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61 hail
I 1. [heil] noun1) (small balls of ice falling from the clouds: There was some hail during the rainstorm last night.) χαλάζι2) (a shower (of things): a hail of arrows.) καταιγισμός2. verb(to shower hail: It was hailing as I drove home.) ρίχνω χαλάζιII 1. [heil] verb1) (to shout to in order to attract attention: We hailed a taxi; The captain hailed the passing ship.) φωνάζω2) (to greet or welcome (a person, thing etc) as something: His discoveries were hailed as a great step forward in medicine.) χαιρετίζω2. noun(a shout (to attract attention): Give that ship a hail.) φωνή3. interjection(an old word of greeting: Hail, O King!) χαίρε! -
62 hail
I [heɪl]1. noun1) small balls of ice falling from the clouds:بَرَدThere was some hail during the rainstorm last night.
2) a shower (of things):وابِلٌ منa hail of arrows.
2. verbto shower hail:يَنْزِلُ البَرَد بِغَزارَه II [heɪl]It was hailing as I drove home.
1. verb1) to shout to in order to attract attention:يُنادي، يَدْعو من بَعيدThe captain hailed the passing ship.
2) to greet or welcome (a person, thing etc) as something:يُرَحِّبُ بِHis discoveries were hailed as a great step forward in medicine.
2. nouna shout (to attract attention):هُتاف، تَحِيَّه، تَرْحيبGive that ship a hail.
3. interjectionan old word of greeting:طَريقة قَديمَة للتَّحِيَّهHail, O King!
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63 hail
I 1. [heil] noun1) (small balls of ice falling from the clouds: There was some hail during the rainstorm last night.) grêle2) (a shower (of things): a hail of arrows.) pluie2. verb(to shower hail: It was hailing as I drove home.) grêlerII 1. [heil] verb1) (to shout to in order to attract attention: We hailed a taxi; The captain hailed the passing ship.) héler2) (to greet or welcome (a person, thing etc) as something: His discoveries were hailed as a great step forward in medicine.) saluer2. noun(a shout (to attract attention): Give that ship a hail.) appel3. interjection(an old word of greeting: Hail, O King!) salut -
64 hail
I 1. [heil] noun1) (small balls of ice falling from the clouds: There was some hail during the rainstorm last night.) granizo2) (a shower (of things): a hail of arrows.) saraivada2. verb(to shower hail: It was hailing as I drove home.) chover granizoII 1. [heil] verb1) (to shout to in order to attract attention: We hailed a taxi; The captain hailed the passing ship.) chamar2) (to greet or welcome (a person, thing etc) as something: His discoveries were hailed as a great step forward in medicine.) saudar2. noun(a shout (to attract attention): Give that ship a hail.) brado3. interjection(an old word of greeting: Hail, O King!) salve -
65 Ampère, André-Marie
SUBJECT AREA: Electricity[br]b. 22 Jan 1775 Lyon, Franced. 10 June 1836 Marseille, France[br]French physicist and mathematician who established laws and principles relating magnetism and electricity to each other.[br]Ampère was reputed to have mastered all the then-known mathematics by the age of 12. He became Professor of Physics and Chemistry at Bourg in 1801 and a professor of mathematics at the Ecole Polytechnique in Paris in 1809. Observing a demonstration in 1820 of Oersted's discovery that a magnetic needle was deflected when placed near a current-carrying wire, Ampère was inspired to investigate the subject of electricity, of which he had no previous experience. Within a week he had prepared the first of several important communications on his discoveries to the Academy of Sciences in Paris. Included was a new hypothesis formed on the basis of his experiments on the relation between electricity and magnetism. He investigated the forces exerted on each other by current-carrying conductors and the properties of a solenoid. His mathematical theory describing these phenomena provided the foundations for the development of electro-dynamics and his classic work Théorie mathématique des phénomènes électro-dynamiques was published in 1827.The name "ampere" was adopted to replace the name "weber" as a unit of current after Helmholtz proposed such a change in 1881.[br]Principal Honours and DistinctionsBibliography1827, Théorie mathématique des phénomènes électro-dynamiques, Paris; repub. 1958, Paris (his chief published work).Further ReadingP.Lenard, 1933, Great Men of Science, London, pp. 223–30 (provides a short account). C.C.Gillispie (ed.), 1970, Dictionary of Scientific Biography, Vol. 1, New York, pp.139–46.GW -
66 Barlow, Peter
SUBJECT AREA: Ports and shipping[br]b. 13 October 1776 Norwich, Englandd. 1 March 1862 Kent, England[br]English mathematician, physicist and optician.[br]Barlow had little formal academic education, but by his own efforts rectified this deficiency. His contributions to various periodicals ensured that he became recognized as a man of considerable scientific understanding. In 1801, through competitive examination, he became Assistant Mathematics Master at the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, and some years later was promoted to Professor. He resigned from this post in 1847, but retained full salary in recognition of his many public services.He is remembered for several notable achievements, and for some experiments designed to overcome problems such as the deviation of compasses in iron ships. Here, he proposed the use of small iron plates designed to overcome other attractions: these were used by both the British and Russian navies. Optical experiments commenced around 1827 and in later years he carried out tests to optimize the size and shape of many parts used in the railways that were spreading throughout Britain and elsewhere at that time.In 1814 he published mathematical tables of squares, cubes, square roots, cube roots and reciprocals of all integers from 1 to 10,000. This volume was of great value in ship design and other engineering processes where heavy numerical effort is required; it was reprinted many times, the last being in 1965 when it had been all but superseded by the calculator and the computer. In the preface to the original edition, Barlow wrote, "the only motive which prompted me to engage in this unprofitable task was the utility that I conceived might result from my labour… if I have succeeded in facilitating abstruse arithmetical calculations, then I have obtained the object in view."[br]Principal Honours and DistinctionsFRS 1823; Copley Medal (for discoveries in magnetism) 1825. Honorary Member, Institution of Civil Engineers 1820.Bibliography1811, An Elementary Investigation of the Theory of Numbers.1814, Barlow's Tables (these have continued to be published until recently, one edition being in 1965 (London: Spon); later editions have taken the integers up to 12,500).1817, Essay on the Strength of Timber and Other Materials.Further ReadingDictionary of National Biography.FMW -
67 Bigelow, Erastus Brigham
SUBJECT AREA: Textiles[br]b. 2 April 1814 West Boyleston, Massachusetts, USAd. 6 December 1879 USA[br]American inventor of power looms for making lace and many types of carpets.[br]Bigelow was born in West Boyleston, Massachusetts, where his father struggled as a farmer, wheelwright, and chairmaker. Before he was 20, Bigelow had many different jobs, among them farm labourer, clerk, violin player and cotton-mill employee. In 1830, he went to Leicester Academy, Massachusetts, but he could not afford to go on to Harvard. He sought work in Boston, New York and elsewhere, making various inventions.The most important of his early inventions was the power loom of 1837 for making coach lace. This loom contained all the essential features of his carpet looms, which he developed and patented two years later. He formed the Clinton Company for manufacturing carpets at Leicester, Massachusetts, but the factory became so large that its name was adopted for the town. The next twenty years saw various mechanical discoveries, while his range of looms was extended to cover Brussels, Wilton, tapestry and velvet carpets. Bigelow has been justly described as the originator of every fundamental device in these machines, which were amongst the largest textile machines of their time. The automatic insertion and withdrawal of strong wires with looped ends was the means employed to raise the looped pile of the Brussels carpets, while thinner wires with a knife blade at the end raised and then severed the loops to create the rich Wilton pile. At the Great Exhibition in 1851, it was declared that his looms made better carpets than any from hand looms. He also developed other looms for special materials.He became a noted American economist, writing two books about tariff problems, advocating that the United States should not abandon its protectionist policies. In 1860 he was narrowly defeated in a Congress election. The following year he was a member of the committee that established the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.[br]Further ReadingNational Cyclopedia of American Biography III (the standard account of his life). F.H.Sawyer, 1927, Clinton Item (provides a broad background to his life).C.Singer (ed.), 1958, A History of Technology, Vol. V, Oxford: Clarendon Press (describes Bigelow's inventions).RLHBiographical history of technology > Bigelow, Erastus Brigham
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68 Ἄρτεμις
Ἄρτεμις, ιδος, ἡ (Hom. et al.) Artemis, a deity whose worship was widespread (Diana is her Roman name; on the association, s. esp. Catullus 34). The center of her worship in Asia Minor was at Ephesus (DHogarth, Excav. at Eph. The Archaic Artemisia, 1908; CPicard, Ephèse et Claros 1922.—Jos., Ant. 15, 89; SibOr 5, 293; Ath. 17:3; Tat. 3:1) Ac 19:24, 27f, 34f. As here, A. is called ‘The Great’ in the lit. (X. Eph. 1, 11, 5) and in ins fr. Ephesus (CIG 2963c, 10; τῇ μεγίστῃ θεᾷ Ἐφεσίᾳ Ἀρτέμιδι IBM III, 481, 324f; JWood, Discoveries at Ephesus 1877 app., Ins. fr. the Theater no. 1 col. 1, 9; 4, 48) and elsewh. (IG XII/2, 270 and 514; cp. PGM 4, 2720–22). S. BMüller, ΜΕΓΑΣ ΘΕΟΣ 1913, 331–33.—Jessen, Ephesia: Pauly-W. V 1905, 2753–71; AWikenhauser, comm. Ac 1921, 363–67; JdeJongh, Jr., De tempel te Ephese en het beeld van Diana: GereformTT 26, 1926, 461–75; LTaylor, Beginn. V, ’33, 251–56; HThiersch, Artemis Ephesia I: AGG III 12, ’35; Haenchen, ad loc.; Kl. Pauly I 6118–25; ROster, The Ephesian Artemis as an Opponent of Early Christianity: JAC 19, ’76, 24–44; PScherrer, JÖAI 60, ’90, 87–101; RStrelan, Paul, Artemis, and the Jews in Ephesus: BZNW 80, ’96; s. also HEngelmann, ZPE 97, ’93 279–89 on the imperial cult; EDNT I 158. 168–80. S. on Ἔφεσος.—DELG. -
69 Knowledge
It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and, in a word, all sensible objects, have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But, with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it into question may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. For, what are the forementioned objects but things we perceive by sense? and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations? and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived? (Berkeley, 1996, Pt. I, No. 4, p. 25)It seems to me that the only objects of the abstract sciences or of demonstration are quantity and number, and that all attempts to extend this more perfect species of knowledge beyond these bounds are mere sophistry and illusion. As the component parts of quantity and number are entirely similar, their relations become intricate and involved; and nothing can be more curious, as well as useful, than to trace, by a variety of mediums, their equality or inequality, through their different appearances.But as all other ideas are clearly distinct and different from each other, we can never advance farther, by our utmost scrutiny, than to observe this diversity, and, by an obvious reflection, pronounce one thing not to be another. Or if there be any difficulty in these decisions, it proceeds entirely from the undeterminate meaning of words, which is corrected by juster definitions. That the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the squares of the other two sides cannot be known, let the terms be ever so exactly defined, without a train of reasoning and enquiry. But to convince us of this proposition, that where there is no property, there can be no injustice, it is only necessary to define the terms, and explain injustice to be a violation of property. This proposition is, indeed, nothing but a more imperfect definition. It is the same case with all those pretended syllogistical reasonings, which may be found in every other branch of learning, except the sciences of quantity and number; and these may safely, I think, be pronounced the only proper objects of knowledge and demonstration. (Hume, 1975, Sec. 12, Pt. 3, pp. 163-165)Our knowledge springs from two fundamental sources of the mind; the first is the capacity of receiving representations (the ability to receive impressions), the second is the power to know an object through these representations (spontaneity in the production of concepts).Through the first, an object is given to us; through the second, the object is thought in relation to that representation.... Intuition and concepts constitute, therefore, the elements of all our knowledge, so that neither concepts without intuition in some way corresponding to them, nor intuition without concepts, can yield knowledge. Both may be either pure or empirical.... Pure intuitions or pure concepts are possible only a priori; empirical intuitions and empirical concepts only a posteriori. If the receptivity of our mind, its power of receiving representations in so far as it is in any way affected, is to be called "sensibility," then the mind's power of producing representations from itself, the spontaneity of knowledge, should be called "understanding." Our nature is so constituted that our intuitions can never be other than sensible; that is, it contains only the mode in which we are affected by objects. The faculty, on the other hand, which enables us to think the object of sensible intuition is the understanding.... Without sensibility, no object would be given to us; without understanding, no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind. It is therefore just as necessary to make our concepts sensible, that is, to add the object to them in intuition, as to make our intuitions intelligible, that is to bring them under concepts. These two powers or capacities cannot exchange their functions. The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through their union can knowledge arise. (Kant, 1933, Sec. 1, Pt. 2, B74-75 [p. 92])Metaphysics, as a natural disposition of Reason is real, but it is also, in itself, dialectical and deceptive.... Hence to attempt to draw our principles from it, and in their employment to follow this natural but none the less fallacious illusion can never produce science, but only an empty dialectical art, in which one school may indeed outdo the other, but none can ever attain a justifiable and lasting success. In order that, as a science, it may lay claim not merely to deceptive persuasion, but to insight and conviction, a Critique of Reason must exhibit in a complete system the whole stock of conceptions a priori, arranged according to their different sources-the Sensibility, the understanding, and the Reason; it must present a complete table of these conceptions, together with their analysis and all that can be deduced from them, but more especially the possibility of synthetic knowledge a priori by means of their deduction, the principles of its use, and finally, its boundaries....This much is certain: he who has once tried criticism will be sickened for ever of all the dogmatic trash he was compelled to content himself with before, because his Reason, requiring something, could find nothing better for its occupation. Criticism stands to the ordinary school metaphysics exactly in the same relation as chemistry to alchemy, or as astron omy to fortune-telling astrology. I guarantee that no one who has comprehended and thought out the conclusions of criticism, even in these Prolegomena, will ever return to the old sophistical pseudo-science. He will rather look forward with a kind of pleasure to a metaphysics, certainly now within his power, which requires no more preparatory discoveries, and which alone can procure for reason permanent satisfaction. (Kant, 1891, pp. 115-116)Knowledge is only real and can only be set forth fully in the form of science, in the form of system. Further, a so-called fundamental proposition or first principle of philosophy, even if it is true, it is yet none the less false, just because and in so far as it is merely a fundamental proposition, merely a first principle. It is for that reason easily refuted. The refutation consists in bringing out its defective character; and it is defective because it is merely the universal, merely a principle, the beginning. If the refutation is complete and thorough, it is derived and developed from the nature of the principle itself, and not accomplished by bringing in from elsewhere other counter-assurances and chance fancies. It would be strictly the development of the principle, and thus the completion of its deficiency, were it not that it misunderstands its own purport by taking account solely of the negative aspect of what it seeks to do, and is not conscious of the positive character of its process and result. The really positive working out of the beginning is at the same time just as much the very reverse: it is a negative attitude towards the principle we start from. Negative, that is to say, in its one-sided form, which consists in being primarily immediate, a mere purpose. It may therefore be regarded as a refutation of what constitutes the basis of the system; but more correctly it should be looked at as a demonstration that the basis or principle of the system is in point of fact merely its beginning. (Hegel, 1910, pp. 21-22)Knowledge, action, and evaluation are essentially connected. The primary and pervasive significance of knowledge lies in its guidance of action: knowing is for the sake of doing. And action, obviously, is rooted in evaluation. For a being which did not assign comparative values, deliberate action would be pointless; and for one which did not know, it would be impossible. Conversely, only an active being could have knowledge, and only such a being could assign values to anything beyond his own feelings. A creature which did not enter into the process of reality to alter in some part the future content of it, could apprehend a world only in the sense of intuitive or esthetic contemplation; and such contemplation would not possess the significance of knowledge but only that of enjoying and suffering. (Lewis, 1946, p. 1)"Evolutionary epistemology" is a branch of scholarship that applies the evolutionary perspective to an understanding of how knowledge develops. Knowledge always involves getting information. The most primitive way of acquiring it is through the sense of touch: amoebas and other simple organisms know what happens around them only if they can feel it with their "skins." The knowledge such an organism can have is strictly about what is in its immediate vicinity. After a huge jump in evolution, organisms learned to find out what was going on at a distance from them, without having to actually feel the environment. This jump involved the development of sense organs for processing information that was farther away. For a long time, the most important sources of knowledge were the nose, the eyes, and the ears. The next big advance occurred when organisms developed memory. Now information no longer needed to be present at all, and the animal could recall events and outcomes that happened in the past. Each one of these steps in the evolution of knowledge added important survival advantages to the species that was equipped to use it.Then, with the appearance in evolution of humans, an entirely new way of acquiring information developed. Up to this point, the processing of information was entirely intrasomatic.... But when speech appeared (and even more powerfully with the invention of writing), information processing became extrasomatic. After that point knowledge did not have to be stored in the genes, or in the memory traces of the brain; it could be passed on from one person to another through words, or it could be written down and stored on a permanent substance like stone, paper, or silicon chips-in any case, outside the fragile and impermanent nervous system. (Csikszentmihalyi, 1993, pp. 56-57)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Knowledge
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