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101 κονίς
Grammatical information: f.Meaning: `eggs of lice, fleas, bugs' (Arist., Antyll. ap. Orib., Hdn.).Other forms: mostly. pl. κονίδες f.Derivatives: κονιδισμός `disease of the eyelids' (Cyran.; on the formation Chantraine Formation 142ff.).Etymology: Old word, to which several languages have cognates. Closest are Germ. OE knitu, OHG (h)niz ` Niss' and Alb. thënī́ `louse', which will go back on IE. *ḱnid- (Gr. κονίς after κόνις? Georgacas Glotta 36, 164). Beside it with IE. gh- Slav., e. g. Russ. gnída, Latv. gnĩda, NGerm., e. g. OWNo. gnit `louse'. With -l- Lith. glìnda `id.', which resembles Lat. lēns, lendis `id.'. Diff. again Celt., e. g. MIr. sned f. `id.' (IE. * snidā) and Arm. anic `Laus' (IE. *sn̥nid-s-?). - Because of folketymological, euphemistic, tabooistic changes no uniform proto-form van be reconstructed. Connection with κναίω, κνίζω gives a problem for Alb. thënī́ which has an initial platal. The Slavisc and NGerm. forms have been connected with a verb for `gnaw through, rub' (Gr. χνίει, χναύω etc.). - Details in Pok. 608 a. 437, W.-Hofmann a. Ernout-Meillet s. 2. lēns, Fraenkel Lit. et. Wb. s. glìnda, Vasmer Russ. et. Wb. s. gnída.Page in Frisk: 1,912-913Greek-English etymological dictionary (Ελληνικά-Αγγλικά ετυμολογική λεξικό) > κονίς
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102 Toyota production system
Opsa manufacturing system, developed by Toyota in Japan after World War II, which aims to increase production efficiency by the elimination of waste in all its forms. The Toyota production system was invented, and made to work, by Taiichi Ohno. Japan’s fledgling car-making industry was suffering from poor productivity, and Ohno was brought into Toyota with an initial assignment of catching up with the productivity levels of Ford’s car plants. In analyzing the problem, he decided that although Japanese workers must be working at the same rate as their American counterparts, waste and inefficiency were the main causes of their different productivity levels. Ohno identified waste in a number of forms, including overproduction, waiting time, transportation problems, inefficient processing, inventory, and defective products. The philosophy of TPS is to remove or minimize the influence of all these elements. In order to achieve this, TPS evolved to operate under lean production conditions. It is made up of soft, or cultural aspects, such as automation with the human touch— autonomation—and hard, or technical, aspects, which include just-in-time, kanban, and production smoothing. Each aspect is equally important and complementary. TPS has proven itself to be one of the most efficient manufacturing systems in the world but although leading companies have adopted it in one form or another, few have been able to replicate the success of Toyota.Abbr. TPS -
103 Girard, Philippe de
SUBJECT AREA: Textiles[br]b. 1775 Franced. 1845[br]French developer of a successful flax-heckling machine for the preparation of fibres for power-spinning.[br]Early drawing and spinning processes failed to give linen yarn the requisite fineness and homogeneity. In 1810 Napoleon offered a prize of a million francs for a successful flax-spinning machine as part of his policy of stimulating the French textile industries. Spurred on by this offer, Girard suggested three improvements. He was too late to win the prize, but his ideas were patented in England in 1814, although not under his own name. He proposed that the fibres should be soaked in a very hot alkaline solution both before drawing and immediately before they went to the spindles. The actual drawing was to be done by passing the dried material through combs or gills that moved alternately; gill drawing was taken up in England in 1816. His method of wet spinning was never a commercial success, but his processes were adopted in part and developed in Britain and spread to Austria, Poland and France, for his ideas were essentially good and produced a superior product. The successful power-spinning of linen thread from flax depended primarily upon the initial processes of heckling and drawing. The heckling of the bundles or stricks of flax, so as to separate the long fibres of "line" from the shorter ones of "tow", was extremely difficult to mechanize, for each strick had to be combed on both sides in turn and then in the reverse direction. It was to this problem that Girard next turned his attention, inventing a successful machine in 1832 that subsequently was improved in England. The strick was placed between two vertical sheets of combs that moved opposite to each other, depositing the tow upon a revolving cylinder covered with a brush at the bottom of the machine, while the holder from which the strick was suspended moved up and down so as to help the teeth to penetrate deeper into the flax. The tow was removed from the cylinder at the bottom of the machine and taken away to be spun like cotton. The long line fibres were removed from the top of the machine and required further processing if the yarn was to be uniform.When N.L.Sadi Carnot's book Réflexions sur la puissance motrice du feu, was published in 1824, Girard made a favourable report on it.[br]Further ReadingM.Daumas (ed.), 1968, Histoire générale des techniques, Vol. III: L'Expansion duMachinisme, Paris.C.Singer (ed.), 1958, A History of'Technology, Vol. IV, Oxford: Clarendon Press. T.K.Derry and T.I.Williams, 1960, A Short History of Technology from the EarliestTimes to AD 1900, Oxford.W.A.McCutcheon, 1966–7, "Water power in the North of Ireland", Transactions of the Newcomen Society 39 (discusses the spinning of flax and mentions Girard).RLH -
104 Whitney, Eli
[br]b. 8 December 1765 Westborough, Massachusetts, USAd. 8 January 1825 New Haven, Connecticut, USA[br]American inventor of the cotton gin and manufacturer of firearms.[br]The son of a prosperous farmer, Eli Whitney as a teenager showed more interest in mechanics than school work. At the age of 15 he began an enterprise business manufacturing nails in his father's workshop, even having to hire help to fulfil his orders. He later determined to acquire a university education and, his father having declined to provide funds, he taught at local schools to obtain the means to attend Leicester Academy, Massachusetts, in preparation for his entry to Yale in 1789. He graduated in 1792 and then decided to study law. He accepted a position in Georgia as a tutor that would have given him time for study; this post did not materialize, but on his journey south he met General Nathanael Greene's widow and the manager of her plantations, Phineas Miller (1764–1803). A feature of agriculture in the southern states was that the land was unsuitable for long-staple cotton but could yield large crops of green-seed cotton. Green-seed cotton was difficult to separate from its seed, and when Whitney learned of the problem in 1793 he quickly devised a machine known as the cotton gin, which provided an effective solution. He formed a partnership with Miller to manufacture the gin and in 1794 obtained a patent. This invention made possible the extraordinary growth of the cotton industry in the United States, but the patent was widely infringed and it was not until 1807, after amendment of the patent laws, that Whitney was able to obtain a favourable decision in the courts and some financial return.In 1798 Whitney was in financial difficulties following the failure of the initial legal action against infringement of the cotton gin patent, but in that year he obtained a government contract to supply 10,000 muskets within two years with generous advance payments. He built a factory at New Haven, Connecticut, and proposed to use a new method of manufacture, perhaps the first application of the system of interchangeable parts. He failed to supply the firearms in the specified time, and in fact the first 500 guns were not delivered until 1801 and the full contract was not completed until 1809.In 1812 Whitney made application for a renewal of his cotton gin patent, but this was refused. In the same year, however, he obtained a second contract from the Government for 15,000 firearms and a similar one from New York State which ensured the success of his business.[br]Further ReadingJ.Mirsky and A.Nevins, 1952, The World of Eli Whitney, New York (a good biography). P.J.Federico, 1960, "Records of Eli Whitney's cotton gin patent", Technology and Culture 1: 168–76 (for details of the cotton gin patent).R.S.Woodbury, 1960, The legend of Eli Whitney and interchangeable parts', Technology and Culture 1:235–53 (challenges the traditional view of Eli Whitney as the sole originator of the "American" system of manufacture).See also Technology and Culture 14(1973):592–8; 18(1977):146–8; 19(1978):609–11.RTS -
105 теорема Коши
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106 γεύομαι
γεύομαι fut. γεύσομαι, 1 aor. ἐγευσάμην (Hom. et al.; pap, LXX; TestReub 1:10 [v.l. ἔφαγον]; TestZeb 4:2; TestJos 6:3; JosAs 10:20; ApcEsdr 7:1 p. 32, 8 Tdf.; ApcMos, Philo, Joseph.) to have perception of someth. either by mouth or by experience, esp. in ref. to relatively small quantity.① to partake of someth. by mouth, taste, partake of w. acc. (rarely in Gk. lit. with this verb [for acc. w. verbs of consumption, but not γεύομαι, s. Kühner-G. I 356, 2]: Anth. Pal. 6, 120 ἔρσης ἰκμάδα γευόμενος ‘tasting the juicy dew’; also Sb 1106 οἱ συμπόσιον γευόμενοι; 1 Km 14:43; Job 12:11; 34:3; Tob 7:12 BA) water J 2:9. μηδὲν εἰ μὴ ἄρτον καὶ ὕδωρ Hs 5, 3, 7. W. gen. of thing (Crates, Ep. 14 ἰχθύος κ. οἴνου; Dio Chrys. 2, 47; POxy 658, 12; 1576, 4 τοῦ οἴνου; 1 Km 14:24; 2 Km 3:35 al.): a meal=take part in it Lk 14:24. μηδενός (Jos., Ant. 7, 42) Ac 23:14; poisonous plants ITr 11:1. The obj. of the verb is indicated by the context Mt 27:34; Ac 20:11. μὴ ἅψῃ μηδὲ γεύσῃ μηδὲ θίγῃς Col 2:21 (s. ἅπτω 3).—Abs. with apparent ref. to the initial phase of dining γεύομαι= eat (ins Sb 1944; Tob 2:4 BA ‘left his meal untouched’; Jos., Ant. 6, 119 ‘taste’ in contrast to ‘eat’ [ἐσθίω]; 338 the witch of Endor urges Saul to ‘take some food’ [in contrast to his fasting]; cp. Appian, Bell. Civ. 2, 98 §407 ‘dine’) Ac 10:10.② to experience someth. cognitively or emotionally, come to know someth. fig. ext. of 1 (Hom. et al.; Pr 31:18; Pfuhl-Möbius II, 1310, 8 ‘taste of words’, or lit.). W. gen. of thing (Pind., N. 6, 24 πόνων; Hdt. 6, 5 ἐλευθερίης; Lycophron vs. 1431 φυγῆς [of Xerxes]; Dio Chrys. 15 [32], 72 πολέμου; Ael. Aristid. 28, 60 K.=49 p. 510 D.: ἀλαζονείας; Maximus Tyr. 33, 4c ἡδονῶν): θανάτου (analogous to rabb. טָעַם מִיתָה [Billerb. I 751f; 4 Esdr 6:26]; Leonidas in Anth. Pal. 7, 662 ἀδελφὸν ἀστόργου γευσάμενον θανάτου; cp. γ. ζωῆς IGUR III, 1216, 1; s. HRüger, ZNW 59, ’68, 113f) Mt 16:28; Mk 9:1; Lk 9:27; J 8:52; Hb 2:9; Ox 654, 5 (where θανάτου is supplied)=ASyn. 247, 20; partake of knowledge 1 Cl 36:2 (cp. Herm. Wr. 10, 8 γ. ἀθανασίας; Philo, Virt. 188 σοφίας al.; Jos., Bell. 2, 158); obtain a gift Hb 6:4. W. acc. of thing (B-D-F §169): a word of God vs. 5. W. ὅτι foll.: γεύσασθαι ὅτι χρηστὸς ὁ κύριος experience the Lord’s kindness 1 Pt 2:3 (Ps 33:9); RPerdelwitz, D. Mysterienrel. u. d. Problem des 1 Pt 1911, 65ff.—B. 1030. DELG. M-M. New Docs 4, 41. TW. -
107 Language
Philosophy is written in that great book, the universe, which is always open, right before our eyes. But one cannot understand this book without first learning to understand the language and to know the characters in which it is written. It is written in the language of mathematics, and the characters are triangles, circles, and other figures. Without these, one cannot understand a single word of it, and just wanders in a dark labyrinth. (Galileo, 1990, p. 232)It never happens that it [a nonhuman animal] arranges its speech in various ways in order to reply appropriately to everything that may be said in its presence, as even the lowest type of man can do. (Descartes, 1970a, p. 116)It is a very remarkable fact that there are none so depraved and stupid, without even excepting idiots, that they cannot arrange different words together, forming of them a statement by which they make known their thoughts; while, on the other hand, there is no other animal, however perfect and fortunately circumstanced it may be, which can do the same. (Descartes, 1967, p. 116)Human beings do not live in the object world alone, nor alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression for their society. It is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially without the use of language and that language is merely an incidental means of solving specific problems of communication or reflection. The fact of the matter is that the "real world" is to a large extent unconsciously built on the language habits of the group.... We see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do because the language habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation. (Sapir, 1921, p. 75)It powerfully conditions all our thinking about social problems and processes.... No two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the same social reality. The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same worlds with different labels attached. (Sapir, 1985, p. 162)[A list of language games, not meant to be exhaustive:]Giving orders, and obeying them- Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements- Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)Reporting an eventSpeculating about an eventForming and testing a hypothesisPresenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagramsMaking up a story; and reading itPlay actingSinging catchesGuessing riddlesMaking a joke; and telling itSolving a problem in practical arithmeticTranslating from one language into anotherLANGUAGE Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, and praying-. (Wittgenstein, 1953, Pt. I, No. 23, pp. 11 e-12 e)We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages.... The world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds-and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds.... No individual is free to describe nature with absolute impartiality but is constrained to certain modes of interpretation even while he thinks himself most free. (Whorf, 1956, pp. 153, 213-214)We dissect nature along the lines laid down by our native languages.The categories and types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do not find there because they stare every observer in the face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds-and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds.... We are thus introduced to a new principle of relativity, which holds that all observers are not led by the same physical evidence to the same picture of the universe, unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar or can in some way be calibrated. (Whorf, 1956, pp. 213-214)9) The Forms of a Person's Thoughts Are Controlled by Unperceived Patterns of His Own LanguageThe forms of a person's thoughts are controlled by inexorable laws of pattern of which he is unconscious. These patterns are the unperceived intricate systematizations of his own language-shown readily enough by a candid comparison and contrast with other languages, especially those of a different linguistic family. (Whorf, 1956, p. 252)It has come to be commonly held that many utterances which look like statements are either not intended at all, or only intended in part, to record or impart straightforward information about the facts.... Many traditional philosophical perplexities have arisen through a mistake-the mistake of taking as straightforward statements of fact utterances which are either (in interesting non-grammatical ways) nonsensical or else intended as something quite different. (Austin, 1962, pp. 2-3)In general, one might define a complex of semantic components connected by logical constants as a concept. The dictionary of a language is then a system of concepts in which a phonological form and certain syntactic and morphological characteristics are assigned to each concept. This system of concepts is structured by several types of relations. It is supplemented, furthermore, by redundancy or implicational rules..., representing general properties of the whole system of concepts.... At least a relevant part of these general rules is not bound to particular languages, but represents presumably universal structures of natural languages. They are not learned, but are rather a part of the human ability to acquire an arbitrary natural language. (Bierwisch, 1970, pp. 171-172)In studying the evolution of mind, we cannot guess to what extent there are physically possible alternatives to, say, transformational generative grammar, for an organism meeting certain other physical conditions characteristic of humans. Conceivably, there are none-or very few-in which case talk about evolution of the language capacity is beside the point. (Chomsky, 1972, p. 98)[It is] truth value rather than syntactic well-formedness that chiefly governs explicit verbal reinforcement by parents-which renders mildly paradoxical the fact that the usual product of such a training schedule is an adult whose speech is highly grammatical but not notably truthful. (R. O. Brown, 1973, p. 330)he conceptual base is responsible for formally representing the concepts underlying an utterance.... A given word in a language may or may not have one or more concepts underlying it.... On the sentential level, the utterances of a given language are encoded within a syntactic structure of that language. The basic construction of the sentential level is the sentence.The next highest level... is the conceptual level. We call the basic construction of this level the conceptualization. A conceptualization consists of concepts and certain relations among those concepts. We can consider that both levels exist at the same point in time and that for any unit on one level, some corresponding realizate exists on the other level. This realizate may be null or extremely complex.... Conceptualizations may relate to other conceptualizations by nesting or other specified relationships. (Schank, 1973, pp. 191-192)The mathematics of multi-dimensional interactive spaces and lattices, the projection of "computer behavior" on to possible models of cerebral functions, the theoretical and mechanical investigation of artificial intelligence, are producing a stream of sophisticated, often suggestive ideas.But it is, I believe, fair to say that nothing put forward until now in either theoretic design or mechanical mimicry comes even remotely in reach of the most rudimentary linguistic realities. (Steiner, 1975, p. 284)The step from the simple tool to the master tool, a tool to make tools (what we would now call a machine tool), seems to me indeed to parallel the final step to human language, which I call reconstitution. It expresses in a practical and social context the same understanding of hierarchy, and shows the same analysis by function as a basis for synthesis. (Bronowski, 1977, pp. 127-128)t is the language donn eґ in which we conduct our lives.... We have no other. And the danger is that formal linguistic models, in their loosely argued analogy with the axiomatic structure of the mathematical sciences, may block perception.... It is quite conceivable that, in language, continuous induction from simple, elemental units to more complex, realistic forms is not justified. The extent and formal "undecidability" of context-and every linguistic particle above the level of the phoneme is context-bound-may make it impossible, except in the most abstract, meta-linguistic sense, to pass from "pro-verbs," "kernals," or "deep deep structures" to actual speech. (Steiner, 1975, pp. 111-113)A higher-level formal language is an abstract machine. (Weizenbaum, 1976, p. 113)Jakobson sees metaphor and metonymy as the characteristic modes of binarily opposed polarities which between them underpin the two-fold process of selection and combination by which linguistic signs are formed.... Thus messages are constructed, as Saussure said, by a combination of a "horizontal" movement, which combines words together, and a "vertical" movement, which selects the particular words from the available inventory or "inner storehouse" of the language. The combinative (or syntagmatic) process manifests itself in contiguity (one word being placed next to another) and its mode is metonymic. The selective (or associative) process manifests itself in similarity (one word or concept being "like" another) and its mode is metaphoric. The "opposition" of metaphor and metonymy therefore may be said to represent in effect the essence of the total opposition between the synchronic mode of language (its immediate, coexistent, "vertical" relationships) and its diachronic mode (its sequential, successive, lineal progressive relationships). (Hawkes, 1977, pp. 77-78)It is striking that the layered structure that man has given to language constantly reappears in his analyses of nature. (Bronowski, 1977, p. 121)First, [an ideal intertheoretic reduction] provides us with a set of rules"correspondence rules" or "bridge laws," as the standard vernacular has it-which effect a mapping of the terms of the old theory (T o) onto a subset of the expressions of the new or reducing theory (T n). These rules guide the application of those selected expressions of T n in the following way: we are free to make singular applications of their correspondencerule doppelgangers in T o....Second, and equally important, a successful reduction ideally has the outcome that, under the term mapping effected by the correspondence rules, the central principles of T o (those of semantic and systematic importance) are mapped onto general sentences of T n that are theorems of Tn. (P. Churchland, 1979, p. 81)If non-linguistic factors must be included in grammar: beliefs, attitudes, etc. [this would] amount to a rejection of the initial idealization of language as an object of study. A priori such a move cannot be ruled out, but it must be empirically motivated. If it proves to be correct, I would conclude that language is a chaos that is not worth studying.... Note that the question is not whether beliefs or attitudes, and so on, play a role in linguistic behavior and linguistic judgments... [but rather] whether distinct cognitive structures can be identified, which interact in the real use of language and linguistic judgments, the grammatical system being one of these. (Chomsky, 1979, pp. 140, 152-153)23) Language Is Inevitably Influenced by Specific Contexts of Human InteractionLanguage cannot be studied in isolation from the investigation of "rationality." It cannot afford to neglect our everyday assumptions concerning the total behavior of a reasonable person.... An integrational linguistics must recognize that human beings inhabit a communicational space which is not neatly compartmentalized into language and nonlanguage.... It renounces in advance the possibility of setting up systems of forms and meanings which will "account for" a central core of linguistic behavior irrespective of the situation and communicational purposes involved. (Harris, 1981, p. 165)By innate [linguistic knowledge], Chomsky simply means "genetically programmed." He does not literally think that children are born with language in their heads ready to be spoken. He merely claims that a "blueprint is there, which is brought into use when the child reaches a certain point in her general development. With the help of this blueprint, she analyzes the language she hears around her more readily than she would if she were totally unprepared for the strange gabbling sounds which emerge from human mouths. (Aitchison, 1987, p. 31)Looking at ourselves from the computer viewpoint, we cannot avoid seeing that natural language is our most important "programming language." This means that a vast portion of our knowledge and activity is, for us, best communicated and understood in our natural language.... One could say that natural language was our first great original artifact and, since, as we increasingly realize, languages are machines, so natural language, with our brains to run it, was our primal invention of the universal computer. One could say this except for the sneaking suspicion that language isn't something we invented but something we became, not something we constructed but something in which we created, and recreated, ourselves. (Leiber, 1991, p. 8)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Language
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108 начально
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109 медицинская комиссия МОК
медицинская комиссия МОК
Медицинская комиссия была создана в 1967 году для борьбы с обострившейся проблемой допинга в спортивном мире. Первоначальная цель учреждения структуры допинг-контроля была быстро расширена, охватив три следующих фундаментальных принципа:
• защита здоровья спортсменов;
• соблюдение медицинской и спортивной этики;
• равенство всех соревнующихся спортсменов.
Во время Олимпийских игр члены медицинской комиссии МОК осуществляют наблюдение, оценку и предоставление медицинского обслуживания, а также выполнение функций допинг-контроля.
[Департамент лингвистических услуг Оргкомитета «Сочи 2014». Глоссарий терминов]EN
IOC medical commission (IOC MC)
Medical commission was created in 1967 in order to deal with the increasing problem of doping in the world of sports. The initial goal of putting in place a doping control structure was rapidly widened to encompass the following three fundamental principles:
• protection of the health of athletes
• respect for both medical and sport ethics
• equality for all competing athletes.the Olympic Games, members of the IOC medical commission observe, assess, and support the medical services and doping control functions.
[Департамент лингвистических услуг Оргкомитета «Сочи 2014». Глоссарий терминов]Тематики
EN
Русско-английский словарь нормативно-технической терминологии > медицинская комиссия МОК
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