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semantic+memory

  • 1 Memory

       To what extent can we lump together what goes on when you try to recall: (1) your name; (2) how you kick a football; and (3) the present location of your car keys? If we use introspective evidence as a guide, the first seems an immediate automatic response. The second may require constructive internal replay prior to our being able to produce a verbal description. The third... quite likely involves complex operational responses under the control of some general strategy system. Is any unitary search process, with a single set of characteristics and inputoutput relations, likely to cover all these cases? (Reitman, 1970, p. 485)
       [Semantic memory] Is a mental thesaurus, organized knowledge a person possesses about words and other verbal symbols, their meanings and referents, about relations among them, and about rules, formulas, and algorithms for the manipulation of these symbols, concepts, and relations. Semantic memory does not register perceptible properties of inputs, but rather cognitive referents of input signals. (Tulving, 1972, p. 386)
       The mnemonic code, far from being fixed and unchangeable, is structured and restructured along with general development. Such a restructuring of the code takes place in close dependence on the schemes of intelligence. The clearest indication of this is the observation of different types of memory organisation in accordance with the age level of a child so that a longer interval of retention without any new presentation, far from causing a deterioration of memory, may actually improve it. (Piaget & Inhelder, 1973, p. 36)
       4) The Logic of Some Memory Theorization Is of Dubious Worth in the History of Psychology
       If a cue was effective in memory retrieval, then one could infer it was encoded; if a cue was not effective, then it was not encoded. The logic of this theorization is "heads I win, tails you lose" and is of dubious worth in the history of psychology. We might ask how long scientists will puzzle over questions with no answers. (Solso, 1974, p. 28)
       We have iconic, echoic, active, working, acoustic, articulatory, primary, secondary, episodic, semantic, short-term, intermediate-term, and longterm memories, and these memories contain tags, traces, images, attributes, markers, concepts, cognitive maps, natural-language mediators, kernel sentences, relational rules, nodes, associations, propositions, higher-order memory units, and features. (Eysenck, 1977, p. 4)
       The problem with the memory metaphor is that storage and retrieval of traces only deals [ sic] with old, previously articulated information. Memory traces can perhaps provide a basis for dealing with the "sameness" of the present experience with previous experiences, but the memory metaphor has no mechanisms for dealing with novel information. (Bransford, McCarrell, Franks & Nitsch, 1977, p. 434)
       7) The Results of a Hundred Years of the Psychological Study of Memory Are Somewhat Discouraging
       The results of a hundred years of the psychological study of memory are somewhat discouraging. We have established firm empirical generalisations, but most of them are so obvious that every ten-year-old knows them anyway. We have made discoveries, but they are only marginally about memory; in many cases we don't know what to do with them, and wear them out with endless experimental variations. We have an intellectually impressive group of theories, but history offers little confidence that they will provide any meaningful insight into natural behavior. (Neisser, 1978, pp. 12-13)
       A schema, then is a data structure for representing the generic concepts stored in memory. There are schemata representing our knowledge about all concepts; those underlying objects, situations, events, sequences of events, actions and sequences of actions. A schema contains, as part of its specification, the network of interrelations that is believed to normally hold among the constituents of the concept in question. A schema theory embodies a prototype theory of meaning. That is, inasmuch as a schema underlying a concept stored in memory corresponds to the mean ing of that concept, meanings are encoded in terms of the typical or normal situations or events that instantiate that concept. (Rumelhart, 1980, p. 34)
       Memory appears to be constrained by a structure, a "syntax," perhaps at quite a low level, but it is free to be variable, deviant, even erratic at a higher level....
       Like the information system of language, memory can be explained in part by the abstract rules which underlie it, but only in part. The rules provide a basic competence, but they do not fully determine performance. (Campbell, 1982, pp. 228, 229)
       When people think about the mind, they often liken it to a physical space, with memories and ideas as objects contained within that space. Thus, we speak of ideas being in the dark corners or dim recesses of our minds, and of holding ideas in mind. Ideas may be in the front or back of our minds, or they may be difficult to grasp. With respect to the processes involved in memory, we talk about storing memories, of searching or looking for lost memories, and sometimes of finding them. An examination of common parlance, therefore, suggests that there is general adherence to what might be called the spatial metaphor. The basic assumptions of this metaphor are that memories are treated as objects stored in specific locations within the mind, and the retrieval process involves a search through the mind in order to find specific memories....
       However, while the spatial metaphor has shown extraordinary longevity, there have been some interesting changes over time in the precise form of analogy used. In particular, technological advances have influenced theoretical conceptualisations.... The original Greek analogies were based on wax tablets and aviaries; these were superseded by analogies involving switchboards, gramophones, tape recorders, libraries, conveyor belts, and underground maps. Most recently, the workings of human memory have been compared to computer functioning... and it has been suggested that the various memory stores found in computers have their counterparts in the human memory system. (Eysenck, 1984, pp. 79-80)
       Primary memory [as proposed by William James] relates to information that remains in consciousness after it has been perceived, and thus forms part of the psychological present, whereas secondary memory contains information about events that have left consciousness, and are therefore part of the psychological past. (Eysenck, 1984, p. 86)
       Once psychologists began to study long-term memory per se, they realized it may be divided into two main categories.... Semantic memories have to do with our general knowledge about the working of the world. We know what cars do, what stoves do, what the laws of gravity are, and so on. Episodic memories are largely events that took place at a time and place in our personal history. Remembering specific events about our own actions, about our family, and about our individual past falls into this category. With amnesia or in aging, what dims... is our personal episodic memories, save for those that are especially dear or painful to us. Our knowledge of how the world works remains pretty much intact. (Gazzaniga, 1988, p. 42)
       The nature of memory... provides a natural starting point for an analysis of thinking. Memory is the repository of many of the beliefs and representations that enter into thinking, and the retrievability of these representations can limit the quality of our thought. (Smith, 1990, p. 1)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Memory

  • 2 семантическая память

    Russian-english psychology dictionary > семантическая память

  • 3 anlamsal hafıza

    semantic memory

    Turkish-English dictionary > anlamsal hafıza

  • 4 Bibliography

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     ■ Varela, F. J. (1984). The creative circle: Sketches on the natural history of circularity. In P. Watzlawick (Ed.), The invented reality (pp. 309-324). New York: W. W. Norton.
     ■ Voltaire (1961). On the Penseґs of M. Pascal. In Philosophical letters (pp. 119-146). E. Dilworth (Trans.). Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
     ■ Wagman, M. (1997a). Cognitive science and the symbolic operations of human and artificial intelligence: Theory and research into the intellective processes. Westport, CT: Praeger.
     ■ Wagman, M. (1997b). The general unified theory of intelligence: Central conceptions and specific application to domains of cognitive science. Westport, CT: Praeger.
     ■ Wagman, M. (1998a). Cognitive science and the mind- body problem: From philosophy to psychology to artificial intelligence to imaging of the brain. Westport, CT: Praeger.
     ■ Wagman, M. (1999). The human mind according to artificial intelligence: Theory, re search, and implications. Westport, CT: Praeger.
     ■ Wall, R. (1972). Introduction to mathematical linguistics. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
     ■ Wallas, G. (1926). The Art of Thought. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.
     ■ Wason, P. (1977). Self contradictions. In P. Johnson-Laird & P. Wason (Eds.), Thinking: Readings in cognitive science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
     ■ Wason, P. C., & P. N. Johnson-Laird. (1972). Psychology of reasoning: Structure and content. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
     ■ Watson, J. (1930). Behaviorism. New York: W. W. Norton.
     ■ Watzlawick, P. (1984). Epilogue. In P. Watzlawick (Ed.), The invented reality. New York: W. W. Norton, 1984.
     ■ Weinberg, S. (1977). The first three minutes: A modern view of the origin of the uni verse. New York: Basic Books.
     ■ Weisberg, R. W. (1986). Creativity: Genius and other myths. New York: W. H. Freeman.
     ■ Weizenbaum, J. (1976). Computer power and human reason: From judgment to cal culation. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.
     ■ Wertheimer, M. (1945). Productive thinking. New York: Harper & Bros.
     ■ Whitehead, A. N. (1925). Science and the modern world. New York: Macmillan.
     ■ Whorf, B. L. (1956). In J. B. Carroll (Ed.), Language, thought and reality: Selected writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
     ■ Whyte, L. L. (1962). The unconscious before Freud. New York: Anchor Books.
     ■ Wiener, N. (1954). The human use of human beings. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
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    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Bibliography

  • 5 семантическая память

    1) Linguistics: conceptual memory
    2) Information technology: semantic memory, semantic storage

    Универсальный русско-английский словарь > семантическая память

  • 6 Cognition

       As used here, the term "cognition" refers to all processes by which the sensory input is transformed, reduced, elaborated, stored, recovered, and used. It is concerned with these processes even when they operate in the absence of relevant stimulation, as in images and hallucinations....
       [G]iven such a sweeping definition, it is apparent that cognition is involved in everything a human being might possibly do; that every psychological phenomenon is a cognitive phenomenon. (Neisser, 1976, p. 4)
       Man is describable as a dual processor, dual memory system with extensive input-output buffering within each system. The input-output system appears to have substantial peripheral computing power itself. But man is not modeled by a dual processor computer. The two processors of the brain are asymmetric. The semantic memory processor is a serial processor with a list structure memory. The image memory processor may very well be a sophisticated analog processor attached to an associative memory. When we propose models of cognition it would perhaps be advisable if we specified the relation of the model to this system architecture and its associated addressing system and data structure. (Hunt, 1973, pp. 370-371)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Cognition

  • 7 Grammar

       I think that the failure to offer a precise account of the notion "grammar" is not just a superficial defect in linguistic theory that can be remedied by adding one more definition. It seems to me that until this notion is clarified, no part of linguistic theory can achieve anything like a satisfactory development.... I have been discussing a grammar of a particular language here as analogous to a particular scientific theory, dealing with its subject matter (the set of sentences of this language) much as embryology or physics deals with its subject matter. (Chomsky, 1964, p. 213)
       Obviously, every speaker of a language has mastered and internalized a generative grammar that expresses his knowledge of his language. This is not to say that he is aware of the rules of grammar or even that he can become aware of them, or that his statements about his intuitive knowledge of his language are necessarily accurate. (Chomsky, 1965, p. 8)
       Much effort has been devoted to showing that the class of possible transformations can be substantially reduced without loss of descriptive power through the discovery of quite general conditions that all such rules and the representations they operate on and form must meet.... [The] transformational rules, at least for a substantial core grammar, can be reduced to the single rule, "Move alpha" (that is, "move any category anywhere"). (Mehler, Walker & Garrett, 1982, p. 21)
       4) The Relationship of Transformational Grammar to Semantics and to Human Performance
       he implications of assuming a semantic memory for what we might call "generative psycholinguistics" are: that dichotomous judgments of semantic well-formedness versus anomaly are not essential or inherent to language performance; that the transformational component of a grammar is the part most relevant to performance models; that a generative grammar's role should be viewed as restricted to language production, whereas sentence understanding should be treated as a problem of extracting a cognitive representation of a text's message; that until some theoretical notion of cognitive representation is incorporated into linguistic conceptions, they are unlikely to provide either powerful language-processing programs or psychologically relevant theories.
       Although these implications conflict with the way others have viewed the relationship of transformational grammars to semantics and to human performance, they do not eliminate the importance of such grammars to psychologists, an importance stressed in, and indeed largely created by, the work of Chomsky. It is precisely because of a growing interdependence between such linguistic theory and psychological performance models that their relationship needs to be clarified. (Quillian, 1968, p. 260)
       here are some terminological distinctions that are crucial to explain, or else confusions can easily arise. In the formal study of grammar, a language is defined as a set of sentences, possibly infinite, where each sentence is a string of symbols or words. One can think of each sentence as having several representations linked together: one for its sound pattern, one for its meaning, one for the string of words constituting it, possibly others for other data structures such as the "surface structure" and "deep structure" that are held to mediate the mapping between sound and meaning. Because no finite system can store an infinite number of sentences, and because humans in particular are clearly not pullstring dolls that emit sentences from a finite stored list, one must explain human language abilities by imputing to them a grammar, which in the technical sense is a finite rule system, or programme, or circuit design, capable of generating and recognizing the sentences of a particular language. This "mental grammar" or "psychogrammar" is the neural system that allows us to speak and understand the possible word sequences of our native tongue. A grammar for a specific language is obviously acquired by a human during childhood, but there must be neural circuitry that actually carries out the acquisition process in the child, and this circuitry may be called the language faculty or language acquisition device. An important part of the language faculty is universal grammar, an implementation of a set of principles or constraints that govern the possible form of any human grammar. (Pinker, 1996, p. 263)
       A grammar of language L is essentially a theory of L. Any scientific theory is based on a finite number of observations, and it seeks to relate the observed phenomena and to predict new phenomena by constructing general laws in terms of hypothetical constructs.... Similarly a grammar of English is based on a finite corpus of utterances (observations), and it will contain certain grammatical rules (laws) stated in terms of the particular phonemes, phrases, etc., of English (hypothetical constructs). These rules express structural relations among the sentences of the corpus and the infinite number of sentences generated by the grammar beyond the corpus (predictions). (Chomsky, 1957, p. 49)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Grammar

  • 8 смысловая память

    Aviation medicine: semantic memory

    Универсальный русско-английский словарь > смысловая память

  • 9 Artificial Intelligence

       In my opinion, none of [these programs] does even remote justice to the complexity of human mental processes. Unlike men, "artificially intelligent" programs tend to be single minded, undistractable, and unemotional. (Neisser, 1967, p. 9)
       Future progress in [artificial intelligence] will depend on the development of both practical and theoretical knowledge.... As regards theoretical knowledge, some have sought a unified theory of artificial intelligence. My view is that artificial intelligence is (or soon will be) an engineering discipline since its primary goal is to build things. (Nilsson, 1971, pp. vii-viii)
       Most workers in AI [artificial intelligence] research and in related fields confess to a pronounced feeling of disappointment in what has been achieved in the last 25 years. Workers entered the field around 1950, and even around 1960, with high hopes that are very far from being realized in 1972. In no part of the field have the discoveries made so far produced the major impact that was then promised.... In the meantime, claims and predictions regarding the potential results of AI research had been publicized which went even farther than the expectations of the majority of workers in the field, whose embarrassments have been added to by the lamentable failure of such inflated predictions....
       When able and respected scientists write in letters to the present author that AI, the major goal of computing science, represents "another step in the general process of evolution"; that possibilities in the 1980s include an all-purpose intelligence on a human-scale knowledge base; that awe-inspiring possibilities suggest themselves based on machine intelligence exceeding human intelligence by the year 2000 [one has the right to be skeptical]. (Lighthill, 1972, p. 17)
       4) Just as Astronomy Succeeded Astrology, the Discovery of Intellectual Processes in Machines Should Lead to a Science, Eventually
       Just as astronomy succeeded astrology, following Kepler's discovery of planetary regularities, the discoveries of these many principles in empirical explorations on intellectual processes in machines should lead to a science, eventually. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)
       Many problems arise in experiments on machine intelligence because things obvious to any person are not represented in any program. One can pull with a string, but one cannot push with one.... Simple facts like these caused serious problems when Charniak attempted to extend Bobrow's "Student" program to more realistic applications, and they have not been faced up to until now. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 77)
       What do we mean by [a symbolic] "description"? We do not mean to suggest that our descriptions must be made of strings of ordinary language words (although they might be). The simplest kind of description is a structure in which some features of a situation are represented by single ("primitive") symbols, and relations between those features are represented by other symbols-or by other features of the way the description is put together. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)
       [AI is] the use of computer programs and programming techniques to cast light on the principles of intelligence in general and human thought in particular. (Boden, 1977, p. 5)
       The word you look for and hardly ever see in the early AI literature is the word knowledge. They didn't believe you have to know anything, you could always rework it all.... In fact 1967 is the turning point in my mind when there was enough feeling that the old ideas of general principles had to go.... I came up with an argument for what I called the primacy of expertise, and at the time I called the other guys the generalists. (Moses, quoted in McCorduck, 1979, pp. 228-229)
       9) Artificial Intelligence Is Psychology in a Particularly Pure and Abstract Form
       The basic idea of cognitive science is that intelligent beings are semantic engines-in other words, automatic formal systems with interpretations under which they consistently make sense. We can now see why this includes psychology and artificial intelligence on a more or less equal footing: people and intelligent computers (if and when there are any) turn out to be merely different manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon. Moreover, with universal hardware, any semantic engine can in principle be formally imitated by a computer if only the right program can be found. And that will guarantee semantic imitation as well, since (given the appropriate formal behavior) the semantics is "taking care of itself" anyway. Thus we also see why, from this perspective, artificial intelligence can be regarded as psychology in a particularly pure and abstract form. The same fundamental structures are under investigation, but in AI, all the relevant parameters are under direct experimental control (in the programming), without any messy physiology or ethics to get in the way. (Haugeland, 1981b, p. 31)
       There are many different kinds of reasoning one might imagine:
        Formal reasoning involves the syntactic manipulation of data structures to deduce new ones following prespecified rules of inference. Mathematical logic is the archetypical formal representation. Procedural reasoning uses simulation to answer questions and solve problems. When we use a program to answer What is the sum of 3 and 4? it uses, or "runs," a procedural model of arithmetic. Reasoning by analogy seems to be a very natural mode of thought for humans but, so far, difficult to accomplish in AI programs. The idea is that when you ask the question Can robins fly? the system might reason that "robins are like sparrows, and I know that sparrows can fly, so robins probably can fly."
        Generalization and abstraction are also natural reasoning process for humans that are difficult to pin down well enough to implement in a program. If one knows that Robins have wings, that Sparrows have wings, and that Blue jays have wings, eventually one will believe that All birds have wings. This capability may be at the core of most human learning, but it has not yet become a useful technique in AI.... Meta- level reasoning is demonstrated by the way one answers the question What is Paul Newman's telephone number? You might reason that "if I knew Paul Newman's number, I would know that I knew it, because it is a notable fact." This involves using "knowledge about what you know," in particular, about the extent of your knowledge and about the importance of certain facts. Recent research in psychology and AI indicates that meta-level reasoning may play a central role in human cognitive processing. (Barr & Feigenbaum, 1981, pp. 146-147)
       Suffice it to say that programs already exist that can do things-or, at the very least, appear to be beginning to do things-which ill-informed critics have asserted a priori to be impossible. Examples include: perceiving in a holistic as opposed to an atomistic way; using language creatively; translating sensibly from one language to another by way of a language-neutral semantic representation; planning acts in a broad and sketchy fashion, the details being decided only in execution; distinguishing between different species of emotional reaction according to the psychological context of the subject. (Boden, 1981, p. 33)
       Can the synthesis of Man and Machine ever be stable, or will the purely organic component become such a hindrance that it has to be discarded? If this eventually happens-and I have... good reasons for thinking that it must-we have nothing to regret and certainly nothing to fear. (Clarke, 1984, p. 243)
       The thesis of GOFAI... is not that the processes underlying intelligence can be described symbolically... but that they are symbolic. (Haugeland, 1985, p. 113)
        14) Artificial Intelligence Provides a Useful Approach to Psychological and Psychiatric Theory Formation
       It is all very well formulating psychological and psychiatric theories verbally but, when using natural language (even technical jargon), it is difficult to recognise when a theory is complete; oversights are all too easily made, gaps too readily left. This is a point which is generally recognised to be true and it is for precisely this reason that the behavioural sciences attempt to follow the natural sciences in using "classical" mathematics as a more rigorous descriptive language. However, it is an unfortunate fact that, with a few notable exceptions, there has been a marked lack of success in this application. It is my belief that a different approach-a different mathematics-is needed, and that AI provides just this approach. (Hand, quoted in Hand, 1985, pp. 6-7)
       We might distinguish among four kinds of AI.
       Research of this kind involves building and programming computers to perform tasks which, to paraphrase Marvin Minsky, would require intelligence if they were done by us. Researchers in nonpsychological AI make no claims whatsoever about the psychological realism of their programs or the devices they build, that is, about whether or not computers perform tasks as humans do.
       Research here is guided by the view that the computer is a useful tool in the study of mind. In particular, we can write computer programs or build devices that simulate alleged psychological processes in humans and then test our predictions about how the alleged processes work. We can weave these programs and devices together with other programs and devices that simulate different alleged mental processes and thereby test the degree to which the AI system as a whole simulates human mentality. According to weak psychological AI, working with computer models is a way of refining and testing hypotheses about processes that are allegedly realized in human minds.
    ... According to this view, our minds are computers and therefore can be duplicated by other computers. Sherry Turkle writes that the "real ambition is of mythic proportions, making a general purpose intelligence, a mind." (Turkle, 1984, p. 240) The authors of a major text announce that "the ultimate goal of AI research is to build a person or, more humbly, an animal." (Charniak & McDermott, 1985, p. 7)
       Research in this field, like strong psychological AI, takes seriously the functionalist view that mentality can be realized in many different types of physical devices. Suprapsychological AI, however, accuses strong psychological AI of being chauvinisticof being only interested in human intelligence! Suprapsychological AI claims to be interested in all the conceivable ways intelligence can be realized. (Flanagan, 1991, pp. 241-242)
        16) Determination of Relevance of Rules in Particular Contexts
       Even if the [rules] were stored in a context-free form the computer still couldn't use them. To do that the computer requires rules enabling it to draw on just those [ rules] which are relevant in each particular context. Determination of relevance will have to be based on further facts and rules, but the question will again arise as to which facts and rules are relevant for making each particular determination. One could always invoke further facts and rules to answer this question, but of course these must be only the relevant ones. And so it goes. It seems that AI workers will never be able to get started here unless they can settle the problem of relevance beforehand by cataloguing types of context and listing just those facts which are relevant in each. (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p. 80)
       Perhaps the single most important idea to artificial intelligence is that there is no fundamental difference between form and content, that meaning can be captured in a set of symbols such as a semantic net. (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)
        18) The Assumption That the Mind Is a Formal System
       Artificial intelligence is based on the assumption that the mind can be described as some kind of formal system manipulating symbols that stand for things in the world. Thus it doesn't matter what the brain is made of, or what it uses for tokens in the great game of thinking. Using an equivalent set of tokens and rules, we can do thinking with a digital computer, just as we can play chess using cups, salt and pepper shakers, knives, forks, and spoons. Using the right software, one system (the mind) can be mapped into the other (the computer). (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)
        19) A Statement of the Primary and Secondary Purposes of Artificial Intelligence
       The primary goal of Artificial Intelligence is to make machines smarter.
       The secondary goals of Artificial Intelligence are to understand what intelligence is (the Nobel laureate purpose) and to make machines more useful (the entrepreneurial purpose). (Winston, 1987, p. 1)
       The theoretical ideas of older branches of engineering are captured in the language of mathematics. We contend that mathematical logic provides the basis for theory in AI. Although many computer scientists already count logic as fundamental to computer science in general, we put forward an even stronger form of the logic-is-important argument....
       AI deals mainly with the problem of representing and using declarative (as opposed to procedural) knowledge. Declarative knowledge is the kind that is expressed as sentences, and AI needs a language in which to state these sentences. Because the languages in which this knowledge usually is originally captured (natural languages such as English) are not suitable for computer representations, some other language with the appropriate properties must be used. It turns out, we think, that the appropriate properties include at least those that have been uppermost in the minds of logicians in their development of logical languages such as the predicate calculus. Thus, we think that any language for expressing knowledge in AI systems must be at least as expressive as the first-order predicate calculus. (Genesereth & Nilsson, 1987, p. viii)
        21) Perceptual Structures Can Be Represented as Lists of Elementary Propositions
       In artificial intelligence studies, perceptual structures are represented as assemblages of description lists, the elementary components of which are propositions asserting that certain relations hold among elements. (Chase & Simon, 1988, p. 490)
       Artificial intelligence (AI) is sometimes defined as the study of how to build and/or program computers to enable them to do the sorts of things that minds can do. Some of these things are commonly regarded as requiring intelligence: offering a medical diagnosis and/or prescription, giving legal or scientific advice, proving theorems in logic or mathematics. Others are not, because they can be done by all normal adults irrespective of educational background (and sometimes by non-human animals too), and typically involve no conscious control: seeing things in sunlight and shadows, finding a path through cluttered terrain, fitting pegs into holes, speaking one's own native tongue, and using one's common sense. Because it covers AI research dealing with both these classes of mental capacity, this definition is preferable to one describing AI as making computers do "things that would require intelligence if done by people." However, it presupposes that computers could do what minds can do, that they might really diagnose, advise, infer, and understand. One could avoid this problematic assumption (and also side-step questions about whether computers do things in the same way as we do) by defining AI instead as "the development of computers whose observable performance has features which in humans we would attribute to mental processes." This bland characterization would be acceptable to some AI workers, especially amongst those focusing on the production of technological tools for commercial purposes. But many others would favour a more controversial definition, seeing AI as the science of intelligence in general-or, more accurately, as the intellectual core of cognitive science. As such, its goal is to provide a systematic theory that can explain (and perhaps enable us to replicate) both the general categories of intentionality and the diverse psychological capacities grounded in them. (Boden, 1990b, pp. 1-2)
       Because the ability to store data somewhat corresponds to what we call memory in human beings, and because the ability to follow logical procedures somewhat corresponds to what we call reasoning in human beings, many members of the cult have concluded that what computers do somewhat corresponds to what we call thinking. It is no great difficulty to persuade the general public of that conclusion since computers process data very fast in small spaces well below the level of visibility; they do not look like other machines when they are at work. They seem to be running along as smoothly and silently as the brain does when it remembers and reasons and thinks. On the other hand, those who design and build computers know exactly how the machines are working down in the hidden depths of their semiconductors. Computers can be taken apart, scrutinized, and put back together. Their activities can be tracked, analyzed, measured, and thus clearly understood-which is far from possible with the brain. This gives rise to the tempting assumption on the part of the builders and designers that computers can tell us something about brains, indeed, that the computer can serve as a model of the mind, which then comes to be seen as some manner of information processing machine, and possibly not as good at the job as the machine. (Roszak, 1994, pp. xiv-xv)
       The inner workings of the human mind are far more intricate than the most complicated systems of modern technology. Researchers in the field of artificial intelligence have been attempting to develop programs that will enable computers to display intelligent behavior. Although this field has been an active one for more than thirty-five years and has had many notable successes, AI researchers still do not know how to create a program that matches human intelligence. No existing program can recall facts, solve problems, reason, learn, and process language with human facility. This lack of success has occurred not because computers are inferior to human brains but rather because we do not yet know in sufficient detail how intelligence is organized in the brain. (Anderson, 1995, p. 2)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Artificial Intelligence

  • 10 entrada léxica

    Ex. Current theories propose that a lexical entry in memory consists of three types of representations: phonological, lexical, and semantic.
    * * *

    Ex: Current theories propose that a lexical entry in memory consists of three types of representations: phonological, lexical, and semantic.

    Spanish-English dictionary > entrada léxica

  • 11 μιμνήσκω

    Grammatical information: v.
    Meaning: `remind (oneself), give heed, care for, make mention'; usu. - ομαι (- ῄσκω, Schwyzer 709f., Aeol. μιμναισκω [Gramm.], μνήσκεται Anacr.); fut. μνήσω, - ομαι, aor. μνῆσαι (Dor. μνᾶσαι), - ασθαι, perf. midd. μέμνημαι (Dor. -μνᾱ-, Aeol. - μναι-) with fut. μεμνήσομαι (all Il.), aor. pass. μνησθῆναι (δ 418, Aeol. μνασθῆναι) with fut. μνησθήσομαι (IA); pres. also μνάομαι, μνῶμαι, μνώοντο, μνωόμενος etc. (Il.), `woo for one's bride, court' (Od.) `solicit' (Hdt., Pi.), προ-μνάομαι `court for' (S., Pl., X.); cf. below.
    Derivatives: 1. μνῆμα, Dor. Aeol. μνᾶμα n. `memorial, monument, tomb' (Il.) with μνημ-εῖον, Ion. -ήϊον, Dor. μναμ- `id.' (Dor., IA; cf. σῆμα: σημεῖον a.o., Chantraine Form. 61, Schwyzer 470), rare a. late - άτιον, - άδιον, - άφιον, - όριον (s. μεμόριον); μνηματίτης λόγος `funeral oration' (Choerob., Eust.; Redard 47); ὑπόμνη-μα `remembrance, note' (Att.) with - ματικός, - ματίζομαι -- 2. μνήμη, Dor. μνάμα f. `remembrance, mention' (Dor., IA; μνή-σ-μη Lycaonia); from this or from μνῆμα: μνημ-ήϊος `as a remembrance' (Phryg.), - ίσκομαι = μιμνήσκομαι (Pap.). -- 3. μνεία f. `remembrance, mention' (Att.), verbal noun \< * μνᾱ-ΐα as πεν-ία a.o. (cf. Chantraine Form. 81), hardly with Schwyzer 425 foll. Sandsjoe Adj. auf - αιος 75f. enlarged from a root noun *μνᾱ. -- 4. μνῆστις ( μνᾶσ-) f. `remembrance, thought, renown' (ν 280) with - σ- as in μνη-σ-θῆναι, μνη-σ-τύς etc.; rather after λῆστις (s. λανθάνω) than with Porzig Satzinhalte 196 the other way round. -- 5. ἀνά-, ὑπό-μνη-σις `remembrance, admonition' (Att.); also μνησι- as verbal 1. member e.g. in μνησι-κακέω `remember the (suffered) wrong' with - ία, - ος (IA). -- 6. μνηστύς, - ύος f. `courting' (Od.), later replaced by μνηστ-εία, - ευμα (s. μνηστεύω); attempt at semantic differentiation by Benveniste Noms d'agent 68f. -- 7. μνηστήρ (μνᾱσ-), - τῆρος m. `wooer' (Od.; on μνηστήρ: μνηστύς Fraenkel Nom. ag. 1, 32 n. 2), also name of a month ( μναστήρ, Messene; cf. Γαμη-λιών and Fraenkel 1, 162); adjectiv. `remembering, reminding' (Pi.; Fraenkel 1, 156 f.), f. μνήστειρα `bride' (AP, `reminding' (Pi.); μνῆστρον `betrothal, marriage' ( Cod. Just.) ; προμνήστρ-ια ( προ-μνάομαι) f. `(woman) matchmaker' (E., Ar., Pl.), - ίς `id.' (X.). -- 8. μνήστωρ `mindful' (A.); on μνήσ-τωρ, - τήρ Fraenkel 2, 12, Benveniste Noms d'agent 47. -- 9. μνηστή f. `wood and won, wedded, memorable' (Hom., A. R.) also `worth remembering' ( Sammelb. 6138), πολυ-μνήστη (- ος) `much wood' (Od.), also `mindful, remaining in memory' (Emp., A.); but Ἄ-μνᾱτος (Gortyn; Schwyzer 503); from this μνηστεύω ( μνασ-) `woo a wife' (Od.), also `canvass a job' with μνήστευμα (E.), - εία (hell.) `wooing'. --10. μνήμων ( μνά-), - ονος m. f., first from μνῆμα, but also directly associated with the verb, `mindful' (Od.), often as title of an office `notary, registrator' (Halic., Crete, Arist.), with μνημο-σύνη `remembrance' (Θ 181); cf. Wyss - σύνη 34; also as name of one of the Muses (h. Merc., Hes.); - συνον n. `id.' (Hdt., Th., Ar.); prob. poetical (Wyss 50); - ος `for remembrance' (LXX); besides Μναμόν-α (Ar. Lys. 1248; cf. on εὑφρόνη), Μνημ-ώ (Orph.) = Μνημοσύνη. Denominat. μνημον-εύω `remember' (IA) with μνημόνευ-σις, - μα etc. Adj. μνημον-ικός `for remembrance, with good memory' (Att.). -- 11. PN like Μνησεύς (Pl.; short name of Μνήσ-αρχος, Bosshardt 130), Μνασίλλει (Boeot.); Μνασέας; prob. hellenis. of Sem. Mǝnašše = Μανασση (Schulze Kl. Schr. 394 f.; cf. Bechtel Dial. 1, 414).
    Origin: IE [Indo-European] [726] * mneh₂- `mention'
    Etymology: The above paradigm, together with the nominal formations built on a general μνᾱ-, is a purely Greek creation. The basis of the generalized system were of course one or a few verbal forms; as however the new system was already complete at the beginneing of Greek and the cognate languages present nothing that could be compared directly with the Greek forms, we can no more follow its creation. A monosyllabic IE * mnā- is found in class. Sanskrit, as in aor. a-mnā-siṣ-uḥ `they mentioned', which typologically reminds of μνῆ-σ-αι, in the perf. act. ma-mnau (gramm.), prob. innovation to midd. ma-mn-e (cf. μέμονα) and not (with Brugmann Grundr.2 II: 3,441) to be connected with μέμνημαι; further in - mnā-ta- `mentioned' and mnā-ya-te `is mentioned', with which agree on the one hand Ἄ-μνᾱ-τος and - with secondary σ (Schwyzer 503) - μνη-σ-τή, on the other hand μνάομαι. But the last is undoubtedly analogically innovated after wellknown patterns to μνήσασθαι etc.; also the verbal adj. does not look archaic. The development of μιμνήσκω has been prob. about the same as with κικλήσκω (where however καλέ-σαι was retained) or with βιβρώσκω (s.v.), where also non-Greek agreements to βρω- are rare or doubtful. The general re-creation isolated μιμνήσκω both formally and semantically from the old μέμονα and even more from μαίνομαι. -- From μνάομαι `remind, mention' developed as courteous expression the meaning `woo a woman, court'; s. Benveniste Sprachgesch. u. Wortbed. 13 ff., where also against the connection with γυνή (Schwyzer 726 n. 1). Against Benveniste Ambrosini Rend. Acc. Lincei 8: 10, 62ff. with new interpretation: to δάμνημι, ἀδμής; not convincing. -- Further rich lit. in WP. 2, 264ff., Pok. 726ff., W. -Hofmann s. meminī, Fraenkel Lit. et. Wb. s. miñti. Cf. μαίνομαι, μέμονα, μένος.
    Page in Frisk: 2,238-241

    Greek-English etymological dictionary (Ελληνικά-Αγγλικά ετυμολογική λεξικό) > μιμνήσκω

  • 12 funkcja

    -i; -e; gen pl; -i; f
    function; ( stanowisko) function, position
    * * *
    f.
    1. (= stanowisko) position, function; funkcja kustosza curatorship; funkcja redaktora editorship; pełnić funkcję act as, do duty for; pełnić kilka funkcji jednocześnie wear several hats.
    2. (= realizowanie czynności) function, facility; funkcja pamięci ( w aparacie telefonicznym) memory facility; funkcja przeszukiwania search function; spełniać funkcję czegoś perform a function of, serve the function of; funkcja semantyczna jęz. semantic function; funkcja zdaniowa log. propositional function; funkcja harmoniczna muz. harmonic function.
    3. fil. function.
    4. mat. function; funkcja algebraiczna algebraic function; funkcja analityczna analitic function; funkcja ciągła continuous function; funkcja odwrotna inverse function; funkcja okresowa periodic function; funkcja pierwotna primitive; funkcja podcałkowa integrand; funkcja prawdopodobieństwa probability function; funkcja rzeczywista real-valued function; funkcja stała constant function; funkcja trygonometryczna trigonometric function; funkcja wielowartościowa multivalued function; funkcja wykładnicza exponential function; x jest funkcją y x is a function of y.

    The New English-Polish, Polish-English Kościuszko foundation dictionary > funkcja

  • 13 δόξα

    δόξα, ης, ἡ (s. δοξάζω; in var. mngs. Hom.+; in Ath. ‘meaning’). In many of the passages in our lit. the OT and Gr-Rom. perceptions of dependence of fame and honor on extraordinary performance deserve further exploration. SIG 456, 15 is typical: concern for others leads to enhancement of one’s δόξα or reputation. The Common Gk. usage of δ. in sense of ‘notion, opinion’ is not found in the NT.
    ① the condition of being bright or shining, brightness, splendor, radiance (a distinctive aspect of Hb. כָּבוֹד).
    ⓐ of physical phenomena (PGM 13, 189 τὴν δόξαν τοῦ φωτός, cp. 298ff. On this Rtzst., Mysterienrel.3 357ff, also 314 δόξα ἐκ τ. πυρός [cp. Just., D. 128]; 315 φῶς κ. δόξαν θεῖαν [=Cleopatra 150]; LXX; TestJob 43:6 τῆ λαμπάδα αὐτοῦ) οὐκ ἐνέβλεπον ἀπὸ τῆς δ. τοῦ φωτός I could not see because of the brightness of the light Ac 22:11; ὁρᾶν τὴν δ. see the radiance Lk 9:32; cp. vs. 31. Everything in heaven has this radiance: the radiant bodies in the sky 1 Cor 15:40f (cp. PGM 13, 64 σὺ ἔδωκας ἡλίῳ τὴν δόξαν κ. δύναμιν; 448; Sir 43:9, 12; 50:7).
    ⓑ of humans involved in transcendent circumstances, and also transcendent beings: cherubim (Sir 49:8; Ezk 10:4) Hb 9:5; angels Lk 2:9; Rv 18:1. Esp. of God’s self (Ex 24:17; 40:34; Num 14:10; Bar 5:9 τὸ φῶς τῆς δόξης αὐτου; Tob 12:15; 13:16 BA; 2 Macc 2:8; SibOr 5, 427) ὁ θεὸς τῆς δ. (En 25:7) Ac 7:2 (Ps 28:3); cp. J 12:41 (Is 6:1); Ac 7:55; 2 Th 1:9; 2 Pt 1:17b; Rv 15:8; 19:1; 21:11, 23. ὁ πατὴρ τῆς δ. Eph 1:17; βασιλεὺς τῆς δ. AcPl BMM verso 24 and 26. But also of those who appear before God: Moses 2 Cor 3:7–11, 18 (Just., D. 127, 3; cp. Ἀδὰμ τῆς δ. θεοῦ ἐγυμνώθη GrBar 4:16); Christians in the next life 1 Cor 15:43; Col 3:4. The δόξα τοῦ θεοῦ as it relates to the final judgment Ro 3:23; 5:2 (but s. 3); Jesus himself has a σῶμα τῆς δ. radiant, glorious body Phil 3:21; cp. 2 Cl 17:5. Christ is the κύριος τ. δόξης 1 Cor 2:8 (cp. En 22:14; 27:3, 5; 36:4; 40:3 of God; PGM 7, 713 κύριοι δόξης of deities).—The concept has been widened to denote the glory, majesty, sublimity of God in general (PGM 4, 1202 ἐφώνησά σου τ. ἀνυπέρβλητον δόξαν; Orig., C. Cels. 4, 1, 24 οἰκοδομεῖν … ναὸν δόξης θεοῦ) ἀλλάσσειν τὴν δ. τοῦ θεοῦ exchange the majesty of God Ro 1:23; κατενώπιον τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ Jd 24 (cp. En 104:1)=before himself. Christ was raised fr. the dead διὰ τῆς δ. τοῦ πατρός by the majesty (here, as in J 2:11, the thought of power, might is also present; cp. Rtzst., Mysterienrel.3 344, 359 and PGM 4, 1650 δὸς δόξαν καὶ χάριν τῷ φυλακτηρίῳ τούτῳ; Wsd 9:11 φυλάξει με ἐν τ. δόξῃ; Philo, Spec. Leg. 1, 45.—JVogel, Het sanscrit woord tejas [=gloedvuur] in de beteekenis van magische Kracht 1930) of the Father Ro 6:4; cp. Mt 16:27; Mk 8:38; AcPl Ha 10, 9; ὄψῃ τὴν δ. τοῦ θεοῦ J 11:40; κράτος τῆς δ. majestic power Col 1:11; πλοῦτος τῆς δ. the wealth of his glory Ro 9:23; Eph 1:18; cp. Eph 3:16; Phil 4:19; Col 1:27; δ. τῆς χάριτος (PGM 4, 1650, s. above) Eph 1:6; w. ἀρετή 2 Pt 1:3 (τῆς ἐπʼ ἀρετῇ καὶ δόξῃ διαλήψεως, ins at Aphrodisias II, 14: ZPE 8, ’71, 186); ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δ. Hb 1:3; τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν τῆς δ. τοῦ μεγάλου θεοῦ Tit 2:13. Some would classify Ro 2:7, 10 here, but these and related pass. w. the formulation δόξα καὶ τιμή prob. are better placed in 3 below because of their focus on honor and prestige. Doxol. σοῦ ἐστιν ἡ δ. εἰς τ. αἰῶνας, ἀμήν (Odes 12:15 [Prayer of Manasseh]) Mt 6:13 v.l.; AcPl Ha 2, 33; εἰς ἔπαινον τῆς δ. αὐτοῦ Eph 1:12, 14; cp. 1:6.—1 Th 2:12; 1 Pt 5:10. Pl. Hv 1, 3, 3. κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τῆς δ. τοῦ μακαρίου θεοῦ 1 Ti 1:11. Transferred to Christ: Mt 19:28; 24:30; 25:31; Mk 10:37; 13:26; Lk 9:26; 21:27; J 1:14; 2:11; Js 2:1 (AMeyer, D. Rätsel d. Js 1930, 118ff); B 12:7; AcPl Ha 7:7. τὸν φωτισμὸν τοῦ εὐαγγελίου τῆς δ. τοῦ χριστοῦ the news that shines with the greatness of Christ 2 Cor 4:4; cp. 4:6 (cp. Just., A I, 51, 8 παραγίνεσθαι μετὰ δόξης μέλλει). Of Christ’s prestige promoted by Paul’s associates 2 Cor 8:23 (but s. d and 3 below).
    ⓒ The state of being in the next life is thus described as participation in the radiance or glory
    α. w. ref. to Christ: εἰσελθεῖν εἰς τὴν δ. αὐτοῦ enter into his glory Lk 24:26 (βασιλείαν P75 first hand); ἀνελήμφθη ἐν δ. 1 Ti 3:16; cp. τὰς μετὰ ταῦτα δ.1 Pt 1:11 (but s. β below; pl. because of the παθήματα; cp. also Wsd 18:24; Isocr. 4, 51; POslo 85, 13 [III A.D.]), 21. ἐν τῇ ἀποκαλύψει τῆς δ. αὐτοῦ 4:13. Also of Christ’s preëxistence: J 17:5, 22, 24.
    β. w. ref. to his followers (cp. Da 12:13; Herm. Wr. 10, 7): Ro 8:18, 21; 1 Cor 2:7; 2 Cor 4:17; 1 Th 2:12; 2 Th 2:14; 2 Ti 2:10; Hb 2:10; 1 Pt 5:1, 4 (στέφανος τ. δόξης; on this expr. cp. Jer 13:18; TestBenj 4:1); εἰς … δ. καὶ τιμὴν ἐν ἀποκαλύψει Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ 1 Pt 1:7 (perh. 1:11 belongs here, in ref. to sufferings that are endured in behalf of Christ). πνεῦμα τῆς δ. w. πν. τοῦ θεοῦ 4:14. ἵνα πνευματικὴν καὶ ἄφθαρτον τῆς δικαιοσύνης δόξαν κληρονομήσωσιν ending of Mk 16:14 v.l. (Freer ms. ln. 11f) (Cleopatra 146f ἐνέδυσεν αὐτοὺς θείαν δόξαν πνευματικήν); ἥτις ἐστὶν δ. ὑμῶν (my troubles) promote your glory Eph 3:13 (s. MDibelius, comm. on Col 1:24ff) τόπος τῆς δ.=the hereafter 1 Cl 5:4.
    ⓓ of reflected radiance reflection ἀνὴρ … εἰκὼν καὶ δόξα θεοῦ man (as distinguished from woman) is the image and reflection of God 1 Cor 11:7 (perh. this thought finds expression Ro 3:23; 5:2, but s. 3, below); also γυνὴ δόξα ἀνδρός ibid. (cp. the formal similarity but difft. mng. in the Jewish ins in Lietzmann comm. ad loc.: ἡ δόξα Σωφρονίου Λούκιλλα εὐλογημένη; s. also AFeuillet, RB 81, ’74, 161–82). Some interpret δ. Χριστοῦ 2 Cor 8:23 in ref. to Paul’s associates (but s. 1b).
    ② a state of being magnificent, greatness, splendor, anything that catches the eye (1 Esdr 6:9; 1 Macc 10:60, 86; 2 Macc 5:20): fine clothing (Sir 6:31; 27:8; 45:7; 50:11) of a king Mt 6:29; Lk 12:27; of royal splendor gener. (Bar 5:6; 1 Macc 10:58; Jos., Ant. 8, 166) Mt 4:8; Lk 4:6; Rv 21:24, 26. Gener. of human splendor of any sort 1 Pt 1:24 (Is 40:6).
    ③ honor as enhancement or recognition of status or performance, fame, recognition, renown, honor, prestige (s. s.v. ἀγαθός and δικαιο-entries; Diod S 15, 61, 5 abs. δόξα= good reputation; Appian, Bell. Civ. 2, 89 §376 δ. ἀγαθή good reputation, esteem; Polyaenus 8 Prooem. δόξα ἀθάνατος=eternal renown; Herm. Wr. 14, 7; PsSol 1:4; 17:6; Jos., Ant. 4, 14, Vi. 274; Just., A II, 10, 8 δόξης … καταφρονήσαντος) of public approbation (cp. Orig., C. Cels. 7, 24, 1; Did., Gen. 238, 25) ἐνώπιον πάντων τῶν συνανακειμένων σοι Lk 14:10; δ. λαμβάνειν (En 99:1; Diog. L. 9, 37 of Democr. οὐκ ἐκ τόπου δόξαν λαβεῖν βουλόμενος) J 5:41, 44a al.; sim. of God Rv 4:11 and the Lamb 5:12 receiving honor. J 8:54 (=make high claims for myself); 12:43a (cp. 8:50); Ro 9:4; 2 Cor 6:8 (opp. ἀτιμία); 1 Th 2:6; 1 Cl 3:1; B 19:3; Hv 1, 1, 8. Gener. γυνὴ … ἐὰν κομᾷ, δόξα αὐτῇ ἐστιν, i.e. she enjoys a favorable reputation 1 Cor 11:15 (opp. ἀτιμία). Oxymoron ὧν … ἡ δόξα ἐν τῇ αἰσχύνῃ αὐτῶν whose prestige is in their disgrace Phil 3:19. Of enhancement of divine prestige as an objective J 7:18; Lazarus’ illness redounds to God’s honor 11:4; Ro 15:7. Of divine approbation of pers. δ. τοῦ θεοῦ J 5:44b; 12:43b (cp. 1QH 17:15; 1QS 4:23); Ro 3:23; 5:2. Here also belong pass. w. the form δὸξα καὶ τιμή / τιμὴ καὶ δόξα (LXX; ins, e.g. OGI 223, 12; 244, 19f; 763, 37; Welles 42, 6; also PGM 4, 1616f δὸς δ. καὶ τιμὴν κ. χάριν; Just., D. 42, 1) Ro 2:7, 10; 1 Ti 1:17; Hb 2:7, 9 (Ps 8:6); cp. 3:3; 1 Pt 1:7; 2 Pt 1:17; Rv 4:9, 11; 5:12, 13; 21:26. Of pers. who bestow renown through their excellence: of Jesus Lk 2:32 (cp. Ro 9:4); of Paul’s epistolary recipients ὑμεῖς ἡ δ. ἡμῶν you bring us renown 1 Th 2:20 (cp. the Jewish ins in Lietzmann, 1d above: Loucilla brings renown to Sophronius).—Israel’s liturgy furnishes the pattern for the liturg. formula δ. θεῷ praise is (BWeiss; HHoltzmann; Harnack; Zahn; EKlostermann; ASchlatter; Rengstorf) or be (Weizsäcker; JWeiss; OHoltzmann) to God Lk 2:14. Cp. 19:38; Ro 11:36; 16:27; Gal 1:5; Eph 3:21; Phil 4:20; 2 Ti 4:18 (perh. Christ as referent); Hb 13:21; 1 Pt 4:11; 1 Cl 20:12; 50:7 al.; τιμὴ καὶ δ. 1 Ti 1:17 (s. also above as extra-biblical formulation, esp. OGI 223, 12; 244, 19f; 763, 37); cp. Jd 25 v.l.; Rv 5:13; 7:12. Doxologies to Christ 2 Pt 3:18; Rv 1:6; εἰς (τὴν) δ. (τοῦ) θεοῦ to the praise of God Ro 15:7; 1 Cor 10:31; 2 Cor 4:15; Phil 1:11; 2:11; cp. Ro 3:7. Also πρὸ δ. 2 Cor 1:20; πρὸ τὴν αὐτοῦ τοῦ κυρίου (Christ) δ. 8:19. Hence the expr. δ. διδόναι τῷ θεῷ praise God (Bar 2:17f; 1 Esdr 9:8; 4 Macc 1:12): in thanksgiving Lk 17:18; Rv 19:7; as a form of relig. devotion: Ac 12:23; Ro 4:20; Rv 4:9; 11:13; 14:7; 16:9; as an adjuration δὸς δ. τῷ θεῷ give God the praise by telling the truth J 9:24.—GBoobyer, ‘Thanksgiving’ and the ‘Glory of God’ in Paul, diss. Leipzig 1929; LChampion, Benedictions and Doxologies in the Epistles of Paul ’35; MPamment, The Meaning of δόξα in the Fourth Gospel: ZNW 74, ’83, 12–16, God’s glory is manifested through the gift of Jesus’ voluntary self-surrender on the cross.
    ④ a transcendent being deserving of honor, majestic being, by metonymy (cp. Diod S 15, 58, 1 of citizens who stood out from among all others in ἐξουσίαι καὶ δόξαι=offices and honors) of angelic beings (s. Philo, Spec. Leg. 1, 45; PGM 1, 199) δόξαι majestic (heavenly) beings Jd 8; 2 Pt 2:10 (s. also Ex 15:11 LXX; TestJud 25:2 αἱ δυνάμεις τ. δόξης. Also the magical text in Rtzst., Poim. p. 28 [VI 17] χαιρέτωσάν σου αἱ δόξαι (practically = δυνάμει) εἰς αἰῶνα, κύριε). Cp. JSickenberger, Engelsoder Teufelslästerer? Festschrift zur Jahrhundertfeier d. Univers. Breslau 1911, 621ff. The mng. majesties and by metonymy illustrious persons is also prob.—On the whole word Rtzst., Mysterienrel.3 289; 314f; 344; 355ff; AvGall, D. Herrlichkeit Gottes 1900; IAbrahams, The Glory of God 1925.—AForster, The Mng. of Δόξα in the Greek Bible: ATR 12, 1929/1930, 311ff; EOwen, Δόξα and Cognate Words: JTS 33, ’32, 139–50; 265–79; CMohrmann, Note sur doxa: ADebrunner Festschr. ’54, 321–28; LBrockington, LXX Background to the NT Use of δ., Studies in the Gospels in memory of RLightfoot ’55, 1–8.—HBöhlig, D. Geisteskultur v. Tarsos 1913, 97ff; GWetter, D. Verherrlichung im Joh.-ev.: Beitr. z. Rel.-wiss. II 1915, 32–113, Phos 1915; RLloyd, The Word ‘Glory’ in the Fourth Gospel: ET 43, ’32, 546–48; BBotte, La gloire du Christ dans l’Evangile de S. Jean: Quest. liturgiques 12, 1927, 65ff; HPass, The Glory of the Father; a Study in St John 13–17, ’35; WThüsing, Die Erhöhung u. Verherrlichung Jesu im J, ’60.—GKittel, D. Rel. gesch. u. d. Urchristentum ’32, 82ff; JSchneider, Doxa ’32; HKittel, D. Herrlichkeit Gottes ’34; MGreindl, Κλεος, Κυδος, Ευχος, Τιμη, Φατις, Δοξα, diss. Munich ’38; AVermeulen, Semantic Development of Gloria in Early-Christian Latin ’56.—RAC IV 210–16; XI 196–225.—B. 1144f. DELG s.v. δοκάω etc. II p. 291. Schmidt, Syn. I 321–28, s. δοκέω. M-M. EDNT. TW. Spicq. Sv.

    Ελληνικά-Αγγλικά παλαιοχριστιανική Λογοτεχνία > δόξα

  • 14 ἀποστοματίζω

    ἀποστοματίζω (s. στόμα) is found since Pla. (Euthyd. 276c; 277a) w. the mngs. ‘dictate for recitation’ or ‘repeat from memory’ (ἀπὸ στόματος), which do not fit the context of Lk 11:53 (note that the passage is not text-critically certain; see Tdf.), but a transf. sense such as question closely, interrogate, quiz τινὰ περί τινος (so L-S-J-M s.v. I 2; cp. Pla. in Pollux 2, 102 [pass.]) is prob.; but s. Wlh. ad loc. Ancient commentators interpreted it as catch (him) in someth. he says=vs. 54; then approx. watch his utterances closely, but such exposition imposes excessive semantic burden on the context. On the analogy of ἐπιστοματίζω ‘to silence’ someone, Luke’s usage may be rendered have him talk (about many things); the opposition expects Jesus to say someth. that would be incriminating, vs. 54.—DELG s.v. στομα. M-M.

    Ελληνικά-Αγγλικά παλαιοχριστιανική Λογοτεχνία > ἀποστοματίζω

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  • semantic memory — noun a) A subcategory of declarative memory, semantic memory stores general information such as names and facts. Directions to mom’s house are stored in your semantic memory. b) A system of the brain where logical concepts relating to the outside …   Wiktionary

  • semantic memory — noun your memory for meanings and general (impersonal) facts • Hypernyms: ↑long term memory, ↑LTM * * * semantic memory noun A computer memory that recalls vast blocks of information corresponding to whole areas of human knowledge, eg language or …   Useful english dictionary

  • Memory for the future — refers to the ability to use memory to picture and plan future events. It is a subcategory of mental time travel which Suddendorf and Corballis described to be the process that allows people to imagine both past and potential future events.… …   Wikipedia

  • Memory consolidation — is a category of processes that stabilize a memory trace after the initial acquisition.[1] Consolidation is distinguished into two specific processes, synaptic consolidation, which occurs within the first few hours after learning, and system… …   Wikipedia

  • Memory errors — Memory gaps and errors refer to the incorrect recall, or complete loss, of information in the memory system for a specific detail and/or event. Memory errors may include remembering events that never occurred, or remembering them differently from …   Wikipedia

  • Semantic dementia — (SD) is a progressive neurodegenerative disorder characterized by loss of semantic memory in both the verbal and non verbal domains. The most common presenting symptoms are in the verbal domain however (with loss of word meaning) and it is… …   Wikipedia

  • Memory disorder — Memory can be defined as an organism s ability to encode, retain, and recall information. Disorders of memory can range from mild to severe, yet are all a result of damage to neuroanatomical structures; either in part or in full. This damage… …   Wikipedia

  • Memory and trauma — Memory is described by psychology as the ability of an organism to store, retain, and subsequently retrieve information. When an individual experiences a traumatic event, whether physically or psychologically traumatic, his or her memory can be… …   Wikipedia

  • Memory sport — Memory sport, sometimes referred to as competitive memory or the mind sport of memory, is a competition in which participants attempt to memorize the most information that they can then present back, under certain guidelines. The sport has been… …   Wikipedia

  • Memory and social interactions — Memory underpins and enables social interactions in a variety of ways. In order to engage in successful social interaction, organisms must be able to remember how they should interact with one another, who they have interacted with previously,… …   Wikipedia

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