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  • 1 ordinary language philosophy

    фил., соц. философия повседневного [обыденного\] языка (анализ и осмысление реально используемых людьми слов и грамматических конструкций; теория оказала влияние на подходы в социологии, подчеркивающие важность повседневной речи и разговора)
    See:

    Англо-русский экономический словарь > ordinary language philosophy

  • 2 ordinary language philosophy

    Универсальный англо-русский словарь > ordinary language philosophy

  • 3 ordinary language philosophy

    • arkikielen filosofia

    English-Finnish dictionary > ordinary language philosophy

  • 4 Language

       Philosophy is written in that great book, the universe, which is always open, right before our eyes. But one cannot understand this book without first learning to understand the language and to know the characters in which it is written. It is written in the language of mathematics, and the characters are triangles, circles, and other figures. Without these, one cannot understand a single word of it, and just wanders in a dark labyrinth. (Galileo, 1990, p. 232)
       It never happens that it [a nonhuman animal] arranges its speech in various ways in order to reply appropriately to everything that may be said in its presence, as even the lowest type of man can do. (Descartes, 1970a, p. 116)
       It is a very remarkable fact that there are none so depraved and stupid, without even excepting idiots, that they cannot arrange different words together, forming of them a statement by which they make known their thoughts; while, on the other hand, there is no other animal, however perfect and fortunately circumstanced it may be, which can do the same. (Descartes, 1967, p. 116)
       Human beings do not live in the object world alone, nor alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression for their society. It is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially without the use of language and that language is merely an incidental means of solving specific problems of communication or reflection. The fact of the matter is that the "real world" is to a large extent unconsciously built on the language habits of the group.... We see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do because the language habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation. (Sapir, 1921, p. 75)
       It powerfully conditions all our thinking about social problems and processes.... No two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the same social reality. The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same worlds with different labels attached. (Sapir, 1985, p. 162)
       [A list of language games, not meant to be exhaustive:]
       Giving orders, and obeying them- Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements- Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)Reporting an eventSpeculating about an eventForming and testing a hypothesisPresenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagramsMaking up a story; and reading itPlay actingSinging catchesGuessing riddlesMaking a joke; and telling it
       Solving a problem in practical arithmeticTranslating from one language into another
       LANGUAGE Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, and praying-. (Wittgenstein, 1953, Pt. I, No. 23, pp. 11 e-12 e)
       We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages.... The world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds-and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds.... No individual is free to describe nature with absolute impartiality but is constrained to certain modes of interpretation even while he thinks himself most free. (Whorf, 1956, pp. 153, 213-214)
       We dissect nature along the lines laid down by our native languages.
       The categories and types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do not find there because they stare every observer in the face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds-and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds.... We are thus introduced to a new principle of relativity, which holds that all observers are not led by the same physical evidence to the same picture of the universe, unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar or can in some way be calibrated. (Whorf, 1956, pp. 213-214)
       9) The Forms of a Person's Thoughts Are Controlled by Unperceived Patterns of His Own Language
       The forms of a person's thoughts are controlled by inexorable laws of pattern of which he is unconscious. These patterns are the unperceived intricate systematizations of his own language-shown readily enough by a candid comparison and contrast with other languages, especially those of a different linguistic family. (Whorf, 1956, p. 252)
       It has come to be commonly held that many utterances which look like statements are either not intended at all, or only intended in part, to record or impart straightforward information about the facts.... Many traditional philosophical perplexities have arisen through a mistake-the mistake of taking as straightforward statements of fact utterances which are either (in interesting non-grammatical ways) nonsensical or else intended as something quite different. (Austin, 1962, pp. 2-3)
       In general, one might define a complex of semantic components connected by logical constants as a concept. The dictionary of a language is then a system of concepts in which a phonological form and certain syntactic and morphological characteristics are assigned to each concept. This system of concepts is structured by several types of relations. It is supplemented, furthermore, by redundancy or implicational rules..., representing general properties of the whole system of concepts.... At least a relevant part of these general rules is not bound to particular languages, but represents presumably universal structures of natural languages. They are not learned, but are rather a part of the human ability to acquire an arbitrary natural language. (Bierwisch, 1970, pp. 171-172)
       In studying the evolution of mind, we cannot guess to what extent there are physically possible alternatives to, say, transformational generative grammar, for an organism meeting certain other physical conditions characteristic of humans. Conceivably, there are none-or very few-in which case talk about evolution of the language capacity is beside the point. (Chomsky, 1972, p. 98)
       [It is] truth value rather than syntactic well-formedness that chiefly governs explicit verbal reinforcement by parents-which renders mildly paradoxical the fact that the usual product of such a training schedule is an adult whose speech is highly grammatical but not notably truthful. (R. O. Brown, 1973, p. 330)
       he conceptual base is responsible for formally representing the concepts underlying an utterance.... A given word in a language may or may not have one or more concepts underlying it.... On the sentential level, the utterances of a given language are encoded within a syntactic structure of that language. The basic construction of the sentential level is the sentence.
       The next highest level... is the conceptual level. We call the basic construction of this level the conceptualization. A conceptualization consists of concepts and certain relations among those concepts. We can consider that both levels exist at the same point in time and that for any unit on one level, some corresponding realizate exists on the other level. This realizate may be null or extremely complex.... Conceptualizations may relate to other conceptualizations by nesting or other specified relationships. (Schank, 1973, pp. 191-192)
       The mathematics of multi-dimensional interactive spaces and lattices, the projection of "computer behavior" on to possible models of cerebral functions, the theoretical and mechanical investigation of artificial intelligence, are producing a stream of sophisticated, often suggestive ideas.
       But it is, I believe, fair to say that nothing put forward until now in either theoretic design or mechanical mimicry comes even remotely in reach of the most rudimentary linguistic realities. (Steiner, 1975, p. 284)
       The step from the simple tool to the master tool, a tool to make tools (what we would now call a machine tool), seems to me indeed to parallel the final step to human language, which I call reconstitution. It expresses in a practical and social context the same understanding of hierarchy, and shows the same analysis by function as a basis for synthesis. (Bronowski, 1977, pp. 127-128)
        t is the language donn eґ in which we conduct our lives.... We have no other. And the danger is that formal linguistic models, in their loosely argued analogy with the axiomatic structure of the mathematical sciences, may block perception.... It is quite conceivable that, in language, continuous induction from simple, elemental units to more complex, realistic forms is not justified. The extent and formal "undecidability" of context-and every linguistic particle above the level of the phoneme is context-bound-may make it impossible, except in the most abstract, meta-linguistic sense, to pass from "pro-verbs," "kernals," or "deep deep structures" to actual speech. (Steiner, 1975, pp. 111-113)
       A higher-level formal language is an abstract machine. (Weizenbaum, 1976, p. 113)
       Jakobson sees metaphor and metonymy as the characteristic modes of binarily opposed polarities which between them underpin the two-fold process of selection and combination by which linguistic signs are formed.... Thus messages are constructed, as Saussure said, by a combination of a "horizontal" movement, which combines words together, and a "vertical" movement, which selects the particular words from the available inventory or "inner storehouse" of the language. The combinative (or syntagmatic) process manifests itself in contiguity (one word being placed next to another) and its mode is metonymic. The selective (or associative) process manifests itself in similarity (one word or concept being "like" another) and its mode is metaphoric. The "opposition" of metaphor and metonymy therefore may be said to represent in effect the essence of the total opposition between the synchronic mode of language (its immediate, coexistent, "vertical" relationships) and its diachronic mode (its sequential, successive, lineal progressive relationships). (Hawkes, 1977, pp. 77-78)
       It is striking that the layered structure that man has given to language constantly reappears in his analyses of nature. (Bronowski, 1977, p. 121)
       First, [an ideal intertheoretic reduction] provides us with a set of rules"correspondence rules" or "bridge laws," as the standard vernacular has it-which effect a mapping of the terms of the old theory (T o) onto a subset of the expressions of the new or reducing theory (T n). These rules guide the application of those selected expressions of T n in the following way: we are free to make singular applications of their correspondencerule doppelgangers in T o....
       Second, and equally important, a successful reduction ideally has the outcome that, under the term mapping effected by the correspondence rules, the central principles of T o (those of semantic and systematic importance) are mapped onto general sentences of T n that are theorems of Tn. (P. Churchland, 1979, p. 81)
       If non-linguistic factors must be included in grammar: beliefs, attitudes, etc. [this would] amount to a rejection of the initial idealization of language as an object of study. A priori such a move cannot be ruled out, but it must be empirically motivated. If it proves to be correct, I would conclude that language is a chaos that is not worth studying.... Note that the question is not whether beliefs or attitudes, and so on, play a role in linguistic behavior and linguistic judgments... [but rather] whether distinct cognitive structures can be identified, which interact in the real use of language and linguistic judgments, the grammatical system being one of these. (Chomsky, 1979, pp. 140, 152-153)
        23) Language Is Inevitably Influenced by Specific Contexts of Human Interaction
       Language cannot be studied in isolation from the investigation of "rationality." It cannot afford to neglect our everyday assumptions concerning the total behavior of a reasonable person.... An integrational linguistics must recognize that human beings inhabit a communicational space which is not neatly compartmentalized into language and nonlanguage.... It renounces in advance the possibility of setting up systems of forms and meanings which will "account for" a central core of linguistic behavior irrespective of the situation and communicational purposes involved. (Harris, 1981, p. 165)
       By innate [linguistic knowledge], Chomsky simply means "genetically programmed." He does not literally think that children are born with language in their heads ready to be spoken. He merely claims that a "blueprint is there, which is brought into use when the child reaches a certain point in her general development. With the help of this blueprint, she analyzes the language she hears around her more readily than she would if she were totally unprepared for the strange gabbling sounds which emerge from human mouths. (Aitchison, 1987, p. 31)
       Looking at ourselves from the computer viewpoint, we cannot avoid seeing that natural language is our most important "programming language." This means that a vast portion of our knowledge and activity is, for us, best communicated and understood in our natural language.... One could say that natural language was our first great original artifact and, since, as we increasingly realize, languages are machines, so natural language, with our brains to run it, was our primal invention of the universal computer. One could say this except for the sneaking suspicion that language isn't something we invented but something we became, not something we constructed but something in which we created, and recreated, ourselves. (Leiber, 1991, p. 8)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Language

  • 5 philosophy

    1. философия
    2. принцип
    3. основные принципы

     

    основные принципы

    [А.С.Гольдберг. Англо-русский энергетический словарь. 2006 г.]

    Тематики

    EN

     

    принцип
    взгляд
    мнение


    [ http://www.iks-media.ru/glossary/index.html?glossid=2400324]

    Тематики

    • электросвязь, основные понятия

    Синонимы

    EN

     

    философия

    [ http://www.eionet.europa.eu/gemet/alphabetic?langcode=en]

    EN

    philosophy
    The academic discipline concerned with making explicit the nature and significance of ordinary and scientific beliefs and investigating the intelligibility of concepts by means of rational argument concerning their presuppositions, implications, and interrelationships; in particular, the rational investigation of the nature and structure of reality (metaphysics), the resources and limits of knowledge (epistemology), the principles and import of moral judgment (ethics), and the relationship between language and reality (semantics). (Source: CED)
    [http://www.eionet.europa.eu/gemet/alphabetic?langcode=en]

    Тематики

    EN

    DE

    FR

    Англо-русский словарь нормативно-технической терминологии > philosophy

  • 6 analytic philosophy

    фил. аналитическая философия (направление философии, которое сводит философию к анализу языковых и понятийных средств познания; противопоставляется метафизической)
    See:

    Англо-русский экономический словарь > analytic philosophy

  • 7 Oxford philosophy

    Англо-русский экономический словарь > Oxford philosophy

  • 8 arkikielen filosofia

    • ordinary language philosophy

    Suomi-Englanti sanakirja > arkikielen filosofia

  • 9 logical positivism

    фил. логический позитивизм (доктрина, предполагающая формулирование научного знания в системе логически взаимосвязанных и эмпирически верифицируемых высказываний об "основных фактах")
    See:

    Англо-русский экономический словарь > logical positivism

  • 10 speech act

    соц., лингв. речевой [иллокутивный\] акт (произнесение говорящим высказывания, адресованного слушающему в определенной обстановке и с конкретной целью; в результате совершения речевого акта, говорящий влияет на слушающего в плане изменения его мнения, ментального или психического состояния, побуждения к действию и т. п.)
    See:

    Англо-русский экономический словарь > speech act

  • 11 философия обыденного языка

    Универсальный русско-английский словарь > философия обыденного языка

  • 12 Philosophie der normalen Sprache

    philosophie du langage ordinaire [ordinary language philosophy]

    Lexique philosophique allemand-français > Philosophie der normalen Sprache

  • 13 Logic

       My initial step... was to attempt to reduce the concept of ordering in a sequence to that of logical consequence, so as to proceed from there to the concept of number. To prevent anything intuitive from penetrating here unnoticed, I had to bend every effort to keep the chain of inference free of gaps. In attempting to comply with this requirement in the strictest possible way, I found the inadequacy of language to be an obstacle. (Frege, 1972, p. 104)
       I believe I can make the relation of my 'conceptual notation' to ordinary language clearest if I compare it to the relation of the microscope to the eye. The latter, because of the range of its applicability and because of the ease with which it can adapt itself to the most varied circumstances, has a great superiority over the microscope. Of course, viewed as an optical instrument it reveals many imperfections, which usually remain unnoticed only because of its intimate connection with mental life. But as soon as scientific purposes place strong requirements upon sharpness of resolution, the eye proves to be inadequate.... Similarly, this 'conceptual notation' is devised for particular scientific purposes; and therefore one may not condemn it because it is useless for other purposes. (Frege, 1972, pp. 104-105)
       To sum up briefly, it is the business of the logician to conduct an unceasing struggle against psychology and those parts of language and grammar which fail to give untrammeled expression to what is logical. He does not have to answer the question: How does thinking normally take place in human beings? What course does it naturally follow in the human mind? What is natural to one person may well be unnatural to another. (Frege, 1979, pp. 6-7)
       We are very dependent on external aids in our thinking, and there is no doubt that the language of everyday life-so far, at least, as a certain area of discourse is concerned-had first to be replaced by a more sophisticated instrument, before certain distinctions could be noticed. But so far the academic world has, for the most part, disdained to master this instrument. (Frege, 1979, pp. 6-7)
       There is no reproach the logician need fear less than the reproach that his way of formulating things is unnatural.... If we were to heed those who object that logic is unnatural, we would run the risk of becoming embroiled in interminable disputes about what is natural, disputes which are quite incapable of being resolved within the province of logic. (Frege, 1979, p. 128)
       [L]inguists will be forced, internally as it were, to come to grips with the results of modern logic. Indeed, this is apparently already happening to some extent. By "logic" is not meant here recursive function-theory, California model-theory, constructive proof-theory, or even axiomatic settheory. Such areas may or may not be useful for linguistics. Rather under "logic" are included our good old friends, the homely locutions "and," "or," "if-then," "if and only if," "not," "for all x," "for some x," and "is identical with," plus the calculus of individuals, event-logic, syntax, denotational semantics, and... various parts of pragmatics.... It is to these that the linguist can most profitably turn for help. These are his tools. And they are "clean tools," to borrow a phrase of the late J. L. Austin in another context, in fact, the only really clean ones we have, so that we might as well use them as much as we can. But they constitute only what may be called "baby logic." Baby logic is to the linguist what "baby mathematics" (in the phrase of Murray Gell-Mann) is to the theoretical physicist-very elementary but indispensable domains of theory in both cases. (Martin, 1969, pp. 261-262)
       There appears to be no branch of deductive inference that requires us to assume the existence of a mental logic in order to do justice to the psychological phenomena. To be logical, an individual requires, not formal rules of inference, but a tacit knowledge of the fundamental semantic principle governing any inference; a deduction is valid provided that there is no way of interpreting the premises correctly that is inconsistent with the conclusion. Logic provides a systematic method for searching for such counter-examples. The empirical evidence suggests that ordinary individuals possess no such methods. (Johnson-Laird, quoted in Mehler, Walker & Garrett, 1982, p. 130)
       The fundamental paradox of logic [that "there is no class (as a totality) of those classes which, each taken as a totality, do not belong to themselves" (Russell to Frege, 16 June 1902, in van Heijenoort, 1967, p. 125)] is with us still, bequeathed by Russell-by way of philosophy, mathematics, and even computer science-to the whole of twentieth-century thought. Twentieth-century philosophy would begin not with a foundation for logic, as Russell had hoped in 1900, but with the discovery in 1901 that no such foundation can be laid. (Everdell, 1997, p. 184)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Logic

  • 14 философия

    1. philosophy

     

    философия

    [ http://www.eionet.europa.eu/gemet/alphabetic?langcode=en]

    EN

    philosophy
    The academic discipline concerned with making explicit the nature and significance of ordinary and scientific beliefs and investigating the intelligibility of concepts by means of rational argument concerning their presuppositions, implications, and interrelationships; in particular, the rational investigation of the nature and structure of reality (metaphysics), the resources and limits of knowledge (epistemology), the principles and import of moral judgment (ethics), and the relationship between language and reality (semantics). (Source: CED)
    [http://www.eionet.europa.eu/gemet/alphabetic?langcode=en]

    Тематики

    EN

    DE

    FR

    Русско-английский словарь нормативно-технической терминологии > философия

  • 15 философия

    1. Philosophie

     

    философия

    [ http://www.eionet.europa.eu/gemet/alphabetic?langcode=en]

    EN

    philosophy
    The academic discipline concerned with making explicit the nature and significance of ordinary and scientific beliefs and investigating the intelligibility of concepts by means of rational argument concerning their presuppositions, implications, and interrelationships; in particular, the rational investigation of the nature and structure of reality (metaphysics), the resources and limits of knowledge (epistemology), the principles and import of moral judgment (ethics), and the relationship between language and reality (semantics). (Source: CED)
    [http://www.eionet.europa.eu/gemet/alphabetic?langcode=en]

    Тематики

    EN

    DE

    FR

    Русско-немецкий словарь нормативно-технической терминологии > философия

  • 16 philosophie

    1. философия

     

    философия

    [ http://www.eionet.europa.eu/gemet/alphabetic?langcode=en]

    EN

    philosophy
    The academic discipline concerned with making explicit the nature and significance of ordinary and scientific beliefs and investigating the intelligibility of concepts by means of rational argument concerning their presuppositions, implications, and interrelationships; in particular, the rational investigation of the nature and structure of reality (metaphysics), the resources and limits of knowledge (epistemology), the principles and import of moral judgment (ethics), and the relationship between language and reality (semantics). (Source: CED)
    [http://www.eionet.europa.eu/gemet/alphabetic?langcode=en]

    Тематики

    EN

    DE

    FR

    Франко-русский словарь нормативно-технической терминологии > philosophie

  • 17 Philosophie

    1. философия

     

    философия

    [ http://www.eionet.europa.eu/gemet/alphabetic?langcode=en]

    EN

    philosophy
    The academic discipline concerned with making explicit the nature and significance of ordinary and scientific beliefs and investigating the intelligibility of concepts by means of rational argument concerning their presuppositions, implications, and interrelationships; in particular, the rational investigation of the nature and structure of reality (metaphysics), the resources and limits of knowledge (epistemology), the principles and import of moral judgment (ethics), and the relationship between language and reality (semantics). (Source: CED)
    [http://www.eionet.europa.eu/gemet/alphabetic?langcode=en]

    Тематики

    EN

    DE

    FR

    Немецко-русский словарь нормативно-технической терминологии > Philosophie

  • 18 философия

    1. philosophie

     

    философия

    [ http://www.eionet.europa.eu/gemet/alphabetic?langcode=en]

    EN

    philosophy
    The academic discipline concerned with making explicit the nature and significance of ordinary and scientific beliefs and investigating the intelligibility of concepts by means of rational argument concerning their presuppositions, implications, and interrelationships; in particular, the rational investigation of the nature and structure of reality (metaphysics), the resources and limits of knowledge (epistemology), the principles and import of moral judgment (ethics), and the relationship between language and reality (semantics). (Source: CED)
    [http://www.eionet.europa.eu/gemet/alphabetic?langcode=en]

    Тематики

    EN

    DE

    FR

    Русско-французский словарь нормативно-технической терминологии > философия

См. также в других словарях:

  • Ordinary language philosophy —   [ ɔːdnrɪ læȖgwɪdʒ fɪ lɔsəfɪ; englisch »Philosophie der Alltagssprache«], seit etwa 1930 in Großbritannien aufgekommene Richtung der sprachanalytischen Philosophie (analytische Philosophie), in Abgrenzung zu den Versuchen der Philosophen des… …   Universal-Lexikon

  • Ordinary language philosophy — For the philosophy of language, see Philosophy of language. Ordinary language philosophy is a philosophical school that approaches traditional philosophical problems as rooted in misunderstandings philosophers develop by distorting or forgetting… …   Wikipedia

  • ordinary-language philosophy — noun Date: 1957 a trend in philosophical analysis that seeks to resolve philosophical perplexity by revealing sources of puzzlement in the misunderstanding of ordinary language …   New Collegiate Dictionary

  • ordinary language — The language of everyday use. Ordinary language philosophy was the variety of linguistic philosophy that paid particular attention to the nuances of everyday usage, believing that philosophical error often arose from neglecting distinctions… …   Philosophy dictionary

  • ordinary-language philosophy — /awr dn er ee lang gwij/. See linguistic analysis. [1955 60] * * * …   Universalium

  • ordinary-language philosophy — /awr dn er ee lang gwij/. See linguistic analysis. [1955 60] …   Useful english dictionary

  • language, philosophy of — Philosophical study of the nature and use of natural languages and the relations between language, language users, and the world. It encompasses the philosophical study of linguistic meaning (see semantics), the philosophical study of language… …   Universalium

  • Ordinary language — The phrase ordinary language is often used in philosophy and logic to distinguish between ordinary, unsurprising uses of terms and their more specialized uses in theorizing, or jargon. For example, the statements I find that class of person very… …   Wikipedia

  • Ordinary Language Philosophie — Philosophie der normalen Sprache (engl. ordinary language philosophy ) oder Linguistische Philosophie (engl. linguistic philosophy ) ist eine philosophische Zugangsweise zur Sprache innerhalb der Analytischen Philosophie, die im Unterschied zur… …   Deutsch Wikipedia

  • Ordinary language — Der Ausdruck Gebrauchssprache (engl. ordinary language (im weiteren Sinn)) bezeichnet die von einer Sprachgemeinschaft verwendete natürliche Sprache. Der Begriff Gebrauchssprache ist ein Gegenbegriff zur formalen Sprache. Unter den Begriff der… …   Deutsch Wikipedia

  • philosophy —    Philosophy (from the Greek philo (love) and sophia (wisdom)) in British culture has undergone a series of revolutionary changes since 1960. Until recently, English language philosophy was dominated by analytic and linguistic philosophy based… …   Encyclopedia of contemporary British culture

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