the+nature+of+the+question

① maker of stage properties (acc. to Pollux 7, 189 the Old Comedy used the word as a synonym for μηχανοποιός=either a ‘stagehand’ who moved stage properties [as Aristoph., Pax 174] or a ‘manufacturer of stage properties’. Associated terms include σκηνογράφος Diog. L. 2, 125 and σκηνογραφία Arist., Poet. 1449a and Polyb. 12, 28a, 1, in ref. to painting of stage scenery) Ac 18:3. But if one understands σκηνή not as ‘scene’ but as ‘tent’ and considers it improbable that Prisca, Aquila, and Paul would have practiced such a trade in the face of alleged religious objections (s. Schürer II 54–55 on Jewish attitudes towards theatrical productions), one would follow the traditional rendering

② tentmaker. This interpretation has long enjoyed favor (s. Lampe s.v.; REB, NRSV; Hemer, Acts 119, 233), but several considerations militate against it. The term σκηνοποιός is not used outside the Bible (and its influence), except for Pollux (above) and Herm. Wr. 516, 10f=Stob. I, 463, 7ff. There it appears as an adj. and in a figurative sense concerning production of a dwelling appropriate for the soul. The context therefore clearly indicates a structure as the primary component, but in the absence of such a qualifier in Ac 18:3 it is necessary to take account of words and expressions that similarly contain the terms σκηνή and ποιεῖν. A survey of usage indicates that σκηνή appears freq. as the obj. of ποιέω in the sense ‘pitch’ or ‘erect a tent’ (s. ποιέω 1a; act. σκηνοποιέω Is 13:20 Sym. οὐδὲ σκηνοποιήσει ἐκεῖ ῎ Αραψ; 22:15 Sym.; mid. σκηνοποιέομαι Aristot., Meteor. 348b, 35; Clearch., Fgm. 48 W.; Polyb. 14, 1, 7; Diod S 3, 27, 4; Ps.-Callisth. 2, 9, 8.—Cp. σκηνοποιί̈α Aeneas Tact. 8, 3; Polyb. 6, 28, 3; ins, RevArch 3, ’34, 40; and acc. to the text. trad. of Dt 31:10 as an alternate expr. for σκηνοπηγία.—Ex 26:1, it is granted, offers clear evidence of use of the non-compounded σκηνή + ποιέω in the sense ‘produce’ or ‘manufacture [not pitch] a tent’, but the context makes the meaning unmistakable; cp. Herodian 7, 2, 4 on the building of rude housing). Analogously σκηνοποιός would mean ‘one who pitches or erects tents’, linguistically a more probable option than that of ‘tentmaker’, but in the passages cited for σκηνοποιέω and σκηνοποιί̈α components in the context (cp. the case for provision of housing in the Hermetic pass.) clearly point to the denotation ‘pitching of tents’, whereas Ac 18:3 lacks such a clear qualifier. Moreover, it is questionable whether residents of nomadic areas would depend on specialists to assist in such a common task (s. Mt 17:4 par. where a related kind of independent enterprise is mentioned).—That Prisca, Aquila, and Paul might have been engaged in the preparation of parts for the production of a tent is also improbable, since such tasks would have been left to their hired help. That they might have been responsible for putting a tent together out of various pieces is ruled out by the availability of the term σκηνορράφος (Ael., VH 2, 1 et al.; Bull. Inst. Arch. Bulg. 8, 69) in the sense of stitching together (the verb ἐπιτελεῖν Hb 8:5 does not support such a view, for it is not an alternate expr. for ‘production’ of a tent but denotes ‘completion’ of a project, connoting a strong sense of religious commitment; see ἐπιτελέω 2) in which the component ῥαφ-provides an unmistakable qualifier.—In modern times more consideration has been given to identification of Paul’s trade as ‘leather-worker’, an interpretation favored by numerous versions and patristic writings (s. Zahn, AG, ad loc.; L-S-J-M Suppl., s.v., as replacement for their earlier ‘tentmaker’; Haenchen, ad loc., after JJeremias, ZNW 30, ’31; Hock, s. below). As such he would make tents and other products from leather (Hock [s. below] 21). But this and other efforts at more precise definition, such as weaver of tent-cloth (a view no longer in fashion) may transmit reflections of awareness of local practice in lieu of semantic precision.—In the absence of any use of the term σκηνοποιός, beyond the pass. in Pollux and the Herm. Wr., and the lack of specific qualifiers in the text of Ac 18:3, one is left with the strong probability that Luke’s publics in urban areas, where theatrical productions were in abundance, would think of σκηνοποιός in ref. to matters theatrical (s. 1). In addition, Ac 20:34; 1 Cor 4:12; 1 Th 2:9; 2 Th 3:8 indicate that Paul’s work was of a technical nature and was carried out in metropolitan areas, where there would be large demand for such kind of work. What publics in other areas might understand is subject to greater question, for the evidence is primarily anecdotal.—JWeiss, Das Urchristentum 1917, 135; FGrosheide, Παῦλος σκηνοποιός: TSt 35, 1917, 241f; Zahn, AG II 632, 10; 634; Billerb. II 745–47; Beginn. IV, 223; PLampe, BZ 31, ’87, 211–21; RHock, The Social Context of Paul’s Ministry: Tentmaking and Apostleship ’80.—M-M. TW.

ἀλήθεια, ας, ἡ (cp. λανθάνω ‘escape notice’ s. DELG s.v. λανθάνω; Schwyzer I 469; Hom. +) prim. ‘hiding nothing’.

① the quality of being in accord with what is true, truthfulness, dependability, uprightness in thought and deed (Alcaeus 57 [366 L.-P.]; Mimnermus 8 al.) of God (Gen 24:27 al.) Ro 3:7; 15:8. Of people (Pittacus in Diog. L. 1, 78; Arrian, Anab. 7, 30, 3; Lucian, Dial. Mort. 11, 6; 4 Km 20:3; Judg 9:15f al.; EpArist 206) ἐν ἀ. λαλεῖν speak truthfully 2 Cor 7:14; (w. εἰλικρίνεια) 1 Cor 5:8; (w. ἀγαθωσύνη and δικαιοσύνη) Eph 5:9; 1 Cl 19:1; 31:2; 35:2; Pol 2:1; ἐν πάσῃ ἀ. w. perfect fidelity 4:2.—Hm 8:9; 12, 3, 1; Hs 9, 15, 2.

② the content of what is true, truth (opp. ψεῦδος)

ⓐ gener. ἀ. λαλεῖν tell the truth (Zech 8:16) Eph 4:25; Hm 3:5; 2 Cl 12:3. ἀ. λέγειν (Hdt. 2, 115 al.; PGiss 84, 14 [II A.D.] τὴν ἀ. εἰπεῖν) Ro 9:1; 1 Ti 2:7. Fut. ἀ. ἐρῶ 2 Cor 12:6. ἀ. ἀγαπᾶν Hm 3:1. Opp. ψεύδεσθαι κατὰ τῆς ἀ. lie against the truth Js 3:14; εἶπεν αὐτῷ πᾶσαν τὴν ἀ. she told him the whole truth Mk 5:33 (cp. Hdt. 9, 89; Thu. 6, 87, 1 al.; Cleopatra ln. 88; POxy 283, 13f [45 A.D.] γνωσθῆναι πᾶσαν τὴν ἀ.; Jos., Bell. 7, 31 πυθόμενος παρʼ αὐτοῦ πᾶσαν τὴν ἀ.). ἐν λόγῳ ἀληθείας by truthful speech 2 Cor 6:7; ῥήματα ἀληθείας Ac 26:25; μόρφωσις τῆς γνώσεως καὶ τῆς ἀ. embodiment of knowledge and truth Ro 2:20; ἡ ἁγνότης τῆς ἀ. the purity that belongs to truth Hv 3, 7, 3. ἔξωθεν τῆς ἀ.=ψευδής 3, 4, 3.

ⓑ esp. of the content of Christianity as the ultimate truth (cp. Plut., Mor. 351e ἀ. περὶ θεῶν; Philo, Spec. Leg. 4, 178, the proselyte is a μεταναστὰς εἰς ἀ.) Eph 4:21 (CScott, Exp. 8th ser. 3, 1912, 178–85; FBriggs, ET 39, 1928, 526). ὁ λόγος τῆς ἀ. the word of truth Eph 1:13; 2 Ti 2:15; Js 1:18. ὁ λόγος τῆς ἀ. τοῦ εὐαγγελίου τοῦ παρόντος εἰς ὑμᾶς Col 1:5; cp. 2 Pt 1:12. ἡ ἀ. τοῦ εὐαγγελίου Gal 2:5, 14. ἔστιν ἀ. Χριστοῦ ἐν ἐμοί 2 Cor 11:10. ὁ περὶ ἀ. λόγος Pol 3:2; πείθεσθαι τῇ ἀ. Gal 5:7; πιστεύειν τῇ ἀ. 2 Th 2:12; hence πίστει ἀληθείας belief in the truth vs. 13; δύνασθαί τι κατὰ τῆς ἀ. … ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀ. 2 Cor 13:8; περιπατεῖν ἐν ἀ. 2J 4; 3J 3f (cp. 4 Km 20:3); ζῆν κατὰ ἀ. IEph 6:2; πορεύεσθαι κατὰ τὴν ἀ. Pol 5:2; ἐν ἀ. (3 Km 2:4) Hm 3:4; gird oneself w. truth Eph 6:14; cp. Hm 11:4.—Truth expresses itself in virtues like righteousness and holiness, Eph 4:24 (Nicol. Dam.: 90 Fgm. 67, 1 Jac. δικαιοσύνην κ. ἀλ.). Hence it is contrasted w. ἀδικία 1 Cor 13:6; Ro 1:18; 2:8. In the last-named passage a negative attitude toward the truth is called ἀπειθεῖν τῇ ἀ. Also πλανᾶσθαι ἀπὸ τῆς ἀ. wander from the truth Js 5:19; ἀστοχεῖν περὶ τὴν ἀ. 2 Ti 2:18; καταστρέφειν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀ. Hs 6, 2, 1, cp. 4; ἀποστρέφειν τὴν ἀκοὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀ. 2 Ti 4:4 opp. μῦθοι, cp. ἀποστρέφεσθαι Tit 1:14; ἀποστερεῖσθαι τῆς ἀ. 1 Ti 6:5; ἐρευνᾶν περὶ τῆς ἀ. make inquiries about the truth Hm 10, 1, 4; 6; ἀνθίστασθαι τῇ ἀ. oppose the truth (i.e. the gospel) 2 Ti 3:8. Opp. μῦθοι 4:4. Truth can be communicated (cp. Did., Gen. 86, 21): φανερώσει τῆς ἀ. by a clear statement of the truth 2 Cor 4:2 (sim. in later Christian prayer POxy 925, 4f φανέρωσόν μοι τὴν παρὰ σοὶ ἀλ.); is taught D 11:10; recognized 1 Ti 4:3; Hv 3, 6, 2; cp. ἐπίγνωσις τῆς ἀληθείας (Alex. Aphr., Quaest. 3, 12, II 2 p. 102, 3 γνῶσις τ. ἀληθείας) 1 Ti 2:4; 2 Ti 2:25; 3:7; Tit 1:1; Hb 10:26; ἑδραίωμα τῆς ἀ.1 Ti 3:15; ὁδὸς τῆς ἀ. 2 Pt 2:2; 1 Cl 35:5 (cp. Pind., P. 3, 103; Eur., Fgm. 289; Gen 24:48 al.; En 104:13; OdeSol 11:3); ὑπακοὴ τῆς ἀ. 1 Pt 1:22; ἀγάπη τῆς ἀ. 2 Th 2:10. God is πατὴρ τῆς ἀ. 2 Cl 3:1; 20:5; φῶς ἀληθείας IPhld 2:1 (cp. Ps 42:3); θεὸς τῆς ἀ. (1 Esdr 4:40) 2 Cl 19:1; cp. 1 Cl 60:2. The reverse genitival constr. in ἀ. τοῦ θεοῦ Ro 1:25, is best rendered truth about God (so Twentieth Century NT, NRSV) as opp. to the deception of polytheists, who in effect lie about God despite their better knowledge described vss. 19–21 (REB et al.: truth of God).—Ἀ. is a favorite word of the Joh. lit., and plays a major role in it. God’s word is truth J 17:17 (Ps 118:142). Truth w. χάρις 1:14, 17; w. πνεῦμα 4:23f; cp. ἐν ἔργῳ καὶ ἀ. 1J 3:18 (opp. λόγῳ, γλώσσῃ). W. ἀγάπη 2J 3. The Spirit leads into truth J 16:13; hence πνεῦμα τῆς ἀ. 14:17; 15:26; 16:13; 1J 4:6 (cp. Hm 3:4). πνεῦμα is identified w. ἀ. 1J 5:6; it is mediated through Christ J 1:17, who calls himself truth 14:6 (cp. PGM 5, 148 ἐγώ εἰμι ἡ ἀλήθεια, on the other hand POxy 1380, 63 [early II A.D.] Isis is called ἀ.; Apollonaretal. Berl. Gr. Pap. 11517 [II A.D.]: Her 55, 1920, 188–95 ln. 52 Apollo as the ἀψευδὴς ἀ.; M. Ant., 9, 1, 2 God=Nature ἀλήθεια ὀνομάζεται; Lucian, Hist. Conscr. 61 says of a good history-writer: ἦν ἀλήθεια ἐπὶ πᾶσι); hence as source of praise for a Christian Δημητρίῳ μεμαρτύρηται … ὑπʼ αὐτῆς τῆς ἀ. 3J 12. One who possesses Christ knows truth (γινώσκ. τὴν ἀ. as Jos., Ant. 13, 291; Tat. 13, 1; ἀληθείας γνῶσις: Maximus Tyr. 26, 5b; Did., Gen. 116, 17) J 8:32; (cp. 1QS 5:10); 2J 1; does the truth J 3:21, cp. 1J 1:6 (ποιεῖν τὴν ἀ. Gen 32:11; 47:29; Is 26:10 al.; TestReub 6:9; TestBenj 10:3; ἔλεος καὶ ἀ. PsSol 17:15); stands in the truth J 8:44; is of the truth 18:37; cp. 1J 2:21; 3:19 (ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας=corresponding to the truth PTurin I, 6, 13). The truth sets one free J 8:32, but is not present in those who deny the fact of sin in their lives 1J 1:8 or do not heed Christ’s commands. Christ proclaims this truth: λέγειν (Jos., Ant. 10, 124) J 8:45f; 16:7; λαλεῖν 8:40 (also λαλεῖν ἐν ἀ. IEph 6:2); μαρτυρεῖν τῇ ἀ. 18:37. As John the Baptist witnesses to Jesus, he witnesses to the truth 5:33; cp. μαρτυρούντων σου τῇ ἀληθείᾳ bear witness to your ( fidelity to the) truth 3J 3; ἵνα συνεργοὶ γινώμεθα τῇ ἀ. vs. 8. In Pilate’s question τί ἐστιν ἀ.; J 18:38 the worldling speaks (cp. 4 Macc 5:10). Opp. θάνατος ISm 5:1.—Mlt-Turner 177f.

③ an actual event or state, reality (Diogenes 21 p. 114, 10 al. Malherbe; Mel., P. 4, 33; 42, 289 [opp. τύπος] Diod S 2, 8, 4) as opposed to mere appearance (opp. πρόφασις) Phil 1:18. κατὰ ἀλήθειαν rightly Ro 2:2 (cp. Diod S 4, 64, 2 οἱ κατʼ ἀλήθειαν γονεῖς; M. Ant. 2, 11, 3; 4, 11; Damianus of Larissa p. 20, 2 [ed. Schöne 1897]; PCairZen 202, 7 [254 B.C.]; EpArist 140; 4 Macc 5:18; Just. A I, 2, 1; Ath., R. 66, 11; Orig., C. Cels. 2, 13, 84; PGM 12, 235). ἐν ἀληθείᾳ indeed, truly (Jer 33:15; ἀγαπᾶν PsSol 6:6; 10:3; 14:1 al.) Mt 22:16; J 17:19; 1 Cl 63:1 (s. also 2b on 1J 3:18). ἐπιγινώσκειν τὴν χάριν ἐν ἀλ. Col 1:6; οὓς ἐγὼ ἀγαπῶ ἐν ἀλ. 2J 1, cp. 3J 1, belongs here (like the epist. formulas PFay 118, 26; 119, 26 [100–110 A.D.] τοὺς φιλοῦντας ἡμᾶς πρὸς ἀ.=‘really and truly’). ἐπʼ ἀληθείας in accordance w. the truth, truly (Demosth. 18, 17; SIG 495, 174 [III B.C.]; PAmh 68, 33; POxy 480, 9; Job, Da; Philo, Leg. ad Gai. 60; 248): διδάσκειν Mk 12:14; Lk 20:21; εἰπεῖν Mk 12:32; λέγειν Lk 4:25; συνάγεσθαι Ac 4:27; καταλαμβάνεσθαι 10:34; τελειοῦν 1 Cl 23:5; ἐπιστέλλειν 47:3; ἐπʼ ἀ. καὶ οὗτος μετʼ αὐτοῦ ἦν certainly this fellow (s. οὗτος 1aα) was with him, too Lk 22:59.—GStorz, Gebr. u. Bedeutungsentwicklg v. ἀλήθεια u. begriffsverwandten Wörtern, diss. Tüb. 1922; WLuther, ‘Wahrheit’ u. ‘Lüge’ im ältest. Griechentum ’35; HBraun, Qumran und d. NT II ’66, 118–44; I de la Potterie, TU 73, ’59, 277–94 (John); BJackayya, CTM 41, ’70, 171–75 (John); RBultmann, Untersuchungen z. J. Ἀλήθεια: ZNW 27, 1928, 113–63.—EDNT. M-M. TW. Spicq. Sv.

   1) The Problem of Innate Ideas

   I never wrote or concluded that the mind required innate ideas which were in some sort different from its faculty of thinking; but when I observed the existence in me of certain thoughts which proceeded, not from extraneous objects nor from the determination of my will, but solely from the faculty of thinking which is within me, then... I termed [these] "innate." (Descartes, 1955, p. 442)

   2) The Source of the Mind's Complex Ideas

   [S]imple ideas are not fictions of our fancies, but the natural and regular productions of things without us really operating upon us.... Thus, the idea of whiteness or bitterness, as it is in the mind, exactly answering that power which is in any body to produce it there, has all the real conformity it can or ought to have with things without us.... [However], all our complex ideas except those of substances being archetypes of the mind's own making, not intended to be the copies of anything, as to their originals, cannot want any conformity necessary to real knowledge. For that which is not designed to represent anything but itself, can never be capable of a wrong representation, nor mislead us from the true apprehension of anything by its dislikeness to it; and such, excepting those of substances, are all our complex ideas: which... are combinations of ideas which the mind by its free choice puts together without considering any connection they have in nature. (Locke, 1956, B. IV, Chap. 4, Sec. 5)

   3) Our Moral Ideas

   [O]ur moral ideas as well as mathematical, being archetypes themselves, and so adequate and complete ideas, all the agreement or disagreement which we shall find in them will produce real knowledge, as well as in mathematical figures. (Locke, 1956, B. IV, Chap. 4, Sec. 7)

   4) An Idea Can Be like Nothing But an Idea

   Ideas... are real things, or do really exist; this we do not deny, but we deny they can subsist without the minds which perceive them, or that they are resemblances of any archetypes existing without the mind; since the very being of a sensation or idea consists in being perceived, and an idea can be like nothing but an idea. (Berkeley, 1996, Pt. I, No. 90, pp. 63-64)

   5) Ideas Create Information, Not the Other Way Around

   The empiricists were right to believe that facts and ideas are significantly connected, but they inverted the relationship. Ideas create information, not the other way around. Every fact grows from an idea; it is the answer to a question we could not ask in the first place if an idea had not been invented which isolated some portion of the world, made it important, focused our attention, and stimulated inquiry. (Roszak, 1994, p. 105)

   1) A Unitary Search Process for All the Phenomena of Memory

   To what extent can we lump together what goes on when you try to recall: (1) your name; (2) how you kick a football; and (3) the present location of your car keys? If we use introspective evidence as a guide, the first seems an immediate automatic response. The second may require constructive internal replay prior to our being able to produce a verbal description. The third... quite likely involves complex operational responses under the control of some general strategy system. Is any unitary search process, with a single set of characteristics and inputoutput relations, likely to cover all these cases? (Reitman, 1970, p. 485)

   2) Semantic Memory Is a Mental Thesaurus

   [Semantic memory] Is a mental thesaurus, organized knowledge a person possesses about words and other verbal symbols, their meanings and referents, about relations among them, and about rules, formulas, and algorithms for the manipulation of these symbols, concepts, and relations. Semantic memory does not register perceptible properties of inputs, but rather cognitive referents of input signals. (Tulving, 1972, p. 386)

   3) The Development of Mnemonic Codes

   The mnemonic code, far from being fixed and unchangeable, is structured and restructured along with general development. Such a restructuring of the code takes place in close dependence on the schemes of intelligence. The clearest indication of this is the observation of different types of memory organisation in accordance with the age level of a child so that a longer interval of retention without any new presentation, far from causing a deterioration of memory, may actually improve it. (Piaget & Inhelder, 1973, p. 36)

   4) The Logic of Some Memory Theorization Is of Dubious Worth in the History of Psychology

   If a cue was effective in memory retrieval, then one could infer it was encoded; if a cue was not effective, then it was not encoded. The logic of this theorization is "heads I win, tails you lose" and is of dubious worth in the history of psychology. We might ask how long scientists will puzzle over questions with no answers. (Solso, 1974, p. 28)

   5) The Constituent Elements of Memory Theory

   We have iconic, echoic, active, working, acoustic, articulatory, primary, secondary, episodic, semantic, short-term, intermediate-term, and longterm memories, and these memories contain tags, traces, images, attributes, markers, concepts, cognitive maps, natural-language mediators, kernel sentences, relational rules, nodes, associations, propositions, higher-order memory units, and features. (Eysenck, 1977, p. 4)

   6) The Problem with the Memory Metaphor

   The problem with the memory metaphor is that storage and retrieval of traces only deals [ sic] with old, previously articulated information. Memory traces can perhaps provide a basis for dealing with the "sameness" of the present experience with previous experiences, but the memory metaphor has no mechanisms for dealing with novel information. (Bransford, McCarrell, Franks & Nitsch, 1977, p. 434)

   7) The Results of a Hundred Years of the Psychological Study of Memory Are Somewhat Discouraging

   The results of a hundred years of the psychological study of memory are somewhat discouraging. We have established firm empirical generalisations, but most of them are so obvious that every ten-year-old knows them anyway. We have made discoveries, but they are only marginally about memory; in many cases we don't know what to do with them, and wear them out with endless experimental variations. We have an intellectually impressive group of theories, but history offers little confidence that they will provide any meaningful insight into natural behavior. (Neisser, 1978, pp. 12-13)

   8) The Structure and Function of a Schema in Memory

   A schema, then is a data structure for representing the generic concepts stored in memory. There are schemata representing our knowledge about all concepts; those underlying objects, situations, events, sequences of events, actions and sequences of actions. A schema contains, as part of its specification, the network of interrelations that is believed to normally hold among the constituents of the concept in question. A schema theory embodies a prototype theory of meaning. That is, inasmuch as a schema underlying a concept stored in memory corresponds to the mean ing of that concept, meanings are encoded in terms of the typical or normal situations or events that instantiate that concept. (Rumelhart, 1980, p. 34)

   9) Competence and Performance in Theories of Memory

   Memory appears to be constrained by a structure, a "syntax," perhaps at quite a low level, but it is free to be variable, deviant, even erratic at a higher level....

   Like the information system of language, memory can be explained in part by the abstract rules which underlie it, but only in part. The rules provide a basic competence, but they do not fully determine performance. (Campbell, 1982, pp. 228, 229)

    10) Metaphors of Memory

   When people think about the mind, they often liken it to a physical space, with memories and ideas as objects contained within that space. Thus, we speak of ideas being in the dark corners or dim recesses of our minds, and of holding ideas in mind. Ideas may be in the front or back of our minds, or they may be difficult to grasp. With respect to the processes involved in memory, we talk about storing memories, of searching or looking for lost memories, and sometimes of finding them. An examination of common parlance, therefore, suggests that there is general adherence to what might be called the spatial metaphor. The basic assumptions of this metaphor are that memories are treated as objects stored in specific locations within the mind, and the retrieval process involves a search through the mind in order to find specific memories....

   However, while the spatial metaphor has shown extraordinary longevity, there have been some interesting changes over time in the precise form of analogy used. In particular, technological advances have influenced theoretical conceptualisations.... The original Greek analogies were based on wax tablets and aviaries; these were superseded by analogies involving switchboards, gramophones, tape recorders, libraries, conveyor belts, and underground maps. Most recently, the workings of human memory have been compared to computer functioning... and it has been suggested that the various memory stores found in computers have their counterparts in the human memory system. (Eysenck, 1984, pp. 79-80)

    11) Comparison of Primary Memory and Secondary Memory

   Primary memory [as proposed by William James] relates to information that remains in consciousness after it has been perceived, and thus forms part of the psychological present, whereas secondary memory contains information about events that have left consciousness, and are therefore part of the psychological past. (Eysenck, 1984, p. 86)

    12) Semantic Memory and Episodic Memory

   Once psychologists began to study long-term memory per se, they realized it may be divided into two main categories.... Semantic memories have to do with our general knowledge about the working of the world. We know what cars do, what stoves do, what the laws of gravity are, and so on. Episodic memories are largely events that took place at a time and place in our personal history. Remembering specific events about our own actions, about our family, and about our individual past falls into this category. With amnesia or in aging, what dims... is our personal episodic memories, save for those that are especially dear or painful to us. Our knowledge of how the world works remains pretty much intact. (Gazzaniga, 1988, p. 42)

    13) The Relation of Memory to Thinking

   The nature of memory... provides a natural starting point for an analysis of thinking. Memory is the repository of many of the beliefs and representations that enter into thinking, and the retrievability of these representations can limit the quality of our thought. (Smith, 1990, p. 1)

   1) The Ego Is Not Even Master in Its Own House

   [Psychoanalysis] seeks to prove to the ego that it is not even master in its own house, but must content itself with scanty information of what is going on unconsciously in the mind. (Freud, 1953-1974, Vol. 16, pp. 284-285)

   2) Methodological Problems of Psychoanalysis

   Although in the interview the analyst is supposedly a "passive" auditor of the "free association" narration by the subject, in point of fact the analyst does direct the course of the narrative. This by itself does not necessarily impair the evidential worth of the outcome, for even in the most meticulously conducted laboratory experiment the experimenter intervenes to obtain the data he is after. There is nevertheless the difficulty that in the nature of the case the full extent of the analyst's intervention is not a matter that is open to public scrutiny, so that by and large one has only his own testimony as to what transpires in the consulting room. It is perhaps unnecessary to say that this is not a question about the personal integrity of psychoanalytic practitioners. The point is the fundamental one that no matter how firmly we may resolve to make explicit our biases, no human being is aware of all of them, and that objectivity in science is achieved through the criticism of publicly accessible material by a community of independent inquirers.... Moreover, unless data are obtained under carefully standardized circumstances, or under different circumstances whose dependence on known variables is nevertheless established, even an extensive collection of data is an unreliable basis for inference. To be sure, analysts apparently do attempt to institute standard conditions for the conduct of interviews. But there is not much information available on the extent to which the standardization is actually enforced, or whether it relates to more than what may be superficial matters. (E. Nagel, 1959, pp. 49-50)

   3) No Necessary Incompatibility between Psychoanalysis and Certain Religious Formulations

   here would seem to be no necessary incompatibility between psychoanalysis and those religious formulations which locate God within the self. One could, indeed, argue that Freud's Id (and even more Groddeck's It), the impersonal force within which is both the core of oneself and yet not oneself, and from which in illness one become[s] alienated, is a secular formation of the insight which makes religious people believe in an immanent God. (Ryecroft, 1966, p. 22)

   4) The Problem of Verifying Psychoanalytic Theory

   Freudian analysts emphasized that their theories were constantly verified by their "clinical observations."... It was precisely this fact-that they always fitted, that they were always confirmed-which in the eyes of their admirers constituted the strongest argument in favour of these theories. It began to dawn on me that this apparent strength was in fact their weakness.... It is easy to obtain confirmations or verifications, for nearly every theory-if we look for confirmation. (Popper, 1968, pp. 3435)

   5) Psychoanalysis Is Not a Science But Rather the Interpretation of a Narrated History

   Psychoanalysis does not satisfy the standards of the sciences of observation, and the "facts" it deals with are not verifiable by multiple, independent observers.... There are no "facts" nor any observation of "facts" in psychoanalysis but rather the interpretation of a narrated history. (Ricoeur, 1974, p. 186)

   6) Some of the Qualities of a Scientific Approach Are Possessed by Psychoanalysis

   In sum: psychoanalysis is not a science, but it shares some of the qualities associated with a scientific approach-the search for truth, understanding, honesty, openness to the import of the observation and evidence, and a skeptical stance toward authority. (Breger, 1981, p. 50)

   7) Major Attributes of Psychoanalysis

   [Attributes of Psychoanalysis:]

   1. Psychic Determinism. No item in mental life and in conduct and behavior is "accidental"; it is the outcome of antecedent conditions.

   2. Much mental activity and behavior is purposive or goal-directed in character.

   3. Much of mental activity and behavior, and its determinants, is unconscious in character. 4. The early experience of the individual, as a child, is very potent, and tends to be pre-potent over later experience. (Farrell, 1981, p. 25)

   8) The Scientific and Rational Are Not Co- extensive

   Our sceptic may be unwise enough... to maintain that, because analytic theory is unscientific on his criterion, it is not worth discussing. This step is unwise, because it presupposes that, if a study is not scientific on his criterion, it is not a rational enterprise... an elementary and egregious mistake. The scientific and the rational are not co-extensive. Scientific work is only one form that rational inquiry can take: there are many others. (Farrell, 1981, p. 46)

   9) The Validity of Psychoanalytic Therapy

   Psychoanalysts have tended to write as though the term analysis spoke for itself, as if the statement "analysis revealed" or "it was analyzed as" preceding a clinical assertion was sufficient to establish the validity of what was being reported. An outsider might easily get the impression from reading the psychoanalytic literature that some standardized, generally accepted procedure existed for both inference and evidence. Instead, exactly the opposite has been true. Clinical material in the hands of one analyst can lead to totally different "findings" in the hands of another. (Peterfreund, 1986, p. 128)

    10) The Issues of Inference and Evidence in Psychoanalysis

   The analytic process-the means by which we arrive at psychoanalytic understanding-has been largely neglected and is poorly understood, and there has been comparatively little interest in the issues of inference and evidence. Indeed, psychoanalysts as a group have not recognized the importance of being bound by scientific constraints. They do not seem to understand that a possibility is only that-a possibility-and that innumerable ways may exist to explain the same data. Psychoanalysts all too often do not seem to distinguish hypotheses from facts, nor do they seem to understand that hypotheses must be tested in some way, that criteria for evidence must exist, and that any given test for any hypothesis must allow for the full range of substantiation/refutation. (Peterfreund, 1986, p. 129)

¹ = severance, cut, cut off [cutoff], break, slit, snip, nick, clipping.

Ex. Examples can be found where exchange of publications remains as the only form of contact after severance of diplomatic and trade relations.

Ex. The best concentration of PVA solutions for restoring is 8 per cent for mending tears and suturing cuts.

Ex. It is assumed that the sum of those units receiving top priority status is less than the current budgeted amount and that a cut off will occur at some point.

Ex. In terms of the reference process a break in the chain has occurred between the information need and the initial question.

Ex. To make room for your puppet's mouth, make a slit in the sock between your thumb and fingers.

Ex. With a snip here and a snip there, it's easy to turn a plant into a living sculpture.

Ex. The table was purchased a year and a half ago as a conference table and has a few nicks and scratches but still looks good.

Ex. The interlacing of twigs into wickerwork is in all probability contemporary with first clipping of flint into arrow-heads.

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* alicates de corte = wire cutters.

* corte de pelo = hair cut.

* corte de voz = voice insert.

* corte temporal = time period.

* corte transversal = cross-section [cross section], sectional cutting.

* de corte + Adjetivo = of a + Adjetivo + nature.

sensible [sɑ̃sibl]

   a. [personne] sensitive (à to)

• film déconseillé aux personnes sensibles film not recommended for people of a nervous disposition

• être sensible au charme de qn to find sb charming

• ils ne sont pas du tout sensibles à notre humour they don't appreciate our sense of humour at all

   b. ( = significatif) noticeable

• la différence n'est pas sensible the difference is hardly noticeable

   c. [blessure, organe, peau] sensitive

• sensible au chaud/froid sensitive to heat/cold

• être sensible de la gorge to have a sensitive throat

   d. ( = difficile) [dossier, projet, secteur] sensitive ; [établissement scolaire, quartier] problem

• zone sensible ( = quartier) problem area ; (Military) sensitive area

   e. [balance, baromètre, marché] sensitive (à to)

━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━

+1! sensible ne se traduit pas par le mot anglais sensible.

* * *

1) gén sensitive

2) [peau] sensitive; [peau cicatrisée] tender; [membre blessé] sore

3) ( notable) [hausse, différence] appreciable; [effort] real

4) ( perceptible)

nom masculin et féminin sensitive person

* * *

1) (= émotif) sensitive

2) (appareil, ouïe) sensitive

3) (= délicat) sensitive

4) (aux sens) perceptible

5) (= appréciable) (différence, progrès) visible, noticeable

* * *

sensible

A adj

1 ( non indifférent) [personne, nature] sensitive; être sensible aux compliments to like compliments; être sensible aux charmes de qn to be susceptible to sb's charms; j'ai été très sensible à votre gentille attention I was most touched by your kindness; je suis sensible au fait que I am aware that; avoir le cœur sensible to be sensitive; ce film est déconseillé aux personnes sensibles this film is not for the squeamish; être sensible à un argument to be swayed by an argument; les natures sensibles pej the fainthearted;

2 ( qui perçoit) [organe, membrane, appareil, instrument] sensitive; avoir l'oreille sensible to have keen hearing; un être sensible a sentient being; être sensible au froid/à la lumière [membrane, appareil] to be sensitive to cold/to light; je suis très sensible au froid I really feel the cold; balance sensible au milligramme scale which is accurate to a milligram; marché sensible aux fluctuations économiques ( délicat) market sensitive to fluctuations in the economy;

3 ( fragile) [peau] sensitive; ( un peu douloureux) [peau cicatrisée] tender; [membre blessé] sore; je suis sensible de la gorge, j'ai la gorge sensible I often get a sore throat; j'ai les pieds sensibles I have tender feet;

4 ( notable) [recul, hausse, différence] appreciable; [effort] real; de manière sensible appreciably; la différence est à peine sensible the difference is hardly noticeable;

5 Phot sensitive; sensible à la lumière photosensitive;

6 ( délicat) [dossier, question, thème] sensitive;

7 ( perceptible) le monde sensible the physical ou tangible world.

B nmf sensitive person; c'est un grand sensible he's very sensitive.

C nf Mus leading note.

[sɑ̃sibl] adjectif

1. [physiquement, émotivement] sensitive

2. [peau, gencive] delicate, sensitive

[balance, microphone] sensitive, responsive

[direction de voiture] responsive

3. [phénomène - perceptible] perceptible ; [ - notable] noticeable, marked, sensible (soutenu)

4. PHILOSOPHIE sensory

5. MUSIQUE [note] leading

6. PHOTOGRAPHIE sensitive

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[sɑ̃sibl] nom féminin

MUSIQUE leading note, subtonic