speech+function

рус Смешанные специфические расстройства психологического развития

eng Mixed specific developmental disorders. A residual category for disorders in which there is some admixture of specific developmental disorders of speech and language, of scholastic skills, and of motor function, but in which none predominates sufficiently to constitute the prime diagnosis. This mixed category should be used only when there is a major overlap between each of these specific developmental disorders. The disorders are usually, but not always, associated with some degree of general impairment of cognitive functions. Thus, the category should be used when there are dysfunctions meeting the criteria for two or more of F80.-, F81.- and F82.

рус Смешанные специфические расстройства психологического развития

eng Mixed specific developmental disorders. A residual category for disorders in which there is some admixture of specific developmental disorders of speech and language, of scholastic skills, and of motor function, but in which none predominates sufficiently to constitute the prime diagnosis. This mixed category should be used only when there is a major overlap between each of these specific developmental disorders. The disorders are usually, but not always, associated with some degree of general impairment of cognitive functions. Thus, the category should be used when there are dysfunctions meeting the criteria for two or more of F80.-, F81.- and F82.

(Imperative of aller):

1. Vapour¼: O.K. for ¼Va pour trois briques! Alright, I'll settle for three grand!

2. Va donc! (Insult intensifier): Va donc, eh couillon! You stupid idiot, you! (More current in everyday speech is va! with no specific connotation; its sole function is to emphasize a statement. Je t'aime bien, va! You know I love you! Tu es mechant, va! You're really bad to me! Il est gentil, va! He's a nice boy! Sometimes it is merely a 'rhetorical prop' like the Liverpudlian 'you know!'. C'est pas difficile, va! It's not difficult, you know!)

3. A la va-vite (adv. exp.): In a slapdash manner, in a rushed and careless way.

4. A la va-comme-jete-pousse (adv. exp.): In a 'happen-what-may' careless manner. Elle nous a servi à bouffer à la va-comme-je-te-pousse! She dished up the grub just any-old-how!

1) разг. ( повторение) repetition; ( повторное воспроизведение) repeat; (телепрограммы тж.) rebroadcast, rerun

2) тех. ( двоение изображения) echo

1. noun

1) the art of using movement to perform the function of speech, especially in drama:

2) a play in which no words are spoken and the actions tell the story:

3) an actor in such a play; someone who practises this art:

2. verb

1. school function

2. speech day Br.

χάρις, ιτος, ἡ (Hom.+) acc. quite predom. χάριν, but χάριτα Ac 24:27; 25:9 v.l.; Jd 4 and pl. χάριτας Ac 24:27 v.l.; 1 Cl 23:1 (Eur., Hel. 1378; Hdt. 6, 41; X., Hell. 3, 5, 16; ins, pap; Zech 4:7; 6:14; EpArist 272, pl. 230.—B-D-F §47, 3; W-S. §9, 7; Mayser 271f; Thackeray 150; Helbing 40f; Mlt-H. 132.—It seems that χάρις is not always clearly differentiated in mng. fr. χαρά; Apollodorus [II B.C.]: 244 Fgm. 90 Jac. says in the second book περὶ θεῶν: κληθῆναι δὲ αὐτὰς ἀπὸ μὲν τ. χαρᾶς Χάριτας• καὶ γὰρ πολλάκις … οἱ ποιηταὶ τ. χάριν χαρὰν καλοῦσιν ‘the [deities] Charites are so called from χαρά [joy], for poets freq. equate χάρις with χαρά’. Cp. the wordplay AcPl Ha 8, 7 χαρᾶς καὶ χάριτος the house was filled with gaiety and gratitude.).

① a winning quality or attractiveness that invites a favorable reaction, graciousness, attractiveness, charm, winsomeness (Hom.+; Jos., Ant. 2, 231) of human form and appearance παῖς λίαν εὐειδής ἐν χάριτι an exceptionally fine-looking and winsome youth AcPl Ha 3, 13. Of speech (Demosth. 51, 9; Ps.-Demetr. [I A.D.], Eloc. §127; 133; 135 al.; Eccl 10:12; Sir 21:16; Jos., Ant. 18, 208) οἱ λόγοι τῆς χάριτος (gen. of quality) the gracious words Lk 4:22. ὁ λόγος ὑμῶν πάντοτε ἐν χάριτι let your conversation always be winsome Col 4:6 (cp. Plut., Mor. 514f; s. also HAlmqvist, Plut. u. das NT ’46, 121f; Epict. 3, 22, 90). τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ χάριτος ἐπληροῦτο MPol 12:1 can also be placed here in case χάρις means nothing more than graciousness (s. 4 below); prob. also GJs 7:3 (s. 3b).

② a beneficent disposition toward someone, favor, grace, gracious care/help, goodwill (almost a t.t. in the reciprocity-oriented world dominated by Hellenic influence [cp. e.g. OGI 669, 29] as well as by the Semitic sense of social obligation expressed in the term חֶסֶד [NGlueck, Das Wort ḥesed in alttestamentlichen Sprachgebrauche etc. 1927]. Of a different order and spirit is the subset of reciprocity known as Roman patronage, in which superiority of the donor over the client is clearly maintained)

ⓐ act., that which one grants to another, the action of one who volunteers to do someth. not otherwise obligatory χάρις θεοῦ ἦν ἐπʼ αὐτό Lk 2:40. ἡ χάρις τοῦ θεοῦ (cp. τῇ τοῦ θεοῦ Κλαυδίου χάριτι OGI 669, 29) Ac 11:2 D; 14:26. τοῦ κυρίου 15:40.—Esp. of the beneficent intention of God (cp. χ. in reference to God: Apollon. Rhod. 3, 1005 σοὶ θεόθεν χάρις ἔσσεται; Dio Chrys. 80 [30], 40 χ. τῶν θεῶν; Ael. Aristid. 13 p. 320 D.; 53 p. 620; Sextus 436b; likew. in LXX, Philo, Joseph.; SibOr 4, 46=189; 5, 330; Ezk. Trag. 162 [Eus., PE 9, 29, 12].—χ. to denote beneficent dispensations of the emperor: OGI 669, 44 [I A.D.]; BGU 19 I, 21 [II A.D.] χάρ. τοῦ θεοῦ Αὐτοκράτορος; 1085 II, 4) and of Christ, who give (undeserved) gifts to people; God: δικαιούμενοι δωρεὰν τῇ αὐτοῦ χάριτι Ro 3:24. Cp. 5:15a, 20f; 6:1; 11:5 (ἐκλογή 1), 6abc; Gal 1:15 (διά A 3e); Eph 1:6f (KKuhn, NTS 7, ’61, 337 [reff. to Qumran lit.]); 2:5, 7, 8; cp. Pol 1:3; 2 Th 1:12; 2:16; 2 Ti 1:9; Tit 2:11 (ἡ χάρ. τοῦ θεοῦ σωτήριος; s. Dibelius, Hdb. exc. after Tit 2:14); 3:7; Hb 2:9 (χωρίς 2aα); 4:16a (DdeSilva, JBL 115, ’96, 100–103); 1 Cl 50:3; ISm 9:2; IPol 7:3. ἐν χάρ[ιτι θεοῦ] AcPl Ha 7, 23 (restoration uncertain). κατὰ χάριν as a favor, out of goodwill (cp. Pla., Leg. 740c; schol. on Soph., Oed. Col. 1751 p. 468 Papag.) Ro 4:4 (opp. κατὰ ὀφείλημα), 16.—The beneficence or favor of Christ: διὰ τῆς χάριτος τοῦ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ πιστεύομεν σωθῆναι Ac 15:11. Cp. Ro 5:15b; 2 Cor 8:9; 1 Ti 1:14; IPhld 8:1. On Ac 2:47 in this sense s. TAnderson, NTS 34, ’88, 604–10.

ⓑ pass., that which one experiences fr. another (Arrian, Anab. Alex. 3, 26, 4) χάριν ἔχειν have favor 3J 4 v.l. πρός τινα with someone=win his respect Ac 2:47 (cp. 2a end; cp. Pind., O. 7, 89f χάριν καὶ ποτʼ ἀστῶν καὶ ποτὶ ξείνων grant him respect in the presence of his townfolk as well as strangers); παρά τινι (Appian, Bell. Civ. 2, 89 §376) Hm 10, 3, 1, cp. 5, 1, 5. εὑρεῖν χάριν παρά τινι (Philo, Leg. All. 3, 77, end) Lk 1:30; Hs 5, 2, 10; ἐνώπιόν τινος Ac 7:46; GJs 11:2 (JosAs 15:14). ἐν τοῖς μέλλουσι μετανοεῖν among those who are about to repent Hm 12, 3, 3. Ἰησοῦς προέκοπτεν χάριτι παρὰ θεῷ καὶ ἀνθρώποις Lk 2:52 (an indication of exceptional ἀρετή, cp. Pind. above). Cp. Ac 4:33; 7:10 (ἐναντίον Φαραώ); Hb 4:16b.—ποία ὑμῖν χάρις ἐστίν; what credit is that to you? Lk 6:32–34; s. D 1:3; 2 Cl 13:4. Cp. 1 Cor 9:16 v.l. In these passages the mng. comes close to reward (s. Wetter [5 below] 209ff w. reff.).—Also by metonymy that which brings someone (God’s) favor or wins a favorable response fr. God 1 Pt 2:19, 20.

ⓒ In Christian epistolary lit. fr. the time of Paul χάρις is found w. the sense (divine) favor in fixed formulas at the beginning and end of letters (Zahn on Gal 1:3; vDobschütz on 1 Th 1:1; ELohmeyer, ZNW 26, 1927, 158ff; APujol, De Salutat. Apost. ‘Gratia vobis et pax’: Verb. Dom. 12, ’32, 38–40; 76–82; WFoerster, TW II ’34, 409ff; Goodsp., Probs. 141f. S. also the lit. s.v. χαίρω 2b). At the beginning of a letter χάρις ὑμῖν καὶ εἰρήνη (sc. εἴη; New Docs 8, 127f) Ro 1:7; 1 Cor 1:3; 2 Cor 1:2; Gal 1:3; Eph 1:2; Phil 1:2; Col 1:2; 1 Th 1:1; 2 Th 1:2; Phlm 3; Rv 1:4; without ὑμῖν Tit 1:4. χάρις ὑμῖν καὶ εἰρήνη πληθυνθείη 1 Pt 1:2; 2 Pt 1:2; 1 Cl ins. χάρις, ἔλεος, εἰρήνη 1 Ti 1:2; 2 Ti 1:2; 2J 3 (on the triplet cp. En 5:7 φῶς καὶ χάρις καὶ εἰρήνη).—At the end ἡ χάρις (τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ etc.) μεθʼ ὑμῶν (or μετὰ πάντων ὑμῶν etc.) Ro 16:20, 23 (24) v.l.; 1 Cor 16:23; 2 Cor 13:13; Gal 6:18; Eph 6:24; Phil 4:23; Col 4:18; 1 Th 5:28; 2 Th 3:18; 1 Ti 6:21; 2 Ti 4:22; Tit 3:15; Phlm 25; Hb 13:25; Rv 22:21; 1 Cl 65:2. ἔσται ἡ χάρις μετὰ πάντων τῶν φοβουμένων τὸν Κύριον GJs 25:2. ὁ κύριος τῆς δόξης καὶ πάσης χάριτος μετὰ τοῦ πνεύματος ὑμῶν B 21:9. χάρις ὑμῖν, ἔλεος, εἰρήνη, ὑπομονὴ διὰ παντός ISm 12:2. ἔρρωσθε ἐν χάριτι θεοῦ 13:2.

③ practical application of goodwill, (a sign of) favor, gracious deed/gift, benefaction

ⓐ on the part of humans (X., Symp. 8, 36, Ages. 4, 3; Appian, Bell. Civ. 1, 49 §213; Dionys. Hal. 2, 15, 4) χάριν (-ιτα) καταθέσθαι τινί (κατατίθημι 2) Ac 24:27; 25:9. αἰτεῖσθαι χάριν 25:3 (in these passages from Ac χ. suggests [political] favor, someth. one does for another within a reciprocity system. Cp. Appian, Bell. Civ. 1, 108 §506 ἐς χάριν Σύλλα=as a favor to Sulla; ApcSed 8:1 οὐκ ἐποίησάς μοι χάριν=you did me no favor). ἵνα δευτέραν χάριν σχῆτε that you might have a second proof of my goodwill 2 Cor 1:15 (unless χάρις here means delight [so in poetry, Pind. et al., but also Pla., Isocr.; L-S-J-M s.v. χάρις IV; cp. also the quot. fr. Apollodorus at the beg. of the present entry, and the fact that χαρά is v.l. in 2 Cor 1:15]; in that case δευτέρα means double; but s. comm.). Of the collection for Jerusalem (cp. Appian, Bell. Civ. 3, 42 §173 χάριτας λαμβάνειν=receive gifts) 1 Cor 16:3; 2 Cor 8:4, 6f, 19 (DdeSilva, JBL 115, ’96, 101). Cp. B 21:7.—Eph 4:29 may suggest a demonstration of human favor (cp. Plut., Mor. 514e χάριν παρασκευάζοντες ἀλλήλοις), but a ref. to the means by which divine grace is mediated is not to be ruled out (s. b below).

ⓑ on the part of God and Christ; the context will show whether the emphasis is upon the possession of divine favor as a source of blessings for the believer, or upon a store of favor that is dispensed, or a favored status (i.e. standing in God’s favor) that is brought about, or a gracious deed wrought by God in Christ, or a gracious work that grows fr. more to more (so in contrast to the old covenant Mel., P. 3, 16 al.). God is called ὁ θεὸς πάσης χάριτος 1 Pt 5:10, i.e. God, who is noted for any conceivable benefit or favor; cp. B 21:9.—χάριν διδόναι τινί show favor to someone (Anacr. 110 Diehl; Appian, Ital. 5 §10): τὸν δόντα αὐτῷ τὴν χάριν GJs 14:2. ταπεινοῖς δίδωσι χάριν (Pr 3:34) Js 4:6b; 1 Pt 5:5; 1 Cl 30:2; without a dat. Js 4:6a (Menand., Epitr. 231 S. [55 Kö.]). Perh. καὶ ἔβαλλε κύριος … χάριν ἐπʼ αὐτήν GJs 7:3 (but s. 1 above). The Logos is πλήρης χάριτος J 1:14. Those who belong to him receive of the fullness of his grace, χάριν ἀντὶ χάριτος vs. 16 (ἀντί 2). Cp. vs. 17. τὴν χάριν ταύτην ἐν ᾗ ἑστήκαμεν this favor (of God) we now enjoy Ro 5:2 (Goodsp.).—5:17; 1 Cor 1:4; 2 Cor 4:15 (divine beneficence in conversion); cp. Ac 11:23; 6:1; Gal 1:6 (by Christ’s gracious deed); 2:21; 5:4; Col 1:6; 2 Ti 2:1; Hb 12:15; 13:9; 1 Pt 1:10, 13; 3:7 (συνκληρονόμοι χάριτος ζωῆς fellow-heirs of the gift that spells life; s. ζωή 2bα); 5:12; 2 Pt 3:18; Jd 4; IPhld 11:1; ISm 6:2. Christians stand ὑπὸ χάριν under God’s gracious will as expressed in their release from legal constraint Ro 6:14f, or they come ὑπὸ τὸν ζυγὸν τῆς χάριτος αὐτοῦ 1 Cl 16:17 (ζυγός 1). The proclamation of salvation is the message of divine beneficence τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τῆς χάριτος τοῦ θεοῦ Ac 20:24 or ὁ λόγος τῆς χάριτος αὐτοῦ (=τοῦ κυρίου) 14:3; 20:32. Even the gospel message can be called ἡ χάρις τοῦ θεοῦ 13:43; cp. 18:27; MPol 2:3. τὸ πνεῦμα τῆς χάριτος the Spirit from or through whom (God’s) favor is shown Hb 10:29 (AArgyle, Grace and the Covenant: ET 60, ’48/49, 26f).—Pl. benefits, favors (Diod S 3, 2, 4; 3, 73, 6; Sb 8139, 4 [ins of I B.C.] of Isis; Jos., C. Ap. 2, 190) 1 Cl 23:1.—Nelson Glueck, Das Wort ḥesed etc. 1927, but s. FAndersen, ‘Yahweh, the Kind and Sensitive God’: God Who is Rich in Mercy, ed. PO’Brien/DPeterson ’86.

④ exceptional effect produced by generosity, favor. Of effects produced by divine beneficence which go beyond those associated with a specific Christian’s status (ins μεγάλαι χάριτες τοῦ θεου: FCumont, Syria 7, 1926, 347ff), in the congregations of Macedonia 2 Cor 8:1 and Corinth 9:14; cp. vs. 8; in Rome AcPl Ha 7, 8. The Christian confessor is in full possession of divine grace ISm 11:1. Paul knows that through the χάρις of God he has been called to be an apostle, and that he has been fitted out w. the powers and capabilities requisite for this office fr. the same source: Ro 1:5; 12:3; 15:15; 1 Cor 3:10; 15:10ab (for the subject matter cp. Polyb. 12, 12b, 3 αὐτὸν [Alex. the Great] ὑπὸ τοῦ δαιμονίου τετευχέναι τούτων ὧν ἔτυχεν=whatever he has received he has received from what is divine. [For this reason he does not deserve any divine honors.]); 2 Cor 12:9; Gal 2:9; Eph 3:2, 7f; Phil 1:7.—The χάρις of God manifests itself in various χαρίσματα: Ro 12:6; Eph 4:7; 1 Pt 4:10. This brings into view a number of passages in which χάρις is evidently to be understood in a very concrete sense. It is hardly to be differentiated fr. δύναμις (θεοῦ) or fr. γνῶσις or δόξα (q.v. 1b. On this subj. s. Wetter [5 below] p. 94ff; esp. 130ff; pap in the GLumbroso Festschr. 1925, 212ff: χάρις, δύναμις, πνεῦμα w. essentially the same mng.; PGM 4, 2438; 3165; Herm. Wr. 1, 32; Just., D. 87, 5 ἀπὸ χάριτος τῆς δυνάμεως τοῦ πνεύματος). οὐκ ἐν σοφίᾳ σαρκικῇ ἀλλʼ ἐν χάριτι θεοῦ 2 Cor 1:12. οὐκ ἐγὼ δὲ ἀλλὰ ἡ χάρις τοῦ θεοῦ σὺν ἐμοί 1 Cor 15:10c. αὐξάνετε ἐν χάριτι καὶ γνώσει τοῦ κυρίου 2 Pt 3:18; cp. 1 Cl 55:3; B 1:2 (τῆς δωρεᾶς πνευματικῆς χάρις). Stephen is said to be πλήρης χάριτος καὶ δυνάμεως Ac 6:8. Divine power fills the Christian confessor or martyr w. a radiant glow MPol 12:1 (but s. 1 above). As the typical quality of the age to come, contrasted w. the κόσμος D 10:6.

⑤ response to generosity or beneficence, thanks, gratitude (a fundamental component in the Gr-Rom. reciprocity system; exx. fr. later times: Diod S 11, 71, 4 [χάριτες=proofs of gratitude]; Appian, Syr. 3, 12; 13. Cp. Wetter [below] p. 206f) χάριν ἔχειν τινί be grateful to someone (Eur., Hec. 767; X., An. 2, 5, 14; Pla., Phlb. 54d; Ath. 2, 1; PLips 104, 14 [I B.C.] χάριν σοι ἔχω) foll. by ὅτι (Epict. 3, 5, 10; Jos., C. Ap. 1, 270; 2, 49) Lk 17:9 (ERiggenbach, NKZ 34, 1923, 439–43); mostly of gratitude to God or Christ; χάρις in our lit. as a whole, in the sense gratitude, refers to appropriate respone to the Deity for benefits conferred (Hom., Pind., Thu. et al.; ins, pap, LXX; Jos., Ant. 7, 208) χάριν ἔχω τῷ θεῷ (POxy 113, 13 [II A.D.] χάριν ἔχω θεοῖς πᾶσιν.—Epict. 4, 7, 9) 2 Ti 1:3; foll. by ὅτι because 1 Ti 1:12 (Herm. Wr. 6, 4 κἀγὼ χάριν ἔχω τῷ θεῷ …, ὅτι; Jos., Ant. 4, 316); χάριν ἔχειν ἐπί τινι be grateful for someth. Phlm 7 v.l. (to humans). ἔχωμεν χάριν let us be thankful (to God) Hb 12:28 (the reason for it is given by the preceding ptc. παραλαμβάνοντες). Elliptically (B-D-F §128, 6; cp. Rob. 1201f) χάρις (ἔστω) τῷ θεῷ (X., Oec. 8, 16 πολλὴ χάρις τοῖς θεοῖς; Epict. 4, 4, 7 χάρις τῷ θεῳ; BGU 843, 6 [I/II A.D.] χάρις τοῖς θεοῖς al. in pap since III B.C..—Philo, Rer. Div. Her. 309) Ro 7:25; MPol 3:1. Foll. by ὅτι (X., An. 3, 3, 14 τοῖς θεοῖς χάρις ὅτι; PFay 124, 16 τοῖς θεοῖς ἐστιν χάρις ὅτι; Epict. 4, 5, 9) Ro 6:17. Foll. by ἐπί τινι for someth. (UPZ 108, 30 [99 B.C.]) 2 Cor 9:15. The reason for the thanks is given in the ptc. agreeing w. τῷ θεῷ 2:14; 8:16; 1 Cor 15:57 (cp. Jos., Ant. 6, 145; Philo, Somn. 2, 213). Thankfulness (Appian, Bell. Civ. 3, 15 §51 πρός τινα=toward someone) χάριτι in thankfulness 10:30. So prob. also ἐν τῇ χάριτι in a thankful spirit Col 3:16 (Dibelius, Hdb. ad loc.). πλησθῆναι χαρᾶς καὶ χάριτος AcPl Ha 8, 7. S. εὐχαριστέω, end. Also PSchubert, Form and Function of the Pauline Thanksgivings ’39.—OLoew, Χάρις, diss., Marburg 1908; GWetter, Charis 1913; AvHarnack, Sanftmut, Huld u. Demut in der alten Kirche: JKaftan Festschr. 1920, 113ff; NBonwetsch, Zur Geschichte des Begriffs Gnade in der alten Kirche: Harnack Festgabe 1921, 93–101; EBurton, Gal ICC 1921, 423f; WWhitley, The Doctrine of Grace ’32; JMoffatt, Grace in the NT ’31; RWinkler, D. Gnade im NT: ZST 10, ’33, 642–80; RHomann, D. Gnade in d. Syn. Ev.: ibid. 328–48; JWobbe, D. Charisgedanke b. Pls ’32; RBultmann, Theologie des NT ’48, 283–310 (Paul); HBoers, Ἀγάπη and Χάρις in Paul’s Thought: CBQ 59, ’97, 693–713; on 2 Cor 8: FDanker, Augsburg Comm. 2 Cor, 116–34; PRousselot, La Grâce d’après St. Jean et d’après St. Paul: SR 18, 1928, 87–108, Christent. u. Wissensch. 8, ’32, 402–30; JMontgomery, Hebrew Hesed and Gk. Charis: HTR 32, ’39, 97–102; Dodd 61f; TTorrance, The Doctrine of Grace in the Apost. Fathers, ’48; JRenié, Studia Anselmiana 27f, ’51, 340–50; CRSmith, The Bible Doctrine of Grace, ’56; EFlack, The Concept of Grace in Bibl. Thought: Bibl. Studies in Memory of HAlleman, ed. Myers, ’60, 137–54; DDoughty, NTS 19, ’73, 163–80.—B. 1166. DELG. M-M. EDNT. TW. Spicq. Sv.

   1) To Know the Different Operations of the Mind

   It becomes, therefore, no inconsiderable part of science... to know the different operations of the mind, to separate them from each other, to class them under their proper heads, and to correct all that seeming disorder in which they lie involved when made the object of reflection and inquiry.... It cannot be doubted that the mind is endowed with several powers and faculties, that these powers are distinct from one another, and that what is really distinct to the immediate perception may be distinguished by reflection and, consequently, that there is a truth and falsehood which lie not beyond the compass of human understanding. (Hume, 1955, p. 22)

   2) The Mind Is Furnished by Experience

   Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white Paper, void of all Characters, without any Ideas: How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store, which the busy and boundless Fancy of Man has painted on it, with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of Reason and Knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from Experience. (Locke, quoted in Herrnstein & Boring, 1965, p. 584)

   3) Mythical Thought Is as Rigorous as That of Modern Science

   The kind of logic in mythical thought is as rigorous as that of modern science, and... the difference lies, not in the quality of the intellectual process, but in the nature of things to which it is applied.... Man has always been thinking equally well; the improvement lies, not in an alleged progress of man's mind, but in the discovery of new areas to which it may apply its unchanged and unchanging powers. (Leґvi-Strauss, 1963, p. 230)

   4) The Mind Has Nothing But Itself to Know Itself

   MIND. A mysterious form of matter secreted by the brain. Its chief activity consists in the endeavor to ascertain its own nature, the futility of the attempt being due to the fact that it has nothing but itself to know itself with. (Bierce, quoted in Minsky, 1986, p. 55)

   5) To Know Is to Represent Accurately

   [Philosophy] understands the foundations of knowledge and it finds these foundations in a study of man-as-knower, of the "mental processes" or the "activity of representation" which make knowledge possible. To know is to represent accurately what is outside the mind, so to understand the possibility and nature of knowledge is to understand the way in which the mind is able to construct such representation.... We owe the notion of a "theory of knowledge" based on an understanding of "mental processes" to the seventeenth century, and especially to Locke. We owe the notion of "the mind" as a separate entity in which "processes" occur to the same period, and especially to Descartes. We owe the notion of philosophy as a tribunal of pure reason, upholding or denying the claims of the rest of culture, to the eighteenth century and especially to Kant, but this Kantian notion presupposed general assent to Lockean notions of mental processes and Cartesian notions of mental substance. (Rorty, 1979, pp. 3-4)

   6) The Question of Mind in Relation to Machine

   Under pressure from the computer, the question of mind in relation to machine is becoming a central cultural preoccupation. It is becoming for us what sex was to Victorians-threat, obsession, taboo, and fascination. (Turkle, 1984, p. 313)

   7) Understanding the Mind Remains as Resistant to Neurological as to Cognitive Analyses

   Recent years have been exciting for researchers in the brain and cognitive sciences. Both fields have flourished, each spurred on by methodological and conceptual developments, and although understanding the mechanisms of mind is an objective shared by many workers in these areas, their theories and approaches to the problem are vastly different....

   Early experimental psychologists, such as Wundt and James, were as interested in and knowledgeable about the anatomy and physiology of the nervous system as about the young science of the mind. However, the experimental study of mental processes was short-lived, being eclipsed by the rise of behaviorism early in this century. It was not until the late 1950s that the signs of a new mentalism first appeared in scattered writings of linguists, philosophers, computer enthusiasts, and psychologists.

   In this new incarnation, the science of mind had a specific mission: to challenge and replace behaviorism. In the meantime, brain science had in many ways become allied with a behaviorist approach.... While behaviorism sought to reduce the mind to statements about bodily action, brain science seeks to explain the mind in terms of physiochemical events occurring in the nervous system. These approaches contrast with contemporary cognitive science, which tries to understand the mind as it is, without any reduction, a view sometimes described as functionalism.

   The cognitive revolution is now in place. Cognition is the subject of contemporary psychology. This was achieved with little or no talk of neurons, action potentials, and neurotransmitters. Similarly, neuroscience has risen to an esteemed position among the biological sciences without much talk of cognitive processes. Do the fields need each other?... [Y]es because the problem of understanding the mind, unlike the wouldbe problem solvers, respects no disciplinary boundaries. It remains as resistant to neurological as to cognitive analyses. (LeDoux & Hirst, 1986, pp. 1-2)

   8) Approaches to the Study of the Mind

   Since the Second World War scientists from different disciplines have turned to the study of the human mind. Computer scientists have tried to emulate its capacity for visual perception. Linguists have struggled with the puzzle of how children acquire language. Ethologists have sought the innate roots of social behaviour. Neurophysiologists have begun to relate the function of nerve cells to complex perceptual and motor processes. Neurologists and neuropsychologists have used the pattern of competence and incompetence of their brain-damaged patients to elucidate the normal workings of the brain. Anthropologists have examined the conceptual structure of cultural practices to advance hypotheses about the basic principles of the mind. These days one meets engineers who work on speech perception, biologists who investigate the mental representation of spatial relations, and physicists who want to understand consciousness. And, of course, psychologists continue to study perception, memory, thought and action.

... [W]orkers in many disciplines have converged on a number of central problems and explanatory ideas. They have realized that no single approach is likely to unravel the workings of the mind: it will not give up its secrets to psychology alone; nor is any other isolated discipline-artificial intelligence, linguistics, anthropology, neurophysiology, philosophy-going to have any greater success. (Johnson-Laird, 1988, p. 7)

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