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81 amplecto

am-plector (old form amploctor, Prisc. p. 552, 39 P.), exus, 3, v. dep. ( act. form amplecto, Liv. And. Od. ap. Diom. p. 379 P.; cf. Prisc. p. 797 P.; Struve, 114.—In pass., Plaut. Mil. 2, 6, 27; Lucil. ap. Prisc. p. 791 P.).
I.
A.. Lit., to wind or twine round a person or thing (aliquem, plekesthai amphitina; hence with reference to the other object; cf. adimo), to surround, encompass, encircle; of living beings, to embrace (class. in prose and poetry): genua amplectens, Liv. And. Od. ap. Diom. p. 379 P. (as transl. of Hom. Od. 6, 142: gounôn labôn):
amplectimur tibi genua,
Plaut. Rud. 1, 5, 16; so id. Cist. 2, 3, 25:
exsanguem (patrem) amplexus,
Tac. H. 3, 25:
effigiem Augusti amplecti,
id. A. 4, 67:
magnam Herculis aram,
id. ib. 12, 24:
serpens arboris amplectens stirpem,
Lucr. 5, 34:
quorum tellus amplectitur ossa,
id. 1, 135:
manibus saxa,
to grasp, Liv. 5, 47:
munimento amplecti,
id. 35, 28; so id. 41, 5 et saep.:
amplectitur intra se insulam,
Plin. 5, 1, 1, § 3:
amplexa jugerum soli quercus,
id. 16, 31, 56, § 130:
et molli circum est ansas amplexus acantho,
Verg. E. 3, 45:
urbes amplecti muro,
Hor. A. P. 209 et saep.:
visne ego te ac tute me amplectare?
Plaut. Most. 1, 4, 9; * Ter. And. 2, 5, 19:
ille me amplexus atque osculans flere prohibebat,
Cic. Somn. Scip. 3 (id. Rep. 6, 14, where Orell. reads complexus).—
B.
Of space, to embrace:
spatium amplexus ad vim remigii,
Tac. A. 12, 56:
quattuor milia passuum ambitu amplexus est,
id. ib. 4, 49:
domus naturae amplectens pontum terrasque jacentes,
Manil. 1, 536.—
II.
Trop.
A.
To embrace in mind or knowledge, i. e. to comprehend, to understand:
animo rei magnitudinem amplecti,
Cic. de Or. 1, 5, 19:
Quas (artes) si quis unus complexus omnes,
id. ib. 1, 17, 76:
quae si judex non amplectetur omnia consilio, non animo ac mente circumspiciet,
id. Font. 7; also simply to reflect upon, to consider:
cogitationem toto pectore amplecti,
id. Att. 12, 35.—
B.
In discourse, to comprehend, i.e. to discuss, to handle, treat:
quod ego argumentum pluribus verbis amplecterer,
Cic. Rosc. Com. 12:
actio verbis causam et rationem juris amplectitur,
id. Caecin. 14, 40:
omnes res per scripturam amplecti,
id. Inv. 2, 50: non ego cuncta meis amplecti versibus opto, Verg. G. 2, 42:
totius Ponti forma breviter amplectenda est, ut facilius partes noscantur,
Plin. 4, 12, 24, § 75.—Also of a name, to comprehend under:
quod idem interdum virtutis nomine amplectimur,
Cic. Tusc. 2, 13, 30; cf.:
si quis universam et propriam oratoris vim definire complectique vult,
to define the peculiar function of the orator and include the whole of it, id. de Or. 1, 15, 64; so of a law, to include:
sed neque haec (verba) in principem aut principis parentem, quos lex majestatis amplectitur,
Tac. A. 4, 34.—
C.
Of study, learning, to include, embrace: neque eam tamen scientiam, quam adjungis oratori, complexus es, but yet have notincluded in your attainments that knowledge which, etc., Cic. de Or. 1, 17, 77:
Quod si tantam rerum maximarum arte suā rhetorici illi doctores complecterentur,
id. ib. 1, 19, 86.—
D.
To embrace in heart, i.e. to love, favor, cherish:
quem mihi videtur amplecti res publica,
Cic. Cat. 4, 3:
nimis amplecti plebem videbatur,
id. Mil. 72:
aliquem amicissime,
id. Fam. 6, 6 fin.; Sall. J. 7, 6:
hoc se amplectitur uno, i. e. se amat,
esteems himself, Hor. S. 1, 2, 53:
qui tanto amore possessiones suas amplexi tenebant,
Cic. Sull. 20;
opp. repudiare,
id. de Or. 1, 24;
opp. removere,
id. Cat. 4, 7:
amplecti virtutem,
id. Phil. 10, 4:
nobilitatem et dignitates hominum amplecti,
id. Fam. 4, 8: mens hominis amplectitur maxime cognitionem, delights in understanding, id. Ac. pr. 2, 10, 31: (episcopum) amplectentem eum fidelem sermonem, * Vulg. Tit. 1, 9: amplexus civitates (sc. animo), having fixed his mind on, i. e. intending to attack, seize, Tac. Agr. 25:
causam rei publicae amplecti,
Cic. Sest. 93;
and so playfully of one who robs the State treasury: rem publicam nimium amplecti,
id. Fl. 18.—
E.
In circumlocution: magnam Brigantium partem aut victoriā amplexus est aut bello, embraced in conquest, i. e. conquered, Tac. Agr. 17.

Lewis & Short latin dictionary > amplecto
82 amplector

am-plector (old form amploctor, Prisc. p. 552, 39 P.), exus, 3, v. dep. ( act. form amplecto, Liv. And. Od. ap. Diom. p. 379 P.; cf. Prisc. p. 797 P.; Struve, 114.—In pass., Plaut. Mil. 2, 6, 27; Lucil. ap. Prisc. p. 791 P.).
I.
A.. Lit., to wind or twine round a person or thing (aliquem, plekesthai amphitina; hence with reference to the other object; cf. adimo), to surround, encompass, encircle; of living beings, to embrace (class. in prose and poetry): genua amplectens, Liv. And. Od. ap. Diom. p. 379 P. (as transl. of Hom. Od. 6, 142: gounôn labôn):
amplectimur tibi genua,
Plaut. Rud. 1, 5, 16; so id. Cist. 2, 3, 25:
exsanguem (patrem) amplexus,
Tac. H. 3, 25:
effigiem Augusti amplecti,
id. A. 4, 67:
magnam Herculis aram,
id. ib. 12, 24:
serpens arboris amplectens stirpem,
Lucr. 5, 34:
quorum tellus amplectitur ossa,
id. 1, 135:
manibus saxa,
to grasp, Liv. 5, 47:
munimento amplecti,
id. 35, 28; so id. 41, 5 et saep.:
amplectitur intra se insulam,
Plin. 5, 1, 1, § 3:
amplexa jugerum soli quercus,
id. 16, 31, 56, § 130:
et molli circum est ansas amplexus acantho,
Verg. E. 3, 45:
urbes amplecti muro,
Hor. A. P. 209 et saep.:
visne ego te ac tute me amplectare?
Plaut. Most. 1, 4, 9; * Ter. And. 2, 5, 19:
ille me amplexus atque osculans flere prohibebat,
Cic. Somn. Scip. 3 (id. Rep. 6, 14, where Orell. reads complexus).—
B.
Of space, to embrace:
spatium amplexus ad vim remigii,
Tac. A. 12, 56:
quattuor milia passuum ambitu amplexus est,
id. ib. 4, 49:
domus naturae amplectens pontum terrasque jacentes,
Manil. 1, 536.—
II.
Trop.
A.
To embrace in mind or knowledge, i. e. to comprehend, to understand:
animo rei magnitudinem amplecti,
Cic. de Or. 1, 5, 19:
Quas (artes) si quis unus complexus omnes,
id. ib. 1, 17, 76:
quae si judex non amplectetur omnia consilio, non animo ac mente circumspiciet,
id. Font. 7; also simply to reflect upon, to consider:
cogitationem toto pectore amplecti,
id. Att. 12, 35.—
B.
In discourse, to comprehend, i.e. to discuss, to handle, treat:
quod ego argumentum pluribus verbis amplecterer,
Cic. Rosc. Com. 12:
actio verbis causam et rationem juris amplectitur,
id. Caecin. 14, 40:
omnes res per scripturam amplecti,
id. Inv. 2, 50: non ego cuncta meis amplecti versibus opto, Verg. G. 2, 42:
totius Ponti forma breviter amplectenda est, ut facilius partes noscantur,
Plin. 4, 12, 24, § 75.—Also of a name, to comprehend under:
quod idem interdum virtutis nomine amplectimur,
Cic. Tusc. 2, 13, 30; cf.:
si quis universam et propriam oratoris vim definire complectique vult,
to define the peculiar function of the orator and include the whole of it, id. de Or. 1, 15, 64; so of a law, to include:
sed neque haec (verba) in principem aut principis parentem, quos lex majestatis amplectitur,
Tac. A. 4, 34.—
C.
Of study, learning, to include, embrace: neque eam tamen scientiam, quam adjungis oratori, complexus es, but yet have notincluded in your attainments that knowledge which, etc., Cic. de Or. 1, 17, 77:
Quod si tantam rerum maximarum arte suā rhetorici illi doctores complecterentur,
id. ib. 1, 19, 86.—
D.
To embrace in heart, i.e. to love, favor, cherish:
quem mihi videtur amplecti res publica,
Cic. Cat. 4, 3:
nimis amplecti plebem videbatur,
id. Mil. 72:
aliquem amicissime,
id. Fam. 6, 6 fin.; Sall. J. 7, 6:
hoc se amplectitur uno, i. e. se amat,
esteems himself, Hor. S. 1, 2, 53:
qui tanto amore possessiones suas amplexi tenebant,
Cic. Sull. 20;
opp. repudiare,
id. de Or. 1, 24;
opp. removere,
id. Cat. 4, 7:
amplecti virtutem,
id. Phil. 10, 4:
nobilitatem et dignitates hominum amplecti,
id. Fam. 4, 8: mens hominis amplectitur maxime cognitionem, delights in understanding, id. Ac. pr. 2, 10, 31: (episcopum) amplectentem eum fidelem sermonem, * Vulg. Tit. 1, 9: amplexus civitates (sc. animo), having fixed his mind on, i. e. intending to attack, seize, Tac. Agr. 25:
causam rei publicae amplecti,
Cic. Sest. 93;
and so playfully of one who robs the State treasury: rem publicam nimium amplecti,
id. Fl. 18.—
E.
In circumlocution: magnam Brigantium partem aut victoriā amplexus est aut bello, embraced in conquest, i. e. conquered, Tac. Agr. 17.

Lewis & Short latin dictionary > amplector
83 диалог типа выбора меню

1. menu dialog

диалоговая система управления с меню — menu drive system

меню формируемое пользователем — user-configurable menu

статическое меню; неподвижное меню — permanent menu

меню высвечиваемое во временном окне — pop-up menu

меню с вытеснением нижней строки — pull-down menu

2. menu dialogue

меню конструкторских возможностей — create menu

функция основного меню — master menu function

управление с помощью меню — menu management

меню объект - орган — object fff organ menu

меню блокнотного типа — worksheet-like menu

Русско-английский большой базовый словарь > диалог типа выбора меню
84 команда на машинном языке

1. machine code instruction

код языка — language code

кодовый язык — code language

команда языка Бэйсик — basic instruction

язык машинных кодов — actual machine language

команда на выходном языке — object instruction

2. machine language instruction

формализовать язык — formalize a language

функция языка — language oriented function

явно определенный язык — explicit language

язык без контроля типов — untyped language

язык на основе языка Си — C-based language

3. absolute instruction

машинный язык — absolute language

язык для задач обучения — instruction language

команда на языке автокода — autocode instruction

команда на символическом языке — mnemonic instruction

Русско-английский большой базовый словарь > команда на машинном языке
85 purpose

[ˈpəːpəs] noun
1) the reason for doing something; the aim to which an action etc is directed:

What is the purpose of your visit?
قَصْد، هَدَف
2) the use or function of an object:

The purpose of this lever is to stop the machine in an emergency.
وَظيفَة، غَرَض
3) determination:

a man of purpose.
عَزْم، تَصْميم

Arabic-English dictionary > purpose
86 μέλω

μέλω

Grammatical information: v.

Meaning: `be anxious, care for, go to the heart'; ἐπι-μέλομαι and - έομαι Schwyzer 721) `care for', μετα-μέλομαι, μετα-μέλει μοι `repent' (IA.).

Other forms: 3. sg. μέλει μοι, μέλομαι, fut. μελήσω, - σει, - σομαι (Il.), aor. μελῆσαι, ἐμέλησε (Att.), pass. μεληθῆναι (S.), perf. μέμηλα, -ε (Il.), midd. μέμβλεται, - το (Il., with new present μέμβλομαι [A. R., Opp.]), μεμέληκε (Att.), μεμέλημαι (Theoc., Call.)

Derivatives: 1 μέλημα n. `anxiety, object of care, darling' (Sapph., Pi., A.), μελησμός `care' (EM). 2. μελέτωρ, - ορος m. `who cares for' = `avenger' (S. El. 846); cf. Fraenkel Nom. ag. 2, 10f., Benveniste Noms d'agent 32. - 3. μελετάω `care for, study, practise oratory' (Hes., h. Merc.) beside μελέτη `care, educator, pactice etc.' (Hes.); because of the accent (: γενετή, τελετή a. o.) prob. at least partly backformation like e.g. ἀγάπη from ἀγαπάω; diff. e.g. Fraenkel Nom. ag. 2, 115 a. 152, Porzig Satzinhalte 246; on the deverbatives in - ( ε)τάω Schwyzer 705; from this μελετη-ρός `who likes practice' (X.). From μελετάω: μελέτ-ημα `practise' (Att.), - ησις `id.' (AB). - ητικός `caring' (LXX), - ητής m. `trainer' (Aristid.), - ητήριον `place for practice' (Plu.). -- 4. μελε-δῶνες f. pl. (late sg.) `cares, concerns' (v. l. τ 517, h. Hom., Hes., Thgn.), also μελη-δόνες, - δών `id.' (Simon., A. R.); - εδων- and - ηδον- both metr. conditioned for - εδον-; μελεδῶναι pl. `id.' (v.l. τ 517, Sapph., Theoc., sg. - ώνη Hp.); on - ών: - ώνη Egli Heteroklisie 12; μελεδωνός m. f. `watcher' (Ion.; Fraenkel Nom. ag. 1, 234), - ωνεύς `id.' (Theoc.; Boßhardt 65). Here as denominat. μελεδαίνω `care for' (Ion., Archil.; Schwyzer 724; besides μελεταίνω Argos VI^a after μελετάω) with μελεδήματα pl. = μελε-δῶνες (Ψ 62; after νοήματα, Porzig Satzinhalte 187; cf. also Debrunner IF 21, 34), μελεδήμων `caring' (Emp., AP; after νοήμων a. o., Chantraine Form. 173), μελεδ-ηθμός `practice' (Orac.); backformation μελέδη f. `care' (Hp.; after μελέτη). -- From ἐπι-μέλομαι: 1. ἐπιμελ-ής `caring for, anxious, who is at the heart' (IA.) with verbal function of the σ-stem (Schwyzer 513); from it ἐπιμέλεια `care, attention' (Att.); 2. ἐπιμελη-τής m. `who cares, governor' etc. To μετα-μέλομαι analogically μεταμέλεια `repentance, change of mind' (Att.); also (backformation) μετάμελος `id.' (Th. 7, 55).

Origin: XX [etym. unknown]

Etymology: Beside the full grade thematic root-present μέλω (Schwyzer 684) stands with remarkable lengthened grade the perfect μέμηλα (archaic; s. Specht KZ 62, 67 with Schulze), to which with zero grade and remarkable thematic vowel the middle μέμβλεται, - το for *με-μλ-ε- (Schwyzer 770 a. 768, Chantraine Gramm. hom. 1, 426 u. 432). The η-enlargement in μελ-ή-σω (Schwyzer 782 f., Chantraine 1, 446) conquered in time the whole verbal system: μελῆ-σαι, - θῆναι, μεμέλη-κε, - μαι. -- No convincing etymology. Against the connection with μέλλω (e.g. Curtius 330f., Pok. 720, Hofmann Et. Wb.) WP. 2, 292, who considers the connection with μάλα `very', Lat. melior `better' (Prellwitz, Brugmann Grundr.² 2: 3, 459, Bq). (W.-) Hofmann s. melior reminds after Loth Rev. celt. 41, 211 of Welsh gofal `caree', diofal `without care, quiet', dyfal `attent'. -- Machek Studia in hon. Acad. d. Dečev 51 f. wants to equate μέλει μοι with Čech. mele mne `I am grieved'.

Page in Frisk: 2,204-206

Greek-English etymological dictionary (Ελληνικά-Αγγλικά ετυμολογική λεξικό) > μέλω
87 Valinor

place-name "the land or people of the Valar", *"Vali-land" Vali = Valar, land of the Gods in the West BAL, NDOR; cf. Valandor. Full form Valinórë BAL; Vali-nórë under NDOR.Said to be the true Eldarin name of Aman, the latter name being explained as a borrowing from Valarin in some versions of the linguistic scenario VT49:26. In the early "Qenya Lexicon", Valinor, Valinórë is glossed "Asgard", the name of the city of the gods in Norse mythology LT1:272. It seems that in such more restricted use, Valinor is not the entire Blessed Realm but rather the specific region beyond the Pelóri where most of the Valar dwelt, with Valimar as the chief city. Thus it is said of Eärendil that he went into Valinor and to the halls of Valimar only after he had already left his ship and ventured as far as Tirion Silmarillion, chapter 24. Possessive Valinóreva in Nurtalë Valinóreva, the "Hiding of Valinor", the possessive case here assuming the function of object genitive Silm; genitive Valinórëo in Yénië Valinórëo Annals of Valinor MR:200; the last word was changed from Valinóren, Tolkien revising the genitive ending from -n to -o

Quettaparma Quenyallo (Quenya-English) > Valinor
88 εὐχαριστέω

εὐχαριστέω (s. χάρις) 1 aor. εὐχαρίστησα (ηὐχ-Ro 1:21 [edd. exc. t.r.] s. W-S. §12, 5b; Mlt-H. 191f); 1 aor. pass. subj. 3 sg. εὐχαριστηθῇ; ptc. εὐχαριστηθείς (Just.)

① to show that one is under obligation, be thankful, feel obligated to thank. This mng. is common in diplomatic documents in which the recipient of a favor reciprocates with assurance of goodwill (e.g. decrees of the Byzantines in Demosth. 18, 91f, concluding: οὐκ ἐλλείψει εὐχαριστῶν καὶ ποιῶν ὅ τι ἄν δύνηται ἀγαθόν =the people of the Chersonesus ‘will never stop being grateful and doing whatever they can’ (for the people of Athens); cp. OGI 730, 11; IPriene 44, 8 et al.). In this sense ἐ. = χάριν διδόναι (in contrast to χάριν εἰδέναι, s. Phryn. p. 18 Lob.). This mng. has been suggested for Lk 18:11 (the Pharisee is interpreted as making requital in fasting and tithing vs. 12) and Ro 16:4 (in sense of indebtedness; this pass. is the only one in the NT that deals w. thankfulness toward humans [as 2 Macc. 12:31]), but both pass. fit equally well in 2.

② to express appreciation for benefits or blessings, give thanks, express thanks, render/return thanks (as ‘render thanks’ since Polyb. 16, 25, 1; Posidon. 87, Fgm. 36 [in Athen. 5, 213e]; Diod S 20, 34, 5; Plut., Mor. 505d; Epict., ins, pap, LXX, Philo; Jos., Ant. 20, 12; cp. Phryn. p. 18 Lob.). Except for Ro 16:4 (cp. 2 Macc 12:31) εὐ. is used w. God as object (Diod S 14, 29, 4; 16, 11, 1 τοῖς θεοῖς περὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν; Epict. 1, 4, 32; 1, 10, 3; 2, 23, 5 τῷ θεῷ; Artem. 4, 2 p. 206, 4 θῦε καὶ εὐχαρίστει; Herm. Wr. 1, 29 τ. θεῷ; SIG 995, 11 τ. θεοῖς; 1173, 9f; UPZ 59, 10 [168 B.C.] τ. θεοῖς; PTebt 56, 9; BGU 423, 6 τ. κυρίῳ Σεράπιδι; PGM 13, 706 [w. δέομαι]; Jdth 8:25; 2 Macc 1:11; 10:7; 3 Macc 7:16; EpArist 177 ὑμῖν, … τῷ θεῷ; Philo, Spec. Leg. 2, 204; 3, 6 θεῷ; TestSol 7:4 and Jos., Ant. 1, 193 τ. θεῷ; TestJos 8:5 τῷ κυρίω; TestAbr A 15 p. 95, 14 [Stone p. 38]; Ar. 15, 10 al.; Just., Orig., Hippol., Did.) αὐτῷ (of Jesus, who reveals himself as God in a miracle) Lk 17:16. τῷ θεῷ (μου) Ac 28:15; Ro 7:25 v.l.; 1 Cor 14:18; Phil 1:3; Col 1:3, 12; 3:17; Phlm 4; 1 Cl 38:4; 41:1 v.l.; B 7:1; IEph 21:1; Hv 4, 1, 4. εὐχαριστῶ σοι=God Lk 18:11 (cp. 1QH 2:20 al.אוֹדְכָה אֲדוֹנָי ‘I praise you, O Lord’). Elliptically Ro 1:21, where τῷ θεῷ is to be understood fr. the preceding ὡς θεόν (though εὐ. occasionally is used w. the acc. praise someone w. thanks SIG 1172, 3 εὐχαριστεῖ Ἀσκληπιόν; Cat. Cod. Astr. VII 177, 17); 1 Th 5:18; 2 Cl 18:1.—Esp. of thanksgiving before meals, w. dat. added τῷ θεῷ Ac 27:35; Ro 14:6 (cp. Ar. 15, 10); σοι D 10:3; ᾧ B 7:1. Abs. Mt 15:36; 26:27; Mk 8:6, 7 v.l.; 14:23; Lk 22:17, 19; J 6:11, 23; 1 Cor 11:24 (cp. Just., A I, 65, 5). W. mention of the obj., for which one gives thanks τινί τι (to) someone for someth. Hs 7:5 (εὐ. τι=‘thank for someth.’, a rare usage [Hippocr., Ep. 17, 46], s. 2 Cor 1:11 below; cp. Just., A I, 65, 5 τοῦ εὐχαριστηθέντος ἄρτου). περί τινος for someone, because of someone (Philo, Spec. Leg. 1, 211) 1 Th 1:2; for someth. Hs 5, 1, 1; also foll by ὅτι because (Ps.-Callisth. 2, 22, 11; Berl. pap: APF 12, ’37, 247; TestAbr A 15 p. 95, 14 [Stone p. 38]) Ro 1:8; 1 Cor 1:4f; 2 Th 1:3; 2:13. ὑπέρ τινος w. gen. of the pers. on whose behalf one thanks 2 Cor 1:11; Eph 1:16; Hs 2:6; also foll. by ὅτι because IPhld 11:1; ISm 10:1. ὑπέρ τινος w. gen. of thing for someth. (Philo, Congr. Erud. Gr. 96) 1 Cor 10:30; Eph 5:20; D 9:2f; 10:2. W. ἐπί τινι because of, for (IPergamon 224a, 14; Sb 7172, 25 [217 B.C.] εὐχαριστῶν τοῖς θεοῖς ἐπὶ τῷ συντελέσαι αὐτοὺς ἃ ἐπηγγείλαντο αὐτῷ; UPZ 59, 10f [168 B.C.]; Philo, Spec. Leg. 1, 67; TestGad 7:6 v.l. ἐπὶ πᾶσι τῷ κυρίῳ; Jos., Ant. 1, 193) 1 Cor 1:4; Hs 9, 14, 3. W. (τινί and) ὅτι foll. Lk 18:11 (cp. 1QH 2:20 al.); J 11:41; 1 Cor 1:14; 1 Th 2:13; Rv 11:17; 1 Cl 38:2; IPhld 6:3; D 10:3, 4. W. acc. of content εὐχαριστεῖν ὅσα θέλουσιν do the eucharistic prayer (in as many words as) the prophets choose D 10:7. Abs. σὺ εὐχαριστεῖς you offer a prayer of thanksgiving 1 Cor 14:17; in wordplay do the Eucharist οὕτως εὐχαριστήσατε D 9:1; εὐχαριστήσατε 14:1; cp. 10:1. As a parenthetical clause εὐχαριστῶ τῷ θεῷ thanks be to God 1 Cor 14:18. Pass. (cp. Dssm., B 119 [BS 122]; Philo, Rer. Div. Her. 174 ἵνα ὑπὲρ τ. ἀγαθῶν ὁ θεὸς εὐχαριστῆται) ἵνα ἐκ πολλῶν προσώπων τὸ εἰς ἡμᾶς χάρισμα διὰ πολλῶν εὐχαριστηθῇ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν in order that thanks may be given by many persons on our behalf for the blessing granted to us 2 Cor 1:11 (on εὐ. τι s. above).—PSchubert, Form and Function of the Pauline Thanksgivings ’39. In a few passages the word could also mean

③ pray gener. (PTebt 56, 9 [II B.C.] εὐχαριστῆσαι τοῖς θεοῖς; PLond II, 413, 3 p. 301 and II, 418, 3 p. 303 [both Christ., c. 346 A.D.]; BGU 954, 4).—1 Cl 62:2 v.l. (for εὐαριστεῖν).—FHort, Εὐχαριστία, εὐχαριστεῖν (in Philo): JTS 3, 1902, 594–98; TSchermann, Εὐχαριστία and εὐχαριστεῖν: Philol 69, 1910, 375–410; GBoobyer, ‘Thanksgiving’ and the ‘Glory of God’ in Paul, diss. Heidelb. 1929; JMRobinson, Die Hodajot-Formel in Gebet und Hymnus des Frühchristentums, in: Apophoreta (Festschr. EHaenchen) ’64, 194–235; HPatsch, ZNW 62, ’71, 210–31; RAC VI, 900–928.—B. 1166. DELG s.v. χάρις. New Docs 127–29. M-M. EDNT. TW.

Ελληνικά-Αγγλικά παλαιοχριστιανική Λογοτεχνία > εὐχαριστέω
89 τύπος

τύπος, ου, ὁ (Aeschyl., Hdt.+; ins in var. senses: New Docs 4, 41f; loanw. in rabb.).

① a mark made as the result of a blow or pressure, mark, trace (Posidon.: 169 Fgm. 1 Jac.; Anth. Pal. 6, 57, 5 ὀδόντων; Athen. 13, 49, 585c τῶν πληγῶν; Diog. L. 7, 45; 50 of a seal-ring; ViJer 13 [p. 73, 10 Sch.]; Philo, Mos. 1, 119; Jos., Bell. 3, 420; PGM 4, 1429; 5, 307.—ὁ ἐκ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τ. ἐν διανοίᾳ γινόμενος Did., Gen. 217, 19) τῶν ἥλων J 20:25ab (v.l. τὸν τόπον).—This may be the place for οἱ τύποι τῶν λίθων Hs 9, 10, 1f (taking a stone out of the ground leaves a hole that bears the contours of the stone, but in effect the stone has made the impression; s. KLake, Apost. Fathers II, 1917; MDibelius, Hdb. But s. 4 below).

② embodiment of characteristics or function of a model, copy, image (cp. Artem. 2, 85 the children are τύπ. of their parents.—Cp. ὁ γὰρ ἥλιος ἐν τύπῳ θεοῦ ἐστιν Theoph. Ant. 2, 15 [p. 138, 8]) the master is a τύπος θεοῦ image of God to the slave B 19:7; D 4:11. The supervisor/bishop is τύπος τοῦ πατρός ITr 3:1; cp. IMg 6:1ab (in both instances here, τύπον is Zahn’s conjecture, favored by Lghtf., for τόπον, which is unanimously read by Gk. and Lat. mss., and which can be retained, with Funk, Hilgenfeld, Krüger, Bihlmeyer).

③ an object formed to resemble some entity, image, statue of any kind of material (Hdt. 3, 88,3 τύπ. λίθινος. Of images of the gods Herodian 5, 5, 6; Jos., Ant. 1, 311 τ. τύπους τῶν θεῶν; 15, 329; SibOr 3, 14) Ac 7:43 (Am 5:26).

④ a kind, class, or thing that suggests a model or pattern, form, figure, pattern (Aeschyl. et al.; Pla., Rep. 387c; 397c) ἐποίησεν ἡμᾶς ἄλλον τύπον he has made us people of a different stamp B 6:11. τύπος διδαχῆς pattern of teaching Ro 6:17 (cp. διδαχή 2; Iambl., Vi. Pyth. 23, 105 τὸν τύπον τῆς διδασκαλίας.—The use of τύπος for the imperial ‘rescripts’ [e.g. OGI 521, 5; s. note 4, esp. the reff. for θεῖος τύπος] appears too late to merit serious consideration.—JKürzinger, Biblica 39, ’58, 156–76; ELee, NTS 8, ’61/62, 166–73 [‘mold’]). Of the form (of expression) (Dionys. Hal., Ad Pomp. 4, 2 Rad.; PLips 121, 28 [II A.D.]; POxy 1460, 12) γράψας ἐπιστολὴν ἔχουσαν τὸν τύπον τοῦτον (cp. EpArist 34 ἐπιστολὴ τὸν τύπον ἔχουσα τοῦτον) somewhat as follows, after this manner, to this effect (so numerous versions) Ac 23:25, but s. next.—On τοὺς τύπους τῶν λίθων ἀναπληροῦν Hs 9, 10, 1 s. ἀναπληρόω 3 and 1 above.

⑤ the content of a document, text, content (Iambl., Vi. Pyth. 35, 259 τύπος τ. γεγραμμένων; 3 Macc 3:30; PFlor 278 II, 20 [III A.D.] τῷ αὐτῷ τύπῳ κ. χρόνῳ=of the same content and date) Ac 23:25 (EpArist 34 ἐπιστολὴ τὸν τύπον ἔχουσα τοῦτον). Cp. POxy 3366, 28 (of a copy of a letter), 32 (the original). S. New Docs 1, 77f (with caution against confusing rhetorical practice in composition of speeches and the inclusion of letters whose value lay in their verbatim expression). For a difft. view s. 4 above; more ambivalently Hemer, Acts 347f.

⑥ an archetype serving as a model, type, pattern, model (Pla., Rep. 379a περὶ θεολογίας)

ⓐ technically design, pattern (Diod S 14, 41, 4) Ac 7:44; Hb 8:5 (cp. on both Ex 25:40).

ⓑ in the moral life example, pattern (OGI 383, 212 [I B.C.] τ. εὐσεβείας; SibOr 1, 380; Did., Gen. 125, 27; in a pejorative sense 4 Macc 6:19 ἀσεβείας τύπ.) τύπος γίνου τῶν πιστῶν 1 Ti 4:12.—Phil 3:17; 1 Th 1:7; 2 Th 3:9; Tit 2:7; 1 Pt 5:3; IMg 6:2.—S. ESelwyn, 1 Pt ’46, 298f.

ⓒ of the types given by God as an indication of the future, in the form of persons or things (cp. Philo, Op. M. 157; Iren. 1, 6, 4 [Harv. I 74, 3]); of Adam: τύπος τοῦ μέλλοντος (Ἀδάμ) a type of the Adam to come (i.e. of Christ) Ro 5:14. Cp. 1 Cor 10:6, 11 v.l.; B 7:3, 7, 10f; 8:1; 12:2, 5f, 10; 13:5. χριστὸς Ἰησοῦς … ἑαυτὸν τύπον ἔδειξε Jesus Christ showed himself as the prime exemplar of the resurrection AcPlCor 2:6 (cp. Just., D. 40, 1 τύπος ἦν τοῦ χριστοῦ). Also of the pictorial symbols that Hermas sees, and their deeper meaning Hv 3, 11, 4. The vision serves εἰς τύπον τῆς θλίψεως τῆς ἐπερχομένης as a symbol or foreshadowing of the tribulation to come 4, 1, 1; cp. 4, 2, 5; 4, 3, 6. The two trees are to be εἰς τύπον τοῖς δούλοις τοῦ θεοῦ Hs 2:2a; cp. b.—ἐν τύπῳ χωρίου Ῥωμαίων IRo ins is a conjecture by Zahn for ἐν τόπῳ χ. Ῥ., which is read by all mss. and makes good sense.—AvBlumenthal, Τύπος u. παράδειγμα: Her 63, 1928, 391–414; LGoppelt, Typos. D. typolog. Deutung des AT im Neuen ’39; RBultmann, TLZ 75, ’50, cols. 205–12; AFridrichsen et al., The Root of the Vine (typology) ’53; GLampe and KWoollcombe, Essays in Typology, ’57; KOstmeyer, NTS 46, ’00, 112–31.—New Docs 1, 77f; 4, 41. DELG s.v. τύπτω B. M-M. EDNT. TW. Spicq. Sv.

Ελληνικά-Αγγλικά παλαιοχριστιανική Λογοτεχνία > τύπος
90 Logic

   1) The Science of Logic Finds Ordinary Language to Be an Obstacle

   My initial step... was to attempt to reduce the concept of ordering in a sequence to that of logical consequence, so as to proceed from there to the concept of number. To prevent anything intuitive from penetrating here unnoticed, I had to bend every effort to keep the chain of inference free of gaps. In attempting to comply with this requirement in the strictest possible way, I found the inadequacy of language to be an obstacle. (Frege, 1972, p. 104)

   2) Logic Is a Microscope

   I believe I can make the relation of my 'conceptual notation' to ordinary language clearest if I compare it to the relation of the microscope to the eye. The latter, because of the range of its applicability and because of the ease with which it can adapt itself to the most varied circumstances, has a great superiority over the microscope. Of course, viewed as an optical instrument it reveals many imperfections, which usually remain unnoticed only because of its intimate connection with mental life. But as soon as scientific purposes place strong requirements upon sharpness of resolution, the eye proves to be inadequate.... Similarly, this 'conceptual notation' is devised for particular scientific purposes; and therefore one may not condemn it because it is useless for other purposes. (Frege, 1972, pp. 104-105)

   3) Logic Carries on an Unceasing Struggle with Psychology

   To sum up brieﬂy, it is the business of the logician to conduct an unceasing struggle against psychology and those parts of language and grammar which fail to give untrammeled expression to what is logical. He does not have to answer the question: How does thinking normally take place in human beings? What course does it naturally follow in the human mind? What is natural to one person may well be unnatural to another. (Frege, 1979, pp. 6-7)

   4) Logic Should Replace the Ordinary Language of Everyday Discourse

   We are very dependent on external aids in our thinking, and there is no doubt that the language of everyday life-so far, at least, as a certain area of discourse is concerned-had first to be replaced by a more sophisticated instrument, before certain distinctions could be noticed. But so far the academic world has, for the most part, disdained to master this instrument. (Frege, 1979, pp. 6-7)

   5) Logic Is Unnatural

   There is no reproach the logician need fear less than the reproach that his way of formulating things is unnatural.... If we were to heed those who object that logic is unnatural, we would run the risk of becoming embroiled in interminable disputes about what is natural, disputes which are quite incapable of being resolved within the province of logic. (Frege, 1979, p. 128)

   6) The Significance of " Baby Logic" for Linguistics

   [L]inguists will be forced, internally as it were, to come to grips with the results of modern logic. Indeed, this is apparently already happening to some extent. By "logic" is not meant here recursive function-theory, California model-theory, constructive proof-theory, or even axiomatic settheory. Such areas may or may not be useful for linguistics. Rather under "logic" are included our good old friends, the homely locutions "and," "or," "if-then," "if and only if," "not," "for all x," "for some x," and "is identical with," plus the calculus of individuals, event-logic, syntax, denotational semantics, and... various parts of pragmatics.... It is to these that the linguist can most profitably turn for help. These are his tools. And they are "clean tools," to borrow a phrase of the late J. L. Austin in another context, in fact, the only really clean ones we have, so that we might as well use them as much as we can. But they constitute only what may be called "baby logic." Baby logic is to the linguist what "baby mathematics" (in the phrase of Murray Gell-Mann) is to the theoretical physicist-very elementary but indispensable domains of theory in both cases. (Martin, 1969, pp. 261-262)

   7) The Existence of a Mental Logic Denied

   There appears to be no branch of deductive inference that requires us to assume the existence of a mental logic in order to do justice to the psychological phenomena. To be logical, an individual requires, not formal rules of inference, but a tacit knowledge of the fundamental semantic principle governing any inference; a deduction is valid provided that there is no way of interpreting the premises correctly that is inconsistent with the conclusion. Logic provides a systematic method for searching for such counter-examples. The empirical evidence suggests that ordinary individuals possess no such methods. (Johnson-Laird, quoted in Mehler, Walker & Garrett, 1982, p. 130)

   8) The Fundamental Paradox of Logic

   The fundamental paradox of logic [that "there is no class (as a totality) of those classes which, each taken as a totality, do not belong to themselves" (Russell to Frege, 16 June 1902, in van Heijenoort, 1967, p. 125)] is with us still, bequeathed by Russell-by way of philosophy, mathematics, and even computer science-to the whole of twentieth-century thought. Twentieth-century philosophy would begin not with a foundation for logic, as Russell had hoped in 1900, but with the discovery in 1901 that no such foundation can be laid. (Everdell, 1997, p. 184)

Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Logic
91 Mind

   1) To Know the Different Operations of the Mind

   It becomes, therefore, no inconsiderable part of science... to know the different operations of the mind, to separate them from each other, to class them under their proper heads, and to correct all that seeming disorder in which they lie involved when made the object of reﬂection and inquiry.... It cannot be doubted that the mind is endowed with several powers and faculties, that these powers are distinct from one another, and that what is really distinct to the immediate perception may be distinguished by reﬂection and, consequently, that there is a truth and falsehood which lie not beyond the compass of human understanding. (Hume, 1955, p. 22)

   2) The Mind Is Furnished by Experience

   Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white Paper, void of all Characters, without any Ideas: How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store, which the busy and boundless Fancy of Man has painted on it, with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of Reason and Knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from Experience. (Locke, quoted in Herrnstein & Boring, 1965, p. 584)

   3) Mythical Thought Is as Rigorous as That of Modern Science

   The kind of logic in mythical thought is as rigorous as that of modern science, and... the difference lies, not in the quality of the intellectual process, but in the nature of things to which it is applied.... Man has always been thinking equally well; the improvement lies, not in an alleged progress of man's mind, but in the discovery of new areas to which it may apply its unchanged and unchanging powers. (Leґvi-Strauss, 1963, p. 230)

   4) The Mind Has Nothing But Itself to Know Itself

   MIND. A mysterious form of matter secreted by the brain. Its chief activity consists in the endeavor to ascertain its own nature, the futility of the attempt being due to the fact that it has nothing but itself to know itself with. (Bierce, quoted in Minsky, 1986, p. 55)

   5) To Know Is to Represent Accurately

   [Philosophy] understands the foundations of knowledge and it finds these foundations in a study of man-as-knower, of the "mental processes" or the "activity of representation" which make knowledge possible. To know is to represent accurately what is outside the mind, so to understand the possibility and nature of knowledge is to understand the way in which the mind is able to construct such representation.... We owe the notion of a "theory of knowledge" based on an understanding of "mental processes" to the seventeenth century, and especially to Locke. We owe the notion of "the mind" as a separate entity in which "processes" occur to the same period, and especially to Descartes. We owe the notion of philosophy as a tribunal of pure reason, upholding or denying the claims of the rest of culture, to the eighteenth century and especially to Kant, but this Kantian notion presupposed general assent to Lockean notions of mental processes and Cartesian notions of mental substance. (Rorty, 1979, pp. 3-4)

   6) The Question of Mind in Relation to Machine

   Under pressure from the computer, the question of mind in relation to machine is becoming a central cultural preoccupation. It is becoming for us what sex was to Victorians-threat, obsession, taboo, and fascination. (Turkle, 1984, p. 313)

   7) Understanding the Mind Remains as Resistant to Neurological as to Cognitive Analyses

   Recent years have been exciting for researchers in the brain and cognitive sciences. Both fields have ﬂourished, each spurred on by methodological and conceptual developments, and although understanding the mechanisms of mind is an objective shared by many workers in these areas, their theories and approaches to the problem are vastly different....

   Early experimental psychologists, such as Wundt and James, were as interested in and knowledgeable about the anatomy and physiology of the nervous system as about the young science of the mind. However, the experimental study of mental processes was short-lived, being eclipsed by the rise of behaviorism early in this century. It was not until the late 1950s that the signs of a new mentalism first appeared in scattered writings of linguists, philosophers, computer enthusiasts, and psychologists.

   In this new incarnation, the science of mind had a specific mission: to challenge and replace behaviorism. In the meantime, brain science had in many ways become allied with a behaviorist approach.... While behaviorism sought to reduce the mind to statements about bodily action, brain science seeks to explain the mind in terms of physiochemical events occurring in the nervous system. These approaches contrast with contemporary cognitive science, which tries to understand the mind as it is, without any reduction, a view sometimes described as functionalism.

   The cognitive revolution is now in place. Cognition is the subject of contemporary psychology. This was achieved with little or no talk of neurons, action potentials, and neurotransmitters. Similarly, neuroscience has risen to an esteemed position among the biological sciences without much talk of cognitive processes. Do the fields need each other?... [Y]es because the problem of understanding the mind, unlike the wouldbe problem solvers, respects no disciplinary boundaries. It remains as resistant to neurological as to cognitive analyses. (LeDoux & Hirst, 1986, pp. 1-2)

   8) Approaches to the Study of the Mind

   Since the Second World War scientists from different disciplines have turned to the study of the human mind. Computer scientists have tried to emulate its capacity for visual perception. Linguists have struggled with the puzzle of how children acquire language. Ethologists have sought the innate roots of social behaviour. Neurophysiologists have begun to relate the function of nerve cells to complex perceptual and motor processes. Neurologists and neuropsychologists have used the pattern of competence and incompetence of their brain-damaged patients to elucidate the normal workings of the brain. Anthropologists have examined the conceptual structure of cultural practices to advance hypotheses about the basic principles of the mind. These days one meets engineers who work on speech perception, biologists who investigate the mental representation of spatial relations, and physicists who want to understand consciousness. And, of course, psychologists continue to study perception, memory, thought and action.

... [W]orkers in many disciplines have converged on a number of central problems and explanatory ideas. They have realized that no single approach is likely to unravel the workings of the mind: it will not give up its secrets to psychology alone; nor is any other isolated discipline-artificial intelligence, linguistics, anthropology, neurophysiology, philosophy-going to have any greater success. (Johnson-Laird, 1988, p. 7)

Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Mind
92 Bibliography

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Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Bibliography

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