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the+rational

  • 21 rational

    1) (able to think, reason and judge etc: Man is a rational animal.) fornuftig, fornufts-
    2) (sensible; reasonable; logical; not (over-) influenced by emotions etc: There must be a rational explanation for those strange noises) fornuftig, rasjonell
    - rationality
    fornuftig
    I
    subst. \/ˈræʃənl\/
    rasjonell størrelse, rasjonelt tall
    II
    adj. \/ˈræʃənl\/
    1) rasjonell, logisk, fornuftig, fornuftig begrunnet, fornuftsbestemt, forstandsmessig, fornufts-
    2) ved sin fulle fornuft, ved sine fulle fem
    3) rasjonell, effektiv
    4) ( matematikk) rasjonal
    rational number rasjonal størrelse, rasjonalt tall

    English-Norwegian dictionary > rational

  • 22 rational

    ra·tion·al [ʼræʃənəl] adj
    rational;
    she was too upset to be \rational sie war zu aufgeregt, um vernünftig denken zu können;
    a \rational approach ein rationaler Ansatz;
    a \rational argument ein vernünftiges Argument;
    the most \rational course of action die sinnvollste Vorgehensweise;
    a \rational explanation eine rationale Erklärung

    English-German students dictionary > rational

  • 23 rational

    Adj
    1. सज्ञान
    The patient seemed quite rational.
    Man is a rational being.

    English-Hindi dictionary > rational

  • 24 rational utilization

    1) Дипломатический термин: (of the World Ocean) рациональное освоение (Мирового океана)

    Универсальный англо-русский словарь > rational utilization

  • 25 the purely arithmetical significance of the system of all rational numbers is now apparent

    Математика: теперь видно

    Универсальный англо-русский словарь > the purely arithmetical significance of the system of all rational numbers is now apparent

  • 26 rational utilization (of the World Ocean)

    Дипломатический термин: рациональное освоение (Мирового океана)

    Универсальный англо-русский словарь > rational utilization (of the World Ocean)

  • 27 the patient is completely rational

    Универсальный англо-русский словарь > the patient is completely rational

  • 28 rational utilization (of the World Ocean)

    Англо-русский дипломатический словарь > rational utilization (of the World Ocean)

  • 29 rational utilization (of the World Ocean)

    English-russian dctionary of diplomacy > rational utilization (of the World Ocean)

  • 30 rational utilization (of the World Ocean)

    English-russian dctionary of diplomacy > rational utilization (of the World Ocean)

  • 31 Lucy and the football

    •• * В статье обозревателя Washington Post Чарльза Краутхаммера, резко критической в отношении «виртуального мирного договора», подписанного израильскими и палестинскими политиками в Женеве, встретился следующий пассаж, который сначала привел меня в некоторое замешательство:

    •• Arafat pocketed every Israeli concession and betrayed every promise he signed in Oslo. It’s Lucy and the football all over again, and the same chorus of delusionals who so applauded Oslo – Jimmy Carter, Sandy Burger, Tom Friedman – is applauding again. This time, however, the Israeli surrender is so breathtaking, it makes Oslo look rational.
    •• Смысл фразы Lucy and the football all over again – сильно напоминающей знаменитую сентенцию Йоги Берра (it’s déjà vu all over again) – конечно, ясен, но захотелось все-таки выяснить ее происхождение, точное значение и статус. Помог, как почти всегда, гугл, выдавший следующую статью из Princeton Alumni Weekly:
    •• Lucy and the football
    •• Will basketball once again break our young columnist’s heart? I grew up in a Peanuts household. My father, a man with a deep appreciation for pathos, fell in love with Charlie Brown as a child, and numerous Peanuts anthologies lined the walls of our library.
    •• <...>
    •• One annual segment involving Charlie Brown did capture my imagination. Every fall Charlie Brown and Lucy would go outside to kick a field goal with a football. Every fall Charlie Brown would recall that the previous year Lucy had pulled the football away at the last possible moment, causing Charlie Brown to fly 10 feet in the air and land flat on his back. Every fall Lucy would patiently explain to Charlie Brown that this was the year that things would be different. And every fall Charlie Brown would again end up flat on his back as Lucy reminded him of the cruel realities of our world.
    •• <...>
    •• This season I worry that the men’s basketball team may be preparing to perform a milder version of the Lucy and the football trick on me. After I watched the Tigers get thoroughly dissected by California and St. Josephs – and as Penn made some serious noise in early-season games – I made peace with the notion that this was a rebuilding year. In fact, as we entered the Ivy League season at 4-7, I was even prepared to concede that we might ( shudder) finish lower than second in the league.
    •• So what happens? On the Monday after the first full weekend of the season, I check the scores, fully prepared for terrible news. But what I discover is that Princeton has swept Harvard and Dartmouth while Penn has managed to lose in Cambridge. And suddenly I’m a believer again.
    •• <...>
    •• But warning signs already abound. <...> For the moment, however, my early-season jitters are long forgotten. I am a convert, a true believer, orange and black to the hilt. I have trotted back to the bandwagon like a pathetic puppy and I am ready for another unexpected and magical run to the NCAA Tournament. At least until Lucy again pulls that football away.
    •• Итак, речь идет о героях комиксов серии Peanuts. В американском футболе гол «с поля» забивается игроком, для которого другой игрок (в данном случае Lucy) придерживает овальный мяч на земле. Если в последний момент мяч убирается, то бьющий с разбега теряет равновесие и действительно падает на спину. Так что можно понимать это выражение как подвох и даже подлость. Но можно посмотреть на это и с другой стороны. Чарли Браун, как сказали бы в аналогичной ситуации по-русски, опять наступает на грабли. Конечно, рекомендовать это как перевод вряд ли можно – ведь у слушающего появляется соблазн развития метафоры. Но для понимания это сравнение полезно.
    •• Остается вопрос о статусе этого выражения. Что это – реалия, крылатое выражение, аллюзия? Или вошедшее в язык фразеологическое сочетание? Судя по отсутствию этого выражения в словарях, последнее – вряд ли. Но если начнет работать механизм языковой моды, то переход в категорию фразеологизма может произойти довольно быстро.

    English-Russian nonsystematic dictionary > Lucy and the football

  • 32 add fuel to the fire

    подлить масла в огонь

    Just as the discussion seemed to be becoming more rational Mary added fuel to the fire saying that people should only talk about things they understand.

    Англо-русский словарь идиом и фразовых глаголов > add fuel to the fire

  • 33 typical examples of irrational numbers are the numbers

    Математика: ( and e, as well as the principal roots of rational numbers типичными примерами иррациональных чисел являются

    Универсальный англо-русский словарь > typical examples of irrational numbers are the numbers

  • 34 typical examples of irrational numbers are the numbers ( and e, as well as the principal roots of rational numbers

    Математика: типичными примерами иррациональных чисел являются

    Универсальный англо-русский словарь > typical examples of irrational numbers are the numbers ( and e, as well as the principal roots of rational numbers

  • 35 Stoicism (A school of philosophy in Grecoroman antiquity that stressed duty and held that, through reason, man can come to regard the universe - both physical and moral - as governed by fate and, despite appearances, as fundamentally rational)

    Общая лексика: стоиц

    Универсальный англо-русский словарь > Stoicism (A school of philosophy in Grecoroman antiquity that stressed duty and held that, through reason, man can come to regard the universe - both physical and moral - as governed by fate and, despite appearances, as fundamentally rational)

  • 36 demiurge (In philosophy, a subordinate god who fashions and arranges the physical world to make it conform to a rational and eternal ideal)

    Религия: демиург

    Универсальный англо-русский словарь > demiurge (In philosophy, a subordinate god who fashions and arranges the physical world to make it conform to a rational and eternal ideal)

  • 37 if the function f is a polynomial or a rational function then f is continouos wherever it is defined

    Универсальный англо-русский словарь > if the function f is a polynomial or a rational function then f is continouos wherever it is defined

  • 38 Psychoanalysis

       [Psychoanalysis] seeks to prove to the ego that it is not even master in its own house, but must content itself with scanty information of what is going on unconsciously in the mind. (Freud, 1953-1974, Vol. 16, pp. 284-285)
       Although in the interview the analyst is supposedly a "passive" auditor of the "free association" narration by the subject, in point of fact the analyst does direct the course of the narrative. This by itself does not necessarily impair the evidential worth of the outcome, for even in the most meticulously conducted laboratory experiment the experimenter intervenes to obtain the data he is after. There is nevertheless the difficulty that in the nature of the case the full extent of the analyst's intervention is not a matter that is open to public scrutiny, so that by and large one has only his own testimony as to what transpires in the consulting room. It is perhaps unnecessary to say that this is not a question about the personal integrity of psychoanalytic practitioners. The point is the fundamental one that no matter how firmly we may resolve to make explicit our biases, no human being is aware of all of them, and that objectivity in science is achieved through the criticism of publicly accessible material by a community of independent inquirers.... Moreover, unless data are obtained under carefully standardized circumstances, or under different circumstances whose dependence on known variables is nevertheless established, even an extensive collection of data is an unreliable basis for inference. To be sure, analysts apparently do attempt to institute standard conditions for the conduct of interviews. But there is not much information available on the extent to which the standardization is actually enforced, or whether it relates to more than what may be superficial matters. (E. Nagel, 1959, pp. 49-50)
       3) No Necessary Incompatibility between Psychoanalysis and Certain Religious Formulations
       here would seem to be no necessary incompatibility between psychoanalysis and those religious formulations which locate God within the self. One could, indeed, argue that Freud's Id (and even more Groddeck's It), the impersonal force within which is both the core of oneself and yet not oneself, and from which in illness one become[s] alienated, is a secular formation of the insight which makes religious people believe in an immanent God. (Ryecroft, 1966, p. 22)
       Freudian analysts emphasized that their theories were constantly verified by their "clinical observations."... It was precisely this fact-that they always fitted, that they were always confirmed-which in the eyes of their admirers constituted the strongest argument in favour of these theories. It began to dawn on me that this apparent strength was in fact their weakness.... It is easy to obtain confirmations or verifications, for nearly every theory-if we look for confirmation. (Popper, 1968, pp. 3435)
       5) Psychoanalysis Is Not a Science But Rather the Interpretation of a Narrated History
       Psychoanalysis does not satisfy the standards of the sciences of observation, and the "facts" it deals with are not verifiable by multiple, independent observers.... There are no "facts" nor any observation of "facts" in psychoanalysis but rather the interpretation of a narrated history. (Ricoeur, 1974, p. 186)
       6) Some of the Qualities of a Scientific Approach Are Possessed by Psychoanalysis
       In sum: psychoanalysis is not a science, but it shares some of the qualities associated with a scientific approach-the search for truth, understanding, honesty, openness to the import of the observation and evidence, and a skeptical stance toward authority. (Breger, 1981, p. 50)
       [Attributes of Psychoanalysis:]
       1. Psychic Determinism. No item in mental life and in conduct and behavior is "accidental"; it is the outcome of antecedent conditions.
       2. Much mental activity and behavior is purposive or goal-directed in character.
       3. Much of mental activity and behavior, and its determinants, is unconscious in character. 4. The early experience of the individual, as a child, is very potent, and tends to be pre-potent over later experience. (Farrell, 1981, p. 25)
       Our sceptic may be unwise enough... to maintain that, because analytic theory is unscientific on his criterion, it is not worth discussing. This step is unwise, because it presupposes that, if a study is not scientific on his criterion, it is not a rational enterprise... an elementary and egregious mistake. The scientific and the rational are not co-extensive. Scientific work is only one form that rational inquiry can take: there are many others. (Farrell, 1981, p. 46)
       Psychoanalysts have tended to write as though the term analysis spoke for itself, as if the statement "analysis revealed" or "it was analyzed as" preceding a clinical assertion was sufficient to establish the validity of what was being reported. An outsider might easily get the impression from reading the psychoanalytic literature that some standardized, generally accepted procedure existed for both inference and evidence. Instead, exactly the opposite has been true. Clinical material in the hands of one analyst can lead to totally different "findings" in the hands of another. (Peterfreund, 1986, p. 128)
       The analytic process-the means by which we arrive at psychoanalytic understanding-has been largely neglected and is poorly understood, and there has been comparatively little interest in the issues of inference and evidence. Indeed, psychoanalysts as a group have not recognized the importance of being bound by scientific constraints. They do not seem to understand that a possibility is only that-a possibility-and that innumerable ways may exist to explain the same data. Psychoanalysts all too often do not seem to distinguish hypotheses from facts, nor do they seem to understand that hypotheses must be tested in some way, that criteria for evidence must exist, and that any given test for any hypothesis must allow for the full range of substantiation/refutation. (Peterfreund, 1986, p. 129)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Psychoanalysis

  • 39 Philosophy

       And what I believe to be more important here is that I find in myself an infinity of ideas of certain things which cannot be assumed to be pure nothingness, even though they may have perhaps no existence outside of my thought. These things are not figments of my imagination, even though it is within my power to think of them or not to think of them; on the contrary, they have their own true and immutable natures. Thus, for example, when I imagine a triangle, even though there may perhaps be no such figure anywhere in the world outside of my thought, nor ever have been, nevertheless the figure cannot help having a certain determinate nature... or essence, which is immutable and eternal, which I have not invented and which does not in any way depend upon my mind. (Descartes, 1951, p. 61)
       Let us console ourselves for not knowing the possible connections between a spider and the rings of Saturn, and continue to examine what is within our reach. (Voltaire, 1961, p. 144)
       As modern physics started with the Newtonian revolution, so modern philosophy starts with what one might call the Cartesian Catastrophe. The catastrophe consisted in the splitting up of the world into the realms of matter and mind, and the identification of "mind" with conscious thinking. The result of this identification was the shallow rationalism of l'esprit Cartesien, and an impoverishment of psychology which it took three centuries to remedy even in part. (Koestler, 1964, p. 148)
       It has been made of late a reproach against natural philosophy that it has struck out on a path of its own, and has separated itself more and more widely from the other sciences which are united by common philological and historical studies. The opposition has, in fact, been long apparent, and seems to me to have grown up mainly under the influence of the Hegelian philosophy, or, at any rate, to have been brought out into more distinct relief by that philosophy.... The sole object of Kant's "Critical Philosophy" was to test the sources and the authority of our knowledge, and to fix a definite scope and standard for the researches of philosophy, as compared with other sciences.... [But Hegel's] "Philosophy of Identity" was bolder. It started with the hypothesis that not only spiritual phenomena, but even the actual world-nature, that is, and man-were the result of an act of thought on the part of a creative mind, similar, it was supposed, in kind to the human mind.... The philosophers accused the scientific men of narrowness; the scientific men retorted that the philosophers were crazy. And so it came about that men of science began to lay some stress on the banishment of all philosophic influences from their work; while some of them, including men of the greatest acuteness, went so far as to condemn philosophy altogether, not merely as useless, but as mischievous dreaming. Thus, it must be confessed, not only were the illegitimate pretensions of the Hegelian system to subordinate to itself all other studies rejected, but no regard was paid to the rightful claims of philosophy, that is, the criticism of the sources of cognition, and the definition of the functions of the intellect. (Helmholz, quoted in Dampier, 1966, pp. 291-292)
       Philosophy remains true to its classical tradition by renouncing it. (Habermas, 1972, p. 317)
       I have not attempted... to put forward any grand view of the nature of philosophy; nor do I have any such grand view to put forth if I would. It will be obvious that I do not agree with those who see philosophy as the history of "howlers" and progress in philosophy as the debunking of howlers. It will also be obvious that I do not agree with those who see philosophy as the enterprise of putting forward a priori truths about the world.... I see philosophy as a field which has certain central questions, for example, the relation between thought and reality.... It seems obvious that in dealing with these questions philosophers have formulated rival research programs, that they have put forward general hypotheses, and that philosophers within each major research program have modified their hypotheses by trial and error, even if they sometimes refuse to admit that that is what they are doing. To that extent philosophy is a "science." To argue about whether philosophy is a science in any more serious sense seems to me to be hardly a useful occupation.... It does not seem to me important to decide whether science is philosophy or philosophy is science as long as one has a conception of both that makes both essential to a responsible view of the world and of man's place in it. (Putnam, 1975, p. xvii)
       What can philosophy contribute to solving the problem of the relation [of] mind to body? Twenty years ago, many English-speaking philosophers would have answered: "Nothing beyond an analysis of the various mental concepts." If we seek knowledge of things, they thought, it is to science that we must turn. Philosophy can only cast light upon our concepts of those things.
       This retreat from things to concepts was not undertaken lightly. Ever since the seventeenth century, the great intellectual fact of our culture has been the incredible expansion of knowledge both in the natural and in the rational sciences (mathematics, logic).
       The success of science created a crisis in philosophy. What was there for philosophy to do? Hume had already perceived the problem in some degree, and so surely did Kant, but it was not until the twentieth century, with the Vienna Circle and with Wittgenstein, that the difficulty began to weigh heavily. Wittgenstein took the view that philosophy could do no more than strive to undo the intellectual knots it itself had tied, so achieving intellectual release, and even a certain illumination, but no knowledge. A little later, and more optimistically, Ryle saw a positive, if reduced role, for philosophy in mapping the "logical geography" of our concepts: how they stood to each other and how they were to be analyzed....
       Since that time, however, philosophers in the "analytic" tradition have swung back from Wittgensteinian and even Rylean pessimism to a more traditional conception of the proper role and tasks of philosophy. Many analytic philosophers now would accept the view that the central task of philosophy is to give an account, or at least play a part in giving an account, of the most general nature of things and of man. (Armstrong, 1990, pp. 37-38)
       8) Philosophy's Evolving Engagement with Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science
       In the beginning, the nature of philosophy's engagement with artificial intelligence and cognitive science was clear enough. The new sciences of the mind were to provide the long-awaited vindication of the most potent dreams of naturalism and materialism. Mind would at last be located firmly within the natural order. We would see in detail how the most perplexing features of the mental realm could be supported by the operations of solely physical laws upon solely physical stuff. Mental causation (the power of, e.g., a belief to cause an action) would emerge as just another species of physical causation. Reasoning would be understood as a kind of automated theorem proving. And the key to both was to be the depiction of the brain as the implementation of multiple higher level programs whose task was to manipulate and transform symbols or representations: inner items with one foot in the physical (they were realized as brain states) and one in the mental (they were bearers of contents, and their physical gymnastics were cleverly designed to respect semantic relationships such as truth preservation). (A. Clark, 1996, p. 1)
       Socrates of Athens famously declared that "the unexamined life is not worth living," and his motto aptly explains the impulse to philosophize. Taking nothing for granted, philosophy probes and questions the fundamental presuppositions of every area of human inquiry.... [P]art of the job of the philosopher is to keep at a certain critical distance from current doctrines, whether in the sciences or the arts, and to examine instead how the various elements in our world-view clash, or fit together. Some philosophers have tried to incorporate the results of these inquiries into a grand synoptic view of the nature of reality and our human relationship to it. Others have mistrusted system-building, and seen their primary role as one of clarifications, or the removal of obstacles along the road to truth. But all have shared the Socratic vision of using the human intellect to challenge comfortable preconceptions, insisting that every aspect of human theory and practice be subjected to continuing critical scrutiny....
       Philosophy is, of course, part of a continuing tradition, and there is much to be gained from seeing how that tradition originated and developed. But the principal object of studying the materials in this book is not to pay homage to past genius, but to enrich one's understanding of central problems that are as pressing today as they have always been-problems about knowledge, truth and reality, the nature of the mind, the basis of right action, and the best way to live. These questions help to mark out the territory of philosophy as an academic discipline, but in a wider sense they define the human predicament itself; they will surely continue to be with us for as long as humanity endures. (Cottingham, 1996, pp. xxi-xxii)
       In his study of ancient Greek culture, The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche drew what would become a famous distinction, between the Dionysian spirit, the untamed spirit of art and creativity, and the Apollonian, that of reason and self-control. The story of Greek civilization, and all civilizations, Nietzsche implied, was the gradual victory of Apollonian man, with his desire for control over nature and himself, over Dionysian man, who survives only in myth, poetry, music, and drama. Socrates and Plato had attacked the illusions of art as unreal, and had overturned the delicate cultural balance by valuing only man's critical, rational, and controlling consciousness while denigrating his vital life instincts as irrational and base. The result of this division is "Alexandrian man," the civilized and accomplished Greek citizen of the later ancient world, who is "equipped with the greatest forces of knowledge" but in whom the wellsprings of creativity have dried up. (Herman, 1997, pp. 95-96)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Philosophy

  • 40 Paré, Ambroise

    SUBJECT AREA: Medical technology
    [br]
    b. 1510 Laval, Maine, France
    d. 20 December 1590 Paris, France
    [br]
    French physician, surgeon and anatomist recognized as the founder of the rational approach to the practice of surgery and the treatment of wounds.
    [br]
    After a barber-surgeon apprenticeship in Paris, Paré was appointed Resident Surgeon to the Hôtel-Dieu in 1533. From 1537 he served as a military surgeon in the Wars of Religion under Henri II, François II, Charles IX and Henri III. His immense experience of battlefield surgery led him to initiate new treatments of wounds and amputations, replacing the destructive and infecting procedures then practised. His first book, published in 1549, advocated the use of simple ointments and ligatures for amputations.
    During the following years he experienced many adventures and vicissitudes and survived the St Bartholomew's Day massacre probably as a result of royal intervention. His numerous surgical and anatomical discoveries and innovations appeared in two major sets of works published in 1564 and 1572. In 1574 he was appointed premier chirurgien, conseiller et valet-de-chambre to Henri II, and a further collection of writings was published in 1575.
    His attempts to unite French surgeons under his leadership were consistently opposed by the Faculty of Physicians, who not only objected to his writing in French rather than Latin, but also to his refutation of such therapies as "mummies and unicorn's horn".
    Of his many contributions to medicine, his insistence on rational treatments is outstanding, and two aphorisms are representative: "Then I resolved never again to so cruelly burn the poor wounded by gunshot"; "I removed the stone but God cured the patient".
    [br]
    Bibliography
    1575, Les Oeuvres de M.Ambroise Paré, Paris.
    Further Reading
    MG

    Biographical history of technology > Paré, Ambroise

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