-
101 Rittinger, Peter von
SUBJECT AREA: Mining and extraction technology[br]b. 23 January 1811 Neutitschein, Moravia (now Now Jicin, Czech Republic)d. 7 December 1872 Vienna, Austria[br]Austrian mining engineer, improver of the processing of minerals.[br]After studying law, philosophy and politics at the University of Olmutz (now Olomouc), in 1835 Rittinger became a fellow of the Mining Academy in Schemnitz (now Banská Štiavnica), Slovakia. In 1839, the year he finished at the academy, he published a book on perspective drawing. The following year, he became Inspector of Mills at the ore mines in Schemnitz, and in 1845 he was engaged in coal mining in Bohemia and Moravia. In 1849 he joined the mining administration at Joachimsthal (now Jáchymov), Bohemia. In these early years he contributed his first important innovations for the mining industry and thus fostered his career in the government's service. In 1850 he was called to Vienna to become a high-ranked officer in various ministries. He was responsible for the construction of buildings, pumping installations and all sorts of machinery in the mining industry; he reorganized the curricula of the mining schools, was responsible for the mint and became head of the department of mines, forests and salt-works in the Austrian empire.During all his years of public service, Rittinger continued his concern with technological innovations. He improved the processing of ores by introducing in 1844 the rotary washer and the box classifier, and later his continuously shaking concussion table which, having been exhibited at the Vienna World Fair of 1873, was soon adopted in other countries. He constructed water-column pumps, invented a differential shaft pump with hydraulic linkage to replace the heavy iron rods and worked on centrifugal pumps. He was one of the first to be concerned with the transfer of heat, and he developed a system of using exhaust steam for heating in salt-works. He kept his eye on current developments abroad, using his function as official Austrian commissioner to the world exhibitions, on which he published frequently as well as on other matters related to technology. With his systematic handbook on mineral processing, first published in 1867, he emphasized his international reputation in this specialized field of mining.[br]Principal Honours and DistinctionsKnighted 1863. Order of the Iron Crown 1863. Honorary Citizen of Joachimsthal 1864. President, Austrian Chamber of Engineers and Architects 1863–5.Bibliography1849, Der Spitzkasten-Apparat statt Mehlrinnen und Sümpfen…bei der nassen Aufbereitung, Freiberg.1854, Theoretisch-praktische Anleitung zur Rader-Verzahnung, Vienna.1855, Theoretisch-praktische Abhandlung über ein für alle Gattungen von Flüssigkeiten anwendbares neues Abdampfverfahren, Vienna.1861, Theorie und Bau der Rohrturbinen, Prague.1867, Lehrbuch der Aufbereitungskunde, Berlin (with supplements, 1870–73).Further ReadingH.Kunnert, 1972, "Peter Ritter von Rittinger. Lebensbild eines grossen Montanisten", Der Anschnitt 24:3–7 (a detailed description of his life, based on source material).J.Steiner, 1972, "Der Beitrag von Peter Rittinger zur Entwicklung der Aufbereitungstechnik". Berg-und hüttenmännische Monatshefte 117: 471–6 (an evaluation of Rittinger's achievements for the processing of ores).WK -
102 функция маршрутизации
Русско-английский военно-политический словарь > функция маршрутизации
-
103 νεφέλη
νεφέλη, ης, ἡ (Hom.+; Kaibel 375; pap, LXX, En, TestAbr; TestJob 42:3; TestLevi 18:5; ApcEsdr 5:7 p. 29, 32 Tdf.; Philo, Joseph., Just., Mel.) cloud ν. λευκή Rv 14:14a. Clouds fr. the west bringing rain Lk 12:54. νεφέλαι σκότους dark clouds as a comparison for a swarm of worms ApcPt 10:25. ν. σκοτεινή GJs 19:2, foll. by ἡ ν. ὑπεστέλλετο the cloud disappeared. ν. ἄνυδροι waterless clouds, that yield no rain Jd 12; cp. 2 Pt 2:17 v.l. Jesus at the Transfiguration was overshadowed by a νεφέλη φωτεινή bright cloud (ν. as a sign of God’s presence: Jos., Ant. 3, 290; 310) Mt 17:5; cp. Mk 9:7; Lk 9:34f (HRiesenfeld, Jésus Transfiguré ’47, 130–45). περιβεβλημένος νεφέλην (Lucian, Jupp. Trag. 16) clothed in a cloud Rv 10:1. Christ ascending in a cloud Ac 1:9 (cp. Dosiadis [III B.C.]: 458 Fgm. 5 Jac. of Ganymede: νέφος ἥρπασεν αὐτὸν εἰς οὐρανόν; Ps.-Apollod. 2, 7, 7, 12 of Heracles). Likew. the believers 1 Th 4:17 (cp. PGM 5, 277 τὸν περιεχόμενον … ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ ἀέρος νεφέλης); cp. Rv 11:12. Clouds as the vehicle of Christ at his second coming ἐρχόμενον ἐπὶ τῶν ν. τοῦ οὐρανοῦ (cp. Da 7:13) Mt 24:30; 26:64. ἐν νεφέλαις Mk 13:26. ἐν νεφέλῃ Lk 21:27. μετὰ τῶν ν. τοῦ οὐρανοῦ (Da 7:13 Theod.) Mk 14:62; cp. Rv 1:7. ἐπάνω τῶν ν. τοῦ οὐρανοῦ D 16:8; καθήμενος ἐπὶ τῆς ν. Rv 14:15f; ἐπὶ τὴν ν. vs. 14b. ὑπὸ τὴν ν. εἶναι be under the cloud 1 Cor 10:1 (for the idea cp. Ex 14:19ff; Num 14:14; Ps 104:39; Wsd 10:17; 19:7). πάντες ἐβαπτίσθησαν (v.l. ἐβαπτίσαντο; B-D-F §317; Rob. 808) ἐν τῇ νεφέλῃ they were all baptized in (by) the cloud vs. 2 is meant to establish a baptism for those who were in the desert, even though neither the OT nor Jewish tradition views the cloud as a source of moisture.—On the function of clouds in apocalyptic scenarios s. JReeves, Heralds of That Good Realm ’96, 169f.—DELG s.v. νεφέλη I. M-M. TW. -
104 σοφία
σοφία, ας, ἡ (s. σοφίζω, σοφός; Hom., Pre–Socr. et al.; LXX, TestSol; TestJob 37:6; Test12patr, JosAs; AscIs 3:23; AssMos Fgm. e; EpArist, Philo, Joseph., Just.,Tat., Ath.)① the capacity to understand and function accordingly, wisdom.ⓐ natural wisdom that belongs to this world σοφία Αἰγυπτίων (Synes., Provid. 1, 1 p. 89a; Jos., Ant. 2, 286; cp. Tat. 31, 1 πάσης βαρβάρου σοφίας ἀρχηγόν [of Moses]) Ac 7:22 (on the subj. s. Philo, Vita Mos. 1, 20ff; Schürer II 350). In contrast to God’s wisdom and the wisdom that comes fr. God ἡ σοφία τῶν σοφῶν 1 Cor 1:19 (Is 29:14). ἡ σοφία τοῦ κόσμου (τούτου) vs. 20; 3:19. σοφία τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου 2:6b. ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία 2:13. ς. ἀνθρώπων vs. 5. Cp. 1:21b, 22; 2:1. σοφία λόγου cleverness in speaking 1:17. On ἐν πειθοῖς σοφίας λόγοις 2:4 see πειθός. σοφία σαρκική 2 Cor 1:12. ς. ἐπίγειος, ψυχική, δαιμονιώδης Js 3:15 (cp. ς. as ironical referent for dissident teaching: ἡ παμποίκιλος ς. [τῆς] Περατικῆς αἱρέσεως Hippol., Ref. 5, 17, 1).—An advantage that is given to certain persons (like strength and riches, Just., D. 102, 6) 1 Cl 13:1 (Jer 9:22); 32:4; 38:2. So perh. also 39:6 (Job 4:21); but s. bα.ⓑ transcendent wisdomα. wisdom that God imparts to those who are close to God. Solomon (3 Km 5:9; Pr 1:2; Jos., Ant. 8, 168 ς. τοῦ Σ; AssMos Fgm. e [Denis p. 65]; Orig., C. Cels. 3, 45, 9) Mt 12:42; Lk 11:31; Stephen Ac 6:10; Paul 2 Pt 3:15; Pol 3:2; to those believers who are called to account for their faith Lk 21:15. The gift of unveiling secrets (2 Km 14:20; Da 1:17; 2:30. Oenomaus in Eus., PE 5, 27, 1 ἡ σοφία is necessary for the proper use of the oracles) Ac 7:10; Rv 13:18; 17:9. τὸν δεσπότην τὸν δόντα μοι τὴν σοφίαν τοῦ γράψαι τὴν ἱστορίαν ταύτην the Lord, who gave me the wisdom to write this account GJs 25:1. Good judgment in the face of human and specif. Christian demands (practical) wisdom Ac 6:3; Col 4:5; Js 1:5; 3:13, 17 (for the view that ς. in Js 1:5; 3:17=πνεῦμα s. WBieder, TZ 5, ’49, 111). The apostle teaches people ἐν πάσῃ σοφίᾳ Col 1:28, and Christians are to do the same among themselves 3:16 (ἐν πάσῃ ς. also Eph 1:8; Col 1:9).—W. φρόνησις (q.v. 2) Eph 1:8. W. ἀποκάλυψις vs. 17. W. σύνεσις (Jos., Ant. 8, 49): σοφία καὶ σύνεσις πνευματική Col 1:9. σοφία, σύνεσις, ἐπιστήμη, γνῶσις (cp. Philo, Gig. 27) B 2:3; 21:5. σοφία καὶ νοῦς τῶν κρυφίων αὐτοῦ wisdom and understanding of his (i.e. the Lord’s) secrets 6:10.—As a spiritual gift the λόγος σοφίας (cp. Just., D. 121, 2) stands beside the λόγος γνώσεως 1 Cor 12:8 (s. γνῶσις 1 and cp. Aesopica 213, 1 P.: Τύχη ἐχαρίσατο αὐτῷ λόγον σοφίας). Paul differentiates betw. his preaching to unbelievers and immature Christians and σοφίαν λαλεῖν ἐν τοῖς τελείοις 2:6a; the latter he also calls λαλεῖν θεοῦ σοφίαν ἐν μυστηρίῳ set forth the wisdom that comes fr. God as a mystery vs. 7 (WBaird, Interpretation 13, ’59, 425–32).—The false teachers of Colossae consider that their convictions are σοφία Col 2:23.—JdeFinance, La σοφία chez St. Paul: RSR 25, ’35, 385–417.β. wisdom of Christ and of Godא. Christ: of Jesus as a boy (s. ἡλικία 1b) Lk 2:40, 52. Of him as an adult Mt 13:54; Mk 6:2. Of the exalted Christ ἐν ᾧ εἰσιν πάντες οἱ θησαυροὶ τῆς σοφίας καὶ γνώσεως Col 2:3.—Rv 5:12. By metonymy Χρ. Ἰ., ὸ̔ς ἐγενήθη σοφία ἡμῖν ἀπὸ θεοῦ Christ Jesus, who has become a source of wisdom from God for us 1 Cor 1:30. This last makes a transition toב. wisdom of God (Diog. L. 1, 28 σοφίᾳ πρῶτον εἶναι τὸν θεόν; Theoph. Ant. I, 6 [p. 70, 18] ς. τοῦ θεοῦ): revealed in his creation and rule of the world 1 Cor 1:21a, or in the measures intended to bring salvation to the believers Ro 11:33 (here w. γνῶσις; cp. TestJob 37:6 of God’s depth of wisdom); Eph 3:10; Hv 1, 3, 4 (w. πρόνοια).—Rv 7:12; 1 Cl 18:6 (Ps 50:8); B 16:9 (cp. δικαίωμα 1). Christ is called θεοῦ σοφία the embodiment of the wisdom of God 1 Cor 1:24 (cp. א above; Just., D. 61, 3 ὁ λόγος τῆς σοφίας; Diog. L. 9, 50 Protagoras is called Σοφία.—Lucian in Peregr. 11 speaks ironically of the θαυμαστὴ σοφία τῶν Χριστιανῶν. Orig., C. Cels. 6, 44, 27 τῷ υἱῷ τοῦ θεοῦ ὄντι δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ καὶ ς.)—UWilckens, Weisheit u. Torheit ( 1 Cor 1 and 2), ’59; FChrist, Jesus Sophia (synopt.) ’70.② personified wisdom, Wisdom (Ael. Aristid. 45, 17 K. as a mediator betw. Sarapis and humans; perh.=Isis; AHöfler, D. Sarapishymnus des Ael. Aristid. ’35, 50 and 53f; the name of an aeon Iren. 1, 2, 3 [Harv. I 16, 5]; s. also Did., Gen, 213, 12). In connection w. Pr 1:23–33: 1 Cl 57:3 (λέγει ἡ πανάρετος σοφία), 5 (=Pr 1:29); 58:1. On ἐδικαιώθη ἡ σοφία κτλ. Mt 11:19; Lk 7:35 cp. δικαιόω 2bα and Ps.-Pla., Eryx. 6, 394d ἡ σοφία καὶ τὰ ἔργα τὸ ἀπὸ ταύτης=wisdom and her fruits. ἡ σοφία τοῦ θεοῦ εἶπεν Lk 11:49 introduces a statement made by ‘wisdom’ (‘wisdom’ is variously explained in this connection; on the one hand, it is said to refer to the OT, or to an apocryphal book by this title [s. 3 below]; on the other hand, Jesus is thought of as proclaiming a decree of divine wisdom, or Lk is thinking of wisdom that Jesus has communicated to them at an earlier time).③ a book titled ‘The Wisdom of God’, s. 2.—EBréhier, Les idées philosophiques et religieuses de Philon d’Alexandrie 1907, 115ff; JMeinhold, Die Weisheit Israels 1908; GHoennicke, RE XXI 1908, 64ff; HWindisch, Die göttl. Weisheit der Juden u. die paulin. Christologie: Heinrici Festschr. 1914, 220 ff; PHeinisch, Die persönl. Weisheit des ATs in religionsgesch. Beleuchtung2 1923; Bousset, Rel.3 343ff; FFerrari, Il Progresso religioso 8, 1928, 241–53; MTechert, La notion de la Sagesse dans les trois prem. siècles: Archiv. f. Gesch. d. Philos. n.s. 32, 1930, 1–27; WKnox, St. Paul and the Church of the Gentiles ’39, 55–89; BRigaux, NTS 4, ’57/58, esp. 252–57 (Qumran); HConzelmann, Pls. u. die Weisheit, NTS 12, ’66, 231–44; MSuggs, Wisdom, Christology, and Law in Mt, ’70. Other lit. in Schürer III/1, 198–212.—BGladigow, Sophia und Kosmos, Untersuchungen zur frühgeschichte von σοφό und σοφίη ’65.—DELG s.v. σοφό. M-M. EDNT. TW. Sv. -
105 σῶμα
σῶμα, ατος, τό (Hom.+) ‘body.’① body of a human being or animal, bodyⓐ dead body, corpse (so always in Hom. [but s. HHerter, σῶμα bei Homer: Charites, Studien zur Altertumswissenschaft, ELanglotz Festschr., ed. KvonSchauenburg ’57, 206–17] and oft. later, e.g. Memnon: 434 Fgm. 1, 3, 3 Jac. καίειν τὸ ς.=burn the corpse; ins, pap, LXX; PsSol 2:27; TestJob 52:11; ApcMos 34 al.; Philo, Abr. 258; Jos., Bell. 6, 276, Ant. 18, 236; Ar. 4, 3; Mel., P. 28, 196) Mt 14:12 v.l.; 27:59; Mk 15:45 v.l.; Lk 17:37; Ac 9:40; GPt 2:4; pl. J 19:31. W. gen. Mt 27:58; Mk 15:43; Lk 23:52, 55; 24:3, 23; J 19:38ab, 40; 20:12; Jd 9; GPt 2:3. Pl. Mt 27:52; Hb 13:11. AcPlCor 2:27.ⓑ the living body (Hes. et al.) of animals Js 3:3.—Mostly of human beings Mt 5:29f; 6:22f; 26:12; Mk 5:29; 14:8; Lk 11:34abc; J 2:21; Ro 1:24; 1 Cor 6:18ab; IRo 5:3. τὰ τοῦ σώματος the parts of the body 4:2. Of women αἱ ἀσθενεῖς τῷ σώματι 1 Cl 6:2; cp. Hv 3, 11, 4.—W. and in contrast to πνεῦμα (4 Macc 11:11) Ro 8:10, 13; 1 Cor 5:3; 7:34; Js 2:26. W. and in contrast to ψυχή (Pla., Gorg. 47, 493a; Diod S 34 + 35 Fgm. 2, 30; Appian, Bell. Civ. 5, 112 §467; Ael. Aristid. 45, 17f K.=8 p. 88f D.; Lucian, Imag. 23; PGM 7, 589; Wsd 1:4; 8:19f; 2 Macc 7:37; 14:38; 4 Macc 1:28; ApcEsdr 7:3 p. 32, 13 Tdf.; EpArist 139; Philo; Jos., Bell. 3, 372–78; 6, 55; Just., A I, 8, 4; D. 6, 2 al.; Tat. 13, 1; Ath. 1, 4; Did., Gen. 56, 4; Theoph. Ant. 1, 5 [p. 66, 2]) Mt 6:25ab; 10:28ab; Lk 12:4 v.l., 22f; 2 Cl 5:4 (a saying of Jesus, fr. an unknown source); 12:4; MPol 14:2; AcPl Ha 1, 4. τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα (s. the Christian POxy 1161, 6 [IV A.D.]) 1 Th 5:23. W. and in contrast to its parts (ApcSed 11:13; Mel., P. 78, 563) Ro 12:4; 1 Cor 12:12abc (Ltzm. ad loc.), 14–20 (PMich 149, 4, 26 [II A.D.] ἧπαρ … ὅλον τὸ σῶμα); Js 3:6; 1 Cl 37:5abcd. The body as the seat of sexual function Ro 4:19; 1 Cor 7:4ab (rights over the σῶμα of one’s spouse as Artem. 1, 44 p. 42, 14f; Iren. 1, 13, 3 [Harv. I 119, 10]).—The body as seat of mortal life εἶναι ἐν σώματι be in the body = alive, subject to mortal ills (TestAbr A 9 p. 87, 3 [Stone p. 22]; Poryphr., Abst. 1, 38) Hb 13:3. ἐνδημεῖν ἐν τῷ σώματι 2 Cor 5:6 (s. ἐνδημέω). ἐκδημῆσαι ἐκ τοῦ σώματος vs. 8 (s. ἐκδημέω). διὰ τοῦ σώματος during the time of one’s mortal life (cp. Lucian, Menipp. 11, end, Catapl. 23) vs. 10 (s. κομίζω 3, but s. also below in this section). Paul does not know whether, in a moment of religious ecstasy, he was ἐν σώματι or ἐκτὸς (χωρὶς) τοῦ σώματος 12:2f (of Epimenides [A2: Vorsokrat.5 I p. 29] it was said ὡς ἐξίοι ἡ ψυχὴ ὁπόσον ἤθελε καιρὸν καὶ πάλιν εἰσῄει ἐν τῷ σώματι; Clearchus, Fgm. 7: καθάπερ ὁ Κλέαρχος ἐν τοῖς περὶ ὕπνου φησίν, περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὡς ἄρα χωρίζεται τοῦ σώματος καὶ ὡς εἴσεισιν εἰς τὸ σῶμα καὶ ὡς χρῆται αὐτῷ οἷον καταγωγίῳ [a resting-place]. In Fgm. 8 Clearchus tells about Cleonymus the Athenian, who seemed to be dead, but awakened after 3 days and thereupon reported everything that he had seen and heard ἐπειδὴ χωρὶς ἦν τοῦ σώματος. His soul is said finally to have arrived εἴς τινα χῶρον ἱερὸν τῆς Ἑστίας; Maximus Tyr. 38, 3a–f Ἀριστέας ἔφασκεν τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτῷ καταλιποῦσαν τὸ σῶμα in order to wander through the universe. He finds faith everywhere. Similarly 10, 2f. See also the story of Hermotimus in Apollon. Paradox. 3 as well as Lucian, Musc. Enc. [The Fly] 7.—On the two kinds of transcendent vision [with or without the body] s. Proclus, In Pla. Rem Publ. II p. 121, 26ff Kroll: οἱ μὲν μετὰ τοῦ σώματος τῶν τοιούτων [like Ἐμπεδότιμος] ἵστορες [=eyewitnesses], οἱ δὲ ἄνευ σώματος [like Κλεώνυμος]. καὶ πλήρεις αἱ παραδόσεις τούτων.). ἀπὼν τῷ σώματι (παρὼν δὲ τῷ πνεύματι) 1 Cor 5:3. ἡ παρουσία τοῦ σώματος 2 Cor 10:10 (παρουσία 1). The body is the instrument of human experience and suffering 4:10ab; Gal 6:17 (allusion AcPlCor 2, 35); Phil 1:20; the body is the organ of a person’s activity: δοξάσατε τὸν θεὸν ἐν τῷ σώματι ὑμῶν glorify God through your body, i.e. by leading an upright life 1 Cor 6:20; cp. Ro 12:1. This may be the place (s. above in this section) for διὰ τοῦ σώματος 2 Cor 5:10 which, in that case, would be taken in an instrumental sense with or through the body (cp. Pla., Phd. 65a; Ps.-Pla., Axioch. 13, 371c; Aelian, NA 5, 26 τὰ διὰ τοῦ σώματος πραττόμενα). In some of the last-named passages (such as Ro 12:1; Phil 1:20; also Eph 5:28 w. parallel in Plut., Mor. 142e: s. HAlmqvist, Plut. u. d. NT ’46, 116f) the body is almost synonymous w. the whole personality (as Aeschin., Or. 2, 58; X., An. 1, 9, 12 τὰ ἑαυτῶν σώματα=themselves. Appian, Syr. 41 §218 παρεδίδου τὸ σῶμα τοῖς ἐθέλουσιν ἀπαγαγεῖν=[Epaminondas] gave himself up to those who wished to take him away, Mithr. 27 §107 ἐς τὸ σῶμα αὐτοῦ=against his person, Bell. Civ. 2, 106 §442 Caesar’s person [σῶμα] is ἱερὸς καὶ ἄσυλος=sacred and inviolable; 3, 39 §157 ἔργον … σῶμα=course of action … person; Mitt-Wilck. I/2, 55, 7 [III B.C.] ἑκάστου σώματος=for every person. See Wilcken’s note).—Because it is subject to sin and death, man’s mortal body as τὸ σῶμα τῆς σαρκός (σάρξ 2cα) Col 2:11 is a σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας Ro 6:6 or τοῦ θανάτου 7:24; cp. 8:11. In fact, σῶμα can actually take the place of σάρξ 8:13 (cp. Herm. Wr. 4, 6b ἐὰν μὴ πρῶτον τὸ σῶμα μισήσῃς, σεαυτὸν φιλῆσαι οὐ δύνασαι; 11, 21a.—Cp. Hippol., Ref. 5, 19, 6). As a σῶμα τῆς ταπεινώσεως lowly body it stands in contrast to the σῶμα τῆς δόξης glorious body of the heavenly beings Phil 3:21. In another pass. σῶμα ψυχικόν of mortals is opposed to the σῶμα πνευματικόν after the resurrection 1 Cor 15:44abc.—Christ’s earthly body, which was subject to death (Orig., C. Cels. 2, 9, 13) Ro 7:4; Hb 10:5 (Ps 39:7 v.l.), 10; 1 Pt 2:24; AcPlCor 2:16f. τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὰ ὀστᾶ καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ 2:32. τὸ σῶμα τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ Col 1:22. Esp. in the language of the Eucharist (opp. αἷμα) Mt 26:26; Mk 14:22; Lk 22:19; 1 Cor 10:16 (GBornkamm, NTS 2, ’56, 202–6); 11:24, 27, 29. S. the lit. s.v. ἀγάπη 2 and εὐχαριστία 3, also JBonsirven, Biblica 29, ’48, 205–19.—ἓν σῶμα a single body 1 Cor 6:16 (cp. Jos., Ant. 7, 66 Δαυίδης τήν τε ἄνω πόλιν κ. τὴν ἄκραν συνάψας ἐποίησεν ἕν σῶμα; Artem. 3, 66 p. 196, 9; RKempthorne, NTS 14. ’67/68, 568–74).② pl. σώματα slaves (Herodas 2, 87 δοῦλα σώματα; Polyb. et al.; oft. Vett. Val.; ins, pap; Gen 36:6; Tob 10:10; Bel 32; 2 Macc 8:11; Jos., Ant. 14, 321; cp. our colloq. ‘get some bodies for the job’) Rv 18:13 (cp. Ezk 27:13; the abs. usage rejected by Atticists, s. Phryn. 378 Lob.).③ plant and seed structure, body. In order to gain an answer to his own question in 1 Cor 15:35 ποίῳ σώματι ἔρχονται; (i.e. the dead after the resurrection), Paul speaks of bodies of plants (which are different in kind fr. the ‘body’ of the seed which is planted.—Maximus Tyr. 40, 60e makes a distinction betw. the σώματα of the plants, which grow old and pass away, and their σπέρματα, which endure.—σώματα of plants also in Apollon. Paradox. 7 [after Aristot.]) vs. 37f, and of σώματα ἐπουράνια of the heavenly bodies vs. 40 (cp. Ps.-Aristot., De Mundo 2, 2 the stars as σώματα θεῖα; Maximus Tyr. 21, 8b οὐρανὸς κ. τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ σώματα, acc. to 11, 12a οἱ ἀστέρες; 40, 4h; Sallust. 9 p. 18, 5).④ substantive reality, the thing itself, the reality in imagery of a body that casts a shadow, in contrast to σκιά (q.v. 3) Col 2:17.⑤ a unified group of people, body fig. ext. of 1, of the Christian community or church (cp. Cyr. Ins. 58, ‘body of the Hellenes’; Polyaenus, Exc. 18, 4 of the phalanx; Libanius, Or. 1 p. 176, 25 F. τὸ τῆς πόλεως ς.; Plut., Philop. 360 [8, 2]), esp. as the body of Christ, which he fills or enlivens as its Spirit (in this case the head belongs with the body, as Appian, Bell. Civ. 3, 26 §101, where a severed head is differentiated from τὸ ἄλλο σῶμα=the rest of the body), or crowns as its Head (Hdt. 7, 140; Quint. Smyrn. 11, 58; SIG 1169, 3; 15 κεφαλή w. σῶμα as someth. equally independent; Orig., C. Cels. 6, 79, 27): οἱ πολλοὶ ἓν σῶμά ἐσμεν ἐν Χριστῷ Ro 12:5. Cp. 1 Cor 10:17; 12:13, 27; Eph (s. Schlier s.v. ἐκκλησία 3c) 1:23; 2:16; 4:12, 16; 5:23, 30; Col 1:18, 24; 2:19; 3:15; ISm 1:2; Hs 9, 17, 5; 9, 18, 3f. ἓν σῶμα καὶ ἓν πνεῦμα Eph 4:4; cp. Hs 9, 13, 5; 7 (Iambl., Vi. Pyth. 30, 167: all as ἓν σῶμα κ. μία ψυχή; also Just., D. 42, 3) διέλκομεν τὰ μέλη τοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ στασιάζομεν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἴδιον 1 Cl 46:7.—T Schmidt, Der Leib Christi (σῶμα Χριστοῦ) 1919; EKäsemann, Leib u. Leib Christi ’33 (for a critique s. SHanson, Unity of the Church in the NT ’46, 113–16); ÉMersch, Le Corps mystique du Christ2 ’36; AWikenhauser, D. Kirche als d. myst. Leib Christi, nach dem Ap. Pls2 ’40; EPercy, D. Leib Christi in d. paulin. Homologumena u. Antilegomena ’42; RHirzel, Die Person: SBMünAk 1914 H. 10 p. 6–28 (semantic history of σῶμα); WKnox, Parallels to the NT use of σῶμα: JTS 39, ’38, 243–46; FDillistone, How Is the Church Christ’s Body?: Theology Today 2, ’45/46, 56–68; WGoossens, L’Église corps de Christ d’après St. Paul2 ’49; CCraig, Soma Christou: The Joy of Study ’51, 73–85; JRobinson, The Body: A Study in Pauline Theol. ’52; RBultmann, Theol. of the NT, tr. KGrobel ’51, 192–203; HClavier, CHDodd Festschr. ’56, 342–62; CColpe, Zur Leib-Christi Vorstellung im Eph, ’60, 172–87; KGrobel, Bultmann Festschr. ’54, 52–59; HHegermann, TLZ 85, ’60, 839–42; ESchweizer, ibid. 86, ’61, 161–74; 241–56; JMeuzelaar, D. Leib des Messias, ’61; MDahl, The Resurrection of the Body, ’62; RJewett, Paul’s Anthropological Terms, ’71, 201–304; JZiegler, NovT 25, ’83, 133–45 (LXX); JDunn: JSNT Suppl. 100, ’94, 163–81 (Col.).—B. 198. New Docs 4, 38f. DELG. M-M. TW. Sv. -
106 φωτίζω
φωτίζω fut. φωτίσω (1 Cor 4:5; Rv 22:5) and φωτιῶ (Rv 22:5 v.l.; TestLevi 4:3; s.Thackeray 228f); 1 aor. ἐφώτισα. Pass.: 1 fut. 3 sg. pl. φωτισθήσεται,-σονται; 1 aor. ἐφωτίσθην; pf. ptc. πεφωτισμένος (cp. φῶς; Aristot.+; ins, pap, LXX; En 5:8; Test12Patr; ParJer 9:3; Philo, Joseph., Just.; Mel., P. 35, 243 al.)① intr. (Aristot.; Theophr.; Plut., Num. 4, 9; 8, 2; Sir 42:16; Philo, Dec. 49) to function as a source of light, to shine, of God (Ps 75:5) ἐπί τινα upon someone Rv 22:5.② trans. to cause to be illumined, give light to, light (up), illuminate (Aristarch. Sam. [III B.C.] p. 358, 20 al.; Diod S 3, 48, 4 of the sun ἀκτῖσι τὸν κόσμον; Galen XIX p. 174 K.; PGM 3, 152; 4, 2345; IDefixWünsch 4, 14; 2 Esdr 19:12, 19 τὴν ὁδόν) τινά someone Lk 11:36; Rv 22:5 v.l.; τὴν πόλιν Rv 21:23. Pass. (Anaximander, Vorsokr. 12 A 1 [in Diog. L. 2, 1] ἀπὸ ἡλίου; Plut., Mor. 1120e; Diog. L. 7, 144 the whole earth ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ [the sun] φωτίζεσθαι) 18:1.③ trans. to make known in reference to the inner life or transcendent matters and thus enlighten, enlighten, give light to, shed light upon (φῶς 2; 3) fig. ext. of 2ⓐ in imagery of the heavenly light that is granted the ‘enlightened one’ (cp. the prayer PGM 4, 990, that calls upon the μέγιστος θεός as τὸν τὰ πάντα φωτίζοντα καὶ διαυγάζοντα τῇ ἰδίᾳ δυνάμει τὸν σύμπαντα κόσμον; Herm. Wr. 1, 32 the inspired one prays to a deity for δύναμις and χάρις: ἵνα φωτίσω τοὺς ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ. S. also 13, 18; 19 τὸ πᾶν τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν σῷζε ζωή, φώτιζε φῶς, πνευμάτιζε θεέ; Philo, Fuga 139 and TestBenj 6:4 τ. ψυχήν; Sextus 97; ViHab 14 [p. 87, 6 Sch.].—GAnrich, Das antike Mysterienwesen 1894, 125f; GWobbermin, Religionsgesch. Studien 1896, 155ff; Rtzst., Mysterienrel. 3, 1927, 44; 264; 292); τὸ φῶς τὸ ἀληθινὸν (i.e. Christ, the heavenly Redeemer) φωτίζει πάντα ἄνθρωπον J 1:9 (s. Hdb. ad loc. and s.v. φῶς 1bα.—For the combination w. φῶς: ParJer 9:3; Cleom. [II A.D.] 2, 4 p. 188, 18 τὸ φῶς τὸ φωτίζον αὐτόν; Proclus on Pla., Cratyl. p. 103, 28 Pasqu.); φωτίσαι πάντας τίς ἡ οἰκονομία τοῦ μυστηρίου to enlighten everyone about God’s private/mysterious plan Eph 3:9 (perh. in the sense ‘instruct’, cp. 4 Km 17:27f). God is implored to grant πεφωτισμένους τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς τῆς καρδίας enlightened in the eyes of (your) heart = … your inward sight 1:18 (φωτίζειν ὀφθαλμούς: 2 Esdr 9:8; Ps 18:9; Bar 1:12). The Roman Christian community is πεφωτισμένη ἐν θελήματι (i.e. of God) IRo ins (cp. Just., D. 122, 3 ἐθνῶν πεφωτισμένων). οἱ ἅπαξ φωτισθέντες Hb 6:4; cp. 10:32.ⓑ bring to light, reveal τὶ someth. (Polyb. 22, 5, 10; Epict. 1, 4, 31 τὴν ἀλήθειαν; Plut., Mor. 902c; Jos., Ant. 8, 143 the hidden mng. of a riddle; pass., Lucian, Calum. 32; Mel., P. 41, 285 τὸ εὐαγγέλιον) τὰ κρυπτὰ τοῦ σκότους that which is hidden in the dark 1 Cor 4:5. φ. ζωὴν καὶ ἀφθαρσίαν διὰ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου bring life and immortality to light through the gospel 2 Ti 1:10. Abs., foll. by indir. question φωτίσαι τίς ἡ οἰκονομία τοῦ μυστηρίου to make clear what (God’s) mysterious plan is Eph 3:9 v.l.—DELG s.v. φάε C. M-M. EDNT. TW. Spicq. Sv. -
107 Computer Metaphors
Within the AI community there is a growing dissatisfaction concerning the adequacy of sequential models to simulate the cognitive processes....For an example of the dissimilarity between computers and nervous systems, consider that in conventional computers... each piece of data [is] located in its own special space in the memory bank [and] can be retrieved only by a central processor that knows the address in the memory bank for each datum. Human memory appears to be organized along entirely different lines. For one thing, from a partial or a degraded stimulus human memory can "reconstruct" the rest, and there are associative relationships among stored pieces of information based on considerations of context rather than on considerations of location.... t now appears doubtful that individual neurons are so specific that they are tuned to respond to a single item and nothing else. Thus, connectionist models tend to devise and use distributed principles, which means that elements may be selective to a range of stimuli and there are no "grandmother cells."...Information storage, it appears, is in some ill-defined sense a function of connectivity among sets of neurons. This implies that there is something fundamentally wrong in understanding the brain's memory on the model of individual symbols stored at unique addresses in a data bank....A further source of misgivings about the computer metaphor concerns real-time constraints. Although the signal velocities in nervous systems are quite slow in comparison to those in computers, brains are nonetheless far, far faster than electronic devices in the execution of their complex tasks. For example, human brains are incomparably faster than any computer in word-nonword recognition tasks. (P. S. Churchland, 1986, pp. 458-459)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Computer Metaphors
-
108 Intelligence
There is no mystery about it: the child who is familiar with books, ideas, conversation-the ways and means of the intellectual life-before he begins school, indeed, before he begins consciously to think, has a marked advantage. He is at home in the House of intellect just as the stableboy is at home among horses, or the child of actors on the stage. (Barzun, 1959, p. 142)It is... no exaggeration to say that sensory-motor intelligence is limited to desiring success or practical adaptation, whereas the function of verbal or conceptual thought is to know and state truth. (Piaget, 1954, p. 359)ntelligence has two parts, which we shall call the epistemological and the heuristic. The epistemological part is the representation of the world in such a form that the solution of problems follows from the facts expressed in the representation. The heuristic part is the mechanism that on the basis of the information solves the problem and decides what to do. (McCarthy & Hayes, 1969, p. 466)Many scientists implicitly assume that, among all animals, the behavior and intelligence of nonhuman primates are most like our own. Nonhuman primates have relatively larger brains and proportionally more neocortex than other species... and it now seems likely that humans, chimpanzees, and gorillas shared a common ancestor as recently as 5 to 7 million years ago.... This assumption about the unique status of primate intelligence is, however, just that: an assumption. The relations between intelligence and measures of brain size is poorly understood, and evolutionary affinity does not always ensure behavioral similarity. Moreover, the view that nonhuman primates are the animals most like ourselves coexists uneasily in our minds with the equally pervasive view that primates differ fundamentally from us because they lack language; lacking language, they also lack many of the capacities necessary for reasoning and abstract thought. (Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990, p. 4)Few constructs are asked to serve as many functions in psychology as is the construct of human intelligence.... Consider four of the main functions addressed in theory and research on intelligence, and how they differ from one another.1. Biological. This type of account looks at biological processes. To qualify as a useful biological construct, intelligence should be a biochemical or biophysical process or at least somehow a resultant of biochemical or biophysical processes.2. Cognitive approaches. This type of account looks at molar cognitive representations and processes. To qualify as a useful mental construct, intelligence should be specifiable as a set of mental representations and processes that are identifiable through experimental, mathematical, or computational means.3. Contextual approaches. To qualify as a useful contextual construct, intelligence should be a source of individual differences in accomplishments in "real-world" performances. It is not enough just to account for performance in the laboratory. On [sic] the contextual view, what a person does in the lab may not even remotely resemble what the person would do outside it. Moreover, different cultures may have different conceptions of intelligence, which affect what would count as intelligent in one cultural context versus another.4. Systems approaches. Systems approaches attempt to understand intelligence through the interaction of cognition with context. They attempt to establish a link between the two levels of analysis, and to analyze what forms this link takes. (Sternberg, 1994, pp. 263-264)High but not the highest intelligence, combined with the greatest degrees of persistence, will achieve greater eminence than the highest degree of intelligence with somewhat less persistence. (Cox, 1926, p. 187)There are no definitive criteria of intelligence, just as there are none for chairness; it is a fuzzy-edged concept to which many features are relevant. Two people may both be quite intelligent and yet have very few traits in common-they resemble the prototype along different dimensions.... [Intelligence] is a resemblance between two individuals, one real and the other prototypical. (Neisser, 1979, p. 185)Given the complementary strengths and weaknesses of the differential and information-processing approaches, it should be possible, at least in theory, to synthesise an approach that would capitalise upon the strength of each approach, and thereby share the weakness of neither. (Sternberg, 1977, p. 65)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Intelligence
-
109 Psychology
We come therefore now to that knowledge whereunto the ancient oracle directeth us, which is the knowledge of ourselves; which deserveth the more accurate handling, by how much it toucheth us more nearly. This knowledge, as it is the end and term of natural philosophy in the intention of man, so notwithstanding it is but a portion of natural philosophy in the continent of nature.... [W]e proceed to human philosophy or Humanity, which hath two parts: the one considereth man segregate, or distributively; the other congregate, or in society. So as Human philosophy is either Simple and Particular, or Conjugate and Civil. Humanity Particular consisteth of the same parts whereof man consisteth; that is, of knowledges which respect the Body, and of knowledges that respect the Mind... how the one discloseth the other and how the one worketh upon the other... [:] the one is honored with the inquiry of Aristotle, and the other of Hippocrates. (Bacon, 1878, pp. 236-237)The claims of Psychology to rank as a distinct science are... not smaller but greater than those of any other science. If its phenomena are contemplated objectively, merely as nervo-muscular adjustments by which the higher organisms from moment to moment adapt their actions to environing co-existences and sequences, its degree of specialty, even then, entitles it to a separate place. The moment the element of feeling, or consciousness, is used to interpret nervo-muscular adjustments as thus exhibited in the living beings around, objective Psychology acquires an additional, and quite exceptional, distinction. (Spencer, 1896, p. 141)Kant once declared that psychology was incapable of ever raising itself to the rank of an exact natural science. The reasons that he gives... have often been repeated in later times. In the first place, Kant says, psychology cannot become an exact science because mathematics is inapplicable to the phenomena of the internal sense; the pure internal perception, in which mental phenomena must be constructed,-time,-has but one dimension. In the second place, however, it cannot even become an experimental science, because in it the manifold of internal observation cannot be arbitrarily varied,-still less, another thinking subject be submitted to one's experiments, comformably to the end in view; moreover, the very fact of observation means alteration of the observed object. (Wundt, 1904, p. 6)It is [Gustav] Fechner's service to have found and followed the true way; to have shown us how a "mathematical psychology" may, within certain limits, be realized in practice.... He was the first to show how Herbart's idea of an "exact psychology" might be turned to practical account. (Wundt, 1904, pp. 6-7)"Mind," "intellect," "reason," "understanding," etc. are concepts... that existed before the advent of any scientific psychology. The fact that the naive consciousness always and everywhere points to internal experience as a special source of knowledge, may, therefore, be accepted for the moment as sufficient testimony to the rights of psychology as science.... "Mind," will accordingly be the subject, to which we attribute all the separate facts of internal observation as predicates. The subject itself is determined p. 17) wholly and exclusively by its predicates. (Wundt, 1904,The study of animal psychology may be approached from two different points of view. We may set out from the notion of a kind of comparative physiology of mind, a universal history of the development of mental life in the organic world. Or we may make human psychology the principal object of investigation. Then, the expressions of mental life in animals will be taken into account only so far as they throw light upon the evolution of consciousness in man.... Human psychology... may confine itself altogether to man, and generally has done so to far too great an extent. There are plenty of psychological text-books from which you would hardly gather that there was any other conscious life than the human. (Wundt, 1907, pp. 340-341)The Behaviorist began his own formulation of the problem of psychology by sweeping aside all medieval conceptions. He dropped from his scientific vocabulary all subjective terms such as sensation, perception, image, desire, purpose, and even thinking and emotion as they were subjectively defined. (Watson, 1930, pp. 5-6)According to the medieval classification of the sciences, psychology is merely a chapter of special physics, although the most important chapter; for man is a microcosm; he is the central figure of the universe. (deWulf, 1956, p. 125)At the beginning of this century the prevailing thesis in psychology was Associationism.... Behavior proceeded by the stream of associations: each association produced its successors, and acquired new attachments with the sensations arriving from the environment.In the first decade of the century a reaction developed to this doctrine through the work of the Wurzburg school. Rejecting the notion of a completely self-determining stream of associations, it introduced the task ( Aufgabe) as a necessary factor in describing the process of thinking. The task gave direction to thought. A noteworthy innovation of the Wurzburg school was the use of systematic introspection to shed light on the thinking process and the contents of consciousness. The result was a blend of mechanics and phenomenalism, which gave rise in turn to two divergent antitheses, Behaviorism and the Gestalt movement. The behavioristic reaction insisted that introspection was a highly unstable, subjective procedure.... Behaviorism reformulated the task of psychology as one of explaining the response of organisms as a function of the stimuli impinging upon them and measuring both objectively. However, Behaviorism accepted, and indeed reinforced, the mechanistic assumption that the connections between stimulus and response were formed and maintained as simple, determinate functions of the environment.The Gestalt reaction took an opposite turn. It rejected the mechanistic nature of the associationist doctrine but maintained the value of phenomenal observation. In many ways it continued the Wurzburg school's insistence that thinking was more than association-thinking has direction given to it by the task or by the set of the subject. Gestalt psychology elaborated this doctrine in genuinely new ways in terms of holistic principles of organization.Today psychology lives in a state of relatively stable tension between the poles of Behaviorism and Gestalt psychology.... (Newell & Simon, 1963, pp. 279-280)As I examine the fate of our oppositions, looking at those already in existence as guide to how they fare and shape the course of science, it seems to me that clarity is never achieved. Matters simply become muddier and muddier as we go down through time. Thus, far from providing the rungs of a ladder by which psychology gradually climbs to clarity, this form of conceptual structure leads rather to an ever increasing pile of issues, which we weary of or become diverted from, but never really settle. (Newell, 1973b, pp. 288-289)The subject matter of psychology is as old as reflection. Its broad practical aims are as dated as human societies. Human beings, in any period, have not been indifferent to the validity of their knowledge, unconcerned with the causes of their behavior or that of their prey and predators. Our distant ancestors, no less than we, wrestled with the problems of social organization, child rearing, competition, authority, individual differences, personal safety. Solving these problems required insights-no matter how untutored-into the psychological dimensions of life. Thus, if we are to follow the convention of treating psychology as a young discipline, we must have in mind something other than its subject matter. We must mean that it is young in the sense that physics was young at the time of Archimedes or in the sense that geometry was "founded" by Euclid and "fathered" by Thales. Sailing vessels were launched long before Archimedes discovered the laws of bouyancy [ sic], and pillars of identical circumference were constructed before anyone knew that C IID. We do not consider the ship builders and stone cutters of antiquity physicists and geometers. Nor were the ancient cave dwellers psychologists merely because they rewarded the good conduct of their children. The archives of folk wisdom contain a remarkable collection of achievements, but craft-no matter how perfected-is not science, nor is a litany of successful accidents a discipline. If psychology is young, it is young as a scientific discipline but it is far from clear that psychology has attained this status. (Robinson, 1986, p. 12)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Psychology
-
110 Bibliography
■ Aitchison, J. (1987). Noam Chomsky: Consensus and controversy. New York: Falmer Press.■ Anderson, J. R. (1980). Cognitive psychology and its implications. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.■ Anderson, J. R. (1983). The architecture of cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.■ Anderson, J. R. (1995). Cognitive psychology and its implications (4th ed.). New York: W. H. Freeman.■ Archilochus (1971). In M. L. West (Ed.), Iambi et elegi graeci (Vol. 1). Oxford: Oxford University Press.■ Armstrong, D. M. (1990). The causal theory of the mind. In W. G. Lycan (Ed.), Mind and cognition: A reader (pp. 37-47). Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell. (Originally published in 1981 in The nature of mind and other essays, Ithaca, NY: University Press).■ Atkins, P. W. (1992). Creation revisited. Oxford: W. H. Freeman & Company.■ Austin, J. L. (1962). How to do things with words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.■ Bacon, F. (1878). Of the proficience and advancement of learning divine and human. In The works of Francis Bacon (Vol. 1). Cambridge, MA: Hurd & Houghton.■ Bacon, R. (1928). Opus majus (Vol. 2). R. B. Burke (Trans.). Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.■ Bar-Hillel, Y. (1960). The present status of automatic translation of languages. In F. L. Alt (Ed.), Advances in computers (Vol. 1). New York: Academic Press.■ Barr, A., & E. A. Feigenbaum (Eds.) (1981). The handbook of artificial intelligence (Vol. 1). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.■ Barr, A., & E. A. Feigenbaum (Eds.) (1982). The handbook of artificial intelligence (Vol. 2). Los Altos, CA: William Kaufman.■ Barron, F. X. (1963). The needs for order and for disorder as motives in creative activity. In C. W. Taylor & F. X. Barron (Eds.), Scientific creativity: Its rec ognition and development (pp. 153-160). New York: Wiley.■ Bartlett, F. C. (1932). Remembering: A study in experimental and social psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.■ Bartley, S. H. (1969). Principles of perception. London: Harper & Row.■ Barzun, J. (1959). The house of intellect. New York: Harper & Row.■ Beach, F. A., D. O. Hebb, C. T. Morgan & H. W. Nissen (Eds.) (1960). The neu ropsychology of Lashley. New York: McGraw-Hill.■ Berkeley, G. (1996). Principles of human knowledge: Three Dialogues. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Originally published in 1710.)■ Berlin, I. (1953). The hedgehog and the fox: An essay on Tolstoy's view of history. NY: Simon & Schuster.■ Bierwisch, J. (1970). Semantics. In J. Lyons (Ed.), New horizons in linguistics. Baltimore: Penguin Books.■ Black, H. C. (1951). Black's law dictionary. St. Paul, MN: West Publishing.■ Bloom, A. (1981). The linguistic shaping of thought: A study in the impact of language on thinking in China and the West. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.■ Bobrow, D. G., & D. A. Norman (1975). Some principles of memory schemata. In D. G. Bobrow & A. Collins (Eds.), Representation and understanding: Stud ies in Cognitive Science (pp. 131-149). New York: Academic Press.■ Boden, M. A. (1977). Artificial intelligence and natural man. New York: Basic Books.■ Boden, M. A. (1981). Minds and mechanisms. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.■ Boden, M. A. (1990a). The creative mind: Myths and mechanisms. London: Cardinal.■ Boden, M. A. (1990b). The philosophy of artificial intelligence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.■ Boden, M. A. (1994). Precis of The creative mind: Myths and mechanisms. Behavioral and brain sciences 17, 519-570.■ Boden, M. (1996). Creativity. In M. Boden (Ed.), Artificial Intelligence (2nd ed.). San Diego: Academic Press.■ Bolter, J. D. (1984). Turing's man: Western culture in the computer age. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.■ Bolton, N. (1972). The psychology of thinking. London: Methuen.■ Bourne, L. E. (1973). Some forms of cognition: A critical analysis of several papers. In R. Solso (Ed.), Contemporary issues in cognitive psychology (pp. 313324). Loyola Symposium on Cognitive Psychology (Chicago 1972). Washington, DC: Winston.■ Bransford, J. D., N. S. McCarrell, J. J. Franks & K. E. Nitsch (1977). Toward unexplaining memory. In R. Shaw & J. D. Bransford (Eds.), Perceiving, acting, and knowing (pp. 431-466). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.■ Breger, L. (1981). Freud's unfinished journey. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.■ Brehmer, B. (1986). In one word: Not from experience. In H. R. Arkes & K. Hammond (Eds.), Judgment and decision making: An interdisciplinary reader (pp. 705-719). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.■ Bresnan, J. (1978). A realistic transformational grammar. In M. Halle, J. Bresnan & G. A. Miller (Eds.), Linguistic theory and psychological reality (pp. 1-59). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Brislin, R. W., W. J. Lonner & R. M. Thorndike (Eds.) (1973). Cross- cultural research methods. New York: Wiley.■ Bronowski, J. (1977). A sense of the future: Essays in natural philosophy. P. E. Ariotti with R. Bronowski (Eds.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Bronowski, J. (1978). The origins of knowledge and imagination. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.■ Brown, R. O. (1973). A first language: The early stages. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.■ Brown, T. (1970). Lectures on the philosophy of the human mind. In R. Brown (Ed.), Between Hume and Mill: An anthology of British philosophy- 1749- 1843 (pp. 330-387). New York: Random House/Modern Library.■ Bruner, J. S., J. Goodnow & G. Austin (1956). A study of thinking. New York: Wiley.■ Calvin, W. H. (1990). The cerebral symphony: Seashore reflections on the structure of consciousness. New York: Bantam.■ Campbell, J. (1982). Grammatical man: Information, entropy, language, and life. New York: Simon & Schuster.■ Campbell, J. (1989). The improbable machine. New York: Simon & Schuster.■ Carlyle, T. (1966). On heroes, hero- worship and the heroic in history. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. (Originally published in 1841.)■ Carnap, R. (1959). The elimination of metaphysics through logical analysis of language [Ueberwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache]. In A. J. Ayer (Ed.), Logical positivism (pp. 60-81) A. Pap (Trans). New York: Free Press. (Originally published in 1932.)■ Cassirer, E. (1946). Language and myth. New York: Harper and Brothers. Reprinted. New York: Dover Publications, 1953.■ Cattell, R. B., & H. J. Butcher (1970). Creativity and personality. In P. E. Vernon (Ed.), Creativity. Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books.■ Caudill, M., & C. Butler (1990). Naturally intelligent systems. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.■ Chandrasekaran, B. (1990). What kind of information processing is intelligence? A perspective on AI paradigms and a proposal. In D. Partridge & R. Wilks (Eds.), The foundations of artificial intelligence: A sourcebook (pp. 14-46). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.■ Charniak, E., & McDermott, D. (1985). Introduction to artificial intelligence. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.■ Chase, W. G., & H. A. Simon (1988). The mind's eye in chess. In A. Collins & E. E. Smith (Eds.), Readings in cognitive science: A perspective from psychology and artificial intelligence (pp. 461-493). San Mateo, CA: Kaufmann.■ Cheney, D. L., & R. M. Seyfarth (1990). How monkeys see the world: Inside the mind of another species. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.■ Chi, M.T.H., R. Glaser & E. Rees (1982). Expertise in problem solving. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), Advances in the psychology of human intelligence (pp. 7-73). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.■ Chomsky, N. (1957). Syntactic structures. The Hague: Mouton. Janua Linguarum.■ Chomsky, N. (1964). A transformational approach to syntax. In J. A. Fodor & J. J. Katz (Eds.), The structure of language: Readings in the philosophy of lan guage (pp. 211-245). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.■ Chomsky, N. (1965). Aspects of the theory of syntax. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Chomsky, N. (1972). Language and mind (enlarged ed.). New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.■ Chomsky, N. (1979). Language and responsibility. New York: Pantheon.■ Chomsky, N. (1986). Knowledge of language: Its nature, origin and use. New York: Praeger Special Studies.■ Churchland, P. (1979). Scientific realism and the plasticity of mind. New York: Cambridge University Press.■ Churchland, P. M. (1989). A neurocomputational perspective: The nature of mind and the structure of science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Churchland, P. S. (1986). Neurophilosophy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.■ Clark, A. (1996). Philosophical Foundations. In M. A. Boden (Ed.), Artificial in telligence (2nd ed.). San Diego: Academic Press.■ Clark, H. H., & T. B. Carlson (1981). Context for comprehension. In J. Long & A. Baddeley (Eds.), Attention and performance (Vol. 9, pp. 313-330). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.■ Clarke, A. C. (1984). Profiles of the future: An inquiry into the limits of the possible. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.■ Claxton, G. (1980). Cognitive psychology: A suitable case for what sort of treatment? In G. Claxton (Ed.), Cognitive psychology: New directions (pp. 1-25). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.■ Code, M. (1985). Order and organism. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.■ Collingwood, R. G. (1972). The idea of history. New York: Oxford University Press.■ Coopersmith, S. (1967). The antecedents of self- esteem. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.■ Copland, A. (1952). Music and imagination. London: Oxford University Press.■ Coren, S. (1994). The intelligence of dogs. New York: Bantam Books.■ Cottingham, J. (Ed.) (1996). Western philosophy: An anthology. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.■ Cox, C. (1926). The early mental traits of three hundred geniuses. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.■ Craik, K.J.W. (1943). The nature of explanation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.■ Cronbach, L. J. (1990). Essentials of psychological testing (5th ed.). New York: HarperCollins.■ Cronbach, L. J., & R. E. Snow (1977). Aptitudes and instructional methods. New York: Irvington. Paperback edition, 1981.■ Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1993). The evolving self. New York: Harper Perennial.■ Culler, J. (1976). Ferdinand de Saussure. New York: Penguin Books.■ Curtius, E. R. (1973). European literature and the Latin Middle Ages. W. R. Trask (Trans.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.■ D'Alembert, J.L.R. (1963). Preliminary discourse to the encyclopedia of Diderot. R. N. Schwab (Trans.). Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.■ Dampier, W. C. (1966). A history of modern science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.■ Darwin, C. (1911). The life and letters of Charles Darwin (Vol. 1). Francis Darwin (Ed.). New York: Appleton.■ Davidson, D. (1970) Mental events. In L. Foster & J. W. Swanson (Eds.), Experience and theory (pp. 79-101). Amherst: University of Massachussetts Press.■ Davies, P. (1995). About time: Einstein's unfinished revolution. New York: Simon & Schuster/Touchstone.■ Davis, R., & J. J. King (1977). An overview of production systems. In E. Elcock & D. Michie (Eds.), Machine intelligence 8. Chichester, England: Ellis Horwood.■ Davis, R., & D. B. Lenat (1982). Knowledge- based systems in artificial intelligence. New York: McGraw-Hill.■ Dawkins, R. (1982). The extended phenotype: The gene as the unit of selection. Oxford: W. H. Freeman.■ deKleer, J., & J. S. Brown (1983). Assumptions and ambiguities in mechanistic mental models (1983). In D. Gentner & A. L. Stevens (Eds.), Mental modes (pp. 155-190). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.■ Dennett, D. C. (1978a). Brainstorms: Philosophical essays on mind and psychology. Montgomery, VT: Bradford Books.■ Dennett, D. C. (1978b). Toward a cognitive theory of consciousness. In D. C. Dennett, Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology. Montgomery, VT: Bradford Books.■ Dennett, D. C. (1995). Darwin's dangerous idea: Evolution and the meanings of life. New York: Simon & Schuster/Touchstone.■ Descartes, R. (1897-1910). Traite de l'homme. In Oeuvres de Descartes (Vol. 11, pp. 119-215). Paris: Charles Adam & Paul Tannery. (Originally published in 1634.)■ Descartes, R. (1950). Discourse on method. L. J. Lafleur (Trans.). New York: Liberal Arts Press. (Originally published in 1637.)■ Descartes, R. (1951). Meditation on first philosophy. L. J. Lafleur (Trans.). New York: Liberal Arts Press. (Originally published in 1641.)■ Descartes, R. (1955). The philosophical works of Descartes. E. S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross (Trans.). New York: Dover. (Originally published in 1911 by Cambridge University Press.)■ Descartes, R. (1967). Discourse on method (Pt. V). In E. S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross (Eds.), The philosophical works of Descartes (Vol. 1, pp. 106-118). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Originally published in 1637.)■ Descartes, R. (1970a). Discourse on method. In E. S. Haldane & G.R.T. Ross (Eds.), The philosophical works of Descartes (Vol. 1, pp. 181-200). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Originally published in 1637.)■ Descartes, R. (1970b). Principles of philosophy. In E. S. Haldane & G.R.T. Ross (Eds.), The philosophical works of Descartes (Vol. 1, pp. 178-291). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Originally published in 1644.)■ Descartes, R. (1984). Meditations on first philosophy. In J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff & D. Murduch (Trans.), The philosophical works of Descartes (Vol. 2). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Originally published in 1641.)■ Descartes, R. (1986). Meditations on first philosophy. J. Cottingham (Trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Originally published in 1641 as Med itationes de prima philosophia.)■ deWulf, M. (1956). An introduction to scholastic philosophy. Mineola, NY: Dover Books.■ Dixon, N. F. (1981). Preconscious processing. London: Wiley.■ Doyle, A. C. (1986). The Boscombe Valley mystery. In Sherlock Holmes: The com plete novels and stories (Vol. 1). New York: Bantam.■ Dreyfus, H., & S. Dreyfus (1986). Mind over machine. New York: Free Press.■ Dreyfus, H. L. (1972). What computers can't do: The limits of artificial intelligence (revised ed.). New York: Harper & Row.■ Dreyfus, H. L., & S. E. Dreyfus (1986). Mind over machine: The power of human intuition and expertise in the era of the computer. New York: Free Press.■ Edelman, G. M. (1992). Bright air, brilliant fire: On the matter of the mind. New York: Basic Books.■ Ehrenzweig, A. (1967). The hidden order of art. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.■ Einstein, A., & L. Infeld (1938). The evolution of physics. New York: Simon & Schuster.■ Eisenstein, S. (1947). Film sense. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.■ Everdell, W. R. (1997). The first moderns. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.■ Eysenck, M. W. (1977). Human memory: Theory, research and individual difference. Oxford: Pergamon.■ Eysenck, M. W. (1982). Attention and arousal: Cognition and performance. Berlin: Springer.■ Eysenck, M. W. (1984). A handbook of cognitive psychology. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.■ Fancher, R. E. (1979). Pioneers of psychology. New York: W. W. Norton.■ Farrell, B. A. (1981). The standing of psychoanalysis. New York: Oxford University Press.■ Feldman, D. H. (1980). Beyond universals in cognitive development. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.■ Fetzer, J. H. (1996). Philosophy and cognitive science (2nd ed.). New York: Paragon House.■ Finke, R. A. (1990). Creative imagery: Discoveries and inventions in visualization. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.■ Flanagan, O. (1991). The science of the mind. Cambridge MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.■ Fodor, J. (1983). The modularity of mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.■ Frege, G. (1972). Conceptual notation. T. W. Bynum (Trans.). Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Originally published in 1879.)■ Frege, G. (1979). Logic. In H. Hermes, F. Kambartel & F. Kaulbach (Eds.), Gottlob Frege: Posthumous writings. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Originally published in 1879-1891.)■ Freud, S. (1959). Creative writers and day-dreaming. In J. Strachey (Ed.), The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 9, pp. 143-153). London: Hogarth Press.■ Freud, S. (1966). Project for a scientific psychology. In J. Strachey (Ed.), The stan dard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 1, pp. 295-398). London: Hogarth Press. (Originally published in 1950 as Aus den AnfaЁngen der Psychoanalyse, in London by Imago Publishing.)■ Freud, S. (1976). Lecture 18-Fixation to traumas-the unconscious. In J. Strachey (Ed.), The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 16, p. 285). London: Hogarth Press.■ Galileo, G. (1990). Il saggiatore [The assayer]. In S. Drake (Ed.), Discoveries and opinions of Galileo. New York: Anchor Books. (Originally published in 1623.)■ Gassendi, P. (1970). Letter to Descartes. In "Objections and replies." In E. S. Haldane & G.R.T. Ross (Eds.), The philosophical works of Descartes (Vol. 2, pp. 179-240). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Originally published in 1641.)■ Gazzaniga, M. S. (1988). Mind matters: How mind and brain interact to create our conscious lives. Boston: Houghton Mifflin in association with MIT Press/Bradford Books.■ Genesereth, M. R., & N. J. Nilsson (1987). Logical foundations of artificial intelligence. Palo Alto, CA: Morgan Kaufmann.■ Ghiselin, B. (1952). The creative process. New York: Mentor.■ Ghiselin, B. (1985). The creative process. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. (Originally published in 1952.)■ Gilhooly, K. J. (1996). Thinking: Directed, undirected and creative (3rd ed.). London: Academic Press.■ Glass, A. L., K. J. Holyoak & J. L. Santa (1979). Cognition. Reading, MA: AddisonWesley.■ Goody, J. (1977). The domestication of the savage mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.■ Gruber, H. E. (1980). Darwin on man: A psychological study of scientific creativity (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.■ Gruber, H. E., & S. Davis (1988). Inching our way up Mount Olympus: The evolving systems approach to creative thinking. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), The nature of creativity: Contemporary psychological perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.■ Guthrie, E. R. (1972). The psychology of learning. New York: Harper. (Originally published in 1935.)■ Habermas, J. (1972). Knowledge and human interests. Boston: Beacon Press.■ Hadamard, J. (1945). The psychology of invention in the mathematical field. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.■ Hand, D. J. (1985). Artificial intelligence and psychiatry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.■ Harris, M. (1981). The language myth. London: Duckworth.■ Haugeland, J. (Ed.) (1981). Mind design: Philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.■ Haugeland, J. (1981a). The nature and plausibility of cognitivism. In J. Haugeland (Ed.), Mind design: Philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence (pp. 243-281). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Haugeland, J. (1981b). Semantic engines: An introduction to mind design. In J. Haugeland (Ed.), Mind design: Philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence (pp. 1-34). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.■ Haugeland, J. (1985). Artificial intelligence: The very idea. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Hawkes, T. (1977). Structuralism and semiotics. Berkeley: University of California Press.■ Hebb, D. O. (1949). The organisation of behaviour. New York: Wiley.■ Hebb, D. O. (1958). A textbook of psychology. Philadelphia: Saunders.■ Hegel, G.W.F. (1910). The phenomenology of mind. J. B. Baille (Trans.). London: Sonnenschein. (Originally published as Phaenomenologie des Geistes, 1807.)■ Heisenberg, W. (1958). Physics and philosophy. New York: Harper & Row.■ Hempel, C. G. (1966). Philosophy of natural science. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall.■ Herman, A. (1997). The idea of decline in Western history. New York: Free Press.■ Herrnstein, R. J., & E. G. Boring (Eds.) (1965). A source book in the history of psy chology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.■ Herzmann, E. (1964). Mozart's creative process. In P. H. Lang (Ed.), The creative world of Mozart (pp. 17-30). London: Oldbourne Press.■ Hilgard, E. R. (1957). Introduction to psychology. London: Methuen.■ Hobbes, T. (1651). Leviathan. London: Crooke.■ Holliday, S. G., & M. J. Chandler (1986). Wisdom: Explorations in adult competence. Basel, Switzerland: Karger.■ Horn, J. L. (1986). In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), Advances in the psychology of human intelligence (Vol. 3). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.■ Hull, C. (1943). Principles of behavior. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.■ Hume, D. (1955). An inquiry concerning human understanding. New York: Liberal Arts Press. (Originally published in 1748.)■ Hume, D. (1975). An enquiry concerning human understanding. In L. A. SelbyBigge (Ed.), Hume's enquiries (3rd. ed., revised P. H. Nidditch). Oxford: Clarendon. (Spelling and punctuation revised.) (Originally published in 1748.)■ Hume, D. (1978). A treatise of human nature. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Ed.), Hume's enquiries (3rd. ed., revised P. H. Nidditch). Oxford: Clarendon. (With some modifications of spelling and punctuation.) (Originally published in 1690.)■ Hunt, E. (1973). The memory we must have. In R. C. Schank & K. M. Colby (Eds.), Computer models of thought and language. (pp. 343-371) San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.■ Husserl, E. (1960). Cartesian meditations. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.■ Inhelder, B., & J. Piaget (1958). The growth of logical thinking from childhood to adolescence. New York: Basic Books. (Originally published in 1955 as De la logique de l'enfant a` la logique de l'adolescent. [Paris: Presses Universitaire de France])■ James, W. (1890a). The principles of psychology (Vol. 1). New York: Dover Books.■ James, W. (1890b). The principles of psychology. New York: Henry Holt.■ Jevons, W. S. (1900). The principles of science (2nd ed.). London: Macmillan.■ Johnson, G. (1986). Machinery of the mind: Inside the new science of artificial intelli gence. New York: Random House.■ Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1983). Mental models: Toward a cognitive science of language, inference, and consciousness. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.■ Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1988). The computer and the mind: An introduction to cognitive science. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.■ Jones, E. (1961). The life and work of Sigmund Freud. L. Trilling & S. Marcus (Eds.). London: Hogarth.■ Jones, R. V. (1985). Complementarity as a way of life. In A. P. French & P. J. Kennedy (Eds.), Niels Bohr: A centenary volume. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.■ Kant, I. (1933). Critique of Pure Reason (2nd ed.). N. K. Smith (Trans.). London: Macmillan. (Originally published in 1781 as Kritik der reinen Vernunft.)■ Kant, I. (1891). Solution of the general problems of the Prolegomena. In E. Belfort (Trans.), Kant's Prolegomena. London: Bell. (With minor modifications.) (Originally published in 1783.)■ Katona, G. (1940). Organizing and memorizing: Studies in the psychology of learning and teaching. New York: Columbia University Press.■ Kaufman, A. S. (1979). Intelligent testing with the WISC-R. New York: Wiley.■ Koestler, A. (1964). The act of creation. New York: Arkana (Penguin).■ Kohlberg, L. (1971). From is to ought. In T. Mischel (Ed.), Cognitive development and epistemology. (pp. 151-235) New York: Academic Press.■ KoЁhler, W. (1925). The mentality of apes. New York: Liveright.■ KoЁhler, W. (1927). The mentality of apes (2nd ed.). Ella Winter (Trans.). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.■ KoЁhler, W. (1930). Gestalt psychology. London: G. Bell.■ KoЁhler, W. (1947). Gestalt psychology. New York: Liveright.■ KoЁhler, W. (1969). The task of Gestalt psychology. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.■ Kuhn, T. (1970). The structure of scientific revolutions (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.■ Langer, E. J. (1989). Mindfulness. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.■ Langer, S. (1962). Philosophical sketches. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.■ Langley, P., H. A. Simon, G. L. Bradshaw & J. M. Zytkow (1987). Scientific dis covery: Computational explorations of the creative process. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Lashley, K. S. (1951). The problem of serial order in behavior. In L. A. Jeffress (Ed.), Cerebral mechanisms in behavior, the Hixon Symposium (pp. 112-146) New York: Wiley.■ LeDoux, J. E., & W. Hirst (1986). Mind and brain: Dialogues in cognitive neuroscience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.■ Lehnert, W. (1978). The process of question answering. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.■ Leiber, J. (1991). Invitation to cognitive science. Oxford: Blackwell.■ Lenat, D. B., & G. Harris (1978). Designing a rule system that searches for scientific discoveries. In D. A. Waterman & F. Hayes-Roth (Eds.), Pattern directed inference systems (pp. 25-52) New York: Academic Press.■ Levenson, T. (1995). Measure for measure: A musical history of science. New York: Touchstone. (Originally published in 1994.)■ Leґvi-Strauss, C. (1963). Structural anthropology. C. Jacobson & B. Grundfest Schoepf (Trans.). New York: Basic Books. (Originally published in 1958.)■ Levine, M. W., & J. M. Schefner (1981). Fundamentals of sensation and perception. London: Addison-Wesley.■ Lewis, C. I. (1946). An analysis of knowledge and valuation. LaSalle, IL: Open Court.■ Lighthill, J. (1972). A report on artificial intelligence. Unpublished manuscript, Science Research Council.■ Lipman, M., A. M. Sharp & F. S. Oscanyan (1980). Philosophy in the classroom. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.■ Lippmann, W. (1965). Public opinion. New York: Free Press. (Originally published in 1922.)■ Locke, J. (1956). An essay concerning human understanding. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co. (Originally published in 1690.)■ Locke, J. (1975). An essay concerning human understanding. P. H. Nidditch (Ed.). Oxford: Clarendon. (Originally published in 1690.) (With spelling and punctuation modernized and some minor modifications of phrasing.)■ Lopate, P. (1994). The art of the personal essay. New York: Doubleday/Anchor Books.■ Lorimer, F. (1929). The growth of reason. London: Kegan Paul. Machlup, F., & U. Mansfield (Eds.) (1983). The study of information. New York: Wiley.■ Manguel, A. (1996). A history of reading. New York: Viking.■ Markey, J. F. (1928). The symbolic process. London: Kegan Paul.■ Martin, R. M. (1969). On Ziff's "Natural and formal languages." In S. Hook (Ed.), Language and philosophy: A symposium (pp. 249-263). New York: New York University Press.■ Mazlish, B. (1993). The fourth discontinuity: the co- evolution of humans and machines. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.■ McCarthy, J., & P. J. Hayes (1969). Some philosophical problems from the standpoint of artificial intelligence. In B. Meltzer & D. Michie (Eds.), Machine intelligence 4. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.■ McClelland, J. L., D. E. Rumelhart & G. E. Hinton (1986). The appeal of parallel distributed processing. In D. E. Rumelhart, J. L. McClelland & the PDP Research Group (Eds.), Parallel distributed processing: Explorations in the mi crostructure of cognition (Vol. 1, pp. 3-40). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/ Bradford Books.■ McCorduck, P. (1979). Machines who think. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.■ McLaughlin, T. (1970). Music and communication. London: Faber & Faber.■ Mednick, S. A. (1962). The associative basis of the creative process. Psychological Review 69, 431-436.■ Meehl, P. E., & C. J. Golden (1982). Taxometric methods. In Kendall, P. C., & Butcher, J. N. (Eds.), Handbook of research methods in clinical psychology (pp. 127-182). New York: Wiley.■ Mehler, J., E.C.T. Walker & M. Garrett (Eds.) (1982). Perspectives on mental rep resentation: Experimental and theoretical studies of cognitive processes and ca pacities. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.■ Mill, J. S. (1900). A system of logic, ratiocinative and inductive: Being a connected view of the principles of evidence and the methods of scientific investigation. London: Longmans, Green.■ Miller, G. A. (1979, June). A very personal history. Talk to the Cognitive Science Workshop, Cambridge, MA.■ Miller, J. (1983). States of mind. New York: Pantheon Books.■ Minsky, M. (1975). A framework for representing knowledge. In P. H. Winston (Ed.), The psychology of computer vision (pp. 211-277). New York: McGrawHill.■ Minsky, M., & S. Papert (1973). Artificial intelligence. Condon Lectures, Oregon State System of Higher Education, Eugene, Oregon.■ Minsky, M. L. (1986). The society of mind. New York: Simon & Schuster.■ Mischel, T. (1976). Psychological explanations and their vicissitudes. In J. K. Cole & W. J. Arnold (Eds.), Nebraska Symposium on motivation (Vol. 23). Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska Press.■ Morford, M.P.O., & R. J. Lenardon (1995). Classical mythology (5th ed.). New York: Longman.■ Murdoch, I. (1954). Under the net. New York: Penguin.■ Nagel, E. (1959). Methodological issues in psychoanalytic theory. In S. Hook (Ed.), Psychoanalysis, scientific method, and philosophy: A symposium. New York: New York University Press.■ Nagel, T. (1979). Mortal questions. London: Cambridge University Press.■ Nagel, T. (1986). The view from nowhere. Oxford: Oxford University Press.■ Neisser, U. (1967). Cognitive psychology. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.■ Neisser, U. (1972). Changing conceptions of imagery. In P. W. Sheehan (Ed.), The function and nature of imagery (pp. 233-251). London: Academic Press.■ Neisser, U. (1976). Cognition and reality. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.■ Neisser, U. (1978). Memory: What are the important questions? In M. M. Gruneberg, P. E. Morris & R. N. Sykes (Eds.), Practical aspects of memory (pp. 3-24). London: Academic Press.■ Neisser, U. (1979). The concept of intelligence. In R. J. Sternberg & D. K. Detterman (Eds.), Human intelligence: Perspectives on its theory and measurement (pp. 179-190). Norwood, NJ: Ablex.■ Nersessian, N. (1992). How do scientists think? Capturing the dynamics of conceptual change in science. In R. N. Giere (Ed.), Cognitive models of science (pp. 3-44). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.■ Newell, A. (1973a). Artificial intelligence and the concept of mind. In R. C. Schank & K. M. Colby (Eds.), Computer models of thought and language (pp. 1-60). San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.■ Newell, A. (1973b). You can't play 20 questions with nature and win. In W. G. Chase (Ed.), Visual information processing (pp. 283-310). New York: Academic Press.■ Newell, A., & H. A. Simon (1963). GPS: A program that simulates human thought. In E. A. Feigenbaum & J. Feldman (Eds.), Computers and thought (pp. 279-293). New York & McGraw-Hill.■ Newell, A., & H. A. Simon (1972). Human problem solving. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.■ Nietzsche, F. (1966). Beyond good and evil. W. Kaufmann (Trans.). New York: Vintage. (Originally published in 1885.)■ Nilsson, N. J. (1971). Problem- solving methods in artificial intelligence. New York: McGraw-Hill.■ Nussbaum, M. C. (1978). Aristotle's Princeton University Press. De Motu Anamalium. Princeton, NJ:■ Oersted, H. C. (1920). Thermo-electricity. In Kirstine Meyer (Ed.), H. C. Oersted, Natuurvidenskabelige Skrifter (Vol. 2). Copenhagen: n.p. (Originally published in 1830 in The Edinburgh encyclopaedia.)■ Ong, W. J. (1982). Orality and literacy: The technologizing of the word. London: Methuen.■ Onians, R. B. (1954). The origins of European thought. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.■ Osgood, C. E. (1960). Method and theory in experimental psychology. New York: Oxford University Press. (Originally published in 1953.)■ Osgood, C. E. (1966). Language universals and psycholinguistics. In J. H. Greenberg (Ed.), Universals of language (2nd ed., pp. 299-322). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Palmer, R. E. (1969). Hermeneutics. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.■ Peirce, C. S. (1934). Some consequences of four incapacities-Man, a sign. In C. Hartsborne & P. Weiss (Eds.), Collected papers of Charles Saunders Peirce (Vol. 5, pp. 185-189). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.■ Penfield, W. (1959). In W. Penfield & L. Roberts, Speech and brain mechanisms. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.■ Penrose, R. (1994). Shadows of the mind: A search for the missing science of conscious ness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.■ Perkins, D. N. (1981). The mind's best work. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.■ Peterfreund, E. (1986). The heuristic approach to psychoanalytic therapy. In■ J. Reppen (Ed.), Analysts at work, (pp. 127-144). Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press.■ Piaget, J. (1952). The origin of intelligence in children. New York: International Universities Press. (Originally published in 1936.)■ Piaget, J. (1954). Le langage et les opeґrations intellectuelles. Proble` mes de psycho linguistique. Symposium de l'Association de Psychologie Scientifique de Langue Francёaise. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.■ Piaget, J. (1977). Problems of equilibration. In H. E. Gruber & J. J. Voneche (Eds.), The essential Piaget (pp. 838-841). London: Routlege & Kegan Paul. (Originally published in 1975 as L'eґquilibration des structures cognitives [Paris: Presses Universitaires de France].)■ Piaget, J., & B. Inhelder. (1973). Memory and intelligence. New York: Basic Books.■ Pinker, S. (1994). The language instinct. New York: Morrow.■ Pinker, S. (1996). Facts about human language relevant to its evolution. In J.-P. Changeux & J. Chavaillon (Eds.), Origins of the human brain. A symposium of the Fyssen foundation (pp. 262-283). Oxford: Clarendon Press. Planck, M. (1949). Scientific autobiography and other papers. F. Gaynor (Trans.). New York: Philosophical Library.■ Planck, M. (1990). Wissenschaftliche Selbstbiographie. W. Berg (Ed.). Halle, Germany: Deutsche Akademie der Naturforscher Leopoldina.■ Plato (1892). Meno. In The Dialogues of Plato (B. Jowett, Trans.; Vol. 2). New York: Clarendon. (Originally published circa 380 B.C.)■ Poincareґ, H. (1913). Mathematical creation. In The foundations of science. G. B. Halsted (Trans.). New York: Science Press.■ Poincareґ, H. (1921). The foundations of science: Science and hypothesis, the value of science, science and method. G. B. Halstead (Trans.). New York: Science Press.■ Poincareґ, H. (1929). The foundations of science: Science and hypothesis, the value of science, science and method. New York: Science Press.■ Poincareґ, H. (1952). Science and method. F. Maitland (Trans.) New York: Dover.■ Polya, G. (1945). How to solve it. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.■ Polanyi, M. (1958). Personal knowledge. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.■ Popper, K. (1968). Conjectures and refutations: The growth of scientific knowledge. New York: Harper & Row/Basic Books.■ Popper, K., & J. Eccles (1977). The self and its brain. New York: Springer-Verlag.■ Popper, K. R. (1959). The logic of scientific discovery. London: Hutchinson.■ Putnam, H. (1975). Mind, language and reality: Philosophical papers (Vol. 2). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.■ Putnam, H. (1987). The faces of realism. LaSalle, IL: Open Court.■ Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1981). The imagery debate: Analog media versus tacit knowledge. In N. Block (Ed.), Imagery (pp. 151-206). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1984). Computation and cognition: Towards a foundation for cog nitive science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.■ Quillian, M. R. (1968). Semantic memory. In M. Minsky (Ed.), Semantic information processing (pp. 216-260). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Quine, W.V.O. (1960). Word and object. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.■ Rabbitt, P.M.A., & S. Dornic (Eds.). Attention and performance (Vol. 5). London: Academic Press.■ Rawlins, G.J.E. (1997). Slaves of the Machine: The quickening of computer technology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.■ Reid, T. (1970). An inquiry into the human mind on the principles of common sense. In R. Brown (Ed.), Between Hume and Mill: An anthology of British philosophy- 1749- 1843 (pp. 151-178). New York: Random House/Modern Library.■ Reitman, W. (1970). What does it take to remember? In D. A. Norman (Ed.), Models of human memory (pp. 470-510). London: Academic Press.■ Ricoeur, P. (1974). Structure and hermeneutics. In D. I. Ihde (Ed.), The conflict of interpretations: Essays in hermeneutics (pp. 27-61). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.■ Robinson, D. N. (1986). An intellectual history of psychology. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.■ Rorty, R. (1979). Philosophy and the mirror of nature. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.■ Rosch, E. (1977). Human categorization. In N. Warren (Ed.), Studies in cross cultural psychology (Vol. 1, pp. 1-49) London: Academic Press.■ Rosch, E. (1978). Principles of categorization. In E. Rosch & B. B. Lloyd (Eds.), Cognition and categorization (pp. 27-48). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.■ Rosch, E., & B. B. Lloyd (1978). Principles of categorization. In E. Rosch & B. B. Lloyd (Eds.), Cognition and categorization. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.■ Rose, S. (1970). The chemistry of life. Baltimore: Penguin Books.■ Rose, S. (1976). The conscious brain (updated ed.). New York: Random House.■ Rose, S. (1993). The making of memory: From molecules to mind. New York: Anchor Books. (Originally published in 1992)■ Roszak, T. (1994). The cult of information: A neo- Luddite treatise on high- tech, artificial intelligence, and the true art of thinking (2nd ed.). Berkeley: University of California Press.■ Royce, J. R., & W. W. Rozeboom (Eds.) (1972). The psychology of knowing. New York: Gordon & Breach.■ Rumelhart, D. E. (1977). Introduction to human information processing. New York: Wiley.■ Rumelhart, D. E. (1980). Schemata: The building blocks of cognition. In R. J. Spiro, B. Bruce & W. F. Brewer (Eds.), Theoretical issues in reading comprehension. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.■ Rumelhart, D. E., & J. L. McClelland (1986). On learning the past tenses of English verbs. In J. L. McClelland & D. E. Rumelhart (Eds.), Parallel distributed processing: Explorations in the microstructure of cognition (Vol. 2). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Rumelhart, D. E., P. Smolensky, J. L. McClelland & G. E. Hinton (1986). Schemata and sequential thought processes in PDP models. In J. L. McClelland, D. E. Rumelhart & the PDP Research Group (Eds.), Parallel Distributed Processing (Vol. 2, pp. 7-57). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Russell, B. (1927). An outline of philosophy. London: G. Allen & Unwin.■ Russell, B. (1961). History of Western philosophy. London: George Allen & Unwin.■ Russell, B. (1965). How I write. In Portraits from memory and other essays. London: Allen & Unwin.■ Russell, B. (1992). In N. Griffin (Ed.), The selected letters of Bertrand Russell (Vol. 1), The private years, 1884- 1914. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Ryecroft, C. (1966). Psychoanalysis observed. London: Constable.■ Sagan, C. (1978). The dragons of Eden: Speculations on the evolution of human intel ligence. New York: Ballantine Books.■ Salthouse, T. A. (1992). Expertise as the circumvention of human processing limitations. In K. A. Ericsson & J. Smith (Eds.), Toward a general theory of expertise: Prospects and limits (pp. 172-194). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.■ Sanford, A. J. (1987). The mind of man: Models of human understanding. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.■ Sapir, E. (1921). Language. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World.■ Sapir, E. (1964). Culture, language, and personality. Berkeley: University of California Press. (Originally published in 1941.)■ Sapir, E. (1985). The status of linguistics as a science. In D. G. Mandelbaum (Ed.), Selected writings of Edward Sapir in language, culture and personality (pp. 160166). Berkeley: University of California Press. (Originally published in 1929).■ Scardmalia, M., & C. Bereiter (1992). Literate expertise. In K. A. Ericsson & J. Smith (Eds.), Toward a general theory of expertise: Prospects and limits (pp. 172-194). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.■ Schafer, R. (1954). Psychoanalytic interpretation in Rorschach testing. New York: Grune & Stratten.■ Schank, R. C. (1973). Identification of conceptualizations underlying natural language. In R. C. Schank & K. M. Colby (Eds.), Computer models of thought and language (pp. 187-248). San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.■ Schank, R. C. (1976). The role of memory in language processing. In C. N. Cofer (Ed.), The structure of human memory. (pp. 162-189) San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.■ Schank, R. C. (1986). Explanation patterns: Understanding mechanically and creatively. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.■ Schank, R. C., & R. P. Abelson (1977). Scripts, plans, goals, and understanding. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.■ SchroЁdinger, E. (1951). Science and humanism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.■ Searle, J. R. (1981a). Minds, brains, and programs. In J. Haugeland (Ed.), Mind design: Philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence (pp. 282-306). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Searle, J. R. (1981b). Minds, brains and programs. In D. Hofstadter & D. Dennett (Eds.), The mind's I (pp. 353-373). New York: Basic Books.■ Searle, J. R. (1983). Intentionality. New York: Cambridge University Press.■ Serres, M. (1982). The origin of language: Biology, information theory, and thermodynamics. M. Anderson (Trans.). In J. V. Harari & D. F. Bell (Eds.), Hermes: Literature, science, philosophy (pp. 71-83). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.■ Simon, H. A. (1966). Scientific discovery and the psychology of problem solving. In R. G. Colodny (Ed.), Mind and cosmos: Essays in contemporary science and philosophy (pp. 22-40). Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.■ Simon, H. A. (1979). Models of thought. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.■ Simon, H. A. (1989). The scientist as a problem solver. In D. Klahr & K. Kotovsky (Eds.), Complex information processing: The impact of Herbert Simon. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.■ Simon, H. A., & C. Kaplan (1989). Foundations of cognitive science. In M. Posner (Ed.), Foundations of cognitive science (pp. 1-47). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Simonton, D. K. (1988). Creativity, leadership and chance. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), The nature of creativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.■ Skinner, B. F. (1974). About behaviorism. New York: Knopf.■ Smith, E. E. (1988). Concepts and thought. In J. Sternberg & E. E. Smith (Eds.), The psychology of human thought (pp. 19-49). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.■ Smith, E. E. (1990). Thinking: Introduction. In D. N. Osherson & E. E. Smith (Eds.), Thinking. An invitation to cognitive science. (Vol. 3, pp. 1-2). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Socrates. (1958). Meno. In E. H. Warmington & P. O. Rouse (Eds.), Great dialogues of Plato W.H.D. Rouse (Trans.). New York: New American Library. (Original publication date unknown.)■ Solso, R. L. (1974). Theories of retrieval. In R. L. Solso (Ed.), Theories in cognitive psychology. Potomac, MD: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.■ Spencer, H. (1896). The principles of psychology. New York: Appleton-CenturyCrofts.■ Steiner, G. (1975). After Babel: Aspects of language and translation. New York: Oxford University Press.■ Sternberg, R. J. (1977). Intelligence, information processing, and analogical reasoning. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.■ Sternberg, R. J. (1994). Intelligence. In R. J. Sternberg, Thinking and problem solving. San Diego: Academic Press.■ Sternberg, R. J., & J. E. Davidson (1985). Cognitive development in gifted and talented. In F. D. Horowitz & M. O'Brien (Eds.), The gifted and talented (pp. 103-135). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.■ Storr, A. (1993). The dynamics of creation. New York: Ballantine Books. (Originally published in 1972.)■ Stumpf, S. E. (1994). Philosophy: History and problems (5th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.■ Sulloway, F. J. (1996). Born to rebel: Birth order, family dynamics, and creative lives. New York: Random House/Vintage Books.■ Thorndike, E. L. (1906). Principles of teaching. New York: A. G. Seiler.■ Thorndike, E. L. (1970). Animal intelligence: Experimental studies. Darien, CT: Hafner Publishing Co. (Originally published in 1911.)■ Titchener, E. B. (1910). A textbook of psychology. New York: Macmillan.■ Titchener, E. B. (1914). A primer of psychology. New York: Macmillan.■ Toulmin, S. (1957). The philosophy of science. London: Hutchinson.■ Tulving, E. (1972). Episodic and semantic memory. In E. Tulving & W. Donaldson (Eds.), Organisation of memory. London: Academic Press.■ Turing, A. (1946). In B. E. Carpenter & R. W. Doran (Eds.), ACE reports of 1946 and other papers. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Turkle, S. (1984). Computers and the second self: Computers and the human spirit. New York: Simon & Schuster.■ Tyler, S. A. (1978). The said and the unsaid: Mind, meaning, and culture. New York: Academic Press.■ van Heijenoort (Ed.) (1967). From Frege to Goedel. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.■ Varela, F. J. (1984). The creative circle: Sketches on the natural history of circularity. In P. Watzlawick (Ed.), The invented reality (pp. 309-324). New York: W. W. Norton.■ Voltaire (1961). On the Penseґs of M. Pascal. In Philosophical letters (pp. 119-146). E. Dilworth (Trans.). Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.■ Wagman, M. (1991a). Artificial intelligence and human cognition: A theoretical inter comparison of two realms of intellect. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1991b). Cognitive science and concepts of mind: Toward a general theory of human and artificial intelligence. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1993). Cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence: Theory and re search in cognitive science. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1995). The sciences of cognition: Theory and research in psychology and artificial intelligence. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1996). Human intellect and cognitive science: Toward a general unified theory of intelligence. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1997a). Cognitive science and the symbolic operations of human and artificial intelligence: Theory and research into the intellective processes. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1997b). The general unified theory of intelligence: Central conceptions and specific application to domains of cognitive science. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1998a). Cognitive science and the mind- body problem: From philosophy to psychology to artificial intelligence to imaging of the brain. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1998b). Language and thought in humans and computers: Theory and research in psychology, artificial intelligence, and neural science. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1998c). The ultimate objectives of artificial intelligence: Theoretical and research foundations, philosophical and psychological implications. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1999). The human mind according to artificial intelligence: Theory, re search, and implications. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (2000). Scientific discovery processes in humans and computers: Theory and research in psychology and artificial intelligence. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wall, R. (1972). Introduction to mathematical linguistics. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.■ Wallas, G. (1926). The Art of Thought. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.■ Wason, P. (1977). Self contradictions. In P. Johnson-Laird & P. Wason (Eds.), Thinking: Readings in cognitive science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.■ Wason, P. C., & P. N. Johnson-Laird. (1972). Psychology of reasoning: Structure and content. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.■ Watson, J. (1930). Behaviorism. New York: W. W. Norton.■ Watzlawick, P. (1984). Epilogue. In P. Watzlawick (Ed.), The invented reality. New York: W. W. Norton, 1984.■ Weinberg, S. (1977). The first three minutes: A modern view of the origin of the uni verse. New York: Basic Books.■ Weisberg, R. W. (1986). Creativity: Genius and other myths. New York: W. H. Freeman.■ Weizenbaum, J. (1976). Computer power and human reason: From judgment to cal culation. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.■ Wertheimer, M. (1945). Productive thinking. New York: Harper & Bros.■ Whitehead, A. N. (1925). Science and the modern world. New York: Macmillan.■ Whorf, B. L. (1956). In J. B. Carroll (Ed.), Language, thought and reality: Selected writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Whyte, L. L. (1962). The unconscious before Freud. New York: Anchor Books.■ Wiener, N. (1954). The human use of human beings. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.■ Wiener, N. (1964). God & Golem, Inc.: A comment on certain points where cybernetics impinges on religion. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Winograd, T. (1972). Understanding natural language. New York: Academic Press.■ Winston, P. H. (1987). Artificial intelligence: A perspective. In E. L. Grimson & R. S. Patil (Eds.), AI in the 1980s and beyond (pp. 1-12). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Winston, P. H. (Ed.) (1975). The psychology of computer vision. New York: McGrawHill.■ Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical investigations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.■ Wittgenstein, L. (1958). The blue and brown books. New York: Harper Colophon.■ Woods, W. A. (1975). What's in a link: Foundations for semantic networks. In D. G. Bobrow & A. Collins (Eds.), Representations and understanding: Studies in cognitive science (pp. 35-84). New York: Academic Press.■ Woodworth, R. S. (1938). Experimental psychology. New York: Holt; London: Methuen (1939).■ Wundt, W. (1904). Principles of physiological psychology (Vol. 1). E. B. Titchener (Trans.). New York: Macmillan.■ Wundt, W. (1907). Lectures on human and animal psychology. J. E. Creighton & E. B. Titchener (Trans.). New York: Macmillan.■ Young, J. Z. (1978). Programs of the brain. New York: Oxford University Press.■ Ziman, J. (1978). Reliable knowledge: An exploration of the grounds for belief in science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Bibliography
-
111 истокообразно
adv.according to source, sourcewise -
112 биологические меры борьбы с вредителями
биологические меры борьбы с вредителями
—
[ http://www.eionet.europa.eu/gemet/alphabetic?langcode=en]EN
biological pest control
Any living organism applied to or introduced into the environment that is intended to function as a pesticide against another organism declared to be a pest. (Source: LEE)
[http://www.eionet.europa.eu/gemet/alphabetic?langcode=en]Тематики
EN
DE
FR
Русско-английский словарь нормативно-технической терминологии > биологические меры борьбы с вредителями
-
113 делегированное управление
делегированное управление
—
[ http://www.eionet.europa.eu/gemet/alphabetic?langcode=en]EN
delegated management
The process of assigning or transferring authority, decision making or a specific administrative function from one entity to another. (Source: OED)
[http://www.eionet.europa.eu/gemet/alphabetic?langcode=en]Тематики
EN
DE
FR
Русско-английский словарь нормативно-технической терминологии > делегированное управление
-
114 изоляция
электрическая изоляция
изоляция
Часть электротехнического устройства, электрически разделяющая его узлы и (или) детали.
[ ГОСТ 21515-76]
изоляция
-
[IEV number 151-15-41]
изоляция
-
[IEV number 151-15-42]EN
insulation (1)
all the materials and parts used to insulate conductive elements of a device
[IEV number 151-15-41]
insulation (2)
set of properties which characterize the ability of an insulation to provide its function
NOTE – Examples of relevant properties are: resistance, breakdown voltage.
Source: 151-15-41
[IEV number 151-15-42]FR
isolation, f
ensemble des matériaux et parties utilisés pour isoler des éléments conducteurs d'un dispositif
[IEV number 151-15-41]
isolement, m
ensemble des propriétés qui caractérisent l’aptitude d’une isolation à assurer sa fonction
NOTE – Des exemples de propriétés pertinentes sont la résistance, la tension de claquage.
[IEV number 151-15-42]Примечание - Изоляция может быть твердой, жидкой или газообразной (например, воздух), или представлять собой любую комбинацию указанных состояний.
[ ГОСТ Р МЭК 61140-2000]п ерекрытие по поверхности изоляции
Испытание изоляции полным испытательным напряжением
Тематики
- электрическая изоляция
- электротехника, основные понятия
Синонимы
Сопутствующие термины
EN
DE
FR
3.6 изоляция (containment): Состояние, достигаемое в изолирующем устройстве с высокой степенью разделения между процессом и оператором.
Источник: ГОСТ Р ИСО 14644-7-2007: Чистые помещения и связанные с ними контролируемые среды. Часть 7. Изолирующие устройства (укрытия с чистым воздухом, боксы перчаточные, изоляторы и мини-окружения) оригинал документа
2.40 изоляция (containment): Состояние, достигаемое в изолирующем устройстве (2.118) с высокой степенью разделения между процессом и оператором (2.98).
[ИСО 14644-7:2004, статья 3.6]
Источник: ГОСТ Р ИСО 14644-6-2010: Чистые помещения и связанные с ними контролируемые среды. Часть 6. Термины оригинал документа
Русско-английский словарь нормативно-технической терминологии > изоляция
-
115 кожа (анат.)
кожа (анат.)
—
[ http://www.eionet.europa.eu/gemet/alphabetic?langcode=en]EN
skin
The tissue forming the outer covering of the vertebrate body: it consists of two layers, the outermost of which may be covered with hair, scales, feathers, etc. It is mainly protective and sensory in function. (Source: CED)
[http://www.eionet.europa.eu/gemet/alphabetic?langcode=en]Тематики
EN
DE
FR
Русско-английский словарь нормативно-технической терминологии > кожа (анат.)
-
116 машины и оборудование
машины и оборудование
—
[ http://www.eionet.europa.eu/gemet/alphabetic?langcode=en]
машины и оборудование
МСО
Часть основных фондов компании (предприятия), которая включает устройства, преобразующие энергию, материалы и информацию. В аналитической и оценочной практике в общее понятие М. и о. включаются отдельно оцениваемые установки, машины, оборудование и транспортные средства, подразделяемые на виды, а каждый вид – на марки (последним термином для краткости можно обозначать разные модели и модификации машины). Разные марки машин одного вида используются для одних и тех же целей: они способны производить одну и ту же продукцию, выполнять одни и те же работы или оказывать одни и те же услуги ( в противном случае их надо относить в другому виду машин), а следовательно, «взаимозаменяемы» и являются товарами, конкурирующими между собой на рынке Рынок машин каждого вида делится на первичный (новые М..) и вторичный (бывшие в эксплуатации), для которых применяются разные оценочные приемы и инструменты.. М.и о. являются главным объектом инвестирования при разработке и реализации инвестиционного проекта, и, соответственно, одним из основных элементов оценки инвестиционных проектов. Важно, что в отличие от ценных бумаг, акций, М.и о. являются объектами реальных инвестиций, а не финансовых инвестиций.
[ http://slovar-lopatnikov.ru/]EN
machinery
A group of parts or machines arranged to perform a useful function. (Source: MGH)
[http://www.eionet.europa.eu/gemet/alphabetic?langcode=en]Тематики
Синонимы
EN
DE
FR
Русско-английский словарь нормативно-технической терминологии > машины и оборудование
-
117 отделять, отделение
отделять
Полностью отсоединять устройство или электрическую цепь от других устройств или электрических цепей.
[Перевод Интент]
отделять
изолировать
-
[IEV number 151-15-37]EN
isolate (1), verb
disconnect completely a device or an electric circuit from other devices or electric circuits
[IEV number 151-15-37]FR
isoler (2), verbe
déconnecter complètement un dispositif ou un circuit électrique d'autres dispositifs ou circuits électriques
[IEV number 151-15-37]461.1 В зависимости от предназначенной ему функции любое устройство, предназначенное для отделения, отключения или управления, должно соответствовать требованиям стандартов и технических условий на эти устройства.
461.2 В системах TNС нулевой рабочий проводник, совмещенный с защитным, отделять или отключать не следует. В системе TNS отделять или отключать рабочий нулевой проводник не требуется.
Во всех системах распределения электроэнергии отделять или отключать защитные проводники не допускается.
461.3 Мероприятия, приведенные в настоящем стандарте, не заменяют меры защиты, установленные в других стандартах на электроустановки зданий.
462 Отделение
462.1 В каждой цепи должна быть предусмотрена возможность отделения каждого проводника от питающих проводников, находящихся под напряжением, за исключением упомянутых в 461.2.
Допускается предусматривать отделение группы цепей общим устройством, если это позволяют условия эксплуатации.
[ ГОСТ Р 50571. 7-94 ( МЭК 364-4-46-81)]Параллельные тексты EN-RU
When the supply disconnecting device is one of the types specified in 5.3.2 a) to d) it shall fulfil all of the following requirements:
– isolate the electrical equipment from the supply and have one OFF (isolated) and one ON position marked with "O" and "I" …;
...
[IEC 60204-1-2006]Аппараты отключения электропитания, указанные в п. 5.3.2, в перечислениях а)...d), должны удовлетворять всем перечисленным ниже требованиям:
- отделять электрооборудование от источника питания и иметь одно положение ОТКЛЮЧЕНО (отделенное положение) и одно положение ВКЛЮЧЕНО, обозначенные символами «О» и «I» соответственно...;
...
[Перевод Интент]isolation
function intended to make dead for reasons of safety all or a discrete section of the electrical installation by separating the electrical installation or section from every source of electric energy
[IEV number 826-17-01]разъединение (функция)
Действие, направленное на отключение питания всей установки или ее отдельной части путем отделения этой установки или части ее от любого источника электрической энергии по соображениям безопасности.
[ ГОСТ Р 50030. 1-2000 ( МЭК 60947-1-99)]Compact CVS circuit breakers are suitable for Isolation as defined in EC standards 60947-2. The aim of isolation is to separate a circuit or apparatus from the remainder of a system which is energized in order the personnel may carry out work on the isolated part with complete safety.
[Schneider Electric]Автоматический выключатель CVS пригоден к разъединению - функции, определенной в европейском стандарте 60947-2. Целью разъединения является отделение цепей или аппаратов от части системы, остающейся под напряжением для обеспечения полной безопасности персонала, работающего на отделенной части системы.
[Перевод Интент]
Тематики
EN
FR
Русско-английский словарь нормативно-технической терминологии > отделять, отделение
-
118 порок развития
порок развития
—
[ http://www.eionet.europa.eu/gemet/alphabetic?langcode=en]EN
malformation
Permanent structural change that may adversely affect survival, development or function. (Source: KOREN)
[http://www.eionet.europa.eu/gemet/alphabetic?langcode=en]Тематики
EN
DE
FR
Русско-английский словарь нормативно-технической терминологии > порок развития
-
119 растворенный кислород
растворенный кислород
—
[ http://www.eionet.europa.eu/gemet/alphabetic?langcode=en]EN
dissolved oxygen
The amount of oxygen dissolved in a stream, river or lake is an indication of the degree of health of the stream and its ability to support a balanced aquatic ecosystem. The oxygen comes from the atmosphere by solution and from photosynthesis of water plants. The maximum amount of oxygen that can be held in solution in a stream is termed the saturation concentration and, as it is a function of temperature, the greater the temperature, the less the saturation amount. The discharge of an organic waste to a stream imposes an oxygen demand on the stream. If there is an excessive amount of organic matter, the oxidation of waste by microorganisms will consume oxygen more rapidly than it can be replenished. When this happens, the dissolved oxygen is depleted and results in the death of the higher forms of life. (Source: PORT)
[http://www.eionet.europa.eu/gemet/alphabetic?langcode=en]Тематики
EN
DE
FR
Русско-английский словарь нормативно-технической терминологии > растворенный кислород
-
120 ткань (биол.)
ткань (биол.)
—
[ http://www.eionet.europa.eu/gemet/alphabetic?langcode=en]EN
tissue
A part of an organism consisting of a large number of cells having a similar structure and function. (Source: CED)
[http://www.eionet.europa.eu/gemet/alphabetic?langcode=en]Тематики
EN
DE
FR
Русско-английский словарь нормативно-технической терминологии > ткань (биол.)
См. также в других словарях:
Source function — The source function is a characteristic of a stellar atmosphere, and in the case of no scattering of photons, describes the ratio of the emission coefficient to the absorption coefficient. It is a measure of how photons in a light beam are… … Wikipedia
Source lines of code — (SLOC) is a software metric used to measure the size of a software program by counting the number of lines in the text of the program s source code. SLOC is typically used to predict the amount of effort that will be required to develop a program … Wikipedia
Function — Func tion, n. [L. functio, fr. fungi to perform, execute, akin to Skr. bhuj to enjoy, have the use of: cf. F. fonction. Cf. {Defunct}.] 1. The act of executing or performing any duty, office, or calling; performance. In the function of his public … The Collaborative International Dictionary of English
Function generator — [ http://www.agilent.com/u2761a U2761A] USB Modular Function Generator from Agilent Technologies] A function generator is a piece of electronic test equipment or software used to generate electrical waveforms. These waveforms can be either… … Wikipedia
Function (mathematics) — f(x) redirects here. For the band, see f(x) (band). Graph of example function, In mathematics, a function associates one quantity, the a … Wikipedia
Function point — A function point is a unit of measurement to express the amount of business functionality an information system provides to a user. Function points are the units of measure used by the IFPUG Functional Size Measurement Method. The IFPUG FSM… … Wikipedia
Source field — In theoretical physics, a source field is a field J whose multiple: S {source} = JPhiappears in the action, multiplied by the original field Phi. Consequently, the source field appears on the right hand side of the equations of motion (usually… … Wikipedia
Source criticism — This entry is about source evaluation (or information evaluation) in an interdisciplinary context and thus not limited to some discipline specific understanding of the term source criticism . A source (an information source) may be a document, a… … Wikipedia
source code — noun program instructions written as an ASCII text file; must be translated by a compiler or interpreter or assembler into the object code for a particular computer before execution • Hypernyms: ↑ASCII text file * * * noun : computer code in its… … Useful english dictionary
function — [16] The ultimate source of function is the Latin verb fungī ‘perform, discharge’, which may be related to Sanskrit bhunkte ‘he enjoys’. From its past participle, functus, was formed the abstract noun functiō ‘performance, activity’, which passed … The Hutchinson dictionary of word origins
function — [16] The ultimate source of function is the Latin verb fungī ‘perform, discharge’, which may be related to Sanskrit bhunkte ‘he enjoys’. From its past participle, functus, was formed the abstract noun functiō ‘performance, activity’, which passed … Word origins