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inference+problem

  • 21 аппаратный узел решения задач и логических выводов

    Универсальный русско-английский словарь > аппаратный узел решения задач и логических выводов

  • 22 проблемно-привязанный вывод

    Универсальный русско-английский словарь > проблемно-привязанный вывод

  • 23 аппаратные средства решения задач и выводов

    Makarov: (логических) problem-solving and inference machine

    Универсальный русско-английский словарь > аппаратные средства решения задач и выводов

  • 24 аппаратный узел решения задач и выводов

    Makarov: (логических) problem-solving and inference machine

    Универсальный русско-английский словарь > аппаратный узел решения задач и выводов

  • 25 ὑπόθεσις

    ὑπόθεσις, εως, ἡ, ([etym.] ὑποτίθημι, ὑποτίθεμαι)
    A proposal, proposed action,

    τὴν ἐν φίλοις δικαιοτάτην ὑ. ἔχω ὑποτιθέναι X.Cyr.5.5.13

    ;

    ἵνα σὺ τὰ σαυτοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὑ. ὅπως ἂν βούλῃ περαίνῃς Pl.Grg. 454c

    ; intention, policy,

    πολλὰ πρᾶξαι πρὸς τὴν ὑ. τῆς πατρίδος ὡς συχνῆς ἀδικίας δεομένην Thphr.Fr. 136

    ;

    διὰ τὴν ὑ. τῆς πολιτείας.. ἠναγκάζετο χρῆσθαι τοῖς ὑπουργοῦσι Plu.Caes.51

    ; πρὸς ὑ. τινα ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν men good for a particular policy, Arist.Pol. 1293b4; ὑ. τῆς δημοκρατικῆς πολιτείας ἐλευθερία ib. 1317a40; ἡμῖν ἡ τῶν νόμων ὑ. ἐνταῦθα ἔβλεπεν, ὅπως .. Pl.Lg. 743c;

    περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν οὐχ ὁμοίως ἅπασι βουλευτέον, ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἕκαστοι τοῦ βίου ποιήσωνται τὴν ὑ. Isoc.6.90

    ;

    τοῖς φαύλοις ἐνδέχεται τὰ τυχόντα πράττειν· εὐθὺς γὰρ τοῦ βίου τοιαύτην πεποίηνται τὴν ὑ. Id.1.48

    ;

    ἀνάγκη τοῖς περὶ ὅλων τῶν πραγμάτων καλὰς τὰς ὑ. πεποιημένοις καὶ τὰ μέρη τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἔχειν ἐκείνοις Id.7.28

    ;

    πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ὑ. ἀποβλέποντες ἄμεινον βουλευσόμεθα καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων Id.8.18

    ;

    ἐξέστητε τῆς ὑ. ἐφ' ἧς ὑμᾶς οἱ πρόγονοι κατέλιπον D.10.46

    ; οἱ τῆς αὐτῆς ὑ. προεστῶτες those who advocated the same policy, Plb.30.32.12;

    ἅπαντας ἀπονεύσειν ἐπ' ἐκείνην τὴν ὑ. Id.24.9.7

    ; Ἀχαϊκωτέραν εἶναι.. ταύτην τὴν ὑ. καὶ νικητικωτέραν ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς ib.4;

    τὸ τῆς ἰδίας ὑ. λαμπρόν Id.21.23.1

    ;

    τὸ τῶν σαρισῶν μέγεθός ἐστι κατὰ μὲν τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑ. ἑκκαίδεκα πηχῶν, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἁρμογὴν τὴν πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν δεκατεττάρων Id.18.29.2

    ;

    τηροῦντες τὴν αὑτῶν ὑ. Id.5.5.5

    ;

    πρὸς ταύτην ἁρμοζόμενοι τὴν ὑ. Id.3.16.1

    , cf. 3.50.7; κατασκέψασθαι τὴν τῶν ὑπεναντίων ἐπίνοιαν καὶ τὴν ὅλην ὑ. ib.6;

    Φάβιος.. κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑ. οὐδαμῶς κρίνων ἐκκυβεύειν οὐδὲ παραβάλλεσθαι τοῖς ὅλοις Id.3.94.4

    .
    2 suggestion, advice,

    ἐδώκαμεν ἄν σοι ὑποθέσεις δι' ὧν οἱ ἀντίδικοι ἂν οἴμωζον PMich.Zen.57.7

     (iii B. C.);

    διελέγοντο.. κατὰ τὰς ἐντολὰς τὰς Ἀράτου καὶ τὰς ὑ. Plb. 2.48.8

    , cf. 2.52.6, 4.24.2;

    κροτηθείσης τῆς ὑ. Id.28.16.5

    ; πολυτέχνους ὑ. ἔργων elaborate proposals for works, Plu.Per.12.
    3 purpose,

    τῆς στρατηγίας ὑπόθεσιν τὴν τυραννίδα πεποιημένος Id.Tim.2

    ;

    λόγῳ μὲν ἀποδώσων.., ἑτέραν δὲ τῆς ἀποδημίας ἔχων ὑ. λανθάνουσαν τοὺς πολλούς Id.Mar.31

    ;

    ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς αἰτίας τῆς τε ὑ. τοῦ πολέμου ἀξιολογώτατος ἀγὼν συνηνέχθη D.C.41.56

    ;

    ὑ. τοῦ πολέμου καὶ πρόφασιν διδόντων ἐλευθεροῦν τοὺς Ἕλληνας Plu.Flam.15

    ;

    τὸ χωρὶς ὑποθέσεως πολεμεῖν.. τί ἄλλο ἢ μανία; D.Chr.38.17

    ; [

    οἱ ἐλέφαντες] ἴσασι τῆς ὁδοῦ τῆς ἐπ' αὐτοὺς τὴν ὑ... εἶναι.. τοὺς ὀδόντας Ael.NA6.56

    .
    4 occasion, excuse, pretext,

    οὕτω γὰρ ἂν αὐτοῖς ἡ ἀπολογία προαναιροῖτο καὶ ἡ πρώτη ὑ. τῆς ἐθελοδουλείας Luc.Merc.Cond.5

    ; τοιαύτης αὐτοῖς τῆς ὑ. οὔσης ib.10;

    ἀεὶ χρὴ ἐπί τινι λυπεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ ἄνευ ὑ. Artem.

     2.60;

    ὑ. ἀργυρισμοῦ καὶ φόνων εἰληφέναι ἐδόκει D.C.63.26

    ;

    μή με νομίσῃς ἀπὸ τῆς παρούσης ὑ. ἀπαρτᾶν τὸν λόγον Id.52.18

    .
    5 actor's role,

    τοὺς ὑποκριτὰς.. οὓς ὁρῶμεν οὔτε κλαίοντας ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις, ὡς αὐτοὶ θέλουσιν, ἀλλ' ὡς ὁ ἀγὼν ἀπαιτεῖ πρὸς τὴν ὑ. Plu.Dem.22

    ;

    ὶδεῖν τί μου ποιεῖ ὁ ἀθλητής, πῶς μελετᾷ τὴν ὑ. Arr.Epict.1.29.38

    , cf. 41;

    τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τῆς μητρὸς ὑ. λαβεῖν Iamb.VP8.39

    .
    6 function, occupation, station in life, [

    Διονύσιος] ἐκ σημοτικῆς καὶ ταπεινῆς ὑ. ὁρμηθείς Plb.15.35.2

    ; [

    Ἀγαθοκλῆς] ὁρμηθεὶς ἀπὸ τοιαύτης ὑ. Id.12.15.7

    ;

    τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἄλλην βίου ὑ. εἰς τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν οὕτως ἐπιτήδειον ὡς ταύτην ἐν ᾗ νῦν ὢν τυγχάνεις M.Ant.11.7

    , cf. 8.1, Paul. Aeg.3.17.
    7 practical problem,

    κοινὴ ἡ ὑ. καὶ τῷ καθ' ἡμᾶς βίῳ πάνυ πολλή, βαλανείου κατασκευή Luc.Hipp.4

    ;

    ἡ μὲν οὖν ὑ. τοιαύτη HeroAut.21.2

    .
    II subject proposed ( to oneself or another) for discussion,

    κελεῦσαι τὴν πρώτην ὑ. τοῦ πρώτου λόγου ἀναγνῶναι Pl. Prm. 127d

    ;

    ἐπὶ τὴν ὑ. ἐπανάγειν τὸν λόγον X.Mem.4.6.13

    ;

    ἐπὶ τὴν ὑ. πάλιν ἐπανελθεῖν Isoc.4.63

    , cf. Gal.6.124;

    τὴν ὑ. περὶ ἧς βουλεύεσθε οὐχὶ τὴν οὖσαν παριστάντες D.3.1

    ;

    τοὺς δικαστὰς ἀπαγαγὼν ἀπὸ τῆς ὑ. Id.19.242

    ;

    ἐπὶ τῆς ὑ. μεῖναι Aeschin.3.76

    ;

    ἔξω τῆς ὑ. λέγειν Isoc.7.63

    , cf. 12.161;

    μὴ πόρρω λίαν τῆς ὑ. ἀποπλανηθῶ Id.7.77

    , cf. 12.88, Aeschin. 3.176,190;

    ὅτ' ἔγραφον περὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ὑ. Isoc.5.83

    ;

    περὶ [τῆς πόλεως] τὴν ὑ. ποιησάμενος Id.12.35

    ;

    τοῦ πράγματος ἐν κεφαλαίῳ.. δήλωσις, ἵνα γινώσκωσι περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος παρακολουθῶσί τε τῇ ὑ. Arist.Rh.Al. 1436a36

    , cf. Pl.Def. 415b;

    ἡ ὑ. ἐλάττων Arist.Rh. 1404b15

    ; πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν λέγειν, opp. πρὸς ἀμφισβητοῦντα, ib. 1391b13;

    πολλὰ πρὸς τὴν ὑ. οἰκείως διαλεχθείς D.S.13.53

    ; haec erat ὑ., de gravitate ordinis, etc., Cic.Att.1.14.4.
    2 case at law, lawsuit,

    γράφει ὁ Μαιίστας εἰς τὴν ὑ. ταύτην IG11(4).1299.29

     (Delos, iii B. C.), cf. OGI665.18,669.41 (both Egypt, i A. D.), POxy. 237 vii 34, viii 22 (ii A. D.), 486.26 (ii A. D.);

    τὰ περὶ ταύτης τῆς ὑ. πεπραγμένα PLips.34.18

     (iv A. D.).
    3 subject of a poem or treatise, Zeno Stoic.1.23, Plb.1.2.1, D.H.Pomp.3, Longin. 38.2, Plu.Pomp.42, Luc.Charid.14, Pseudol.5, al.; of a picture, Id.Zeux.5,7; of an impromptu declamation,

    ἐπειδὰν οἱ παρόντες ὑποβάλωσί τινας ὑ. καὶ ἀφορμὰς λόγου Id.Rh.Pr.18

    ; plot, story,

    μῦθοι καὶ ὑποθέσεις Phld.Po.2.62

    , cf. 5.5, al., Arg.Men.Oxy.1235.113 (ii A. D.), Dicaearch. ap. S.E.M.3.3, Artem.4.59, Sch.S.Aj.Prooem., Arg.Ar. Ach. tit., etc.
    4 speech,

    αἱ δικανικαὶ καὶ δημηγορικαὶ ὑ. Theon Prog.1

    ; = ἐπίδειξις 1.3, ἀρξαμένων (v.l. -ῳ)

    τῆς ὑ. LXX 4 Ma.1.12

    ; ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὰς ὅλην πληρούσας ὑ. providing matter for a whole speech, Chor.p.34B.
    b speech or subject of a speech in which the person, occasion, etc. are particularized, opp. θέσις v. 2, Aphth.Prog. 13, cf. Quint.Inst.3.5.7.
    5 a kind of play or pantomime,

    μῖμοί τινές εἰσιν ὧν τοὺς μὲν ὑποθέσεις τοὺς δὲ παίγνια καλοῦσιν Plu.2.712e

    ; μιμολωγοι η υποθησις εικυρα (i. e. μιμολόγοι· ἡ ὑπόθεσις Ἑκυρά), i. e. 'theatrical performance: play, the Hecyra', Ath.Mitt.26.4 (inscr. on lamp, iii B. C.); κλάειν ἤρξαντο πάντες καὶ μετέβαλε τὸ συμπόσιον εἰς σκυθρωπὴν ὑ. into a tragedy, Charito 4.3; so perh. in Luc.Nigr.8; of Aesop's fables,

    χρῆται [τῇ ἀλώπεκι] ὁ Αἴσωπος διακόνῳ τῶν πλείστων ὑ. Philostr.Im.1.3

    .
    III supposition,

    ἢ βούλεσθε.. ἀπ' ἐμαυτοῦ ἄρξωμαι καὶ τῆς ἐμαυτοῦ ὑ., περὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς αὐτοῦ ὑποθέμενος, εἴτε ἕν ἐστιν εἴτε μὴ ἕν, τί χρὴ συμβαίνειν; Pl.Prm. 137b

    ; αὕτη ἡ ὑ., εἰ ἓν μὴ ἔστιν ib. 160b; χρὴ.. μὴ μόνον εἰ ἔστιν ἕκαστον ὑποτιθέμενον σκοπεῖν τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐκ τῆς ὑ., ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ μὴ ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὑποτίθεσθαι ib. 135e, cf. 136a; [σκοπεῖν] τί ἐφ' ἑκατέρας τῆς ὑ. συμβήσεται ib. 136b;

    εἰ ὀρθὴ ἡ ὑ. ἦν, τὸ ψυχὴν ἁρμονίαν εἶναι Id.Phd. 94b

    , cf. 92d, Sph. 244c;

    πρὸς μὲν τὴν ὑ. ὀρθῶς λέγουσιν, ὅλως δ' οὐκ ὀρθῶς Arist. Metaph. 1082b32

    ; ἐξ ὑποθέσεως σκοπεῖσθαι examine by starting from an assumption, of reasoning by analysis in geometry, Pl.Men. 86e; τῶν τὴν τέχνην ζητεύντων ἐξ ὑποθέσιος λόγων arguments seeking to derive the (medical) art from an assumption, Hp.VM13; ὑ. αὐτοὶ αὑτοῖς ὑποθέμενοι τῷ λόγῳ ib.1; ἄγοντες ἐπὶ ὑπόθεσιν τὴν τέχνην ib. 15;

    χρῆσιν ἀρετῆς τελείαν, καὶ ταύτην οὐκ ἐξ ὑ. ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς· λέγω δ' ἐξ ὑ. τἀναγκαῖα, οἷον.. τιμωρίαι καὶ κολάσεις.. τὸ καλῶς ἀναγκαίως ἔχουσι Arist.Pol. 1332810

    ; ἡ πολιτεία ἡ ἐξ ὑ. ( = ἡ δοθεῖσα ) the constitution based on a presupposition, ib. 1288b28; of currency, ἓν δή τι δεῖ εἶναι, τοῦτο δ' ἐξ ὑ.· διὸ νόμισμα καλεῖται according to a presupposed convention, Id.EN 1133b21 (cf. a29-31, APr. 41a40); of reductio ad impossibile,

    ἢ δεικτικῶς ἢ ἐξ ὑ. τοῦ δ' ἐξ ὑ. μέρος τὸ διὰ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου Id.APr. 40b25

    -6, cf. 41a25;

    δυνατοῦ δεξάμενον ὑπόθεσιν ἐπ' ἀδύνατον ἀπαχθῆναι Arr.Epict.1.7.25

    , cf. Procl. in Euc.pp.76,252 F.; καθ' ὑπόθεσιν by way of supposition, 'let us suppose', Phld.Rh. 1.95 S., Sign.12, Cleom.1.7.
    IV = τὸ ὑποκείμενον (cf.

    ὑπόκειμαι 11.8

    ), the presupposition of an action, that which has been settled before it begins,

    περὶ τοῦ τέλους οὐθεὶς βουλεύεται, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑ. Arist.EE 1227a8

    , cf. b30;

    τῶν πράξεων τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς ὑ. ἀληθεῖς καὶ δικαίας εἶναι προσήκει D.2.10

    ; of a thing, that without which it cannot exist or be what it is, its essence, αὕτη (sc. τὸ στέλεχος)

    οἷον ὑ. καὶ φύσις δένδρων Thphr.HP4.13.4

     (cf. οὐσία καὶ φύσις τοῦ δένδρου ibid.);

    ἐπὶ τοῖς χυμοῖς μόνοις σηπομένοις ἔχοντος τὴν ὑ. ὅλου τοῦ νοσήματος, ὅπερ ἐστὶ πυρετώδους ὄντος Gal.18(2).299

    .
    2 in the syllogism, the preliminary statements of fact (whether proved or not) from which inference starts, i. e. the premisses ([etym.] προτάσεις) , τῶν ἀποδείξεων αἱ ὑ., equivalent to ἀρχαί, Arist.Metaph. 1013a16;

    αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ αἱ λεγόμεναι ὑ. Id.APo. 81b15

    ; ὅσα δέδεικται δι' ἐκείνων ὑποθέσεις ποιησάμενοι taking as premisses (here) what has been proved in those other works, Gal.6.7, cf. 25,224; ἴστω.. τῆς ὑγιεινῆς πραγματείας ἀνατρέπων τὴν ὑ. ib.17;

    ὑπόθεσιν, αἴτησιν οὖσαν πράγματος εἰς κατασκευήν τινος S.E.M.3.4

    ;

    λαμβάνειν ἀναποδείκτους ὑ. Plu.2.720f

    , cf. 721d;

    ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τὰς ὑ. εἶναι τὰς πρώτας ψευδεῖς, ἢ τὰς ὑπὲρ τῶν συμβαινόντων ἀποφάς εις Plb.1.15.9

    , cf. 11.
    b assumption of existence of any one of the fundamental objects of a particular science,

    ὁ ὁρισμὸς θέσις μέν ἐστι.. ὑ. δ' οὐκ ἔστι· τὸ γὰρ τί ἐστι μονὰς καὶ τὸ εἶναι μονάδα οὐ ταὐτόν Arist.APo. 72a23

    ;

    ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἀρχή, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς αἱ ὑ. Id.EN 1151a17

    .
    3 starting-point,

    ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ὑ. λαβεῖν τὸν λόγον τὴν εἰς ἑκάτερον μέρος ὁρμήν Iamb.VP27.130

    ; beginning, τὰς μὲν ἐλπίδας οὐ τελειοῖ (sc. ὁ ὄνειρος) , τὰς δὲ ὑ. τῶν πραγμάτων ταῖς περιοχαῖς ὁμοίας ποιεῖ (referring to a birth of twins which died), Artem.4.47.
    4 raw material,

    τὴν δοθεῖσαν ὑ. εὐφυᾶ πρὸς ὑποδοχὴν γυμναστικῆς.. ἀμείνω ἀποφαίνειν Luc.Hist. Conscr.35

    ;

    οἵαν ὕλην καὶ ὑ. φεύγεις·.. μένε οὖν μέχρι ἐξοικειώσῃς σαυτῷ καὶ ταῦτα M.Ant.10.31

    .
    V mortgage, Thphr.Fr.97.1 (pl.).
    VI placing under,

    πτύγματος Sor.1.70a

    ;

    προσκεφαλαίου Id.2.86

    .
    2 thing placed under, base, τὰς ὑ. (signf. 111)

    ποιούμενος οὐκ ἀρχὰς ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ὑ., οἷον ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὁρμάς Pl.R. 511b

    , cf. Arr.Epict.1.7.22; in D.2.10 (v. supr. IV. 1) the ἀρχαί and ὑποθέσεις (i. e. basic principles) of actions are compared to the foundations ([etym.] τὰ κάτωθεν) of a house or a ship;

    Τριπτόλεμος.. τὰς πρώτας ὑ. βαλόμενος τῇ πόλει Lib.Or.11.52

    .

    Greek-English dictionary (Αγγλικά Ελληνικά-λεξικό) > ὑπόθεσις

  • 26 Thinking

       But what then am I? A thing which thinks. What is a thing which thinks? It is a thing which doubts, understands, [conceives], affirms, denies, wills, refuses, which also imagines and feels. (Descartes, 1951, p. 153)
       I have been trying in all this to remove the temptation to think that there "must be" a mental process of thinking, hoping, wishing, believing, etc., independent of the process of expressing a thought, a hope, a wish, etc.... If we scrutinize the usages which we make of "thinking," "meaning," "wishing," etc., going through this process rids us of the temptation to look for a peculiar act of thinking, independent of the act of expressing our thoughts, and stowed away in some particular medium. (Wittgenstein, 1958, pp. 41-43)
       Analyse the proofs employed by the subject. If they do not go beyond observation of empirical correspondences, they can be fully explained in terms of concrete operations, and nothing would warrant our assuming that more complex thought mechanisms are operating. If, on the other hand, the subject interprets a given correspondence as the result of any one of several possible combinations, and this leads him to verify his hypotheses by observing their consequences, we know that propositional operations are involved. (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958, p. 279)
       In every age, philosophical thinking exploits some dominant concepts and makes its greatest headway in solving problems conceived in terms of them. The seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophers construed knowledge, knower, and known in terms of sense data and their association. Descartes' self-examination gave classical psychology the mind and its contents as a starting point. Locke set up sensory immediacy as the new criterion of the real... Hobbes provided the genetic method of building up complex ideas from simple ones... and, in another quarter, still true to the Hobbesian method, Pavlov built intellect out of conditioned reflexes and Loeb built life out of tropisms. (S. Langer, 1962, p. 54)
       Experiments on deductive reasoning show that subjects are influenced sufficiently by their experience for their reasoning to differ from that described by a purely deductive system, whilst experiments on inductive reasoning lead to the view that an understanding of the strategies used by adult subjects in attaining concepts involves reference to higher-order concepts of a logical and deductive nature. (Bolton, 1972, p. 154)
       There are now machines in the world that think, that learn and create. Moreover, their ability to do these things is going to increase rapidly until-in the visible future-the range of problems they can handle will be coextensive with the range to which the human mind has been applied. (Newell & Simon, quoted in Weizenbaum, 1976, p. 138)
       But how does it happen that thinking is sometimes accompanied by action and sometimes not, sometimes by motion, and sometimes not? It looks as if almost the same thing happens as in the case of reasoning and making inferences about unchanging objects. But in that case the end is a speculative proposition... whereas here the conclusion which results from the two premises is an action.... I need covering; a cloak is a covering. I need a cloak. What I need, I have to make; I need a cloak. I have to make a cloak. And the conclusion, the "I have to make a cloak," is an action. (Nussbaum, 1978, p. 40)
       It is well to remember that when philosophy emerged in Greece in the sixth century, B.C., it did not burst suddenly out of the Mediterranean blue. The development of societies of reasoning creatures-what we call civilization-had been a process to be measured not in thousands but in millions of years. Human beings became civilized as they became reasonable, and for an animal to begin to reason and to learn how to improve its reasoning is a long, slow process. So thinking had been going on for ages before Greece-slowly improving itself, uncovering the pitfalls to be avoided by forethought, endeavoring to weigh alternative sets of consequences intellectually. What happened in the sixth century, B.C., is that thinking turned round on itself; people began to think about thinking, and the momentous event, the culmination of the long process to that point, was in fact the birth of philosophy. (Lipman, Sharp & Oscanyan, 1980, p. xi)
       The way to look at thought is not to assume that there is a parallel thread of correlated affects or internal experiences that go with it in some regular way. It's not of course that people don't have internal experiences, of course they do; but that when you ask what is the state of mind of someone, say while he or she is performing a ritual, it's hard to believe that such experiences are the same for all people involved.... The thinking, and indeed the feeling in an odd sort of way, is really going on in public. They are really saying what they're saying, doing what they're doing, meaning what they're meaning. Thought is, in great part anyway, a public activity. (Geertz, quoted in J. Miller, 1983, pp. 202-203)
       Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler. (Einstein, quoted in Minsky, 1986, p. 17)
       What, in effect, are the conditions for the construction of formal thought? The child must not only apply operations to objects-in other words, mentally execute possible actions on them-he must also "reflect" those operations in the absence of the objects which are replaced by pure propositions. Thus, "reflection" is thought raised to the second power. Concrete thinking is the representation of a possible action, and formal thinking is the representation of a representation of possible action.... It is not surprising, therefore, that the system of concrete operations must be completed during the last years of childhood before it can be "reflected" by formal operations. In terms of their function, formal operations do not differ from concrete operations except that they are applied to hypotheses or propositions [whose logic is] an abstract translation of the system of "inference" that governs concrete operations. (Piaget, quoted in Minsky, 1986, p. 237)
       [E]ven a human being today (hence, a fortiori, a remote ancestor of contemporary human beings) cannot easily or ordinarily maintain uninterrupted attention on a single problem for more than a few tens of seconds. Yet we work on problems that require vastly more time. The way we do that (as we can observe by watching ourselves) requires periods of mulling to be followed by periods of recapitulation, describing to ourselves what seems to have gone on during the mulling, leading to whatever intermediate results we have reached. This has an obvious function: namely, by rehearsing these interim results... we commit them to memory, for the immediate contents of the stream of consciousness are very quickly lost unless rehearsed.... Given language, we can describe to ourselves what seemed to occur during the mulling that led to a judgment, produce a rehearsable version of the reaching-a-judgment process, and commit that to long-term memory by in fact rehearsing it. (Margolis, 1987, p. 60)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Thinking

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