсолютно неизбежно, удержаться от игры слов невозможно):
•• What should have made Condi hysterical, she deemed “historical.” (Maureen Dowd)
•• Последний пример, кстати, заставляет все-таки выбрать в переводе вариант историческая справка, чтобы попробовать передать игру слов, но все равно сделать это непросто:
•• Информация, способная вызвать истерическую реакцию, для Конди – не более чем историческая справка.
•• А теперь о наречии historically. Словари – как толковые, так и переводные, – как правило, не дают отдельного определения или перевода наречий с - ly, считая, что все и так ясно – их смысл и перевод вытекают из соответствующего прилагательного. Но это далеко не всегда так. В статье из New York Times, попавшей в обзор зарубежной прессы на радио «Эхо Москвы», встретилось: Iran has historically denied that it is pursuing a nuclear weapons program. Ведущая так и сказала: Иран исторически отрицал (и т.д.). Здесь, конечно, нужно просто всегда или неизменно. В некоторых случаях хорошо подойдет русское наречие традиционно: historically black colleges – традиционно негритянские колледжи (здесь это прилагательное, по-моему, вполне приемлемо), historically underutilized businesses – компании, традиционно недопредставленные среди подрядчиков, historically disadvantaged – традиционно находящиеся в тяжелом положении. Иногда подходящее русское соответствие – по многолетним наблюдениям ( This is not uncommon historically for the month of April). Наконец, контекст может подсказать и такой вариант, как беспрецедентно: Historically high growth in employment.
•• Интересный пример из статьи У. Пфаффа в International Herald Tribune:
•• Historically, in joint ventures with U.S. government and industry, U.S. security and proprietary restraints nearly always have forced the European partners into subordinate roles.
•• Здесь самый лучший перевод – просто раньше, прежде.
•• Слово historically, на мой взгляд, не является многозначным, у него одно довольно широкое и несколько расплывчатое значение, но в переводе оно начинает играть своими различными гранями. Разумеется, в приведенном выше примере возможен и перевод Исторически сложилось так, что...
•• В отличие от historically наречие indefinitely дается в большинстве словарей (например, в БАРСе и ABBYY Lingvo) как отдельная словарная статья. Но упущено довольно частое употребление indefinitely в значении, близком к until further notice. Пример из New York Times:
•• Thomas Krens, the foundation director, acknowledged as unrealistic the prospect of financing the $950 million project at a time when the museum is cutting budget, staff and programs. Beginning Sunday, for example, the Guggenheim Las Vegas is to go dark indefinitely.
•• Перевод напрашивается: на неопределенный срок. Кстати, to go dark – есть ли это в словарях? Обычно так говорят, когда, скажем, музей, театр или web-сайт прерывают работу на некоторое время – с возможностью ее возобновления.
•• Еще один пример интересного с точки зрения перевода и лексикографии употребления наречия (для контекста даю несколько предшествующих фраз):
•• After months of inaction, I finally turned to former President Bush, who immediately interceded with Crown Prince Abdallah on the FBI’s behalf. <...> The Saudis immediately acceded. <...> Mr. Bush typically disclaimed any credit for his critical intervention, but he earned the gratitude of many FBI agents and the Khobar families. (American Justice for Khobar Heroes. By Louis J. Freeh. Wall Street Journal)
•• Typically здесь нельзя переводить как типично или даже что для него типично. В каких-то случаях может подойти разговорное что характерно. Но лучше, конечно, в свойственной ему манере или как обычно. Думаю, в двуязычном словаре для такого примера должно найтись место. Во-первых, он показывает идиоматичное употребление английского наречия. Во-вторых, подсказывает перевод.
•• Наречия типа confusingly обычно не включаются в словари в качестве отдельной статьи. Считается, что перевод таких слов, как amazingly или startlingly, не должен вызывать трудностей, но это не всегда так. На конференции по товарным знакам встретилось выражение confusingly similar. В юридическом словаре есть confusion in trademarks – смешение товарных знаков. Соответственно confusingly similar – схожий/ аналогичный до степени смешения (принятый практиками перевод). Пожалуй, это стоит включить не только в специальный словарь.
См. также в других словарях:
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