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  • 121 вымышленное обстоятельство

    Бизнес, юриспруденция. Русско-английский словарь > вымышленное обстоятельство

  • 122 обнаружение нового обстоятельства

    Бизнес, юриспруденция. Русско-английский словарь > обнаружение нового обстоятельства

  • 123 εἰ

    1
    εἰ (Hom.+)
    marker of a condition, existing in fact or hypothetical, if (B-D-F §371f, neg. §428, 1; 2; Rob., indexes; JBoyer, Grace Theological Journal 2, ’81, 75–141, marker of a ‘simple, logical connection between protasis and apodosis’).
    w. the indic.
    α. in all tenses, to express a condition thought of as real or to denote assumptions relating to what has already happened εἰ υἱὸς εἶ τοῦ θεοῦ if you really are the Son of God Mt 4:3; sim. 5:29f; 6:23; 8:31; Ac 5:39. εἰ σὺ Ἰουδαῖος ἐπονομάζῃ if you call yourself a Judean Ro 2:17. εἰ κατακαυχᾶσαι, οὐ σὺ βαστάζεις if you do boast, (remember) you do not support 11:18 al. In Paul the verb is freq. missing, and is to be supplied fr. the context: εἰ Χριστὸς ἐν ὑμῖν (sc. ἐστιν), τὸ μὲν σῶμα νεκρόν (sc. ἐστιν) 8:10. εἰ τέκνα (sc. ἐστέ) if you are children, then … vs. 17, εἰ χάριτι (γέγονεν), οὐκέτι ἐξ ἔργων 11:6 al. The negative in clauses where the reality of the condition is taken for granted is οὐ (earlier Gk. μή [for exception s. Goodwin p. 138f]; s. B-D-F §428, 1): εἰ οὐ δύναται τοῦτο παρελθεῖν Mt 26:42. εἰ δὲ ὑμεῖς οὐκ ἀφίετε Mk 11:25 [26] v.l. εἰ πιστοὶ οὐκ ἐγένεσθε Lk 16:11f; εἰ οὐκ ἀκούουσιν vs. 31. εἰ οὐ φοβοῦμαι Lk 18:4; cp. J 5:47; 10:37; Ro 8:9; 11:21; 1 Cor 7:9; 9:2; 11:6; 15:13ff, 29, 32; 16:22 al. εἰ is rarely found w. the future εἰ πάντες σκανδαλισθήσονται Mt 26:33; Mk 14:29; εἰ ἀρνησόμεθα 2 Ti 2:12 (cp. Just., A I, 31, 6 εἰ μὴ ἀρνοῖντο Ἰησοῦν); εἰ ὑπομενεῖτε 1 Pt 2:20; εἰ καὶ οὐ δώσει (class. ἐὰν καὶ μὴ δῷ B-D-F §372, 3; Rob. 1012) Lk 11:8. W. aor., when events are regarded as having taken place Mt 24:22; Mk 3:26; 13:20.
    β. w. the pres., impf., aor., or plpf. indic. to express an unreal (contrary to fact) condition (B-D-F §360; 372; Rob. 1012ff). ἄν is usu. found in the apodosis (regularly in class.) εἰ ἐν Τύρῳ καὶ Σίδωνι ἐγένοντο αἱ δυνάμεις, πάλαι ἂν μετενόησαν if the wonders had been done in T. and S., they would have repented long ago Mt 11:21. εἰ ἤμεθα ἐν ταῖς ἡμέραις τῶν πατέρων ἡμῶν if we had lived in the days of our fathers 23:30. εἰ ᾔδει ὁ οἰκοδεσπότης if the master of the house had known 24:43 (cp. Just., A I, 12, 2 εἰ … ταῦτα ἐγίνωσκον; 18, 1 al.) εἰ ἦν προφήτης, ἐγίνωσκεν ἄν if he were a prophet, he would know Lk 7:39 al. The pres. indic. εἰ ἔχετε (v.l. εἴχετε) πίστιν … ἐλέγετε ἄν if you had faith … you would say Lk 17:6. Somet. ἄν is lacking in the apodosis (Polyaenus 2, 3, 5 εἰ ἐπεποιήκειμεν … νῦν ἐχρῆν=if we had done … it would have been necessary; Mitt-Wilck. II/2, 16, 18 [II B.C.]; PRein I, 7 [II B.C.]; POxy 526, 10; 530, 8 and 17; Just., A I, 10, 6; 11:2 al.—PMelcher, De sermone Epict., diss. Halle 1905, 75; Mlt. 200f) εἰ μὴ ἦν οὗτος παρὰ θεοῦ, οὐκ ἠδύνατο if this man were not from God, he would not have been able to … J 9:33. εἰ μὴ ἦλθον, ἁμαρτίαν οὐκ εἴχοσαν if I had not come, they would not have sin 15:22; cp. vs. 24. W. the apodosis placed first Mk 9:42 (v.l. περιέκειτο), Lk 17:2; J 19:11.
    εἰ w. subj., as καὶ εἴ τις θελήσῃ Rv 11:5 (s. 7 below), is unusual, perh. a textual error; B-D-F §372, 3 conjectures κἄν for καὶ εἰ. But εἰ w. subj. is found in the older poets and Hdt. (Kühner-G. II 474), in Aristoph., Equ. 698 et al., in var. dialects (EHermann, Griech. Forschungen I 1912, 277f) and in later times (e.g. Epict., Vett. Val., Lucian [ed. CJacobitz, Index graec. 473a]; Philostrat., Vi. Apoll. p. 84, 28; 197, 9; ins [Rdm.2 199]; PRyl 234, 12; POxy 496, 11; Dt 8:5); B-D-F §372, 3; Mlt. 187; Reinhold 107; OSchulthess, AKaegi Festschr. 1919, 161f.
    εἰ w. the optative is rare: εἰ καὶ πάσχοιτε … μακάριοι even if you should suffer, … you would be blessed 1 Pt 3:14. εἰ θέλοι (v.l. θέλει) τὸ θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ if it should be God’s will vs. 17. εἴ τι ἔχοιεν (sc. κατηγορεῖν; cp. Just., A I, 3, 1 εἰ … μηδὲν ἔχοι τις ἐλέγχειν) πρὸς ἐμέ if they should have any charges to bring against me Ac 24:19. εἰ δυνατὸν εἴη (Jos., Ant. 12, 12) if it should be possible 20:16 (but s. B-D-F §385, 2; Just., A II, 15, 2 εἰ δύναιντο). εἰ τύχοι is used as a formula (oft. in later wr., incl. Philo; s. KReik, D. Opt. bei Polyb. u. Philo 1907, 154; Just., A I, 27, 3) it may be, for example, perhaps 1 Cor 15:37; used to tone down an assertion which may be too bold 14:10 (Lucian, Icar. 6 καὶ πολλάκις, εἰ τύχοι, μηδὲ ὁπόσοι στάδιοι Μεγαρόθεν Ἀθήναζέ εἰσιν, ἀκριβῶς ἐπιστάμενοι ‘and many times, so it appears, not even knowing how many stades it is from Megara to Athens’).
    marker of an indirect question as content, that (Kühner-G. II 369, 8; Rob. 965. Cp. Appian, Bell. Civ. 5, 67 §283 ἀγανακτέω εἰ=be exasperated that; Sir 23:14 θελήσεις εἰ μὴ ἐγεννήθης; 2 Macc 14:28; 4 Macc 2:1; 4:7. S. on θαυμάζω 1aγ) ἐθαύμασεν εἰ ἤδη τέθνηκεν he was surprised that he was already dead Mk 15:44a. μὴ θαυμάζετε εἰ μισεῖ ὑμᾶς ὁ κόσμος do not wonder that the world hates you 1J 3:13; θαυμαζόντων …, εἰ τοσαύτη σπουδὴ ἦν τοῦ συλληφθῆναι that there was such interest in arresting MPol 7:2; AcPlCor 2:2 (cp. Just., A II, 8, 3 οὐδὲν … θαυμαστόν, εἰ). Sim. also (Procop. Soph., Ep. 123 χάριν ἔχειν εἰ=that) μαρτυρόμενος … εἰ παθητὸς ὁ Χριστός testifying … that the Christ was to suffer (s. πάσχω 3aα) Ac 26:23.—οὐ μέγα εἰ it is not surprising that 2 Cor 11:15 (cp. Aeschin., In Ctes. 94 ἐστὶ δεινὸν εἰ; Diod S 23, 15, 5, παράδοξον … εἰ=incredible … that; ibid. θαυμαστὸν εἰ; Gen 45:28 μέγα μοί ἐστιν εἰ).— That is also poss. after verbs of knowing or not knowing, e.g. J 9:25; Ac 19:2b; 1 Cor 1:16; 7:16; so CBurchard, ZNW 52, ’61, 73–82 but s. 5bα.
    marker in causal clauses, when an actual case is taken as a supposition, where we also can use if instead of since: εἰ τὸν χόρτον … ὁ θεὸς οὕτως ἀμφιέννυσιν if God so clothes the grass Mt 6:30; Lk 12:28; cp. Mt 7:11; Lk 11:13; J 7:23; 10:35; 13:14, 17, 32; Ac 4:9; 11:17; Ro 6:8; 15:27; Col 2:20; Hb 7:15; 1 Pt 1:17; 1J 4:11.
    marker of strong or solemn assertion, without apodosis (=in aposiopesis; B-D-F §482; Rob. 1203) εἰ ἔγνως if you only knew Lk 19:42. εἰ βούλει παρενέγκαι if you would only let (this) pass 22:42 v.l. (cp. the letter fr. IV B.C. in Dssm., LO 120, note 5 [LAE 149]).—Hebraistic in oaths, like אִם: may this or that happen to me, if … (cp. 2 Km 3:25; GBuchanan, HTR 58, ’65, 319–24); this amounts to a strong negation certainly not (cp. Ps 7:4f; Gen 14:23) ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν εἰ δοθήσεται truly, I tell you, it will not be given Mk 8:12 (NColeman, JTS 28, 1927, 159–67 interprets this as strongly positive; against him FBurkitt, ibid. 274–76). εἰ εἰσελεύσονται they shall certainly not enter Hb 3:11; 4:3, 5 (all 3 Ps 94:11); B-D-F §372, 4; 454, 5; Mlt-H. 468f; Rob. 94; 1024.
    marker of direct and indirect questions (without particle following)
    (not in earlier Gk., B-D-F §440, 3; Rob. 916) w. direct questions (Gen 17:17; 44:19; Am 3:3–6; 6:12; TestAbr A 15 p.96, 8 [Stone p. 40]; 18 p. 100, 13 [St. p. 48]): εἰ ἔξεστιν; is it permitted, may one? Mt 12:10; 19:3 (cp. Mk 10:2); Lk 14:3 v.l.; Ac 21:37; 22:25. εἰ ὀλίγοι οἱ σωζόμενοι; are there only a few who will be saved? Lk 13:23; cp. Mk 8:23; Lk 22:49; Ac 1:6; 7:1; 19:2a. Cp. 6aβ.
    freq. in indir. questions whether (Hom. et al.)
    α. w. pres. indic. (Gen 27:21; 42:16; TestJob 31:1; Jos., Ant. 10, 259; 16, 225; Ar 8, 1; Just., A I, 2, 2; A II, 2, 10) εἴπῃς εἰ σὺ εἶ ὁ Χριστός whether you are the Christ Mt 26:63. εἰ ἁμαρτωλός ἐστιν whether he is a sinner J 9:25; εἰ πνεῦμα ἅγιον ἔστιν whether there is a holy spirit Ac 19:2b (s. 2 above). ἴδωμεν εἰ ἔρχεται Mt 27:49; Mk 15:36 (Lucian, Dial. Mort. 20, 3 φέρʼ ἴδω εἰ=let me see whether, Merc. Cond. 6); cp. Mk 10:2; Lk 14:31; 1 Cor 3:12; 2 Cor 13:5; 1J 4:1.—W. the fut. indic. (4 Km 1:2; Job 5:1) εἰ θεραπεύσει αὐτόν whether he would heal him Mk 3:2 (v.l. θεραπεύει); Lk 6:7 v.l.; εἰ σώσεις whether you will save 1 Cor 7:16.—W. the aor. indic. (Esth 4:14; w. plpf. Just., D. 56, 2) εἰ πάλαι ἀπέθανεν whether he had already died Mk 15:44b; εἰ ἐβάπτισα 1 Cor 1:16.
    β. w. subj. διώκω εἰ καταλάβω I press on (to see) whether I can capture Phil 3:12 (B-D-F §368; 375; Rob. 1017).
    γ. w. opt. (X., An. 1, 8, 15; 2, 1, 15; 4 Macc 9:27; 11:13) ἀνακρίνοντες … εἰ ἔχοι ταῦτα examining … to see whether this was really so Ac 17:11. εἰ βούλοιτο πορεύεσθαι 25:20; cp. 17:27.
    In combination w. other particles, w. the other particles foll.
    εἰ ἄρα
    α. expressing possibility if, indeed; if, in fact; whether (perhaps) (X., An. 3, 2, 22; SIG 834, 12; Gen 18:3; s. B-D-F §454, 2) 1 Cor 15:15 (εἴπερ ἄρα); Hv 3, 4, 3; 3, 7, 5; Hs 6, 4, 1; 8, 3, 3; 9, 5, 7; AcPt Ox 849, 6.
    β. introducing a direct question εἰ ἄρα ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει; is it (really) so? Ac 7:1 v.l.; indirect qu. on the chance that (PPetr II, 13 [19] 9 ‘should you find it impossible’; Num 22:11) Mk 11:13; Ac 5:8 D; 8:22; in the hope that 17:27 (εἰ ἄρα γε); AcPt Ox 849, 2; 22. Cp. εἰ δέ … ; What if …? Ac 23:9.
    εἴ γε if indeed, inasmuch as (Kühner-G. II 177c) Eph 3:2; 4:21; Col 1:23. τοσαῦτα ἐπάθετε εἰκῇ; εἴ γε καὶ εἰκῇ have you experienced so many things in vain? If it really was in vain Gal 3:4. εἴ γε καὶ ἐκδυσάμενοι οὐ γυμνοὶ εὑρεθησόμεθα assuming, of course, that having put it off we shall not be found naked 2 Cor 5:3. [εἴ γ]ε οὕτως ὡς [ἔστιν καὶ παρελάβετε τὸν λόγον] AcPl BMM recto, 31f (restoration based on duplicate Ox 1602 verso, 37f and AcPl Ha 8, 24f, which has a slightly difft. text after εἴ γε [s. also the text of Ghent 62, 17 in HSanders, HTR 31, ’38, 79, n. 2]). S. γέ bα.
    εἰ δὲ καί (Just., D. 110, 1) but if, and if Lk 11:18; 1 Cor 4:7; and even if 2 Cor 4:3 (but s. Lietzmann, Hdb.); 11:6. If, on the other hand, … then AcPlCor 2:28 (εἰ … δέ … καί … μή).
    εἰ δὲ μή (γε) if not, otherwise
    α. after affirmat. clauses, w. the aor. ind, and ἄν in the apodosis J 14:2; or pres. ind. (Demosth., Prooem. 29, 3) and fut. (Gen 30:1; Bel 29 Theod.; PLond 1912, 98) Rv 2:5, 16; or pres. impv. J 14:11.—εἰ δὲ μή γε (μήγε some edd.) otherwise (Pla. et al.; Epict. 3, 22, 27; Jos., Bell. 6, 120, Ant. 17, 113; Just., D. 105, 6; IGR IV, 833; POxy 1159, 6; Mitt-Wilck. I/2, 167, 25; PGM 4, 2629; Da 3:15; Bel 8; TestSol 13:3 P): εἰ δὲ μή γε (sc. προσέχετε), μισθὸν οὐκ ἔχετε otherwise you have no reward Mt 6:1; cp. Lk 10:6. Elliptically: κἂν μὲν ποιήσῃ καρπὸν εἰς τὸ μέλλον• εἰ δὲ μή γε, ἐκκόψεις αὐτήν who knows, it may bear fruit next year; if not, fine, then cut it down (= have it cut down) 13:9.
    β. after negat. clauses, otherwise (X., An. 7, 1, 8; Diod S 3, 47, 4; Dio Chrys. 10 [11], 100; LBW 1651 μὴ ἀδικεῖν…, εἰ δὲ μή; UPZ 196 I, 33 [119 B.C.]; Job 32:22) Mk 2:21f.—After a negative statement: οὐδὲ βάλλουσιν οἶνον νέον εἰς ἀσκοὺς παλαιούς. εἰ δὲ μή γε, ῥήγνυνται people do not pour new wine into old skins; otherwise they burst Mt 9:17; cp. Lk 5:36. μή τίς με δόξῃ ἄφρονα εἶναι• εἰ δὲ μή γε, κἂν ὡς ἄφρονα δέχασθέ με no one is to consider me foolish; otherwise at least accept me as a fool 2 Cor 11:16.
    εἰ καί even if, even though, although Lk 11:8; 18:4; 1 Cor 7:21; 2 Cor 4:16; 7:8; 12:11; Phil 2:17; Col 2:5; Hb 6:9; AcPlCor 2:32.
    εἰ μὲν γάρ for if Ac 25:11 v.l. (for εἰ μὲν οὖν); 2 Cor 11:4; Hb 8:4 v.l. (for εἰ μὲν οὖν).
    εἰ μὲν οὖν if, then Hb 7:11. W. εἰ δέ foll. (X., Cyr. 8, 7, 22; Ael. Aristid. 28, 156 K.=49 p. 542 D.) Ac 19:38.
    εἰ μέντοι if, on the other hand Js 2:8.
    εἰ μή (=πλήν) but 1 Cor 7:17 (= in general) (B-D-F §376).—After negatives
    α. except, if not, mostly without a verb depending on εἰ μή (X., An. 2, 1, 12; JosAs 12:11; Just., A I, 29, 1) Mt 11:27; 12:24; 16:4; J 3:13; Ro 7:7; Gal 1:19 (HKoch, Z. Jakobusfrage Gal 1:19: ZNW 33, ’34, 204–9); but also with a verb (Jos., Ant. 8, 316) Mt 5:13; Mk 6:5; Ac 21:25 v.l.
    β. but (OGI 201, 20f οὐκ ἀφῶ αὐτοὺς καθεσθῆναι εἰς τὴν σκιάν, εἰ μὴ ὑπὸ ἡλίου ἔξω; in note 33 the ed. gives exx. fr. Aristoph. for this use) without a verb Mt 12:4; w. a verb (Theod. Prodr. 7, 426 H.) Gal 1:7, s. ἄλλος 2b. For ἐκτὸς εἰ μή s. ἐκτός 3a.
    εἰ μήτι unless indeed, unless perhaps (Ael. Aristid. 46 p. 198 D.; Jos., Ant. 4, 280; Tat. 10, 2) Lk 9:13; 2 Cor 13:5; w. ἄν (Ps.-Clem., Hom. 16, 4) 1 Cor 7:5 (s. Dssm., NB 32, 1 [BS 204 n.]; B-D-F §376; Mlt. 169; 239; Reinhold 35; JTrunk, De Basilio Magno sermonis Attic. imitatore 1911, 56; JWackernagel, Antike Anredeformen 1912, 27f).
    εἰ οὖν if, therefore Mt 6:23; Lk 11:36; 12:26; J 13:14; 18:8; Col 3:1; Phlm 17.
    εἴπερ if indeed, if after all, since (X., An. 1, 7, 9; Menand., Epitr. 907 S. [587 Kö.]; PHal 7, 6; UPZ 59, 29 [168 B.C.]; Jdth 6:9; TestJob 3:6; Just., Tat., Ath.) Ro 3:30 (ἐπείπερ v.l.); 8:9, 17; 2 Th 1:6.if indeed, provided that εἴπερ ἄρα (ἄρα 1a) 1 Cor 15:15. καὶ γὰρ εἴπερ for even if (cp. Od. 1, 167; B-D-F §454, 2) 1 Cor 8:5; on 2 Cor 5:3 s. εἴ γε καί 6b above. Doubtful IEph 6:2; s. ἤ 2aβ.
    if perchance, if haply εἰ δέ που … τις ἔλθοι if perchance … anyone came Papias (2:4).
    εἴ πως (the spelling εἴπως is also correct; B-D-F §12) if perhaps, if somehow
    α. w. opt. (X., An. 2, 5, 2; 4, 1, 21; POxy 939, 15) εἴ πως δύναιντο παραχειμάσαι in the hope that they could spend the winter Ac 27:12.
    β. w. fut. indic. (3 Km 21:31; 4 Km 19:4; Jer 28:8; TestJos 6:6) εἴ πως εὐοδωθήσομαι whether, perhaps, I shall succeed Ro 1:10; cp. 11:14; Phil 3:11.
    εἴτε … εἴτε (Soph. et al.; ins since 416 B.C. [Meisterhans3-Schw.]; pap [Mayser II/3, 159]; LXX; JosAs 5:9; ApcrEzk [Epiph 70, 11]; Jos., Ant. 16, 33 and 37; Just., Ath. B-D-F §446; 454, 3; Rob. ind.) if … (or) if, whether … or
    α. w. a verb in pres. indic. (Herm. Wr. 12, 22 thrice) 1 Cor 12:26; 2 Cor 1:6; or pres. subj. 1 Th 5:10.
    β. w. no verb (Just., D. 86, 3 al.) Ro 12:6–8; 1 Cor 3:22; 8:5; 2 Cor 5:10 al. εἴτε only once 1 Cor 14:27. εἴτε ἄρσενα εἴτε θήλειαν (ἤτε … ἤτε pap) GJs 4:1.
    Used w. the indef. pron.: εἴ τις, εἴ τι everyone who or whoever; everything that or whatever Mt 16:24; 18:28; Mk 4:23; 9:35; Lk 9:23; 14:26; 1 Ti 3:1, 5; 5:4, 8, 16 al. Cp. 1 Cor 12:31 v.l. (ADebrunner, ConNeot XI, ’47, 37). W. subj. εἴ τις θελήσῃ Rv 11:5 s. 1b, above.—DELG. M-M.
    2
    εἰ μήν, more correctly εἶ μήν (B-D-F §24; Rob. 1150) for the older ἦ μήν (Hom. et al. [s. Denniston 350f], but found also Jos., Ant. 13, 76; 17, 42), in Hellenistic-Roman times (SIG 993, 20 [III B.C.]; 736, 27 [92 B.C.]; IG IV, 840, 15 [EHermann, Gr. Forschungen I 1912, 312]; pap since 112 B.C. [Mayser 78]; LXX e.g. Ezk 33:27; 34:8 al.; Num 14:28; Jdth 1:12; Bar 2:29 [Thackeray 83]) formula used in oaths surely, certainly Hb 6:14 (Gen 22:17).—Dssm., NB 33ff (BS 205ff).—M-M.

    Ελληνικά-Αγγλικά παλαιοχριστιανική Λογοτεχνία > εἰ

  • 124 μή

    μή (Hom.+) negative particle, ‘not’: ‘μή is the negative of will, wish, doubt. If οὐ denies the fact, μή denies the idea’ (Rob. 1167). For the Koine of the NT the usage is simplified to such a degree that οὐ is generally the neg. used w. the indicative, and μή is used w. the other moods (B-D-F §426; Rob. 1167).
    marker of negation, not
    in negative clauses
    α. in conditional clauses after ἐάν Mt 5:20; 6:15; 10:13; 12:29; 18:3, 16, 35; 26:42; Mk 3:27; 7:3f; 10:30; 12:19; Lk 13:3, 5; J 3:2f, 5, 27 al. After ὸ̔ς ἄν (=ἐάν) Mt 10:14; 11:6; 19:9; Mk 6:11; 10:15; 11:23; Lk 8:18; 18:17. After ὅσοι ἄν Lk 9:5; Rv 13:15. After ὅστις ἄν Ac 3:23. After εἰ in a simple condition (B-D-F §428, 1) Lk 6:4; 1 Ti 6:3. After εἰ in a contrary to fact condition (B-D-F §428, 2; Rob. 1169) Mt 24:22; Mk 13:20; J 9:33; 15:22, 24; 18:30; 19:11; Ac 26:32; Ro 7:7. εἰ μή if not, except (that), εἰ δὲ μήγε otherwise with verb and elliptically (B-D-F §428, 3; 439, 1; Rob. 1024f; cp. POxy 1185, 30) Mt 5:13; 6:1; 9:17; 11:27; 12:4, 24 and very oft. (GHarder, 1 Cor 7:17: TLZ 79, ’54, 367–72).
    β. in purpose clauses ἵνα μή in order that…not Mt 5:29f; 7:1; 17:27; Mk 3:9; 4:12; Lk 8:10, 12; 16:28; J 3:20; 7:23; Ac 2:25 (Ps 15:8); 4:17; 24:4; Ro 11:25; 15:20 al. ὅπως μή in order that…not Mt 6:18; Lk 16:26; Ac 20:16; 1 Cor 1:29. μὴ ἵνα IRo 3:2. On the inf. w. neg. as periphrasis for purpose clauses s. below.
    γ. in result clauses ὥστε μή w. inf. foll. (cp. PHib 66, 5) so that not Mt 8:28; Mk 3:20; 1 Cor 1:7; 2 Cor 3:7; 1 Th 1:8; w. impv. foll. 1 Cor 4:5.
    δ. in interrog. clauses w. an element of doubt: δῶμεν ἢ μὴ δῶμεν; should we pay (them) or should we not? Mk 12:14.
    ε. in a few relative clauses (B-D-F §428, 4; Mlt. 171; 239f) διδάσκοντες ἃ μὴ δεῖ Tit 1:11 (cp. Lucian, Dial. Deor. 13, 1; PGM 4, 2653 ὸ̔ μὴ θέμις γενέσθαι; CPR I, 19, 17; 2 Macc 12:14; Sir 13:24). The literary language is the source of ᾧ μὴ πάρεστιν ταῦτα τυφλός ἐστιν 2 Pt 1:9, where the relat. clause has a hypothetical sense. ὅσα μὴ θέλετε Ac 15:29 D. Cp. Col 2:18 v.l. On ὸ̔ μὴ ὁμολογεῖ (v.l. ὸ̔ λύει) 1J 4:3 s. ARahlfs, TLZ 40, 1915, 525.
    ζ. in a causal clause contrary to the rule, which calls for οὐ: ὅτι μὴ πεπίστευκεν εἰς τὸ ὄνομα J 3:18 (cp. Epict. 4, 4, 8; Jos., C. Ap. 1, 217 διήμαρτον, ὅτι μὴ ταῖς ἱεραῖς ἡμῶν βίβλοις ἐνέτυχον; Ps.-Clem., Hom. 8, 4; 11, 8; 32; Ath. 14, 2 ὅτι μὴ κοινῶς ἐκείνοις θεοσεβοῦμεν; Dio Chrys. 31, 94; 110.—B-D-F §428, 5; Mlt. 171; 239; Mlt-Turner 284; Rahlfs, loc. cit.).
    w. various moods
    α. w. inf. (B-D-F §399, 3; 400, 4; 5; Mlt-Turner 285f)
    א. after verbs expressing a negative concept, usu. omitted in translation ἀντιλέγοντες ἀνάστασιν μὴ εἶναι Lk 20:27 (v.l. λέγοντες). ἀπαρνεῖσθαι 22:34. παραιτεῖσθαι Hb 12:19. ἐγκόπτειν τινά Gal 5:7. προσέχειν Mt 6:1. οὐ δύναμαι μὴ I can do nothing else than Ac 4:20.
    ב. gener., after verbs of saying, reporting, ordering, judging, etc.—in declarative clauses: after ἀποκρίνεσθαι Lk 20:7. λέγειν Mt 22:23; Mk 12:18; Lk 20:27 v.l.; Ac 23:8; AcPlCor 2:19. ὀμνύναι Hb 3:18. θέλειν Ro 13:3. χρηματίζεσθαι Lk 2:26.—In clauses denoting a summons or challenge: after λέγειν Mt 5:34, 39; Ac 21:4; Ro 2:22; 12:3. γράφειν 1 Cor 5:9, 11. κηρύσσειν Ro 2:21. παραγγέλλειν Ac 1:4; 4:18; 5:28, 40; 1 Cor 7:10f (w. acc.); 1 Ti 1:3; 6:17. αἰτεῖσθαι Eph 3:13. εὔχεσθαι 2 Cor 13:7 (w. acc.). χρηματίζεσθαι Mt 2:12. ἀξιοῦν Ac 15:38. βοᾶν 25:24.
    ג. after predicates that contain a judgment upon the thing expressed by the inf. (with or without the art.; cp. Just., D. 68, 8 ταῦτα τολμῶσι λέγειν μὴ οὕτως γεγράφθαι): καλόν (sc. ἐστιν) 1 Cor 7:1 (ApcEsdr 1, 6, 21); Gal 4:18; cp. Ro 14:21. ἄλογον Ac 25:27 (w. acc.). κρεῖττον ἦν 2 Pt 2:21. αἱρετώτερον ἦν αὐτοῖς τὸ μὴ γεννηθῆναι Hv 4, 2, 6. Cp. δεῖ Ac 27:21 (cp. use w. ἐχρῆν TestJob 37:6).
    ד. w. gen. of the subst. inf.: τοῦ μή that not (Lat. ne): after verbs of hindering κατέχειν Lk 4:42. παύειν 1 Pt 3:10 (Ps 33:14). καταπαύειν Ac 14:18. κωλύειν 10:47. κρατεῖσθαι Lk 24:16; cp. ἀνένδεκτόν ἐστιν τοῦ…μὴ ἐλθεῖν 17:1.—Also after other expressions: ὀφθαλμοὶ τοῦ μὴ βλέπειν, ὦτα τοῦ μὴ ἀκούειν eyes that should not see, ears that should not hear Ro 11:8, 10 (Ps 68:24). In place of a result clause: τοῦ μὴ εἶναι αὐτὴν μοιχαλίδα so that she commits no adultery, if... 7:3.
    ה. w. subst. inf. after prepositions: εἰς τὸ μή so that…not; to the end that…not Ac 7:19; 1 Cor 10:6; 2 Cor 4:4. W. acc. and inf. foll. 2 Th 2:2; 1 Pt 3:7.—διὰ τὸ μή because…not (PPetr II, 11, 1, 7 [III B.C.] τοῦτο δὲ γίνεται διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀθροῦν ἡμᾶς; 2 Macc 2:11; ApcMos 42 διὰ τὸ μὴ γινώσκειν; Just., D. 95, 1 διὰ τὸ μὴ πάντα φυλάξαι; Tat. 2, 1 διὰ τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι) Mt 13:5f; Mk 4:5f; Lk 8:6; Js 4:2 (w. acc.).—πρὸς τὸ μὴ in order that…not (Ptolem. Pap. aus Alexandria 4, 3 in Witkowski p. 51 πρὸς τὸ μὴ γίνεσθαι τῷ βασιλεῖ τὸ χρήσιμον; Esth 3:13d, e; Bar 1:19; 2:5) 2 Cor 3:13; 1 Th 2:9; 2 Th 3:8.
    ו. w. dat. of the subst. inf. τῷ μή because…not 2 Cor 2:13.
    ז. w. nom. or acc. of the subst. inf. (2 Esdr 6:8; s. B-D-F §399, 3; s. Rob. 1038) Ro 14:13; 2 Cor 2:1; 10:2; 1 Th 4:6.
    β. very oft. w. the ptc., in keeping w. the tendency of later Gk. to prefer μή to οὐ; exceptions in B-D-F §430; s. Rob. 1172.
    א. μή is regularly used to negative the ptc. used w. the article, when the ptc. has a hypothet. sense or refers to no particular person, and has a general mng. (Artem. 4, 22 p. 215, 14 οἱ μὴ νοσοῦντες; ParJer 6:24 ὁ δὲ μὴ ἀκούων; Just., A I, 4, 2 τοὺς μὴ ἐλεγχομένους): ὁ μὴ ὢν μετʼ ἐμοῦ every one who is not with me Mt 12:30ab; Lk 11:23ab; ὁ μὴ πιστεύων J 3:18. πᾶς ὁ μή... Mt 7:26; 1J 3:10ab; 2J 9. πάντες οἱ μή 2 Th 2:12. μακάριοι οἱ μή J 20:29; cp. Ro 14:22. τῶν τὴν ψυχὴν μὴ δυναμένων ἀποκτεῖναι Mt 10:28b and oft.
    ב. w. the ptc. when it has conditional, causal, or concessive sense: πᾶν δένδρον μὴ ποιοῦν Mt 3:10; 7:19. Cp. 9:36; 13:19; Lk 11:24. θερίσομεν μὴ ἐκλυόμενοι we will reap, if we do not become weary (before the harvest) Gal 6:9. μὴ ὄντος νόμου when there is no law Ro 5:13. νόμον μὴ ἔχοντες although they have no law 2:14. μὴ ὢν αὐτὸς ὑπὸ νόμον though I am not under the law 1 Cor 9:20 (cp. TestAbr B 11 p. 115, 22 [Stone p. 78] μὴ ἰδὼν θάνατον). μὴ μεμαθηκώς without having learned (them) J 7:15 (cp. TestAbr B 2 p. 106, 1 [Stone p. 60] μὴ εἰδὼς τίς ἐστιν; TestJob 11:7 μὴ λαμβάνων…ἐνέχυρα; Just., A I, 5, 1 μὴ φροντίζοντες, D. 110, 2 μὴ συνιέντες). μὴ ἔχοντος δὲ αὐτοῦ ἀποδοῦναι but since he could not pay it back Mt 18:25. μὴ βουλόμενος since (God) did not wish to AcPlCor 2:12 (cp. TestAbrB 5 p. 109, 24f [Stone p. 66] μὴ θέλων…παρακοῦσαι).
    ג. when it is to be indicated that the statement has subjective validity (Just., D. 115, 3 ὡς μὴ γεγενημένου ἱερέως): ὡς μὴ λαβών as though you had not received 1 Cor 4:7. ὡς μὴ ἐρχομένου μου vs. 18.
    ד. but also very freq. where earlier Gk. would require οὐ (on developments s. Schwyzer II 595f; B-D-F §430, 3; Burton §485 [464 Z.]; cp. οὐ 2b; for μή here, cp. Just., A I, 3, 9, 3 ἄνδρες δεκαδύο…λαλεῖν μὴ δυνάμενοι; D. 85, 4 διὰ τοὺς μὴ…συνόντας ἡμῖν; Mel., P. 71, 518f): τὰ μὴ ὄντα what does not exist (in reality, not only in Paul’s opinion) Ro 4:17; 1 Cor 1:28 (Philo, Op. M. 81 τὸ τὰ μὴ ὄντα εἰς τὸ εἶναι παραγαγεῖν; Ath. 4:2 τὸ ὸ̓ν οὐ γίνεται ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ ὄν); Hv 1, 1, 6. τὰ μὴ βλεπόμενα what is unseen 2 Cor 4:18ab. τὰ μὴ δέοντα 1 Ti 5:13. τὰ μὴ καθήκοντα (3 Macc 4:16) Ro 1:28. τὰ μὴ σαλευόμενα Hb 12:27. τὸν μὴ γνόντα ἁμαρτίαν 2 Cor 5:21. τυφλὸς μὴ βλέπων Ac 13:11. S. also μὴ ἀσθενήσας τῇ πίστει κατενόησεν Ro 4:19 where, as oft., the main idea is expressed by the ptc.
    in a prohibitive sense in independent clauses, to express a negative wish or a warning
    α. w. subjunctive let us not, we should not: pres. subj. μὴ γινώμεθα κενόδοξοι Gal 5:26. μὴ ἐγκακῶμεν 6:9. μὴ καθεύδωμεν 1 Th 5:6; cp. 1 Cor 5:8. W. aor. subj. μὴ σχίσωμεν αὐτόν J 19:24.
    β. w. optative (B-D-F §427, 4; Rob. 1170) μὴ αὐτοῖς λογισθείη 2 Ti 4:16 (cp. Job 27:5). ἐμοὶ δὲ μὴ γένοιτο καυχᾶσθαι Gal 6:14 (cp. 1 Macc 9:10; 13:5). Esp. in the formula μὴ γένοιτο (s. γίνομαι 4a) Lk 20:16; Ro 3:4, 31; 6:2, 15; 7:7, 13; 9:14; 11:1, 11; 1 Cor 6:15; Gal 2:17; 3:21.
    γ. w. pres. impv.
    א. to express a command that is generally valid (TestReub 2:10) μὴ γίνεσθε ὡς οἱ ὑποκριταί Mt 6:16; cp. vs. 19. μὴ μεριμνᾶτε τῇ ψυχῇ ὑμῶν vs. 25; Lk 12:22.—Mt 7:1; 10:31; 19:6; Lk 6:30; 10:4, 7; 1 Cor 6:9; 7:5, 12f, 18; Eph 4:26 (Ps 4:5), 29 and oft.
    ב. to bring to an end a condition now existing (Aeschyl., Sept. 1036; Chariton 2, 7, 5 μὴ ὀργίζου=‘be angry no longer’; PHib 56, 7 [249 B.C.]; PAmh 37, 7; POxy 295, 5; Wsd 1:12 and elsewh. LXX; TestAbr B 9 p. 113, 20 [Stone p. 74]; JosAs 14:11; GrBar 7:6 and ApcMos 16 μὴ φοβοῦ; Just., D. 87, 1 μὴ…λοιπὸν ὑπολάμβανε; Mlt. 122ff) μὴ φοβεῖσθε do not be afraid (any longer) Mt 14:27; 17:7; Lk 2:10; cp. 1:13, 30. μὴ κλαῖε do not weep (any more) 7:13; cp. 23:28 (GrBar16:1) μὴ σκύλλου do not trouble yourself (any further) 7:6; cp. 8:49 v.l. (TestAbr B 2 p. 107, 2 [Stone p. 62] μὴ σκύλλε τὸ παιδάριον).—9:50; Mk 9:39; J 2:16; 6:43. μὴ γράφε do not write (any longer)=it must no longer stand written 19:21. μή μου ἅπτου do not cling to me any longer = let go of me 20:17. μὴ γίνου ἄπιστος vs. 27.—Ac 10:15; 20:10; Ro 11:18, 20; 1 Th 5:19; Js 2:1 and oft.
    δ. w. aor. impv. (Od. 16, 301; Lucian, Paras. μὴ δότε; 1 Km 17:32; TestJob 45:1 μὴ ἐπιλάθεσθε τοῦ κυρίου) μὴ ἐπιστρεψάτω Mt 24:18; Lk 17:31b. μὴ καταβάτω Mt 24:17; Mk 13:15; Lk 17:31a. μὴ γνώτω Mt 6:3.
    ε. w. aor. subj.
    א. almost always to prevent a forbidden action fr. beginning (Plut., Alex. 696 [54, 6] μὴ φιλήσῃς=‘don’t kiss’; PPetr II, 40a, 12 [III B.C.]; POxy 744, 11; BGU 380, 19; LXX; TestAbr A 2 p. 79, 8 [Stone p. 6] μὴ ἐνέγκωσιν ἵππους; 16 p. 97, 5 [Stone p. 42] μὴ ἐκφοβήσῃς αὐτόν; TestJob 39:11 μὴ κάμητε εἰκῇ; ParJer 3:5 μὴ ἀπολέσητε τὴν πόλιν; ApcEsdr 7:11 μὴ μνησθῇς; Just., D. 137, 1 μὴ κακόν τι εἴπητε.—This is the sense of μὴ θαυμάσῃς Herm. Wr. 11, 17; s. ב below) μὴ φοβηθῇς Mt 1:20; 10:26 (JosAs 23:15; cp. TestJob 17:6 μὴ φοβηθῆτε ὅλως). μὴ δόξητε 3:9; cp. 5:17. μὴ ἅψῃ Col 2:21. μὴ ἀποστραφῇς Mt 5:42. μὴ κτήσησθε 10:9 and oft. Also w. the third pers. of the aor. subj. μή τις αὐτὸν ἐξουθενήσῃ no one is to slight him 1 Cor 16:11. μή τίς με δόξῃ εἶναι 2 Cor 11:16. μή τις ὑμᾶς ἐξαπατήσῃ 2 Th 2:3. μὴ σκληρύνητε Hb 3:8, 15 (quot. fr. Ps 94:8) is hardly a pres. subj.; it is rather to be regarded as an aor.
    ב. only rarely to put an end to a condition already existing (the pres. impv. is regularly used for this; s. above 1 cγב) (TestAbr B 7 p. 111, 19 [Stone p. 70] μὴ κλαύσῃς weep no more) μὴ θαυμάσῃς you need no longer wonder J 3:7 (‘you needn’t be surprised’: s. Mlt. 124; 126; and s. א above).
    ζ. in abrupt expressions without a verb (ParJer 1:7 μὴ κύριέ μου): μὴ ἐν τῇ ἑορτῇ (we must) not (proceed against him) during the festival Mt 26:5; Mk 14:2. Cp. J 18:40. καὶ μὴ (ποιήσωμεν) Ro 3:8 (B-D-F §427, 4). μὴ ὀκνηροὶ (γίνεσθε) 12:11. Cp. 14:1; Gal 5:13; Eph 6:6 al. (B-D-F §481).
    after verbs of fearing, etc. that…(not), lest B-D-F §370.
    α. w. pres. subj. (3 Macc 2:23) ἐπισκοποῦντες…μή τις ῥίζα…ἐνοχλῇ Hb 12:15
    β. w. aor. subj. (Pla., Apol. 1, 17a) φοβηθεὶς μὴ διασπασθῇ Ac 23:10. Also after a pres. 27:17 (cp. Tob 6:15). After βλέπειν in the mng. take care (PLond III, 964, 9 p. 212 [II/III A.D.] βλέπε μὴ ἐπιλάθῃ μηδέν) Mt 24:4; Mk 13:5; Lk 21:8; Ac 13:40; 1 Cor 10:12; Gal 5:15; Hb 12:25. σκοπῶν σεαυτὸν, μὴ καὶ σὺ πειρασθῇς Gal 6:1. στελλόμενοι τοῦτο, μή τις ἡμάς μωμήσηται 2 Cor 8:20. ὁρᾶν Mt 18:10; 1 Th 5:15. Elliptically, like an aposiopesis ὅρα μή take care! you must not do that! Rv 19:10; 22:9 (B-D-F §480, 5; Rob. 932; 1203).
    γ. w. fut. ind. instead of the subj. following (X., Cyr. 4, 1, 18 ὅρα μὴ πολλῶν ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν χειρῶν δεήσει) βλέπετε μή τις ἔσται Col 2:8; cp. Hb 3:12
    taking the place of a purpose clause=so that…not: w. aor. subj. Mk 13:36; Ac 27:42; 2 Cor 12:6.
    marker of expectation of a negative anwer to a question (B-D-F §427, 2; 4; 440; Rob. 1168; 1175; Mlt-Turner 283).
    in direct questions (X. Eph. 398, 26 H.; Job 1:9; 8:11; TestAbr A 2 p. 79, 9f [Stone p. 6]; B 6 p. 110, 6 [Stone p. 68]; TestJob 15, 6; 27, 1; ApcSed 7:2; ApcMos 8:27) somewhat along the lines ‘it isn’t so, is it, that...?’, with expectation of a neg. answer; in tr. the negation can in fact be variously expressed in a form suggesting that an inappropriate answer would be met with complete dismay, e.g. μή τινος ὑστερήσατε; you didn’t lack anything, did you? Lk 22:35; μὴ λίθον ἐπιδώσει αὐτῷ; will one give the person a stone? Mt 7:9; sim. vs. 10; 9:15; Mk 2:19; Lk 5:34; 11:11 v.l.; 17:9; J 3:4; 4:12, 33; 6:67; 7:35, 51f; 21:5 (cp. μήτι); Ac 7:28 (Ex 2:14), 42 (Am 5:25); Ro 3:3, 5 (cp. Job 8:3); 9:14, 20 (Is 29:16); 1 Cor 1:13; 9:8f; 10:22 al. μὴ γάρ J 7:41; 1 Cor 11:22.—In cases like Ro 10:18f; 1 Cor 9:4f μή is an interrog. word and οὐ negatives the verb. The double negative causes one to expect an affirmative answer (B-D-F §427, 2; s. Rob. 1173f; Tetrast. Iamb. 17, 2 p. 266 μὴ οὐκ ἔστι χλόη;=‘there is grass, is there not?’).
    in indirect questions whether…not Lk 11:35 (cp. Epict. 4, 5, 18a; Arrian, Anab. 4, 20, 2 μή τι βίαιον ξυνέβη=whether anything violent has happened [hopefully not]; Jos., Ant. 6, 115).
    marker of reinforced negation, in combination w. οὐ, μή has the effect of strengthening the negation (Kühner-G. II 221–23; Schwyzer II 317; Mlt. 187–92 [a thorough treatment of NT usage]; B-D-F §365; RLudwig: D. prophet. Wort 31 ’37, 272–79; JLee, NovT 27, ’85, 18–23; B-D-F §365.—Pla., Hdt. et al. [Kühner-G. loc. cit.]; SIG 1042, 16; POxy 119, 5, 14f; 903, 16; PGM 5, 279; 13, 321; LXX; TestAbr A 8 p. 85, 11 [Stone p. 46]; JosAs 20:3; GrBar 1:7; ApcEsdr 2:7; Just., D. 141, 2). οὐ μή is the most decisive way of negativing someth. in the future.
    w. the subj.
    α. w. aor. subj. (TestAbr A 17 p. 99, 7 οὐ μὴ δυνηθῇς θεάσασθαι; JosAs 20:3; ParJer 2:5; 8:5; ApcSed 12:5; 13:6; Just., D. 141, 2; Ael. Aristid. 50, 107 K.=26 p. 533 D.: οὐ μὴ ἡμῶν καταφρονήσωσι; Diogenes, Ep. 38, 5; UPZ 62, 34; 79, 19) never, certainly not, etc. Mt 5:18, 20, 26; 24:2; Mk 13:2; Lk 1:15; 6:37ab; 10:19; J 8:52; 10:28; 11:26; 13:8; 1 Cor 8:13; Hb 8:12 (Jer 38:34); 13:5; 1 Pt 2:6 (Is 28:16); Rv 2:11; 3:12; 18:21–23 al.—Also in a rhetorical question, when an affirmative answer is expected οὐ μὴ ποιήσῃ τὴν ἐκδίκησιν; will he not vindicate? Lk 18:7. οὐ μὴ πίω αὐτό; shall I not drink it? J 18:11. τίς οὐ μὴ φοβηθῇ; who shall not fear? Rv 15:4.—In relative clauses Mt 16:28; Mk 9:1; Ac 13:41 (Hab 1:5); Ro 4:8 (Ps 31:2); cp. Lk 18:30.—In declarative and interrogative sentences after ὅτι Mt 24:34; Lk 22:16 (οὐκέτι οὐ μή v.l.); J 11:56; without ὅτι Mt 26:29; Lk 13:35.—Combined w. οὐδέ: οὐδʼ οὐ μὴ γένηται (Mitt-Wilck. I/2, 122, 4 [6 A.D.]) Mt 24:21 (B-D-F §431, 3).
    β. w. pres. subj. Hb 13:5 v.l. ἐγκαταλείπω (accepted by Tdf., whereas most edd. read ἐγκαταλίπω)
    w. fut. ind. (En 98:12; 99:10; TestAbr A 8 p. 85, 11 [Stone p. 20] οὐ μή σοι ἀκολουθήσω; GrBar 1:7 οὐ μὴ προσθήσω; ApcEsdr 2:7 οὐ μὴ παύσομαι) οὐ μὴ ἔσται σοι τοῦτο Mt 16:22.—Hm 9:5; Hs 1:5; 4:7. Cp. Mt 15:6; 26:35; Lk 10:19 v.l.; 21:33; J 4:14; 6:35b; 10:5 (ἀκολουθήσωσιν v.l.); Hb 10:17. οὐκέτι οὐ μὴ εὑρήσουσιν Rv 18:14. οὐ γὰρ μὴ κληρονομήσει Gal 4:30 (Gen 21:10 v.l.); but the tradition wavers mostly betw. the fut. and aor. subj. (s. Mlt. and B-D-F loc. cit.).—DELG. M-M. EDNT.

    Ελληνικά-Αγγλικά παλαιοχριστιανική Λογοτεχνία > μή

  • 125 Artificial Intelligence

       In my opinion, none of [these programs] does even remote justice to the complexity of human mental processes. Unlike men, "artificially intelligent" programs tend to be single minded, undistractable, and unemotional. (Neisser, 1967, p. 9)
       Future progress in [artificial intelligence] will depend on the development of both practical and theoretical knowledge.... As regards theoretical knowledge, some have sought a unified theory of artificial intelligence. My view is that artificial intelligence is (or soon will be) an engineering discipline since its primary goal is to build things. (Nilsson, 1971, pp. vii-viii)
       Most workers in AI [artificial intelligence] research and in related fields confess to a pronounced feeling of disappointment in what has been achieved in the last 25 years. Workers entered the field around 1950, and even around 1960, with high hopes that are very far from being realized in 1972. In no part of the field have the discoveries made so far produced the major impact that was then promised.... In the meantime, claims and predictions regarding the potential results of AI research had been publicized which went even farther than the expectations of the majority of workers in the field, whose embarrassments have been added to by the lamentable failure of such inflated predictions....
       When able and respected scientists write in letters to the present author that AI, the major goal of computing science, represents "another step in the general process of evolution"; that possibilities in the 1980s include an all-purpose intelligence on a human-scale knowledge base; that awe-inspiring possibilities suggest themselves based on machine intelligence exceeding human intelligence by the year 2000 [one has the right to be skeptical]. (Lighthill, 1972, p. 17)
       4) Just as Astronomy Succeeded Astrology, the Discovery of Intellectual Processes in Machines Should Lead to a Science, Eventually
       Just as astronomy succeeded astrology, following Kepler's discovery of planetary regularities, the discoveries of these many principles in empirical explorations on intellectual processes in machines should lead to a science, eventually. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)
       Many problems arise in experiments on machine intelligence because things obvious to any person are not represented in any program. One can pull with a string, but one cannot push with one.... Simple facts like these caused serious problems when Charniak attempted to extend Bobrow's "Student" program to more realistic applications, and they have not been faced up to until now. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 77)
       What do we mean by [a symbolic] "description"? We do not mean to suggest that our descriptions must be made of strings of ordinary language words (although they might be). The simplest kind of description is a structure in which some features of a situation are represented by single ("primitive") symbols, and relations between those features are represented by other symbols-or by other features of the way the description is put together. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)
       [AI is] the use of computer programs and programming techniques to cast light on the principles of intelligence in general and human thought in particular. (Boden, 1977, p. 5)
       The word you look for and hardly ever see in the early AI literature is the word knowledge. They didn't believe you have to know anything, you could always rework it all.... In fact 1967 is the turning point in my mind when there was enough feeling that the old ideas of general principles had to go.... I came up with an argument for what I called the primacy of expertise, and at the time I called the other guys the generalists. (Moses, quoted in McCorduck, 1979, pp. 228-229)
       9) Artificial Intelligence Is Psychology in a Particularly Pure and Abstract Form
       The basic idea of cognitive science is that intelligent beings are semantic engines-in other words, automatic formal systems with interpretations under which they consistently make sense. We can now see why this includes psychology and artificial intelligence on a more or less equal footing: people and intelligent computers (if and when there are any) turn out to be merely different manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon. Moreover, with universal hardware, any semantic engine can in principle be formally imitated by a computer if only the right program can be found. And that will guarantee semantic imitation as well, since (given the appropriate formal behavior) the semantics is "taking care of itself" anyway. Thus we also see why, from this perspective, artificial intelligence can be regarded as psychology in a particularly pure and abstract form. The same fundamental structures are under investigation, but in AI, all the relevant parameters are under direct experimental control (in the programming), without any messy physiology or ethics to get in the way. (Haugeland, 1981b, p. 31)
       There are many different kinds of reasoning one might imagine:
        Formal reasoning involves the syntactic manipulation of data structures to deduce new ones following prespecified rules of inference. Mathematical logic is the archetypical formal representation. Procedural reasoning uses simulation to answer questions and solve problems. When we use a program to answer What is the sum of 3 and 4? it uses, or "runs," a procedural model of arithmetic. Reasoning by analogy seems to be a very natural mode of thought for humans but, so far, difficult to accomplish in AI programs. The idea is that when you ask the question Can robins fly? the system might reason that "robins are like sparrows, and I know that sparrows can fly, so robins probably can fly."
        Generalization and abstraction are also natural reasoning process for humans that are difficult to pin down well enough to implement in a program. If one knows that Robins have wings, that Sparrows have wings, and that Blue jays have wings, eventually one will believe that All birds have wings. This capability may be at the core of most human learning, but it has not yet become a useful technique in AI.... Meta- level reasoning is demonstrated by the way one answers the question What is Paul Newman's telephone number? You might reason that "if I knew Paul Newman's number, I would know that I knew it, because it is a notable fact." This involves using "knowledge about what you know," in particular, about the extent of your knowledge and about the importance of certain facts. Recent research in psychology and AI indicates that meta-level reasoning may play a central role in human cognitive processing. (Barr & Feigenbaum, 1981, pp. 146-147)
       Suffice it to say that programs already exist that can do things-or, at the very least, appear to be beginning to do things-which ill-informed critics have asserted a priori to be impossible. Examples include: perceiving in a holistic as opposed to an atomistic way; using language creatively; translating sensibly from one language to another by way of a language-neutral semantic representation; planning acts in a broad and sketchy fashion, the details being decided only in execution; distinguishing between different species of emotional reaction according to the psychological context of the subject. (Boden, 1981, p. 33)
       Can the synthesis of Man and Machine ever be stable, or will the purely organic component become such a hindrance that it has to be discarded? If this eventually happens-and I have... good reasons for thinking that it must-we have nothing to regret and certainly nothing to fear. (Clarke, 1984, p. 243)
       The thesis of GOFAI... is not that the processes underlying intelligence can be described symbolically... but that they are symbolic. (Haugeland, 1985, p. 113)
        14) Artificial Intelligence Provides a Useful Approach to Psychological and Psychiatric Theory Formation
       It is all very well formulating psychological and psychiatric theories verbally but, when using natural language (even technical jargon), it is difficult to recognise when a theory is complete; oversights are all too easily made, gaps too readily left. This is a point which is generally recognised to be true and it is for precisely this reason that the behavioural sciences attempt to follow the natural sciences in using "classical" mathematics as a more rigorous descriptive language. However, it is an unfortunate fact that, with a few notable exceptions, there has been a marked lack of success in this application. It is my belief that a different approach-a different mathematics-is needed, and that AI provides just this approach. (Hand, quoted in Hand, 1985, pp. 6-7)
       We might distinguish among four kinds of AI.
       Research of this kind involves building and programming computers to perform tasks which, to paraphrase Marvin Minsky, would require intelligence if they were done by us. Researchers in nonpsychological AI make no claims whatsoever about the psychological realism of their programs or the devices they build, that is, about whether or not computers perform tasks as humans do.
       Research here is guided by the view that the computer is a useful tool in the study of mind. In particular, we can write computer programs or build devices that simulate alleged psychological processes in humans and then test our predictions about how the alleged processes work. We can weave these programs and devices together with other programs and devices that simulate different alleged mental processes and thereby test the degree to which the AI system as a whole simulates human mentality. According to weak psychological AI, working with computer models is a way of refining and testing hypotheses about processes that are allegedly realized in human minds.
    ... According to this view, our minds are computers and therefore can be duplicated by other computers. Sherry Turkle writes that the "real ambition is of mythic proportions, making a general purpose intelligence, a mind." (Turkle, 1984, p. 240) The authors of a major text announce that "the ultimate goal of AI research is to build a person or, more humbly, an animal." (Charniak & McDermott, 1985, p. 7)
       Research in this field, like strong psychological AI, takes seriously the functionalist view that mentality can be realized in many different types of physical devices. Suprapsychological AI, however, accuses strong psychological AI of being chauvinisticof being only interested in human intelligence! Suprapsychological AI claims to be interested in all the conceivable ways intelligence can be realized. (Flanagan, 1991, pp. 241-242)
        16) Determination of Relevance of Rules in Particular Contexts
       Even if the [rules] were stored in a context-free form the computer still couldn't use them. To do that the computer requires rules enabling it to draw on just those [ rules] which are relevant in each particular context. Determination of relevance will have to be based on further facts and rules, but the question will again arise as to which facts and rules are relevant for making each particular determination. One could always invoke further facts and rules to answer this question, but of course these must be only the relevant ones. And so it goes. It seems that AI workers will never be able to get started here unless they can settle the problem of relevance beforehand by cataloguing types of context and listing just those facts which are relevant in each. (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p. 80)
       Perhaps the single most important idea to artificial intelligence is that there is no fundamental difference between form and content, that meaning can be captured in a set of symbols such as a semantic net. (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)
        18) The Assumption That the Mind Is a Formal System
       Artificial intelligence is based on the assumption that the mind can be described as some kind of formal system manipulating symbols that stand for things in the world. Thus it doesn't matter what the brain is made of, or what it uses for tokens in the great game of thinking. Using an equivalent set of tokens and rules, we can do thinking with a digital computer, just as we can play chess using cups, salt and pepper shakers, knives, forks, and spoons. Using the right software, one system (the mind) can be mapped into the other (the computer). (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)
        19) A Statement of the Primary and Secondary Purposes of Artificial Intelligence
       The primary goal of Artificial Intelligence is to make machines smarter.
       The secondary goals of Artificial Intelligence are to understand what intelligence is (the Nobel laureate purpose) and to make machines more useful (the entrepreneurial purpose). (Winston, 1987, p. 1)
       The theoretical ideas of older branches of engineering are captured in the language of mathematics. We contend that mathematical logic provides the basis for theory in AI. Although many computer scientists already count logic as fundamental to computer science in general, we put forward an even stronger form of the logic-is-important argument....
       AI deals mainly with the problem of representing and using declarative (as opposed to procedural) knowledge. Declarative knowledge is the kind that is expressed as sentences, and AI needs a language in which to state these sentences. Because the languages in which this knowledge usually is originally captured (natural languages such as English) are not suitable for computer representations, some other language with the appropriate properties must be used. It turns out, we think, that the appropriate properties include at least those that have been uppermost in the minds of logicians in their development of logical languages such as the predicate calculus. Thus, we think that any language for expressing knowledge in AI systems must be at least as expressive as the first-order predicate calculus. (Genesereth & Nilsson, 1987, p. viii)
        21) Perceptual Structures Can Be Represented as Lists of Elementary Propositions
       In artificial intelligence studies, perceptual structures are represented as assemblages of description lists, the elementary components of which are propositions asserting that certain relations hold among elements. (Chase & Simon, 1988, p. 490)
       Artificial intelligence (AI) is sometimes defined as the study of how to build and/or program computers to enable them to do the sorts of things that minds can do. Some of these things are commonly regarded as requiring intelligence: offering a medical diagnosis and/or prescription, giving legal or scientific advice, proving theorems in logic or mathematics. Others are not, because they can be done by all normal adults irrespective of educational background (and sometimes by non-human animals too), and typically involve no conscious control: seeing things in sunlight and shadows, finding a path through cluttered terrain, fitting pegs into holes, speaking one's own native tongue, and using one's common sense. Because it covers AI research dealing with both these classes of mental capacity, this definition is preferable to one describing AI as making computers do "things that would require intelligence if done by people." However, it presupposes that computers could do what minds can do, that they might really diagnose, advise, infer, and understand. One could avoid this problematic assumption (and also side-step questions about whether computers do things in the same way as we do) by defining AI instead as "the development of computers whose observable performance has features which in humans we would attribute to mental processes." This bland characterization would be acceptable to some AI workers, especially amongst those focusing on the production of technological tools for commercial purposes. But many others would favour a more controversial definition, seeing AI as the science of intelligence in general-or, more accurately, as the intellectual core of cognitive science. As such, its goal is to provide a systematic theory that can explain (and perhaps enable us to replicate) both the general categories of intentionality and the diverse psychological capacities grounded in them. (Boden, 1990b, pp. 1-2)
       Because the ability to store data somewhat corresponds to what we call memory in human beings, and because the ability to follow logical procedures somewhat corresponds to what we call reasoning in human beings, many members of the cult have concluded that what computers do somewhat corresponds to what we call thinking. It is no great difficulty to persuade the general public of that conclusion since computers process data very fast in small spaces well below the level of visibility; they do not look like other machines when they are at work. They seem to be running along as smoothly and silently as the brain does when it remembers and reasons and thinks. On the other hand, those who design and build computers know exactly how the machines are working down in the hidden depths of their semiconductors. Computers can be taken apart, scrutinized, and put back together. Their activities can be tracked, analyzed, measured, and thus clearly understood-which is far from possible with the brain. This gives rise to the tempting assumption on the part of the builders and designers that computers can tell us something about brains, indeed, that the computer can serve as a model of the mind, which then comes to be seen as some manner of information processing machine, and possibly not as good at the job as the machine. (Roszak, 1994, pp. xiv-xv)
       The inner workings of the human mind are far more intricate than the most complicated systems of modern technology. Researchers in the field of artificial intelligence have been attempting to develop programs that will enable computers to display intelligent behavior. Although this field has been an active one for more than thirty-five years and has had many notable successes, AI researchers still do not know how to create a program that matches human intelligence. No existing program can recall facts, solve problems, reason, learn, and process language with human facility. This lack of success has occurred not because computers are inferior to human brains but rather because we do not yet know in sufficient detail how intelligence is organized in the brain. (Anderson, 1995, p. 2)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Artificial Intelligence

  • 126 Psychoanalysis

       [Psychoanalysis] seeks to prove to the ego that it is not even master in its own house, but must content itself with scanty information of what is going on unconsciously in the mind. (Freud, 1953-1974, Vol. 16, pp. 284-285)
       Although in the interview the analyst is supposedly a "passive" auditor of the "free association" narration by the subject, in point of fact the analyst does direct the course of the narrative. This by itself does not necessarily impair the evidential worth of the outcome, for even in the most meticulously conducted laboratory experiment the experimenter intervenes to obtain the data he is after. There is nevertheless the difficulty that in the nature of the case the full extent of the analyst's intervention is not a matter that is open to public scrutiny, so that by and large one has only his own testimony as to what transpires in the consulting room. It is perhaps unnecessary to say that this is not a question about the personal integrity of psychoanalytic practitioners. The point is the fundamental one that no matter how firmly we may resolve to make explicit our biases, no human being is aware of all of them, and that objectivity in science is achieved through the criticism of publicly accessible material by a community of independent inquirers.... Moreover, unless data are obtained under carefully standardized circumstances, or under different circumstances whose dependence on known variables is nevertheless established, even an extensive collection of data is an unreliable basis for inference. To be sure, analysts apparently do attempt to institute standard conditions for the conduct of interviews. But there is not much information available on the extent to which the standardization is actually enforced, or whether it relates to more than what may be superficial matters. (E. Nagel, 1959, pp. 49-50)
       3) No Necessary Incompatibility between Psychoanalysis and Certain Religious Formulations
       here would seem to be no necessary incompatibility between psychoanalysis and those religious formulations which locate God within the self. One could, indeed, argue that Freud's Id (and even more Groddeck's It), the impersonal force within which is both the core of oneself and yet not oneself, and from which in illness one become[s] alienated, is a secular formation of the insight which makes religious people believe in an immanent God. (Ryecroft, 1966, p. 22)
       Freudian analysts emphasized that their theories were constantly verified by their "clinical observations."... It was precisely this fact-that they always fitted, that they were always confirmed-which in the eyes of their admirers constituted the strongest argument in favour of these theories. It began to dawn on me that this apparent strength was in fact their weakness.... It is easy to obtain confirmations or verifications, for nearly every theory-if we look for confirmation. (Popper, 1968, pp. 3435)
       5) Psychoanalysis Is Not a Science But Rather the Interpretation of a Narrated History
       Psychoanalysis does not satisfy the standards of the sciences of observation, and the "facts" it deals with are not verifiable by multiple, independent observers.... There are no "facts" nor any observation of "facts" in psychoanalysis but rather the interpretation of a narrated history. (Ricoeur, 1974, p. 186)
       6) Some of the Qualities of a Scientific Approach Are Possessed by Psychoanalysis
       In sum: psychoanalysis is not a science, but it shares some of the qualities associated with a scientific approach-the search for truth, understanding, honesty, openness to the import of the observation and evidence, and a skeptical stance toward authority. (Breger, 1981, p. 50)
       [Attributes of Psychoanalysis:]
       1. Psychic Determinism. No item in mental life and in conduct and behavior is "accidental"; it is the outcome of antecedent conditions.
       2. Much mental activity and behavior is purposive or goal-directed in character.
       3. Much of mental activity and behavior, and its determinants, is unconscious in character. 4. The early experience of the individual, as a child, is very potent, and tends to be pre-potent over later experience. (Farrell, 1981, p. 25)
       Our sceptic may be unwise enough... to maintain that, because analytic theory is unscientific on his criterion, it is not worth discussing. This step is unwise, because it presupposes that, if a study is not scientific on his criterion, it is not a rational enterprise... an elementary and egregious mistake. The scientific and the rational are not co-extensive. Scientific work is only one form that rational inquiry can take: there are many others. (Farrell, 1981, p. 46)
       Psychoanalysts have tended to write as though the term analysis spoke for itself, as if the statement "analysis revealed" or "it was analyzed as" preceding a clinical assertion was sufficient to establish the validity of what was being reported. An outsider might easily get the impression from reading the psychoanalytic literature that some standardized, generally accepted procedure existed for both inference and evidence. Instead, exactly the opposite has been true. Clinical material in the hands of one analyst can lead to totally different "findings" in the hands of another. (Peterfreund, 1986, p. 128)
       The analytic process-the means by which we arrive at psychoanalytic understanding-has been largely neglected and is poorly understood, and there has been comparatively little interest in the issues of inference and evidence. Indeed, psychoanalysts as a group have not recognized the importance of being bound by scientific constraints. They do not seem to understand that a possibility is only that-a possibility-and that innumerable ways may exist to explain the same data. Psychoanalysts all too often do not seem to distinguish hypotheses from facts, nor do they seem to understand that hypotheses must be tested in some way, that criteria for evidence must exist, and that any given test for any hypothesis must allow for the full range of substantiation/refutation. (Peterfreund, 1986, p. 129)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Psychoanalysis

  • 127 С-618

    CO СТОРОНЫ PrepP Invar
    1. \С-618 кого-чего Prep the resulting PrepP is adv
    moving, coming, or issuing from some person, place, location etc
    from the direction of.
    Ему в голову не могло прийти, что у них гости и что ржание коня доносится со стороны микулицынского крыльца, из сада (Пастернак 1). It never occurred to him that they had guests or that the neighing came from the direction of Mikulitsyn's house (1a).
    2. \С-618 смотреть, наблюдать, видно и т. п.
    adv
    (to look at s.o. or sth., be visible etc) from some distance away
    from a distance.
    На солнечном пригреве, на камне, ниже садовой скамейки, сидел Костоглотов... И даже не видно было со стороны, чтобы плечи его поднимались и опускались от дыхания (Солженицын 10). Kostoglotov was sitting in a sunny spot on a stone below a garden bench....From a distance one could not even see his shoulders rising and falling as he breathed... (10a).
    3. — смотреть (на кого-что), судить, казаться и т. п.
    adv
    (to look at, judge etc s.o. or sth.) from the point of view of one who is not directly involved in the matter at hand, (to appear a certain way) to s.o. who is not directly involved in the matter at hand: (look at s.o. sth.) from the outside
    from an outsider' perspective (point of view) from an outside viewpoint (as) seen from the outside (in limited contexts) as an outsider to an outsider (a bystander) ( sth. might look (seem etc)) (view sth.) with (great) detachment (take) a detached view.
    Конечно, обидно: маловато успел. Со стороны может показаться, что вовсе не так. Я и то, и это, пятое, десятое. Но уж я-то знаю, что чепуха (Трифонов 5). It was humiliating, of course. I had accomplished very little. From an outsider's point of view it might not appear that way. I've done this, that, and a number of things. But I myself know how little it has all amounted to (5a).
    В том-то и дело, что если рассказать с некоторой правдивостью любую жизнь со стороны и хотя бы отчасти изнутри, то картинка наша будет такова, что этот человек дальше жить не имеет ни малейшей возможности (Битов 2). That's just the point, that if we tell the story of any life with a degree of truthfulness, from an outside viewpoint and at least partially from within, then the picture will be such that the man hasn't the slightest chance of living on (2a).
    ...Она (жена Огарёва) сама сказала мне впоследствии, что сцена эта показалась ей натянутой, детской. Оно, пожалуй, и могло так показаться со стороны но зачем же она смотрела со стороны?.. (Герцен 2)....She (Ogaryov's wife) told me herself afterwards that this scene had struck her as affected and childish. Of course it might strike one so looking on at it as an outsider, but why was she looking on at it as an outsider? (2a).
    Шли они (Костенко и Росляков) не быстро и не медленно, весело о чём-то разговаривали, заигрывали с девушками... Со стороны могло показаться, что два бездельника просто-напросто убивают время (Семёнов 1). They (Kostyenko and Roslyakov) walked neither quickly nor slowly, talking gaily about something, flirting with the girls....To a bystander they might have looked like a couple of idlers simply killing time (1a).
    Он (Эренбург) на всё смотрел как бы со стороны - что ему оставалось делать после «Молитвы о России»? - и прятался в ироническое всепонимание (Мандельштам 2). Не (Ehrenburg) seemed to view everything with great detachment-what else could he do after his Prayer for Russia?—and took refuge in a kind of ironical knowingness (2a).
    4. человек, люди и т. п. - (nonagreeing postmodif) a person (or people) not belonging to the group, organization etc in question
    from (on) the outside
    outsider(s).
    «Какая баба!.. Ей бы и быть председателем. И на хрена нам кого-то со стороны искать» (Абрамов 1). "What a woman!... If only she could be Chairwoman, and the hell with searching for one on the outside" (1a).
    В деревне не хватало мужчин, и председателю пришлось нанять рабочих со стороны. There weren't enough men in the village, so the chairman had to hire outsiders.
    5. \С-618\С-618 кого, чьей Prep the resulting PrepP is adv
    used to denote a person or group of people with whom an action or statement originates
    for (on) s.o.'s part
    on the part of (in limited contexts) of s.o.
    by s.o. (Бутон:) Так что вы говорите, милостивый государь? Что наш король есть самый лучший, самый блестящий король во всём мире? С моей стороны возражений нет (Булгаков 8). (В.:) So what are you saying, dear sir? That our king is the very best, the most brilliant king in the whole world? For my part I have no objections (8a).
    ...Тут было много и простодушия со стороны Мити, ибо при всех пороках своих это был очень простодушный человек (Достоевский 1)....There was much simple-heartedness on Mitya's part, for with all his vices this was a very simple-hearted man (1a).
    Да где ж это видано, чтобы народ сам по себе собирался без всякого контроля со стороны руководства?» (Войнович 2). "Who ever heard of people assembling all by themselves, without any control on the part of the leadership?" (2a).
    «...Примите в соображение, что ошибка возможна ведь только со стороны первого разряда, то есть „обыкновенных" людей...» (Достоевский 3). "...You must take into consideration the fact that a mistake can be made only by a member of the first class, that is, by the 'ordinary' people..." (3a).
    6. \С-618 кого, чьей Prep the resulting PrepP is adv
    used to denote a person or group of people whose action, behavior, statement etc is characterized or evaluated: (how generous (itis not nice, that's not fair etc)) of s.o. (to do sth.).
    Это очень плохо с его стороны - оставить нас наедине. Никогда не ожидал я от него такого предательства! (Казаков 2). That's not nice of him—to leave us alone. I never expected such treachery from him (2a).
    «Ну вот видишь, вот уж и нечестно с твоей стороны: слово дал, да и на попятный двор» (Гоголь 3). "There, you see, that's not fair of you: you have given me your word of honor, and now you are going back on it" (3c).
    7. \С-618 чего, какой Prep the resulting PrepP is adv
    in a certain respect (as specified by the context)
    from the standpoint (the vantage point) of
    from the point of view of from a AdjP standpoint (point of view).
    «Стригуны» молчали они понимали, что слова Собачкина очень последовательны и что со стороны логики под них нельзя иголки подточить (Салтыков-Щедрин 2). The "colts" were silent, for they realized that Sobachkin's words were very logical and that, from the point of view of pure logic, they were absolutely unassailable (2a).
    8. \С-618 кого, чьей, какой Prep the resulting PrepP is adv
    used to indicate a line of familial descent
    on (one's (the) father' (mother', husbamtfs, wife's etc)) side.
    Юный негодяй был влюблён в княгиню и тоже торчал у неё день и ночь, кажется, на правах соседа или дальнего родственника со стороны мужа (Искандер 3). The young reprobate was in love with the princess and had also been hanging around her day and night, exercising his rights as a neighbor, I believe, or a distant relative on the husband's side (3a).

    Большой русско-английский фразеологический словарь > С-618

  • 128 доказывать

    (= доказать, обосновать, показать, см. также проверять) prove, demonstrate, show, establish
    В качестве более сложного примера мы докажем, что... - As a slightly harder example we prove that...
    В общем случае можно доказать, что... - In general, it is possible to prove that...
    В результате теперь достаточно лишь доказать, что... - Consequently it is enough to prove that...
    Вдобавок можно доказать, что... - In fact it can be proved that...
    Гильберт был первым, кто доказал, что... - Hilbert was the first to prove that...
    Для того, чтобы доказать этот результат, мы должны, во-первых, вычислить... - In order to prove this result we must first calculate...
    Докажем теперь обобщение теоремы 1. - We now prove a generalization of Theorem 1.
    Полезность данной теории еще необходимо доказать. - The utility of this theory has yet to be demonstrated.
    Иногда весьма трудно доказать, что... - It is sometimes quite difficult to prove that...
    Исходя из этих сведений, легко доказать, что... - From these facts it is easy to prove that...
    Итак, мы уже доказали, что... - We have thus proved that...
    Как и ранее, (нам) достаточно доказать... - As before, it is sufficient to prove...
    Мы все еще должны доказать, что... - We still must show that...
    Мы докажем эту теорему при дополнительном предположении, что... - We prove this theorem subject to the extra assumption that...
    Мы докажем, что... - We deduce that...
    Мы доказали следующий результат. - We have proved the following result.
    Мы можем доказать правильность соотношения (6), заметив, что... - We can prove the correctness of (6) by observing that...
    Мы можем доказать это без (особого) труда. - We can prove this without difficulty.
    Мы надеемся доказать гипотезу Смита в ближайшие годы. - We hope to prove Smith's conjecture within a few years.
    Мы надеемся доказать, что... - We hope to prove that...
    Мы надеемся удалить эти ограничения и доказать более общий результат. - We hope to remove these restrictions and prove a more general result.
    Мы надеемся, что кто-нибудь докажет гипотезу Смита в ближайшие годы. - We hope that someone will prove Smith's conjecture within the next few years.
    Мы не будем доказывать здесь чрезвычайно правдоподобное утверждение, что... - We will not prove here the very reasonable statement that...
    Мы не предлагаем доказывать существование... - We do not propose to prove the existence of...
    Мы только что доказали, что... - We have just proved that...
    На этом пути мы надеемся доказать существенный результат. - We hope to prove a significant result along these lines.
    Наконец, мы можем доказать, что... - Finally, we can prove that...
    Остается доказать, (что)... - It remains to show (that)...
    Подобное рассуждение доказало бы, что... - A similar argument would prove that...
    Подобные принципы доказали свою полезность при проектировании... - Similar principles prove helpful in the design of...
    Подобные рассуждения доказывают следующий результат. - Arguments of the same type prove the following result.
    Подобные результаты убедительно доказывают, что... - Such results conclusively prove that...
    Поняв это, мы можем доказать следующее. - With this understanding, we can prove the following.
    Следовательно, можно доказать, что... -It is therefore justifiable to...
    Следовательно, мы должны доказать лишь, что... - Hence we have only to prove that...
    Сначала мы обязаны доказать следующую теорему. - We must first prove the following theorem.
    Строго говоря, мы доказали лишь, что... - Strictly speaking, we have only proved that...;
    Тем лее способом мы доказываем, что... - In the same way we prove that...
    Теперь мы доказываем важную теорему, принадлежащую Банаху. - We now prove an important theorem due to Banach.
    Теперь мы доказываем два фундаментальных результата. - We now prove two fundamental results.
    Теперь мы доказываем один фундаментальный результат. - We now prove a fundamental result.
    Теперь мы можем доказать следующую теорему. - This result enables us to prove the following theorem; We are now able to prove the following theorem; With this result in hand, we can prove the following theorem; With this understanding, we can prove the following theorem; Knowing this, we can prove the following theorem; We can now prove the following theorem; We are now in a position to prove the following theorem; The following theorem is now within our reach; We are now ready for the following theorem.
    Теперь мы можем сформулировать и доказать... - We are now in a position to state and prove...
    Теперь мы подготовлены к тому, чтобы сформулировать и доказать... - We are now equipped to state and prove...
    Теперь это предположение доказано, так как... - This assumption has now been justified, since...
    Часто бывает проще доказать, что... - It is often easier to prove that...
    Чтобы доказать обратное, достаточно заметить, что... - То prove the converse it is sufficient to notice that...
    Чтобы доказать теорему, достаточно показать, что... - То prove the theorem it is sufficient to show that...
    Чтобы доказать это следствие... - То see the corollary, use Proposition 1 to obtain the needed estimation.
    Чтобы доказать это утверждение, мы сделаем упрощающее предположение, что... - То prove this statement, we make the simplifying assumption that...
    Чтобы доказать эту теорему, во-первых, предположим, что... - То prove the theorem, suppose first that...
    Чтобы доказать эту теорему, недостаточно увидеть, что... - То prove this theorem it is not enough to observe that...
    Чтобы это доказать, нам остается лишь показать, что... - То prove this we need only show that...
    Это доказывает лишь то, что... - This proves only that...
    Это доказывает первое утверждение. - This proves the first assertion.
    Это доказывает, что... - This proves that...
    Это можно доказать следующим образом. - This may be proved as follows.
    Этот подход доказал свою полезность в определении ранних стадий... - This approach has proven useful in identifying the early stages of...
    что и требовалось доказать (= ч. т. д. ) - Q. E. D.

    Русско-английский словарь научного общения > доказывать

См. также в других словарях:

  • Fact — For other uses, see Fact (disambiguation). A fact (derived from the Latin Factum, see below) is something that has really occurred or is actually the case. The usual test for a statement of fact is verifiability, that is whether it can be shown… …   Wikipedia

  • fact — noun ADJECTIVE ▪ important, interesting, relevant, salient ▪ You must look at all the relevant facts. ▪ basic, simple ▪ …   Collocations dictionary

  • Statement analysis — is a learned technique, utilised to examine a person s words todetect for concealed information, missing information and whether the information that person provided is true or false. Anytime someone who is lying or withholding sensitive… …   Wikipedia

  • statement — state·ment n 1 a: an official or formal report or declaration a statement of policy b: an oral or written assertion (as by a witness) or conduct intended as an assertion see also hearsay, prior consistent statement …   Law dictionary

  • fact — W1S1 [fækt] n ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ 1¦(true information)¦ 2 the fact (that) 3 in (actual) fact 4 the fact (of the matter) is 5 the fact remains 6¦(real events/not a story)¦ 7 facts and figures 8 the facts speak for themselves 9 after the fact ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ …   Dictionary of contemporary English

  • fact — [ fækt ] noun *** 1. ) count a piece of true information: They have simply attempted to state the facts. fact about: Here children can discover basic scientific facts about the world. fact of: He wrote an article explaining the main facts of the… …   Usage of the words and phrases in modern English

  • Fact — (f[a^]kt), n. [L. factum, fr. facere to make or do. Cf. {Feat}, {Affair}, {Benefit}, {Defect}, {Fashion}, and { fy}.] 1. A doing, making, or preparing. [Obs.] [1913 Webster] A project for the fact and vending Of a new kind of fucus, paint for… …   The Collaborative International Dictionary of English

  • fact — [[t]fæ̱kt[/t]] ♦ facts 1) PHRASE: prep PHR cl, v PHR cl You use the fact that after some verbs or prepositions, especially in expressions such as in view of the fact that, apart from the fact that, and despite the fact that, to link the verb or… …   English dictionary

  • Statement veracity analysis — There are three principal disciplines of Statement Veracity Analysis.1) Criteria Based Content Analysis ( CBCA)2) Statement Content Analysis ( SCAN ) ª3) Scientific Content Analysis ( SCAN )The study of Statement Analysis is the study of Verbal… …   Wikipedia

  • statement — In a general sense, an allegation; a declaration of matters of fact. The term has come to be used of a variety of formal.narratives of facts, required by law in various jurisdictions as the foundation of judicial or official proceedings and in a… …   Black's law dictionary

  • statement — I UK [ˈsteɪtmənt] / US noun Word forms statement : singular statement plural statements *** 1) [countable] a written or spoken announcement on an important subject that someone makes in public make/issue a statement: He had been instructed not to …   English dictionary

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