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121 θηρεύω
θηρεύω 1 aor. ἐθήρευσα (s. θήρ; Hom. et al.; ins, pap, LXX; TestZeb 5:5; Ar. 11, 2) to hunt, catch fig. (so in many ways Pind. et al.; Diod S 2, 5, 1; Ps 139:12; Philo; Jos., Ant. 19, 308) θ. τι ἐκ τοῦ στόματος αὐτοῦ catch him in someth. he might say Lk 11:54 (Pla., Gorg. 489b ὀνόματα θηρεύειν=‘to hunt for the words [of other people] to see whether they might perhaps commit errors’ [ἐάν τις ῥήματι ἀμάρτῃ].—θ.=catch by treachery: Ps.-Clemens, Hom. 8, 22). τίς ὁ θηρεύσας με; Who has deceived me? GJs 13:1.—DELG s.v. θήρ. M-M. -
122 οἶδα
οἶδα (Hom.+) really the perf. of the stem εἰδ-(Lat. video), but used as a pres.; 2 sing. οἶδας (1 Cor 7:16; J 21:15f), οἶσθα (Dt 9:2 4 Macc 6:27), 1 pl. οἴδαμεν LXX, 2 pl. οἴδατε, 3 pl. οἴδασιν (ἴσασιν only Ac 26:4. The form οἴδασιν is found as early as Hdt. 2, 43, 1; X., Oec. 20, 14; SIG 182, 8 [362/361 B.C.]; PCairGoodsp 3, 7 [III B.C.]; οἶδαν GJs 17:1). ἴστε Eph 5:5; Hb 12:17; Js 1:19 can be indic. (so 3 Macc 3:14) or impv.; subj. εἰδῶ; inf. εἰδέναι; εἰδῆσαι Dt 4:35; Jdth 9:14; ptc. εἰδώς, εἰδυῖα Mk 5:33; Ac 5:7. Plpf. ᾔδειν, 2 sg. ᾔδεις Mt 25:26; Lk 19:22, 3 pl. ᾔδεισαν (W-S. §13, 20). Fut. εἰδήσω Hb 8:11 (Jer 38:34) and εἴσομαι (Dg 12:1). B-D-F §99, 2; 101 p. 45 (εἰδέναι); W-S. §14, 7; Mlt-H. 220–22; Helbing p. 108; Mayser 321, 2; 327, 17; 372f; on relation to γινώσκω s. SPorter, Verbal Aspect in the Greek of the NT ’89, 282–87.① to have information about, knowⓐ w. acc. of pers. know someone, know about someone Mk 1:34; J 1:26, 31, 33; 6:42; 7:28a; Ac 3:16; 7:18 (Ex 1:8); Hb 10:30; 10:11. (τὸν) θεόν (Herm. Wr. 14, 8; Ar. 3, 2; Just., D. 10, 4; Tat. 19, 2) of polytheists, who know nothing about God (the one God described in vss. 6–7, and in contrast to the plurality of gods that have previously enslaved the Galatians vs. 8) Gal 4:8; 1 Th 4:5 (cp. Jer 10:25).ⓑ w. acc. of thing: οὐ τὴν ἡμέραν οὐδὲ τὴν ὥραν Mt 25:13; cp. 2 Cl 12:1. τὰς ἐντολάς Mk 10:19; Lk 18:20. βρῶσιν J 4:32. τ. ἐνθυμήσεις Mt 9:4 v.l. (cp. Jos., Vi. 283). τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν Ro 7:7. τὰ μυστήρια πάντα 1 Cor 13:2. τὰ ἐγκάρδια 2 Cl 9:9. τὰ κρύφια IMg 3:2. τὴν πόλιν Hs 1:1.ⓒ w. acc. of pers. and ptc. in place of the predicate (X., An. 1, 10, 16; TestJob 28:5; Just., A I, 12, 7.—B-D-F §416, 2; s. Rob. 1103) οἶδα ἄνθρωπον ἐν Χριστῷ … ἁρπαγέντα τὸν τοιοῦτον ἕως τρίτου οὐρανοῦ I know of a person in Christ … that he was transported into the third heaven 2 Cor 12:2. Also without the ptc. εἰδὼς αὐτὸν ἄνδρα δίκαιον (sc. ὄντα) because he knew that he was a just man Mk 6:20 (Chion, Ep. 3, 5 ἴσθι με προθυμότερον [ὄντα]). The obj. more closely defined by a declarative or interrog. clause: οἴδατε τὴν οἰκίαν Στεφανᾶ ὅτι ἐστὶν ἀπαρχὴ τῆς Ἀχαί̈ας = οἴδατε ὅτι ἡ οἰκία Στεφανᾶ ἐστιν ἀπαρχὴ τῆς Ἀ. 1 Cor 16:15.—Ac 16:3 v.l. An indirect quest. may take the place of ὅτι: οἶδά σε τίς εἶ Mk 1:24; Lk 4:34. οὐκ οἶδα ὑμᾶς πόθεν ἐστέ I do not know where you come from 13:25; cp. vs. 27 (ὑμᾶς is not found in all the mss. here); 2 Cl 4:5. τοῦτον οἴδαμεν πόθεν ἐστίν J 7:27; 9:29b.ⓓ foll. by acc. and inf. (Just., A I, 26, 4; 59, 6, D. 75, 4.—B-D-F §397, 1; s. Rob. 1036ff) Lk 4:41; 1 Pt 5:9; 1 Cl 62:3.ⓔ foll. by ὅτι (Aeneas Tact. 579; Dio Chrys. 31 [48], 1; Maximus Tyr. 16, 2b; TestAbr A 6 p. 83, 14 [Stone p. 14]; JosAs 6:6 al.; Just., A I, 12, 11; D. 4, 4 al.—B-D-F §397, 1; Rob. 1035) Mt 6:32; 9:6; 15:12; 20:25; Mk 10:42; Lk 2:49; 8:53; J 4:25; Ac 3:17 and very oft.; GJs 4:4; 5:1; 17:1; 20:2 codd.; 23:2. εἰδὼς (εἰδότες) ὅτι Ac 2:30; 1 Cl 45:7; 2 Cl 7:1; 10:5; B 10:11; 19:6; IMg 14; ISm 4:1; Hs 8, 6, 1; 10, 3, 4 [Ox 404 recto, 15]; Pol 1:3; 4:1; 5:1; 6:1; D 3:10; AcPl Ha 1, 25; AcPlCor 2:29.—τοῦτο, ὅτι 1 Ti 1:9; 2 Ti 1:15. ἓν οἶδα, ὅτι I know just this one thing, that J 9:25b (Vi. Aesopi I c. 17 p. 269, 16f Eb. οὐκ οἶδα, τί γέγονεν. ἓν δʼ οἶδα μόνον, ὅτι …).—The formula οἴδαμεν ὅτι is freq. used to introduce a well-known fact that is generally accepted Mt 22:16; Lk 20:21; J 3:2; 9:31; Ro 2:2; 3:19; 7:14; 8:22, 28; 2 Cor 5:1; 1 Ti 1:8; 1J 3:2; 5:18ff. Paul also uses for this purpose the rhetorical question (ἢ) οὐκ οἴδατε ὅτι; Ro 6:16; 1 Cor 3:16; 5:6; 6:2f, 9, 15f, 19; 9:13, 24.ⓕ w. indirect quest. foll.: (TestAbr B 2 p. 106, 1 [Stone p. 60] μὴ εἰδὼς τίς ἐστίν; Just., D. 65, 1 οὐκ οἶδα τί φῶ) τίς, τί Mt 20:22; Mk 9:6 (HBaltensweiler, D. Verklärung Jesu ’59, 114f; on the grammar as well as the theme of inappropriateness in the face of transcendence cp. Eur., Bacch. 506, s. also 358); 10:38; 14:40; J 5:13; 6:6; 9:21b; 13:18; 15:15; Ro 8:27; 11:2; 1 Th 4:2; 2 Ti 3:14; IEph 12:1. ποῖος Mt 24:42f; Lk 12:39. ἡλίκος Col 2:1. οἷος 1 Th 1:5. ποῦ (ParJer 5:13) J 3:8; 8:14; 12:35 14:5; 20:2, 13. πῶς (BGU 37, 7; ApcMos 31) J 9:21a; Col 4:6; 2 Th 3:7; 1 Ti 3:15; GJs 23:3. πότε Mk 13:33, 35. πόθεν J 2:9a; 3:8; 7:28b; 8:14; 9:30. Foll. by εἰ whether (Lucian, Tox. 22) J 9:25; 1 Cor 7:16ab (JJeremias, Bultmann Festschr. ’54, 255–66 understands τί οἶδας εἰ as ‘perhaps’; CBurchard, ZNW 61, ’70, 170f); Hm 12, 3, 4.—εἴτε 2 Cor 12:2f.ⓖ followed by a relat. (PPetr II, 11 [1], 7 [III B.C.]) οἶδεν ὁ πατὴρ ὑμῶν ὧν χρείαν ἔχετε Mt 6:8; cp. Mk 5:33; 2 Ti 1:12.ⓗ foll. by περί τινος (Just., D. 5, 1) know about someth. Mt 24:36; Mk 13:32 (RBrown, Jesus, God and Man ’67, 59–79).ⓘ abs. (Just., A I, 21, 4 πρὸς εἰδότας λέγειν οὐκ ἀνάγκη) Mt 21:27; Mk 4:27; Lk 11:44; J 2:9b; 1 Cl 43:6. καθὼς (αὐτοὶ) οἴδατε as you (yourselves) know Ac 2:22; 1 Th 2:2, 5; cp. 3:4. καίπερ εἰδ. though you know (them) 2 Pt 1:12. ὁ θεὸς οἶδεν God knows (that I do) 2 Cor 11:11; cp. 9:9. ἴστε Js 1:19 (indic.: HermvSoden; BWeiss; Weymouth; W-S. §14, 7; impv: Hollmann; MDibelius; Windisch; OHoltzmann; Hauck; Meinertz; NRSV ‘You must understand this’; B-D-F §99, 2; Mlt. 245).② be intimately acquainted with or stand in a close relation to, know οὐκ οἶδα τὸν ἄνθρωπον I don’t know the man Mt 26:72, 74; cp. Mk 14:71; Lk 22:57. ὥστε ἡμεῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν οὐδένα οἴδαμεν κατὰ σάρκα 2 Cor 5:16. οὐ γὰρ ᾔδει αὐτὸν ἐν σαρκί AcPl Ant 13, 16 (for this εἶδεν ἀυτὸν σαρκί Aa I 237, 2).— To know God, i.e. not only to know theoretically of God’s existence, but to have a positive relationship with God, or not to know God, i.e. wanting to know nothing about God: 2 Th 1:8; Tit 1:16.—J 7:28b; 8:19 al.—οὐκ οἶδα ὑμᾶς I have nothing to do with you Mt 25:12. Cp. the formula of similar mng. by which a teacher excluded a scholar for seven days: Billerb. I 469; IV 293.③ to know/understand how, can, be able w. inf. foll. (X., Cyr. 1, 6, 46; Philosoph. Max. p. 497, 7 εἰδὼς εὔχεσθαι; Herodian 3, 4, 8; Jos., Bell. 2, 91; 5, 407) οἴδατε δόματα ἀγαθὰ διδόναι you know how to give good gifts Mt 7:11; Lk 11:13 (cp. TestJob 44:3 ᾔδεισαν εὖ ποιεῖν). οἴδατε δοκιμάζειν you understand how to interpret 12:56ab. οἶδα καὶ ταπεινοῦσθαι, οἶδα καὶ περισσεύειν Phil 4:12. εἰδέναι ἕκαστον ὑμῶν τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σκεῦος κτᾶσθαι ἐν ἁγιασμῷ each one of you is to know how to possess his own vessel (s. σκεῦος 3) in consecration 1 Th 4:4. τοῦ ἰδίου οἴκου προστῆναι οὐκ οἶδεν does not know how to manage his own household 1 Ti 3:5. εἰδὼς καλὸν ποιεῖν Js 4:17. οἶδεν κύριος εὐσεβεῖς ἐκ πειρασμοῦ ῥύεσθαι 2 Pt 2:9. οἴδασιν διὰ κόπου … πορίζειν ἑαυτοῖς τὴν τροφήν 10:4. εἰδὼς φέρειν μαλακίαν one who knew how to endure pain 1 Cl 16:3 (Is 53:3).—Abs. ἀσφαλίσασθε ὡς οἴδατε make it (=the tomb) as secure as you can Mt 27:65.④ to grasp the meaning of someth., understand, recognize, come to know, experience (Just., D. 114, 1 ἣν τέχνην ἐὰν μὴ εἰδῶσιν [of allegorizing]; Sallust. 3 p. 4, 8 τοῖς δυναμένοις εἰδέναι=to those who can understand it) w. acc. of thing τὴν παραβολήν Mk 4:13. τὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ πυροῦ σπόρον … ὅτι the sowing of wheat … that AcPlCor 2:26. τὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου understand what is really human 1 Cor 2:11. τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ χαρισθέντα ἡμῖν vs. 12. τὰ συνέχοντά με IRo 6:3. W. indir. quest. foll. εἰδέναι τίς ἐστιν ἡ ἐλπίς come to know what the hope is Eph 1:18. οὐκ οἶδα τί λέγεις I do not understand what you mean (Philostrat., Vi. Soph. 1, 7, 4; TestAbr A 16, p. 98, 10 [Stone p. 44] οἶδα τί λέγεις) Mt 26:70; cp. J 16:18; 1 Cor 14:16. Lk 22:60 (Oenomaus in Eus., PE 6, 7, 9 οὐκ οἶσθα ἃ λέγεις; Just., D. 9, 1 οὐ γὰρ οἶδας ὅ λέγεις). εἴσεσθε ὅσα παρέχει ὁ θεός you will experience what God bestows Dg 12:1.—Esp. of Jesus’ ability to fathom people’s thoughts: τὰς ἐνθυμήσεις αὐτῶν Mt 12:25. τὴν ὑπόκρισιν Mk 12:15. τοὺς διαλογισμοὺς αὐτῶν Lk 6:8; cp. 11:17. PEg2 50 (=ASyn. 280, 45). W. ἐν ἑαυτῷ added and ὅτι foll. J 6:61.⑤ to remember, recollect, recall, be aware of λοιπὸν οὐκ οἶδα εἴ τινα ἄλλον ἐβάπτισα I don’t recall baptizing anyone else 1 Cor 1:16 (cp. Lucian, Dial. Meretr. 1, 1 οἶσθα αὐτόν, ἢ ἐπιλέλησαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον; οὐκ, ἀλλʼ οἶδα, ὦ Γλυκέριον; Field, Notes 187).⑥ to recognize merit, respect, honor εἰδέναι τοὺς κοπιῶντας ἐν ὑμῖν respect the people who work among you 1 Th 5:12 (εἰδέναι τινά can mean recognize or honor someone [Ael. Aristid. 35, 35 K.=9 p. 111 D. τοὺς κρείττους εἰδέναι] but can also mean take an interest in someone, care for someone: Witkowski 30, 7 οἱ θεοί σε οἴδασιν). θεὸν καὶ ἐπίσκοπον εἰδέναι honor God and the bishop ISm 9:1.—τοῦτο ἴστε γινώσκοντες Eph 5:5 has been viewed as a Hebraism (so ARobinson 1904 ad loc., calling attention to LXX 1 Km 20:3 γινώσκων οἶδεν and Sym. Jer 49 [42]: 22 ἴστε γινώσκοντες), but against this view SPorter, ZNW 81, ’90, 270–76.—B. 1209. DELG. M-M. EDNT. TW. -
123 Creativity
Put in this bald way, these aims sound utopian. How utopian they areor rather, how imminent their realization-depends on how broadly or narrowly we interpret the term "creative." If we are willing to regard all human complex problem solving as creative, then-as we will point out-successful programs for problem solving mechanisms that simulate human problem solvers already exist, and a number of their general characteristics are known. If we reserve the term "creative" for activities like discovery of the special theory of relativity or the composition of Beethoven's Seventh Symphony, then no example of a creative mechanism exists at the present time. (Simon, 1979, pp. 144-145)Among the questions that can now be given preliminary answers in computational terms are the following: how can ideas from very different sources be spontaneously thought of together? how can two ideas be merged to produce a new structure, which shows the influence of both ancestor ideas without being a mere "cut-and-paste" combination? how can the mind be "primed," so that one will more easily notice serendipitous ideas? why may someone notice-and remember-something fairly uninteresting, if it occurs in an interesting context? how can a brief phrase conjure up an entire melody from memory? and how can we accept two ideas as similar ("love" and "prove" as rhyming, for instance) in respect of a feature not identical in both? The features of connectionist AI models that suggest answers to these questions are their powers of pattern completion, graceful degradation, sensitization, multiple constraint satisfaction, and "best-fit" equilibration.... Here, the important point is that the unconscious, "insightful," associative aspects of creativity can be explained-in outline, at least-by AI methods. (Boden, 1996, p. 273)There thus appears to be an underlying similarity in the process involved in creative innovation and social independence, with common traits and postures required for expression of both behaviors. The difference is one of product-literary, musical, artistic, theoretical products on the one hand, opinions on the other-rather than one of process. In both instances the individual must believe that his perceptions are meaningful and valid and be willing to rely upon his own interpretations. He must trust himself sufficiently that even when persons express opinions counter to his own he can proceed on the basis of his own perceptions and convictions. (Coopersmith, 1967, p. 58)he average level of ego strength and emotional stability is noticeably higher among creative geniuses than among the general population, though it is possibly lower than among men of comparable intelligence and education who go into administrative and similar positions. High anxiety and excitability appear common (e.g. Priestley, Darwin, Kepler) but full-blown neurosis is quite rare. (Cattell & Butcher, 1970, p. 315)he insight that is supposed to be required for such work as discovery turns out to be synonymous with the familiar process of recognition; and other terms commonly used in the discussion of creative work-such terms as "judgment," "creativity," or even "genius"-appear to be wholly dispensable or to be definable, as insight is, in terms of mundane and well-understood concepts. (Simon, 1989, p. 376)From the sketch material still in existence, from the condition of the fragments, and from the autographs themselves we can draw definite conclusions about Mozart's creative process. To invent musical ideas he did not need any stimulation; they came to his mind "ready-made" and in polished form. In contrast to Beethoven, who made numerous attempts at shaping his musical ideas until he found the definitive formulation of a theme, Mozart's first inspiration has the stamp of finality. Any Mozart theme has completeness and unity; as a phenomenon it is a Gestalt. (Herzmann, 1964, p. 28)Great artists enlarge the limits of one's perception. Looking at the world through the eyes of Rembrandt or Tolstoy makes one able to perceive aspects of truth about the world which one could not have achieved without their aid. Freud believed that science was adaptive because it facilitated mastery of the external world; but was it not the case that many scientific theories, like works of art, also originated in phantasy? Certainly, reading accounts of scientific discovery by men of the calibre of Einstein compelled me to conclude that phantasy was not merely escapist, but a way of reaching new insights concerning the nature of reality. Scientific hypotheses require proof; works of art do not. Both are concerned with creating order, with making sense out of the world and our experience of it. (Storr, 1993, p. xii)The importance of self-esteem for creative expression appears to be almost beyond disproof. Without a high regard for himself the individual who is working in the frontiers of his field cannot trust himself to discriminate between the trivial and the significant. Without trust in his own powers the person seeking improved solutions or alternative theories has no basis for distinguishing the significant and profound innovation from the one that is merely different.... An essential component of the creative process, whether it be analysis, synthesis, or the development of a new perspective or more comprehensive theory, is the conviction that one's judgment in interpreting the events is to be trusted. (Coopersmith, 1967, p. 59)In the daily stream of thought these four different stages [preparation; incubation; illumination or inspiration; and verification] constantly overlap each other as we explore different problems. An economist reading a Blue Book, a physiologist watching an experiment, or a business man going through his morning's letters, may at the same time be "incubating" on a problem which he proposed to himself a few days ago, be accumulating knowledge in "preparation" for a second problem, and be "verifying" his conclusions to a third problem. Even in exploring the same problem, the mind may be unconsciously incubating on one aspect of it, while it is consciously employed in preparing for or verifying another aspect. (Wallas, 1926, p. 81)he basic, bisociative pattern of the creative synthesis [is] the sudden interlocking of two previously unrelated skills, or matrices of thought. (Koestler, 1964, p. 121)11) The Earliest Stages in the Creative Process Involve a Commerce with DisorderEven to the creator himself, the earliest effort may seem to involve a commerce with disorder. For the creative order, which is an extension of life, is not an elaboration of the established, but a movement beyond the established, or at least a reorganization of it and often of elements not included in it. The first need is therefore to transcend the old order. Before any new order can be defined, the absolute power of the established, the hold upon us of what we know and are, must be broken. New life comes always from outside our world, as we commonly conceive that world. This is the reason why, in order to invent, one must yield to the indeterminate within him, or, more precisely, to certain illdefined impulses which seem to be of the very texture of the ungoverned fullness which John Livingston Lowes calls "the surging chaos of the unexpressed." (Ghiselin, 1985, p. 4)New life comes always from outside our world, as we commonly conceive our world. This is the reason why, in order to invent, one must yield to the indeterminate within him, or, more precisely, to certain illdefined impulses which seem to be of the very texture of the ungoverned fullness which John Livingston Lowes calls "the surging chaos of the unexpressed." Chaos and disorder are perhaps the wrong terms for that indeterminate fullness and activity of the inner life. For it is organic, dynamic, full of tension and tendency. What is absent from it, except in the decisive act of creation, is determination, fixity, and commitment to one resolution or another of the whole complex of its tensions. (Ghiselin, 1952, p. 13)[P]sychoanalysts have principally been concerned with the content of creative products, and with explaining content in terms of the artist's infantile past. They have paid less attention to examining why the artist chooses his particular activity to express, abreact or sublimate his emotions. In short, they have not made much distinction between art and neurosis; and, since the former is one of the blessings of mankind, whereas the latter is one of the curses, it seems a pity that they should not be better differentiated....Psychoanalysis, being fundamentally concerned with drive and motive, might have been expected to throw more light upon what impels the creative person that in fact it has. (Storr, 1993, pp. xvii, 3)A number of theoretical approaches were considered. Associative theory, as developed by Mednick (1962), gained some empirical support from the apparent validity of the Remote Associates Test, which was constructed on the basis of the theory.... Koestler's (1964) bisociative theory allows more complexity to mental organization than Mednick's associative theory, and postulates "associative contexts" or "frames of reference." He proposed that normal, non-creative, thought proceeds within particular contexts or frames and that the creative act involves linking together previously unconnected frames.... Simonton (1988) has developed associative notions further and explored the mathematical consequences of chance permutation of ideas....Like Koestler, Gruber (1980; Gruber and Davis, 1988) has based his analysis on case studies. He has focused especially on Darwin's development of the theory of evolution. Using piagetian notions, such as assimilation and accommodation, Gruber shows how Darwin's system of ideas changed very slowly over a period of many years. "Moments of insight," in Gruber's analysis, were the culminations of slow long-term processes.... Finally, the information-processing approach, as represented by Simon (1966) and Langley et al. (1987), was considered.... [Simon] points out the importance of good problem representations, both to ensure search is in an appropriate problem space and to aid in developing heuristic evaluations of possible research directions.... The work of Langley et al. (1987) demonstrates how such search processes, realized in computer programs, can indeed discover many basic laws of science from tables of raw data.... Boden (1990a, 1994) has stressed the importance of restructuring the problem space in creative work to develop new genres and paradigms in the arts and sciences. (Gilhooly, 1996, pp. 243-244; emphasis in original)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Creativity
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124 Psychoanalysis
[Psychoanalysis] seeks to prove to the ego that it is not even master in its own house, but must content itself with scanty information of what is going on unconsciously in the mind. (Freud, 1953-1974, Vol. 16, pp. 284-285)Although in the interview the analyst is supposedly a "passive" auditor of the "free association" narration by the subject, in point of fact the analyst does direct the course of the narrative. This by itself does not necessarily impair the evidential worth of the outcome, for even in the most meticulously conducted laboratory experiment the experimenter intervenes to obtain the data he is after. There is nevertheless the difficulty that in the nature of the case the full extent of the analyst's intervention is not a matter that is open to public scrutiny, so that by and large one has only his own testimony as to what transpires in the consulting room. It is perhaps unnecessary to say that this is not a question about the personal integrity of psychoanalytic practitioners. The point is the fundamental one that no matter how firmly we may resolve to make explicit our biases, no human being is aware of all of them, and that objectivity in science is achieved through the criticism of publicly accessible material by a community of independent inquirers.... Moreover, unless data are obtained under carefully standardized circumstances, or under different circumstances whose dependence on known variables is nevertheless established, even an extensive collection of data is an unreliable basis for inference. To be sure, analysts apparently do attempt to institute standard conditions for the conduct of interviews. But there is not much information available on the extent to which the standardization is actually enforced, or whether it relates to more than what may be superficial matters. (E. Nagel, 1959, pp. 49-50)3) No Necessary Incompatibility between Psychoanalysis and Certain Religious Formulationshere would seem to be no necessary incompatibility between psychoanalysis and those religious formulations which locate God within the self. One could, indeed, argue that Freud's Id (and even more Groddeck's It), the impersonal force within which is both the core of oneself and yet not oneself, and from which in illness one become[s] alienated, is a secular formation of the insight which makes religious people believe in an immanent God. (Ryecroft, 1966, p. 22)Freudian analysts emphasized that their theories were constantly verified by their "clinical observations."... It was precisely this fact-that they always fitted, that they were always confirmed-which in the eyes of their admirers constituted the strongest argument in favour of these theories. It began to dawn on me that this apparent strength was in fact their weakness.... It is easy to obtain confirmations or verifications, for nearly every theory-if we look for confirmation. (Popper, 1968, pp. 3435)5) Psychoanalysis Is Not a Science But Rather the Interpretation of a Narrated HistoryPsychoanalysis does not satisfy the standards of the sciences of observation, and the "facts" it deals with are not verifiable by multiple, independent observers.... There are no "facts" nor any observation of "facts" in psychoanalysis but rather the interpretation of a narrated history. (Ricoeur, 1974, p. 186)6) Some of the Qualities of a Scientific Approach Are Possessed by PsychoanalysisIn sum: psychoanalysis is not a science, but it shares some of the qualities associated with a scientific approach-the search for truth, understanding, honesty, openness to the import of the observation and evidence, and a skeptical stance toward authority. (Breger, 1981, p. 50)[Attributes of Psychoanalysis:]1. Psychic Determinism. No item in mental life and in conduct and behavior is "accidental"; it is the outcome of antecedent conditions.2. Much mental activity and behavior is purposive or goal-directed in character.3. Much of mental activity and behavior, and its determinants, is unconscious in character. 4. The early experience of the individual, as a child, is very potent, and tends to be pre-potent over later experience. (Farrell, 1981, p. 25)Our sceptic may be unwise enough... to maintain that, because analytic theory is unscientific on his criterion, it is not worth discussing. This step is unwise, because it presupposes that, if a study is not scientific on his criterion, it is not a rational enterprise... an elementary and egregious mistake. The scientific and the rational are not co-extensive. Scientific work is only one form that rational inquiry can take: there are many others. (Farrell, 1981, p. 46)Psychoanalysts have tended to write as though the term analysis spoke for itself, as if the statement "analysis revealed" or "it was analyzed as" preceding a clinical assertion was sufficient to establish the validity of what was being reported. An outsider might easily get the impression from reading the psychoanalytic literature that some standardized, generally accepted procedure existed for both inference and evidence. Instead, exactly the opposite has been true. Clinical material in the hands of one analyst can lead to totally different "findings" in the hands of another. (Peterfreund, 1986, p. 128)The analytic process-the means by which we arrive at psychoanalytic understanding-has been largely neglected and is poorly understood, and there has been comparatively little interest in the issues of inference and evidence. Indeed, psychoanalysts as a group have not recognized the importance of being bound by scientific constraints. They do not seem to understand that a possibility is only that-a possibility-and that innumerable ways may exist to explain the same data. Psychoanalysts all too often do not seem to distinguish hypotheses from facts, nor do they seem to understand that hypotheses must be tested in some way, that criteria for evidence must exist, and that any given test for any hypothesis must allow for the full range of substantiation/refutation. (Peterfreund, 1986, p. 129)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Psychoanalysis
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125 Science
It is a common notion, or at least it is implied in many common modes of speech, that the thoughts, feelings, and actions of sentient beings are not a subject of science.... This notion seems to involve some confusion of ideas, which it is necessary to begin by clearing up. Any facts are fitted, in themselves, to be a subject of science, which follow one another according to constant laws; although those laws may not have been discovered, nor even to be discoverable by our existing resources. (Mill, 1900, B. VI, Chap. 3, Sec. 1)One class of natural philosophers has always a tendency to combine the phenomena and to discover their analogies; another class, on the contrary, employs all its efforts in showing the disparities of things. Both tendencies are necessary for the perfection of science, the one for its progress, the other for its correctness. The philosophers of the first of these classes are guided by the sense of unity throughout nature; the philosophers of the second have their minds more directed towards the certainty of our knowledge. The one are absorbed in search of principles, and neglect often the peculiarities, and not seldom the strictness of demonstration; the other consider the science only as the investigation of facts, but in their laudable zeal they often lose sight of the harmony of the whole, which is the character of truth. Those who look for the stamp of divinity on every thing around them, consider the opposite pursuits as ignoble and even as irreligious; while those who are engaged in the search after truth, look upon the other as unphilosophical enthusiasts, and perhaps as phantastical contemners of truth.... This conflict of opinions keeps science alive, and promotes it by an oscillatory progress. (Oersted, 1920, p. 352)Most of the fundamental ideas of science are essentially simple, and may, as a rule, be expressed in a language comprehensible to everyone. (Einstein & Infeld, 1938, p. 27)A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it. (Planck, 1949, pp. 33-34)[Original quotation: "Eine neue wissenschaftliche Wahrheit pflegt sich nicht in der Weise durchzusetzen, dass ihre Gegner ueberzeugt werden und sich as belehrt erklaeren, sondern vielmehr dadurch, dass die Gegner allmaehlich aussterben und dass die heranwachsende Generation von vornherein mit der Wahrheit vertraut gemacht ist." (Planck, 1990, p. 15)]I had always looked upon the search for the absolute as the noblest and most worth while task of science. (Planck, 1949, p. 46)If you cannot-in the long run-tell everyone what you have been doing, your doing has been worthless. (SchroЁdinger, 1951, pp. 7-8)Even for the physicist the description in plain language will be a criterion of the degree of understanding that has been reached. (Heisenberg, 1958, p. 168)The old scientific ideal of episteґmeґ-of absolutely certain, demonstrable knowledge-has proved to be an idol. The demand for scientific objectivity makes it inevitable that every scientific statement must remain tentative forever. It may indeed be corroborated, but every corroboration is relative to other statements which, again, are tentative. Only in our subjective experiences of conviction, in our subjective faith, can we be "absolutely certain." (Popper, 1959, p. 280)The layman, taught to revere scientists for their absolute respect for the observed facts, and for the judiciously detached and purely provisional manner in which they hold scientific theories (always ready to abandon a theory at the sight of any contradictory evidence) might well have thought that, at Miller's announcement of this overwhelming evidence of a "positive effect" [indicating that the speed of light is not independent from the motion of the observer, as Einstein's theory of relativity demands] in his presidential address to the American Physical Society on December 29th, 1925, his audience would have instantly abandoned the theory of relativity. Or, at the very least, that scientists-wont to look down from the pinnacle of their intellectual humility upon the rest of dogmatic mankind-might suspend judgment in this matter until Miller's results could be accounted for without impairing the theory of relativity. But no: by that time they had so well closed their minds to any suggestion which threatened the new rationality achieved by Einstein's world-picture, that it was almost impossible for them to think again in different terms. Little attention was paid to the experiments, the evidence being set aside in the hope that it would one day turn out to be wrong. (Polanyi, 1958, pp. 12-13)The practice of normal science depends on the ability, acquired from examplars, to group objects and situations into similarity sets which are primitive in the sense that the grouping is done without an answer to the question, "Similar with respect to what?" (Kuhn, 1970, p. 200)Science in general... does not consist in collecting what we already know and arranging it in this or that kind of pattern. It consists in fastening upon something we do not know, and trying to discover it. (Collingwood, 1972, p. 9)Scientific fields emerge as the concerns of scientists congeal around various phenomena. Sciences are not defined, they are recognized. (Newell, 1973a, p. 1)This is often the way it is in physics-our mistake is not that we take our theories too seriously, but that we do not take them seriously enough. I do not think it is possible really to understand the successes of science without understanding how hard it is-how easy it is to be led astray, how difficult it is to know at any time what is the next thing to be done. (Weinberg, 1977, p. 49)Science is wonderful at destroying metaphysical answers, but incapable of providing substitute ones. Science takes away foundations without providing a replacement. Whether we want to be there or not, science has put us in a position of having to live without foundations. It was shocking when Nietzsche said this, but today it is commonplace; our historical position-and no end to it is in sight-is that of having to philosophize without "foundations." (Putnam, 1987, p. 29)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Science
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126 Self
There are some philosophers who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our SELF; that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence; and are certain, beyond the evidence of a demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity....For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception....[S]etting aside some metaphysicians... I may venture to affirm, of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement. Our eyes cannot turn in their sockets without varying our perceptions. Our thought is still more variable than our sight; and all our other senses and faculties contribute to this change; nor is there any single power of the soul, which remains unalterably the same, perhaps for one moment. The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance, pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. There is properly no simplicity in it at any one time, nor identity in different, whatever natural propensity we may have to imagine that simplicity and identity. The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us. [It is merely] the successive perceptions... that constitute the mind; nor have we the most distant notion of the place where the scenes are represented, or of the materials of which it is composed. (Hume, 1978, pp. 251-256)To find wherein personal identity consists, we must consider what person stands for; which, I think, is a thinking intelligent being that has reason and reflection and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking and, as it seems to me, essential for it-it being impossible for anyone to perceive without perceiving that he does perceive.When we see, hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or will anything, we know that we do so. Thus it is always as to our present sensations and perceptions; and by this everyone is to himself that which he calls self, not being considered in this case whether the same self be continued in the same or different substances. For since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is that which makes everyone to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things, in this alone consists personal identity, i.e., the sameness of a rational being. And as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person. It is the same self now it was then, and it is by the same self as this present one that now reflects on it, that action was done. (Locke, 1975, Bk. II, Chap. 27, Sec. 9-10)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Self
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