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Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Bibliography
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42 conocimiento
m.1 knowledge.hablar/actuar con conocimiento de causa to know what one is talking about/doingponer algo en conocimiento de alguien to bring something to somebody's attention, to inform somebody of somethingtener conocimiento de algo to be aware of somethingha llegado a mi conocimiento que estás insatisfecho it has come to my attention that you are not happy2 consciousness (sentido, conciencia).perder/recobrar el conocimiento to lose/regain consciousnessestaba tumbado en el suelo, sin conocimiento he was lying unconscious on the floor3 awareness, consciousness, cognizance.* * *2 (sensatez) good sense3 (conciencia) consciousness\con conocimiento de causa with full knowledge of the factsperder el conocimiento to lose consciousnessponer algo en conocimiento de alguien to make something known to somebody, inform somebody of somethingrecobrar el conocimiento to regain consciousness, come roundtener conocimiento de algo to know about something* * *noun m.1) knowledge* * *SM1) (=saber) knowledgeconocimientos — (=nociones) knowledge sing
mis pocos conocimientos de filosofía/cocina — my limited knowledge of philosophy/cookery
2) (=información) knowledgeel encuentro tuvo lugar sin conocimiento público — the meeting took place without the public's knowledge
•
dar conocimiento de algo, dimos conocimiento del robo a la policía — we informed the police about the robbery•
llegar a conocimiento de algn — to come to sb's attention o notice•
tener conocimiento de algo, aún no tenemos conocimiento de su detención — we still do not know that he has been arrestedse les informó al tenerse conocimiento del suceso — they were informed as soon as it was known what had happened
desea ponerlo en conocimiento público — he wants it brought to the public's attention, he wishes it to be made public
el Ministro ha puesto en conocimiento del rey su decisión — the minister has informed the king of his decision
conocimiento de causa, hacer algo con conocimiento de causa — to be fully aware of what one is doing
3) (=consciencia) consciousnessrecobrar o recuperar el conocimiento — to regain consciousness
4) (=sentido común) common sense5) (Jur) cognizance frm6) (Com)* * *1)a) ( saber) knowledgeb) conocimientos masculino plural ( nociones) knowledge2) (frml) ( información)dar conocimiento de algo a alguien — to inform o (frml) apprise somebody of something
pongo en su conocimiento que... — (Corresp) I am writing to inform you that...
llegar a conocimiento de alguien — to come to somebody's attention o notice (frml)
con conocimiento de causa: obró con conocimiento de causa (frml) he took this step, fully aware of what the consequences would be; hablo con conocimiento de causa — I know what I'm talking about
3) ( sentido) consciousnessperder/recobrar el conocimiento — to lose/regain consciousness
4) ( entendimiento)aún es pequeño, no tiene todavía conocimiento — he's not old enough to understand
* * *= cognition, competency, enlightenment, expertise, familiarisation [familiarization, -USA], familiarity, insight, knowledge, learning, acquaintance, understanding, cognisance [cognizance, -USA], connoisseurship, consciousness.Ex. The information-processing model of cognition, and developments in artificial intelligence encourage such comparisons = El modelo de la cognición sobre el procesamiento de la información de y los avances de la inteligencia artificial fomentan este tipo de comparaciones.Ex. SLIS programmes intended to 'produce' librarians with competency in the use of IT have to be designed.Ex. Considered as necessary work in the interest of humanity and general enlightenment, bibliography gains ground as the years pass.Ex. Its primary function is to provide a centre for software and hardware expertise for its members.Ex. Step 1 Familiarisation: This first step involves the indexer in becoming conversant with the subject content of the document to be indexed.Ex. The most effective searchers are those who have both system experience and some familiarity with the subject area in which they are searching.Ex. The human indexer works mechanically and rapidly; he should require no insight into the document content.Ex. These factors form the basis of the problems in identifying a satisfactory subject approach, and start to explain the vast array of different tolls used in the subject approach to knowledge.Ex. It is the responsibility of educators to stretch their student's intellects, hone their skills of intuitive judgment and synthesis, and build a love of learning that will sustain them beyond the level of formal education.Ex. It is only with accumulating experience and many years of close study and acquaintance with bibliographic works that a really substantial body of knowledge of the potential of bibliographic sources is acquired.Ex. We librarians ought to have a clearer understanding of our stock-in-trade (books) and their function of social mechanism.Ex. The passive cognisance of growth causes considerable difficulties = El conocimiento pasivo del crecimiento causa dificultades importantes.Ex. This book explores the underlying institutional factors that help museum-based connoisseurship and aestheticism and university-based critical theory and revisionist scholarship exist.Ex. For example, the latter are unlikely to engage themselves in conservation issues as these now press upon the professional consciousness of librarians.----* actualizar los conocimientos = upgrade + Posesivo + skills.* adquirir conocimiento = gain + knowledge, glean + knowledge, acquire + knowledge, build up + knowledge.* ampliar el conocimiento = expand + Posesivo + knowledge, expand + Posesivo + knowledge, widen + knowledge, broaden + knowledge, deepen + understanding.* ampliar las fronteras del conocimiento = push back + the frontiers of knowledge.* análisis de áreas del conocimiento = domain analysis.* análisis de dominios del conocimiento = domain analysis.* aprendizaje rico en conocimiento = knowledge-rich learning.* área de conocimiento = area of study.* área del conocimiento = area of knowledge, discipline, subject field, field of activity, knowledge domain, discipline of knowledge.* aumentar el conocimiento = expand + Posesivo + knowledge, deepen + awareness.* aumento del conocimiento = knowledge building.* bannco de conocimiento = knowledge bank.* basado en el conocimiento = knowledge-based.* basado en las disciplinas del conocimiento = discipline-based.* bibliotecario con conocimientos de medicina = informationist.* búsqueda del conocimiento = quest for/of knowledge.* campo del conocimiento = field of knowledge.* centrado en el conocimiento = knowledge-centric.* ciencia del conocimiento = cognitive science.* compartir el conocimiento = knowledge sharing, pool + knowledge.* con conocimiento = authoritatively.* con conocimiento básico en el manejo de la información = information literate [information-literate].* con conocimiento básico en el uso de la biblioteca = library literate [library-literate].* con conocimiento de = appreciative of, conversant with.* con conocimiento de causa = knowingly, knowingly.* con conocimiento de informática = computer literate [computer-literate].* con conocimiento en el uso de Internet = Internet-savvy.* con conocimientos en = versed in.* con conocimientos sobre el correo electrónico = e-mail literate.* con el conocimiento de que = on the understanding that.* conjunto de conocimientos = body of knowledge.* conocimiento académico = academic knowledge.* conocimiento acumulado sobre un tema = lore.* conocimiento básico = working familiarity, working knowledge.* conocimiento científico = scientific knowledge.* conocimiento compartido = knowledge sharing.* conocimiento de base = foundation study.* conocimiento de cómo sobrevivir en el bosque = woodcraft.* conocimiento de embarque = bill of lading.* conocimiento de la existencia = awareness.* conocimiento de lengua = language skill.* conocimiento del objeto = object knowledge.* conocimiento de los diferentes soportes = media competency.* conocimiento detallado = intimate knowledge.* conocimiento de un área temática = area knowledge.* conocimiento documentado = recorded knowledge.* conocimiento enciclopédico = factual knowledge.* conocimiento en tecnología = technological skill.* conocimiento específico = expert knowledge.* conocimiento experto = expert knowledge, expertise.* conocimiento explícito = explicit knowledge.* conocimiento factual = declarative knowledge.* conocimiento humano = human consciousness.* conocimiento humano, el = human record, the.* conocimiento indígena = indigenous knowledge.* conocimiento lingüístico = language skill.* conocimiento mutuo = mutual knowledge.* conocimiento pasivo = nodding acquaintance.* conocimiento pleno = awareness.* conocimiento práctico = working knowledge, procedural knowledge.* conocimiento previo = foreknowledge.* conocimientos = knowledge base [knowledge-base].* conocimientos básicos = literacy.* conocimientos básicos de búsqueda, recuperación y organización de informació = information literacy.* conocimientos básicos de documentación = information literacy.* conocimientos básicos de informática = computer literacy.* conocimientos básicos en tecnología = technical literacy.* conocimientos básicos sobre el uso de las bibliotecas = library skills.* conocimientos de tecnología = techno-savvy, tech-savvy.* conocimientos en el manejo de la información = info-savvy.* conocimiento sobre una materia = subject knowledge.* conocimientos requeridos = job specs.* conocimiento tácito = tacit knowledge, tacit knowledge, tacit knowledge.* conocimiento técnico = know-how, technical knowledge.* conocimiento teórico = declarative knowledge.* con poco conocimiento de las nuevas tecnologías = technologically challenged.* corpus de conocimiento = corpus of knowledge.* crear un fondo común de conocimientos = pool + knowledge.* cúmulo de conocimiento = repository of knowledge, knowledge repository.* decisión con conocimiento de causa = informed decision.* difundir el conocimiento = spread + knowledge.* director ejecutivo de la gestión del conocimiento = knowledge executive.* dominio del conocimiento = knowledge domain.* economía basada en el conocimiento = knowledge driven economy.* economía del conocimiento = knowledge economy.* Era del Conocimiento, la = Knowledge Age, the.* estructuración del conocimiento = knowledge structuring.* examinar los conocimientos = test + knowledge.* falta de conocimiento = unfamiliarity.* filtro del conocimiento = knowledge filter.* fomentar el conocimiento = advance + knowledge.* fondo común de conocimientos = pool of knowledge, pool of expertise.* frontera del conocimiento = frontier of knowledge.* fundamentos del conocimiento, los = foundations of knowledge, the.* gestión del conocimiento = knowledge management (KM).* gestor del conocimiento = knowledge worker, knowledge manager.* hacer avanzar el conocimiento = push back + the frontiers of knowledge.* hacer gala del conocimiento que uno tiene = air + knowledge.* hacer perder el conocimiento = knock + Nombre + out, knock + Nombre + unconscious.* hacer uso de un conocimiento = draw on/upon + knowledge.* impartir conocimiento = impart + knowledge.* inculcar conocimiento = instil + knowledge.* ingeniería del conocimiento = knowledge engineering.* ingeniero del conocimiento = knowledge engineer.* institucion del conocimiento = institution of learning.* intercambio de conocimientos = learning exchange, cross-fertilisation [cross-fertilization, -USA], cross-fertilisation of knowledge.* jefe de los servicios de gestión del conocimiento = chief knowledge officer (CKO).* metaconocimiento = meta-knowledge.* navegación por el conocimiento = knowledge navigation.* navegador del conocimiento = knowledge navigator.* obtener conocimiento = gain + an understanding.* ofrecer conocimiento = package + knowledge.* perder el conocimiento = lose + Posesivo + senses, pass out, lose + Posesivo + consciousness.* pérdida del conocimiento = unconsciousness, fainting, fainting fit, loss of consciousness.* personas sin conocimientos técnicos, las = non-technical, the.* presentar conocimiento = package + knowledge.* producto del conocimiento = knowledge record.* profundizar en el conocimiento = deepen + knowledge.* propagar el conocimiento = propagate + knowledge.* proporcionar conocimientos técnicos = supply + know-how.* quedarse sin conocimiento = lose + Posesivo + consciousness, pass out.* rama del conocimiento = branch of learning.* recobrar el conocimiento = regain + Posesivo + consciousness.* recuperar el conocimiento = regain + Posesivo + consciousness.* red de conocimiento = knowledge network.* servidor del conocimiento = knowledge server.* sin conocimiento = unconscious.* sin conocimiento de causa = unbeknown to, unbeknownst to.* sintetizar el conocimiento = synthesise + knowledge.* sistema basado en el conocimiento = knowledge-base system.* sistema de gestión del conocimiento = knowledge management system (KMS).* sociedad basada en el conocimiento = knowledge based society.* sociedad del conocimiento = knowledge society.* Sociedad para el Conocimiento Global = Global Knowledge Partnership.* suministrar conocimientos técnicos = supply + know-how.* tener conocimiento de = be privy to, be aware of.* toma de decisiones con conocimiento de causa = informed decision making.* tomar decisiones con conocimiento de causa = make + informed decisions.* transferencia de conocimiento = transfer of knowledge, knowledge transfer.* utilizar los conocimientos de Uno = put + Posesivo + knowledge to work.* * *1)a) ( saber) knowledgeb) conocimientos masculino plural ( nociones) knowledge2) (frml) ( información)dar conocimiento de algo a alguien — to inform o (frml) apprise somebody of something
pongo en su conocimiento que... — (Corresp) I am writing to inform you that...
llegar a conocimiento de alguien — to come to somebody's attention o notice (frml)
con conocimiento de causa: obró con conocimiento de causa (frml) he took this step, fully aware of what the consequences would be; hablo con conocimiento de causa — I know what I'm talking about
3) ( sentido) consciousnessperder/recobrar el conocimiento — to lose/regain consciousness
4) ( entendimiento)aún es pequeño, no tiene todavía conocimiento — he's not old enough to understand
* * *= cognition, competency, enlightenment, expertise, familiarisation [familiarization, -USA], familiarity, insight, knowledge, learning, acquaintance, understanding, cognisance [cognizance, -USA], connoisseurship, consciousness.Ex: The information-processing model of cognition, and developments in artificial intelligence encourage such comparisons = El modelo de la cognición sobre el procesamiento de la información de y los avances de la inteligencia artificial fomentan este tipo de comparaciones.
Ex: SLIS programmes intended to 'produce' librarians with competency in the use of IT have to be designed.Ex: Considered as necessary work in the interest of humanity and general enlightenment, bibliography gains ground as the years pass.Ex: Its primary function is to provide a centre for software and hardware expertise for its members.Ex: Step 1 Familiarisation: This first step involves the indexer in becoming conversant with the subject content of the document to be indexed.Ex: The most effective searchers are those who have both system experience and some familiarity with the subject area in which they are searching.Ex: The human indexer works mechanically and rapidly; he should require no insight into the document content.Ex: These factors form the basis of the problems in identifying a satisfactory subject approach, and start to explain the vast array of different tolls used in the subject approach to knowledge.Ex: It is the responsibility of educators to stretch their student's intellects, hone their skills of intuitive judgment and synthesis, and build a love of learning that will sustain them beyond the level of formal education.Ex: It is only with accumulating experience and many years of close study and acquaintance with bibliographic works that a really substantial body of knowledge of the potential of bibliographic sources is acquired.Ex: We librarians ought to have a clearer understanding of our stock-in-trade (books) and their function of social mechanism.Ex: The passive cognisance of growth causes considerable difficulties = El conocimiento pasivo del crecimiento causa dificultades importantes.Ex: This book explores the underlying institutional factors that help museum-based connoisseurship and aestheticism and university-based critical theory and revisionist scholarship exist.Ex: For example, the latter are unlikely to engage themselves in conservation issues as these now press upon the professional consciousness of librarians.* actualizar los conocimientos = upgrade + Posesivo + skills.* adquirir conocimiento = gain + knowledge, glean + knowledge, acquire + knowledge, build up + knowledge.* ampliar el conocimiento = expand + Posesivo + knowledge, expand + Posesivo + knowledge, widen + knowledge, broaden + knowledge, deepen + understanding.* ampliar las fronteras del conocimiento = push back + the frontiers of knowledge.* análisis de áreas del conocimiento = domain analysis.* análisis de dominios del conocimiento = domain analysis.* aprendizaje rico en conocimiento = knowledge-rich learning.* área de conocimiento = area of study.* área del conocimiento = area of knowledge, discipline, subject field, field of activity, knowledge domain, discipline of knowledge.* aumentar el conocimiento = expand + Posesivo + knowledge, deepen + awareness.* aumento del conocimiento = knowledge building.* bannco de conocimiento = knowledge bank.* basado en el conocimiento = knowledge-based.* basado en las disciplinas del conocimiento = discipline-based.* bibliotecario con conocimientos de medicina = informationist.* búsqueda del conocimiento = quest for/of knowledge.* campo del conocimiento = field of knowledge.* centrado en el conocimiento = knowledge-centric.* ciencia del conocimiento = cognitive science.* compartir el conocimiento = knowledge sharing, pool + knowledge.* con conocimiento = authoritatively.* con conocimiento básico en el manejo de la información = information literate [information-literate].* con conocimiento básico en el uso de la biblioteca = library literate [library-literate].* con conocimiento de = appreciative of, conversant with.* con conocimiento de causa = knowingly, knowingly.* con conocimiento de informática = computer literate [computer-literate].* con conocimiento en el uso de Internet = Internet-savvy.* con conocimientos en = versed in.* con conocimientos sobre el correo electrónico = e-mail literate.* con el conocimiento de que = on the understanding that.* conjunto de conocimientos = body of knowledge.* conocimiento académico = academic knowledge.* conocimiento acumulado sobre un tema = lore.* conocimiento básico = working familiarity, working knowledge.* conocimiento científico = scientific knowledge.* conocimiento compartido = knowledge sharing.* conocimiento de base = foundation study.* conocimiento de cómo sobrevivir en el bosque = woodcraft.* conocimiento de embarque = bill of lading.* conocimiento de la existencia = awareness.* conocimiento de lengua = language skill.* conocimiento del objeto = object knowledge.* conocimiento de los diferentes soportes = media competency.* conocimiento detallado = intimate knowledge.* conocimiento de un área temática = area knowledge.* conocimiento documentado = recorded knowledge.* conocimiento enciclopédico = factual knowledge.* conocimiento en tecnología = technological skill.* conocimiento específico = expert knowledge.* conocimiento experto = expert knowledge, expertise.* conocimiento explícito = explicit knowledge.* conocimiento factual = declarative knowledge.* conocimiento humano = human consciousness.* conocimiento humano, el = human record, the.* conocimiento indígena = indigenous knowledge.* conocimiento lingüístico = language skill.* conocimiento mutuo = mutual knowledge.* conocimiento pasivo = nodding acquaintance.* conocimiento pleno = awareness.* conocimiento práctico = working knowledge, procedural knowledge.* conocimiento previo = foreknowledge.* conocimientos = knowledge base [knowledge-base].* conocimientos básicos = literacy.* conocimientos básicos de búsqueda, recuperación y organización de informació = information literacy.* conocimientos básicos de documentación = information literacy.* conocimientos básicos de informática = computer literacy.* conocimientos básicos en tecnología = technical literacy.* conocimientos básicos sobre el uso de las bibliotecas = library skills.* conocimientos de tecnología = techno-savvy, tech-savvy.* conocimientos en el manejo de la información = info-savvy.* conocimiento sobre una materia = subject knowledge.* conocimientos requeridos = job specs.* conocimiento tácito = tacit knowledge, tacit knowledge, tacit knowledge.* conocimiento técnico = know-how, technical knowledge.* conocimiento teórico = declarative knowledge.* con poco conocimiento de las nuevas tecnologías = technologically challenged.* corpus de conocimiento = corpus of knowledge.* crear un fondo común de conocimientos = pool + knowledge.* cúmulo de conocimiento = repository of knowledge, knowledge repository.* decisión con conocimiento de causa = informed decision.* difundir el conocimiento = spread + knowledge.* director ejecutivo de la gestión del conocimiento = knowledge executive.* dominio del conocimiento = knowledge domain.* economía basada en el conocimiento = knowledge driven economy.* economía del conocimiento = knowledge economy.* Era del Conocimiento, la = Knowledge Age, the.* estructuración del conocimiento = knowledge structuring.* examinar los conocimientos = test + knowledge.* falta de conocimiento = unfamiliarity.* filtro del conocimiento = knowledge filter.* fomentar el conocimiento = advance + knowledge.* fondo común de conocimientos = pool of knowledge, pool of expertise.* frontera del conocimiento = frontier of knowledge.* fundamentos del conocimiento, los = foundations of knowledge, the.* gestión del conocimiento = knowledge management (KM).* gestor del conocimiento = knowledge worker, knowledge manager.* hacer avanzar el conocimiento = push back + the frontiers of knowledge.* hacer gala del conocimiento que uno tiene = air + knowledge.* hacer perder el conocimiento = knock + Nombre + out, knock + Nombre + unconscious.* hacer uso de un conocimiento = draw on/upon + knowledge.* impartir conocimiento = impart + knowledge.* inculcar conocimiento = instil + knowledge.* ingeniería del conocimiento = knowledge engineering.* ingeniero del conocimiento = knowledge engineer.* institucion del conocimiento = institution of learning.* intercambio de conocimientos = learning exchange, cross-fertilisation [cross-fertilization, -USA], cross-fertilisation of knowledge.* jefe de los servicios de gestión del conocimiento = chief knowledge officer (CKO).* metaconocimiento = meta-knowledge.* navegación por el conocimiento = knowledge navigation.* navegador del conocimiento = knowledge navigator.* obtener conocimiento = gain + an understanding.* ofrecer conocimiento = package + knowledge.* perder el conocimiento = lose + Posesivo + senses, pass out, lose + Posesivo + consciousness.* pérdida del conocimiento = unconsciousness, fainting, fainting fit, loss of consciousness.* personas sin conocimientos técnicos, las = non-technical, the.* presentar conocimiento = package + knowledge.* producto del conocimiento = knowledge record.* profundizar en el conocimiento = deepen + knowledge.* propagar el conocimiento = propagate + knowledge.* proporcionar conocimientos técnicos = supply + know-how.* quedarse sin conocimiento = lose + Posesivo + consciousness, pass out.* rama del conocimiento = branch of learning.* recobrar el conocimiento = regain + Posesivo + consciousness.* recuperar el conocimiento = regain + Posesivo + consciousness.* red de conocimiento = knowledge network.* servidor del conocimiento = knowledge server.* sin conocimiento = unconscious.* sin conocimiento de causa = unbeknown to, unbeknownst to.* sintetizar el conocimiento = synthesise + knowledge.* sistema basado en el conocimiento = knowledge-base system.* sistema de gestión del conocimiento = knowledge management system (KMS).* sociedad basada en el conocimiento = knowledge based society.* sociedad del conocimiento = knowledge society.* Sociedad para el Conocimiento Global = Global Knowledge Partnership.* suministrar conocimientos técnicos = supply + know-how.* tener conocimiento de = be privy to, be aware of.* toma de decisiones con conocimiento de causa = informed decision making.* tomar decisiones con conocimiento de causa = make + informed decisions.* transferencia de conocimiento = transfer of knowledge, knowledge transfer.* utilizar los conocimientos de Uno = put + Posesivo + knowledge to work.* * *A1 (saber) knowledgetiene algunos conocimientos de inglés he has some knowledge of English, he knows some EnglishB ( frml)(información): dio conocimiento del suceso a las autoridades he informed o ( frml) apprised the authorities of the incidentpuso el hecho en conocimiento de la policía she informed the police of the incident, she reported the incident to the policepongo en su conocimiento que … ( Corresp) I am writing to inform you that …al tener conocimiento del suceso upon learning of the incident ( frml)a esas horas no se tenía todavía conocimiento de la noticia at that time we/they still had not heard the newsciertas personas tienen conocimiento de sus actividades certain people are aware of her activitiesllegar a conocimiento de algn to come to sb's attention o notice ( frml)con conocimiento de causa: obró con conocimiento de causa ( frml); he took this step, fully aware of what the consequences would bete lo digo con conocimiento de causa I know what I'm talking aboutCompuesto:bill of lading, waybillC (sentido) consciousnessperder el conocimiento to lose consciousnesscuando recobró el conocimiento when he regained consciousness, when he came to o roundestar sin conocimiento to be unconsciousD(entendimiento): aún es pequeño, no tiene todavía conocimiento he's not old enough to understand* * *
conocimiento sustantivo masculino
poner algo en conocimiento de algn to inform sb of sth;
tener conocimiento de algo to be aware of sth
◊ perder/recobrar el conocimiento to lose/regain consciousness;
estar sin conocimiento to be unconscious
conocimiento sustantivo masculino
1 knowledge
2 (conciencia) consciousness
3 conocimientos, knowledge
♦ Locuciones: perder/recobrar el conocimiento, to lose/regain consciousness
con conocimiento de causa, with full knowledge of the facts
' conocimiento' also found in these entries:
Spanish:
braga
- ciencia
- conciencia
- desfallecer
- desvanecerse
- dominio
- error
- orientación
- parcela
- revelar
- sentida
- sentido
- experiencia
- perder
- pérdida
- reanimar
- recobrar
- saber
English:
acquaintance
- air
- black out
- blackout
- cognizance
- come to
- comprehensive
- consciousness
- familiarity
- grounding
- improve
- knock out
- knowledge
- notice
- privy
- recover
- self-awareness
- sketchy
- superficial
- thorough
- unconsciousness
- black
- knock
- know
- pass
* * *conocimiento nm1. [saber] knowledge;hablar/actuar con conocimiento de causa to know what one is talking about/doing;puso el robo en conocimiento de la policía she informed the police of the burglary;ponemos en su conocimiento que se ha detectado un error en el programa this is to inform you that an error has been detected in the program;no teníamos conocimiento de su dimisión we were not aware that he had resigned;al tener conocimiento del accidente, acudió inmediatamente al hospital when she found out about the accident she immediately went to the hospital;ha llegado a mi conocimiento que estás insatisfecho it has come to my attention that you are not happy2.conocimientos [nociones] knowledge;tengo algunos conocimientos de informática I have some knowledge of computers, I know a bit about computers;nuestros conocimientos acerca de la enfermedad son muy limitados our knowledge of the disease is very limited, we know very little about the disease3. [sentido, conciencia] consciousness;perder el conocimiento to lose consciousness;recobrar el conocimiento to regain consciousness;estaba tumbado en el suelo, sin conocimiento he was lying unconscious on the floor4. [juicio] (common) sense;no tiene todavía conocimiento para saber lo que es peligroso he doesn't yet have a sense of danger* * *m1 knowledge;poner alguien en conocimiento de algo inform s.o. of sth;para su conocimiento for your information;conocimientos pl ( nociones) knowledge sg2 MED consciousness;perder el conocimiento lose consciousness;sin conocimiento unconscious;recobrar el conocimiento regain consciousness* * *conocimiento nm1) : knowledge2) sentido: consciousness* * *1. (en general) knowledge2. (sentido) consciousness -
43 Mind
It becomes, therefore, no inconsiderable part of science... to know the different operations of the mind, to separate them from each other, to class them under their proper heads, and to correct all that seeming disorder in which they lie involved when made the object of reflection and inquiry.... It cannot be doubted that the mind is endowed with several powers and faculties, that these powers are distinct from one another, and that what is really distinct to the immediate perception may be distinguished by reflection and, consequently, that there is a truth and falsehood which lie not beyond the compass of human understanding. (Hume, 1955, p. 22)Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white Paper, void of all Characters, without any Ideas: How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store, which the busy and boundless Fancy of Man has painted on it, with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of Reason and Knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from Experience. (Locke, quoted in Herrnstein & Boring, 1965, p. 584)The kind of logic in mythical thought is as rigorous as that of modern science, and... the difference lies, not in the quality of the intellectual process, but in the nature of things to which it is applied.... Man has always been thinking equally well; the improvement lies, not in an alleged progress of man's mind, but in the discovery of new areas to which it may apply its unchanged and unchanging powers. (Leґvi-Strauss, 1963, p. 230)MIND. A mysterious form of matter secreted by the brain. Its chief activity consists in the endeavor to ascertain its own nature, the futility of the attempt being due to the fact that it has nothing but itself to know itself with. (Bierce, quoted in Minsky, 1986, p. 55)[Philosophy] understands the foundations of knowledge and it finds these foundations in a study of man-as-knower, of the "mental processes" or the "activity of representation" which make knowledge possible. To know is to represent accurately what is outside the mind, so to understand the possibility and nature of knowledge is to understand the way in which the mind is able to construct such representation.... We owe the notion of a "theory of knowledge" based on an understanding of "mental processes" to the seventeenth century, and especially to Locke. We owe the notion of "the mind" as a separate entity in which "processes" occur to the same period, and especially to Descartes. We owe the notion of philosophy as a tribunal of pure reason, upholding or denying the claims of the rest of culture, to the eighteenth century and especially to Kant, but this Kantian notion presupposed general assent to Lockean notions of mental processes and Cartesian notions of mental substance. (Rorty, 1979, pp. 3-4)Under pressure from the computer, the question of mind in relation to machine is becoming a central cultural preoccupation. It is becoming for us what sex was to Victorians-threat, obsession, taboo, and fascination. (Turkle, 1984, p. 313)7) Understanding the Mind Remains as Resistant to Neurological as to Cognitive AnalysesRecent years have been exciting for researchers in the brain and cognitive sciences. Both fields have flourished, each spurred on by methodological and conceptual developments, and although understanding the mechanisms of mind is an objective shared by many workers in these areas, their theories and approaches to the problem are vastly different....Early experimental psychologists, such as Wundt and James, were as interested in and knowledgeable about the anatomy and physiology of the nervous system as about the young science of the mind. However, the experimental study of mental processes was short-lived, being eclipsed by the rise of behaviorism early in this century. It was not until the late 1950s that the signs of a new mentalism first appeared in scattered writings of linguists, philosophers, computer enthusiasts, and psychologists.In this new incarnation, the science of mind had a specific mission: to challenge and replace behaviorism. In the meantime, brain science had in many ways become allied with a behaviorist approach.... While behaviorism sought to reduce the mind to statements about bodily action, brain science seeks to explain the mind in terms of physiochemical events occurring in the nervous system. These approaches contrast with contemporary cognitive science, which tries to understand the mind as it is, without any reduction, a view sometimes described as functionalism.The cognitive revolution is now in place. Cognition is the subject of contemporary psychology. This was achieved with little or no talk of neurons, action potentials, and neurotransmitters. Similarly, neuroscience has risen to an esteemed position among the biological sciences without much talk of cognitive processes. Do the fields need each other?... [Y]es because the problem of understanding the mind, unlike the wouldbe problem solvers, respects no disciplinary boundaries. It remains as resistant to neurological as to cognitive analyses. (LeDoux & Hirst, 1986, pp. 1-2)Since the Second World War scientists from different disciplines have turned to the study of the human mind. Computer scientists have tried to emulate its capacity for visual perception. Linguists have struggled with the puzzle of how children acquire language. Ethologists have sought the innate roots of social behaviour. Neurophysiologists have begun to relate the function of nerve cells to complex perceptual and motor processes. Neurologists and neuropsychologists have used the pattern of competence and incompetence of their brain-damaged patients to elucidate the normal workings of the brain. Anthropologists have examined the conceptual structure of cultural practices to advance hypotheses about the basic principles of the mind. These days one meets engineers who work on speech perception, biologists who investigate the mental representation of spatial relations, and physicists who want to understand consciousness. And, of course, psychologists continue to study perception, memory, thought and action.... [W]orkers in many disciplines have converged on a number of central problems and explanatory ideas. They have realized that no single approach is likely to unravel the workings of the mind: it will not give up its secrets to psychology alone; nor is any other isolated discipline-artificial intelligence, linguistics, anthropology, neurophysiology, philosophy-going to have any greater success. (Johnson-Laird, 1988, p. 7)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Mind
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44 Concepts
From a psychological perspective, concepts are mental representations of classes (e.g., one's beliefs about the class of dogs or tables), and their most salient function is to promote cognitive economy.... By partitioning the world into classes, we decrease the amount of information we must perceive, learn, remember, communicate, and reason about. Thus, if we had no concepts, we would have to refer to each individual entity by its own name; every different table, for example, would be denoted by a different word. The mental lexicon required would be so enormous that communication as we know it might be impossible. Other mental functions might collapse under the sheer number of entities we would have to keep track of.Another important function of concepts is that they enable us to go beyond the information given.... When we come across an object, say a wolf, we have direct knowledge only of its appearance. It is essential that we go beyond appearances and bring to bear other knowledge that we have, such as our belief that wolves can bite and inflict severe injury. Concepts are our means of linking perceptual and nonperceptual information. We use a perceptual description of the creature in front of us to access the concept wolf and then use our nonperceptual beliefs to direct our behavior, that is, run. Concepts, then, are recognition devices; they serve as entry points into our knowledge stores and provide us with expectations that we can use to guide our actions.A third important function of concepts is that they can be combined to form complex concepts and thoughts. Stoves and burn are two simple concepts; Stoves can burn is a full-fledged thought. Presumably our understanding of this thought, and of complex concepts in general, is based on our understanding of the constituent concepts. (Smith, 1988, pp. 19-20)The concept may be a butterfly. It may be a person he has known. It may be an animal, a city, a type of action, or a quality. Each concept calls for a name. These names are wanted for what may be a noun or a verb, an adjective or an adverb. Concepts of this type have been formed gradually over the years from childhood on. Each time a thing is seen or heard or experienced, the individual has a perception of it. A part of that perception comes from his own concomitant interpretation. Each successive perception forms and probably alters the permanent concept. And words are acquired gradually, also, and deposited somehow in the treasure-house of word memory.... Words are often acquired simultaneously with the concepts.... A little boy may first see a butterfly fluttering from flower to flower in a meadow. Later he sees them on the wing or in pictures, many times. On each occasion he adds to his conception of butterfly.It becomes a generalization from many particulars. He builds up a concept of a butterfly which he can remember and summon at will, although when he comes to manhood, perhaps, he can recollect none of the particular butterflies of past experience.The same is true of the sequence of sound that makes up a melody. He remembers it after he has forgotten each of the many times he heard or perhaps sang or played it. The same is true of colours. He acquires, quite quickly, the concept of lavender, although all the objects of which he saw the colour have faded beyond the frontier of voluntary recall. The same is true of the generalization he forms of an acquaintance. Later on he can summon his concept of the individual without recalling their many meetings. (Penfield, 1959, pp. 228-229)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Concepts
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45 Categories
Two general and basic principles are proposed for the formation of categories: The first has to do with the function of category systems and asserts that the task of category systems is to provide maximum information with the least cognitive effort [("cognitive economy")]; the second has to do with the structure of the information so provided and asserts that the perceived world comes as structured information rather than than arbitrary or unpredictable attributes [("perceived world structure")]. Thus maximum information with least cognitive effort is achieved if categories map the perceived world structure as closely as possible. This condition can be achieved either by the mapping of categories to given attribute structures or by the definition or redefinition of attributes to render a given set of categories appropriately structured. (Rosch, 1978, p. 28)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Categories
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46 Intelligence
There is no mystery about it: the child who is familiar with books, ideas, conversation-the ways and means of the intellectual life-before he begins school, indeed, before he begins consciously to think, has a marked advantage. He is at home in the House of intellect just as the stableboy is at home among horses, or the child of actors on the stage. (Barzun, 1959, p. 142)It is... no exaggeration to say that sensory-motor intelligence is limited to desiring success or practical adaptation, whereas the function of verbal or conceptual thought is to know and state truth. (Piaget, 1954, p. 359)ntelligence has two parts, which we shall call the epistemological and the heuristic. The epistemological part is the representation of the world in such a form that the solution of problems follows from the facts expressed in the representation. The heuristic part is the mechanism that on the basis of the information solves the problem and decides what to do. (McCarthy & Hayes, 1969, p. 466)Many scientists implicitly assume that, among all animals, the behavior and intelligence of nonhuman primates are most like our own. Nonhuman primates have relatively larger brains and proportionally more neocortex than other species... and it now seems likely that humans, chimpanzees, and gorillas shared a common ancestor as recently as 5 to 7 million years ago.... This assumption about the unique status of primate intelligence is, however, just that: an assumption. The relations between intelligence and measures of brain size is poorly understood, and evolutionary affinity does not always ensure behavioral similarity. Moreover, the view that nonhuman primates are the animals most like ourselves coexists uneasily in our minds with the equally pervasive view that primates differ fundamentally from us because they lack language; lacking language, they also lack many of the capacities necessary for reasoning and abstract thought. (Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990, p. 4)Few constructs are asked to serve as many functions in psychology as is the construct of human intelligence.... Consider four of the main functions addressed in theory and research on intelligence, and how they differ from one another.1. Biological. This type of account looks at biological processes. To qualify as a useful biological construct, intelligence should be a biochemical or biophysical process or at least somehow a resultant of biochemical or biophysical processes.2. Cognitive approaches. This type of account looks at molar cognitive representations and processes. To qualify as a useful mental construct, intelligence should be specifiable as a set of mental representations and processes that are identifiable through experimental, mathematical, or computational means.3. Contextual approaches. To qualify as a useful contextual construct, intelligence should be a source of individual differences in accomplishments in "real-world" performances. It is not enough just to account for performance in the laboratory. On [sic] the contextual view, what a person does in the lab may not even remotely resemble what the person would do outside it. Moreover, different cultures may have different conceptions of intelligence, which affect what would count as intelligent in one cultural context versus another.4. Systems approaches. Systems approaches attempt to understand intelligence through the interaction of cognition with context. They attempt to establish a link between the two levels of analysis, and to analyze what forms this link takes. (Sternberg, 1994, pp. 263-264)High but not the highest intelligence, combined with the greatest degrees of persistence, will achieve greater eminence than the highest degree of intelligence with somewhat less persistence. (Cox, 1926, p. 187)There are no definitive criteria of intelligence, just as there are none for chairness; it is a fuzzy-edged concept to which many features are relevant. Two people may both be quite intelligent and yet have very few traits in common-they resemble the prototype along different dimensions.... [Intelligence] is a resemblance between two individuals, one real and the other prototypical. (Neisser, 1979, p. 185)Given the complementary strengths and weaknesses of the differential and information-processing approaches, it should be possible, at least in theory, to synthesise an approach that would capitalise upon the strength of each approach, and thereby share the weakness of neither. (Sternberg, 1977, p. 65)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Intelligence
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47 Memory
To what extent can we lump together what goes on when you try to recall: (1) your name; (2) how you kick a football; and (3) the present location of your car keys? If we use introspective evidence as a guide, the first seems an immediate automatic response. The second may require constructive internal replay prior to our being able to produce a verbal description. The third... quite likely involves complex operational responses under the control of some general strategy system. Is any unitary search process, with a single set of characteristics and inputoutput relations, likely to cover all these cases? (Reitman, 1970, p. 485)[Semantic memory] Is a mental thesaurus, organized knowledge a person possesses about words and other verbal symbols, their meanings and referents, about relations among them, and about rules, formulas, and algorithms for the manipulation of these symbols, concepts, and relations. Semantic memory does not register perceptible properties of inputs, but rather cognitive referents of input signals. (Tulving, 1972, p. 386)The mnemonic code, far from being fixed and unchangeable, is structured and restructured along with general development. Such a restructuring of the code takes place in close dependence on the schemes of intelligence. The clearest indication of this is the observation of different types of memory organisation in accordance with the age level of a child so that a longer interval of retention without any new presentation, far from causing a deterioration of memory, may actually improve it. (Piaget & Inhelder, 1973, p. 36)4) The Logic of Some Memory Theorization Is of Dubious Worth in the History of PsychologyIf a cue was effective in memory retrieval, then one could infer it was encoded; if a cue was not effective, then it was not encoded. The logic of this theorization is "heads I win, tails you lose" and is of dubious worth in the history of psychology. We might ask how long scientists will puzzle over questions with no answers. (Solso, 1974, p. 28)We have iconic, echoic, active, working, acoustic, articulatory, primary, secondary, episodic, semantic, short-term, intermediate-term, and longterm memories, and these memories contain tags, traces, images, attributes, markers, concepts, cognitive maps, natural-language mediators, kernel sentences, relational rules, nodes, associations, propositions, higher-order memory units, and features. (Eysenck, 1977, p. 4)The problem with the memory metaphor is that storage and retrieval of traces only deals [ sic] with old, previously articulated information. Memory traces can perhaps provide a basis for dealing with the "sameness" of the present experience with previous experiences, but the memory metaphor has no mechanisms for dealing with novel information. (Bransford, McCarrell, Franks & Nitsch, 1977, p. 434)7) The Results of a Hundred Years of the Psychological Study of Memory Are Somewhat DiscouragingThe results of a hundred years of the psychological study of memory are somewhat discouraging. We have established firm empirical generalisations, but most of them are so obvious that every ten-year-old knows them anyway. We have made discoveries, but they are only marginally about memory; in many cases we don't know what to do with them, and wear them out with endless experimental variations. We have an intellectually impressive group of theories, but history offers little confidence that they will provide any meaningful insight into natural behavior. (Neisser, 1978, pp. 12-13)A schema, then is a data structure for representing the generic concepts stored in memory. There are schemata representing our knowledge about all concepts; those underlying objects, situations, events, sequences of events, actions and sequences of actions. A schema contains, as part of its specification, the network of interrelations that is believed to normally hold among the constituents of the concept in question. A schema theory embodies a prototype theory of meaning. That is, inasmuch as a schema underlying a concept stored in memory corresponds to the mean ing of that concept, meanings are encoded in terms of the typical or normal situations or events that instantiate that concept. (Rumelhart, 1980, p. 34)Memory appears to be constrained by a structure, a "syntax," perhaps at quite a low level, but it is free to be variable, deviant, even erratic at a higher level....Like the information system of language, memory can be explained in part by the abstract rules which underlie it, but only in part. The rules provide a basic competence, but they do not fully determine performance. (Campbell, 1982, pp. 228, 229)When people think about the mind, they often liken it to a physical space, with memories and ideas as objects contained within that space. Thus, we speak of ideas being in the dark corners or dim recesses of our minds, and of holding ideas in mind. Ideas may be in the front or back of our minds, or they may be difficult to grasp. With respect to the processes involved in memory, we talk about storing memories, of searching or looking for lost memories, and sometimes of finding them. An examination of common parlance, therefore, suggests that there is general adherence to what might be called the spatial metaphor. The basic assumptions of this metaphor are that memories are treated as objects stored in specific locations within the mind, and the retrieval process involves a search through the mind in order to find specific memories....However, while the spatial metaphor has shown extraordinary longevity, there have been some interesting changes over time in the precise form of analogy used. In particular, technological advances have influenced theoretical conceptualisations.... The original Greek analogies were based on wax tablets and aviaries; these were superseded by analogies involving switchboards, gramophones, tape recorders, libraries, conveyor belts, and underground maps. Most recently, the workings of human memory have been compared to computer functioning... and it has been suggested that the various memory stores found in computers have their counterparts in the human memory system. (Eysenck, 1984, pp. 79-80)Primary memory [as proposed by William James] relates to information that remains in consciousness after it has been perceived, and thus forms part of the psychological present, whereas secondary memory contains information about events that have left consciousness, and are therefore part of the psychological past. (Eysenck, 1984, p. 86)Once psychologists began to study long-term memory per se, they realized it may be divided into two main categories.... Semantic memories have to do with our general knowledge about the working of the world. We know what cars do, what stoves do, what the laws of gravity are, and so on. Episodic memories are largely events that took place at a time and place in our personal history. Remembering specific events about our own actions, about our family, and about our individual past falls into this category. With amnesia or in aging, what dims... is our personal episodic memories, save for those that are especially dear or painful to us. Our knowledge of how the world works remains pretty much intact. (Gazzaniga, 1988, p. 42)The nature of memory... provides a natural starting point for an analysis of thinking. Memory is the repository of many of the beliefs and representations that enter into thinking, and the retrievability of these representations can limit the quality of our thought. (Smith, 1990, p. 1)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Memory
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48 rational
1. n рационалист2. n филос. разумное3. a разумный, мыслящий; наделённый разумомrational beings — разумные существа; люди
4. a нормальный5. a благоразумный; рассудительный; рациональный; целесообразный6. a филос. рационалистический7. a мыслительный, относящийся к мышлению; умственный8. a разг. удобный, практичный9. a спец. рациональныйСинонимический ряд:1. analytic (adj.) analytic; cerebral; cognitive; reasoning; thinking2. discerning (adj.) circumspect; collected; discerning; discreet; discriminating; enlightened; perspicacious; prudent; reflective3. sound (adj.) balanced; clearheaded; commonsensical; consequent; intelligent; judicious; level-headed; logical; lucid; normal; reasonable; responsible; sagacious; sage; sane; sensible; sober; sound; wiseАнтонимический ряд:dim; eccentric; erratic; exorbitant; extravagant; fanciful; illogical; incompetent; inconsistent; indiscreet; injudicious; insane; intuitive; irrational; nonsensical; unreasonable -
49 རྣམ་ཤེས་
[rnam shes]vijnana, consciousness, perceptive function, distinct judgments of perception, perceiver, cognitive event, noetic capacity, modes of awareness, sensory perception, conscious activity, to perceive by observable qualities, consciousness principle, knowledge of emergent character of mentality, -> thams cad mkhyen, 1 of 5 phung po, soul of departed, consciousness, 9 kinds (kun gzhi, len pa'i rnam shes, nyon yid, mig, rna, sna, lce, lus, yid) -
50 F83
рус Смешанные специфические расстройства психологического развитияeng Mixed specific developmental disorders. A residual category for disorders in which there is some admixture of specific developmental disorders of speech and language, of scholastic skills, and of motor function, but in which none predominates sufficiently to constitute the prime diagnosis. This mixed category should be used only when there is a major overlap between each of these specific developmental disorders. The disorders are usually, but not always, associated with some degree of general impairment of cognitive functions. Thus, the category should be used when there are dysfunctions meeting the criteria for two or more of F80.-, F81.- and F82. -
51 F83.9
рус Смешанные специфические расстройства психологического развитияeng Mixed specific developmental disorders. A residual category for disorders in which there is some admixture of specific developmental disorders of speech and language, of scholastic skills, and of motor function, but in which none predominates sufficiently to constitute the prime diagnosis. This mixed category should be used only when there is a major overlap between each of these specific developmental disorders. The disorders are usually, but not always, associated with some degree of general impairment of cognitive functions. Thus, the category should be used when there are dysfunctions meeting the criteria for two or more of F80.-, F81.- and F82. -
52 model
1) модель; модификация2) модель (образец; уменьшенная, упрощенная копия)3) модель (абстрактная схема; концепция)•- access control model
- adaptive model
- aggregated model
- algoristic-type model
- allocation model
- analytical model
- ANOVA model
- behavioral model
- birth-death model
- block-diagram model - capability maturity model
- cascade-based model
- causal model
- client/server model
- client-component model
- client-server model
- cognitive model
- computer model
- conceptual model
- controllable model
- correlative model
- cost estimation model
- crude model
- cybernetic model
- data model
- decision-theoretic model
- decision-tree model
- descriptive model
- design model
- desk model
- deterministic model - domain semantic model
- dynamic programming model
- E/R model
- econometric model
- elaborate model
- elemental-equivalent model
- entity set model
- entity-relationship model
- equilibrium model
- estimation model
- exhaustive fault model
- exogenous priority model
- external model
- fault model
- fault-effect model
- finite element model
- fixed cascade delay model
- fixed gate delay model
- flow-oriented model
- forecasting model
- formal model
- frame-based model
- functional model
- gaming model
- gate-based model
- gate-level model
- generalized model
- generic model
- geometrical model
- graph model
- hardware model
- hazard function model
- hazard model
- heuristic model
- hierarchical model
- iconographic model
- internal model
- layout model
- level-based model
- linear programming model
- linear word-level model
- many-server model
- mental model
- MILP model
- model of calculation
- model of knowledge
- Monte-Carlo model
- multiple model
- multivariate model
- network model
- object model
- object-centric model
- OSI reference model
- pandemonium model
- performance-based model
- phenomenological model
- pictorial model
- pilot model
- pin fault model
- predictive model
- preemptive model
- preliminary model
- preproduction model
- priority model
- probabilistic model
- problem model - quantitative model
- queueing model
- real world model
- relational model
- relative model
- reliability model
- role-playing model
- scaling model
- scheduling model
- security model
- semi-Markov model
- seven-layer model
- shaded model
- simplified model
- simulation model
- single-stuck fault model
- singular model
- software model
- solid model
- sophisticated model
- state-space model
- statistical model
- stochastic model
- stream of characters model
- structural model
- stuck-at model
- suspect/monitor model
- symbolic model
- table model
- task-network model
- timing model
- transformational model
- typewriter model
- vocal-tract model
- waiting line model
- waterfall model
- wire-frame model
- word-level model
- world modelEnglish-Russian dictionary of computer science and programming > model
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53 mental
1. n разг. ненормальный, псих2. n разг. умственные способности3. a умственныйmental age — умственное развитие, соотносимое с возрастом
mental deficiency — умственная отсталость; слабоумие
mental work — умственная работа, умственный труд
4. a производимый в уме, мысленныйmental arithmetic — счёт в уме, устный счёт
5. a психический, душевныйmental derangement — психическое расстройство; невменяемость
mental insanity — психическое расстройство; невменяемость
6. a подбородочныйСинонимический ряд:1. bodily (adj.) abdominal; bodily; constitutional; internal; intestinal; organic; physical; visceral2. cerebral (adj.) cerebral; cognitive; intellective; intellectual; psychic; psychical; psychological; rationalАнтонимический ряд:corporal; objective; physical; unreasoning -
54 Computer Metaphors
Within the AI community there is a growing dissatisfaction concerning the adequacy of sequential models to simulate the cognitive processes....For an example of the dissimilarity between computers and nervous systems, consider that in conventional computers... each piece of data [is] located in its own special space in the memory bank [and] can be retrieved only by a central processor that knows the address in the memory bank for each datum. Human memory appears to be organized along entirely different lines. For one thing, from a partial or a degraded stimulus human memory can "reconstruct" the rest, and there are associative relationships among stored pieces of information based on considerations of context rather than on considerations of location.... t now appears doubtful that individual neurons are so specific that they are tuned to respond to a single item and nothing else. Thus, connectionist models tend to devise and use distributed principles, which means that elements may be selective to a range of stimuli and there are no "grandmother cells."...Information storage, it appears, is in some ill-defined sense a function of connectivity among sets of neurons. This implies that there is something fundamentally wrong in understanding the brain's memory on the model of individual symbols stored at unique addresses in a data bank....A further source of misgivings about the computer metaphor concerns real-time constraints. Although the signal velocities in nervous systems are quite slow in comparison to those in computers, brains are nonetheless far, far faster than electronic devices in the execution of their complex tasks. For example, human brains are incomparably faster than any computer in word-nonword recognition tasks. (P. S. Churchland, 1986, pp. 458-459)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Computer Metaphors
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55 Language
Philosophy is written in that great book, the universe, which is always open, right before our eyes. But one cannot understand this book without first learning to understand the language and to know the characters in which it is written. It is written in the language of mathematics, and the characters are triangles, circles, and other figures. Without these, one cannot understand a single word of it, and just wanders in a dark labyrinth. (Galileo, 1990, p. 232)It never happens that it [a nonhuman animal] arranges its speech in various ways in order to reply appropriately to everything that may be said in its presence, as even the lowest type of man can do. (Descartes, 1970a, p. 116)It is a very remarkable fact that there are none so depraved and stupid, without even excepting idiots, that they cannot arrange different words together, forming of them a statement by which they make known their thoughts; while, on the other hand, there is no other animal, however perfect and fortunately circumstanced it may be, which can do the same. (Descartes, 1967, p. 116)Human beings do not live in the object world alone, nor alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression for their society. It is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially without the use of language and that language is merely an incidental means of solving specific problems of communication or reflection. The fact of the matter is that the "real world" is to a large extent unconsciously built on the language habits of the group.... We see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do because the language habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation. (Sapir, 1921, p. 75)It powerfully conditions all our thinking about social problems and processes.... No two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the same social reality. The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same worlds with different labels attached. (Sapir, 1985, p. 162)[A list of language games, not meant to be exhaustive:]Giving orders, and obeying them- Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements- Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)Reporting an eventSpeculating about an eventForming and testing a hypothesisPresenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagramsMaking up a story; and reading itPlay actingSinging catchesGuessing riddlesMaking a joke; and telling itSolving a problem in practical arithmeticTranslating from one language into anotherLANGUAGE Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, and praying-. (Wittgenstein, 1953, Pt. I, No. 23, pp. 11 e-12 e)We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages.... The world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds-and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds.... No individual is free to describe nature with absolute impartiality but is constrained to certain modes of interpretation even while he thinks himself most free. (Whorf, 1956, pp. 153, 213-214)We dissect nature along the lines laid down by our native languages.The categories and types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do not find there because they stare every observer in the face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds-and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds.... We are thus introduced to a new principle of relativity, which holds that all observers are not led by the same physical evidence to the same picture of the universe, unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar or can in some way be calibrated. (Whorf, 1956, pp. 213-214)9) The Forms of a Person's Thoughts Are Controlled by Unperceived Patterns of His Own LanguageThe forms of a person's thoughts are controlled by inexorable laws of pattern of which he is unconscious. These patterns are the unperceived intricate systematizations of his own language-shown readily enough by a candid comparison and contrast with other languages, especially those of a different linguistic family. (Whorf, 1956, p. 252)It has come to be commonly held that many utterances which look like statements are either not intended at all, or only intended in part, to record or impart straightforward information about the facts.... Many traditional philosophical perplexities have arisen through a mistake-the mistake of taking as straightforward statements of fact utterances which are either (in interesting non-grammatical ways) nonsensical or else intended as something quite different. (Austin, 1962, pp. 2-3)In general, one might define a complex of semantic components connected by logical constants as a concept. The dictionary of a language is then a system of concepts in which a phonological form and certain syntactic and morphological characteristics are assigned to each concept. This system of concepts is structured by several types of relations. It is supplemented, furthermore, by redundancy or implicational rules..., representing general properties of the whole system of concepts.... At least a relevant part of these general rules is not bound to particular languages, but represents presumably universal structures of natural languages. They are not learned, but are rather a part of the human ability to acquire an arbitrary natural language. (Bierwisch, 1970, pp. 171-172)In studying the evolution of mind, we cannot guess to what extent there are physically possible alternatives to, say, transformational generative grammar, for an organism meeting certain other physical conditions characteristic of humans. Conceivably, there are none-or very few-in which case talk about evolution of the language capacity is beside the point. (Chomsky, 1972, p. 98)[It is] truth value rather than syntactic well-formedness that chiefly governs explicit verbal reinforcement by parents-which renders mildly paradoxical the fact that the usual product of such a training schedule is an adult whose speech is highly grammatical but not notably truthful. (R. O. Brown, 1973, p. 330)he conceptual base is responsible for formally representing the concepts underlying an utterance.... A given word in a language may or may not have one or more concepts underlying it.... On the sentential level, the utterances of a given language are encoded within a syntactic structure of that language. The basic construction of the sentential level is the sentence.The next highest level... is the conceptual level. We call the basic construction of this level the conceptualization. A conceptualization consists of concepts and certain relations among those concepts. We can consider that both levels exist at the same point in time and that for any unit on one level, some corresponding realizate exists on the other level. This realizate may be null or extremely complex.... Conceptualizations may relate to other conceptualizations by nesting or other specified relationships. (Schank, 1973, pp. 191-192)The mathematics of multi-dimensional interactive spaces and lattices, the projection of "computer behavior" on to possible models of cerebral functions, the theoretical and mechanical investigation of artificial intelligence, are producing a stream of sophisticated, often suggestive ideas.But it is, I believe, fair to say that nothing put forward until now in either theoretic design or mechanical mimicry comes even remotely in reach of the most rudimentary linguistic realities. (Steiner, 1975, p. 284)The step from the simple tool to the master tool, a tool to make tools (what we would now call a machine tool), seems to me indeed to parallel the final step to human language, which I call reconstitution. It expresses in a practical and social context the same understanding of hierarchy, and shows the same analysis by function as a basis for synthesis. (Bronowski, 1977, pp. 127-128)t is the language donn eґ in which we conduct our lives.... We have no other. And the danger is that formal linguistic models, in their loosely argued analogy with the axiomatic structure of the mathematical sciences, may block perception.... It is quite conceivable that, in language, continuous induction from simple, elemental units to more complex, realistic forms is not justified. The extent and formal "undecidability" of context-and every linguistic particle above the level of the phoneme is context-bound-may make it impossible, except in the most abstract, meta-linguistic sense, to pass from "pro-verbs," "kernals," or "deep deep structures" to actual speech. (Steiner, 1975, pp. 111-113)A higher-level formal language is an abstract machine. (Weizenbaum, 1976, p. 113)Jakobson sees metaphor and metonymy as the characteristic modes of binarily opposed polarities which between them underpin the two-fold process of selection and combination by which linguistic signs are formed.... Thus messages are constructed, as Saussure said, by a combination of a "horizontal" movement, which combines words together, and a "vertical" movement, which selects the particular words from the available inventory or "inner storehouse" of the language. The combinative (or syntagmatic) process manifests itself in contiguity (one word being placed next to another) and its mode is metonymic. The selective (or associative) process manifests itself in similarity (one word or concept being "like" another) and its mode is metaphoric. The "opposition" of metaphor and metonymy therefore may be said to represent in effect the essence of the total opposition between the synchronic mode of language (its immediate, coexistent, "vertical" relationships) and its diachronic mode (its sequential, successive, lineal progressive relationships). (Hawkes, 1977, pp. 77-78)It is striking that the layered structure that man has given to language constantly reappears in his analyses of nature. (Bronowski, 1977, p. 121)First, [an ideal intertheoretic reduction] provides us with a set of rules"correspondence rules" or "bridge laws," as the standard vernacular has it-which effect a mapping of the terms of the old theory (T o) onto a subset of the expressions of the new or reducing theory (T n). These rules guide the application of those selected expressions of T n in the following way: we are free to make singular applications of their correspondencerule doppelgangers in T o....Second, and equally important, a successful reduction ideally has the outcome that, under the term mapping effected by the correspondence rules, the central principles of T o (those of semantic and systematic importance) are mapped onto general sentences of T n that are theorems of Tn. (P. Churchland, 1979, p. 81)If non-linguistic factors must be included in grammar: beliefs, attitudes, etc. [this would] amount to a rejection of the initial idealization of language as an object of study. A priori such a move cannot be ruled out, but it must be empirically motivated. If it proves to be correct, I would conclude that language is a chaos that is not worth studying.... Note that the question is not whether beliefs or attitudes, and so on, play a role in linguistic behavior and linguistic judgments... [but rather] whether distinct cognitive structures can be identified, which interact in the real use of language and linguistic judgments, the grammatical system being one of these. (Chomsky, 1979, pp. 140, 152-153)23) Language Is Inevitably Influenced by Specific Contexts of Human InteractionLanguage cannot be studied in isolation from the investigation of "rationality." It cannot afford to neglect our everyday assumptions concerning the total behavior of a reasonable person.... An integrational linguistics must recognize that human beings inhabit a communicational space which is not neatly compartmentalized into language and nonlanguage.... It renounces in advance the possibility of setting up systems of forms and meanings which will "account for" a central core of linguistic behavior irrespective of the situation and communicational purposes involved. (Harris, 1981, p. 165)By innate [linguistic knowledge], Chomsky simply means "genetically programmed." He does not literally think that children are born with language in their heads ready to be spoken. He merely claims that a "blueprint is there, which is brought into use when the child reaches a certain point in her general development. With the help of this blueprint, she analyzes the language she hears around her more readily than she would if she were totally unprepared for the strange gabbling sounds which emerge from human mouths. (Aitchison, 1987, p. 31)Looking at ourselves from the computer viewpoint, we cannot avoid seeing that natural language is our most important "programming language." This means that a vast portion of our knowledge and activity is, for us, best communicated and understood in our natural language.... One could say that natural language was our first great original artifact and, since, as we increasingly realize, languages are machines, so natural language, with our brains to run it, was our primal invention of the universal computer. One could say this except for the sneaking suspicion that language isn't something we invented but something we became, not something we constructed but something in which we created, and recreated, ourselves. (Leiber, 1991, p. 8)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Language
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