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1 дедуктивное умозаключение
Русско-английский словарь по электронике > дедуктивное умозаключение
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2 дедуктивное умозаключение
Русско-английский словарь по радиоэлектронике > дедуктивное умозаключение
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3 дедуктивный вывод
Русско-английский словарь по вычислительной технике и программированию > дедуктивный вывод
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4 deduktivno zaključivanje
• Deductive Inference -
5 дедуктивное умозаключение
Русско-английский синонимический словарь > дедуктивное умозаключение
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6 дедуктивний умовивід
Короткий українсько-англійський словник термінів із психології > дедуктивний умовивід
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7 дедуктивный
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8 дедуктивный
Русско-английский словарь по информационным технологиям > дедуктивный
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9 дедуктивный вывод
Русско-английский большой базовый словарь > дедуктивный вывод
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10 дедуктивный вывод
deductive derivation мат., deductive inference, deductive treatmentРусско-английский научно-технический словарь Масловского > дедуктивный вывод
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11 deductivo
• deductive• inference• inferential statistics -
12 дедуктивный
1. inferential2. deductive -
13 дедуктивный вывод
1) Computers: deductive response2) Mathematics: deductive derivation, deductive treatment3) Information technology: deductive inference4) Robots: deductive reasoning5) Aviation medicine: (логический) top-down reasoning -
14 Logic
My initial step... was to attempt to reduce the concept of ordering in a sequence to that of logical consequence, so as to proceed from there to the concept of number. To prevent anything intuitive from penetrating here unnoticed, I had to bend every effort to keep the chain of inference free of gaps. In attempting to comply with this requirement in the strictest possible way, I found the inadequacy of language to be an obstacle. (Frege, 1972, p. 104)I believe I can make the relation of my 'conceptual notation' to ordinary language clearest if I compare it to the relation of the microscope to the eye. The latter, because of the range of its applicability and because of the ease with which it can adapt itself to the most varied circumstances, has a great superiority over the microscope. Of course, viewed as an optical instrument it reveals many imperfections, which usually remain unnoticed only because of its intimate connection with mental life. But as soon as scientific purposes place strong requirements upon sharpness of resolution, the eye proves to be inadequate.... Similarly, this 'conceptual notation' is devised for particular scientific purposes; and therefore one may not condemn it because it is useless for other purposes. (Frege, 1972, pp. 104-105)To sum up briefly, it is the business of the logician to conduct an unceasing struggle against psychology and those parts of language and grammar which fail to give untrammeled expression to what is logical. He does not have to answer the question: How does thinking normally take place in human beings? What course does it naturally follow in the human mind? What is natural to one person may well be unnatural to another. (Frege, 1979, pp. 6-7)We are very dependent on external aids in our thinking, and there is no doubt that the language of everyday life-so far, at least, as a certain area of discourse is concerned-had first to be replaced by a more sophisticated instrument, before certain distinctions could be noticed. But so far the academic world has, for the most part, disdained to master this instrument. (Frege, 1979, pp. 6-7)There is no reproach the logician need fear less than the reproach that his way of formulating things is unnatural.... If we were to heed those who object that logic is unnatural, we would run the risk of becoming embroiled in interminable disputes about what is natural, disputes which are quite incapable of being resolved within the province of logic. (Frege, 1979, p. 128)[L]inguists will be forced, internally as it were, to come to grips with the results of modern logic. Indeed, this is apparently already happening to some extent. By "logic" is not meant here recursive function-theory, California model-theory, constructive proof-theory, or even axiomatic settheory. Such areas may or may not be useful for linguistics. Rather under "logic" are included our good old friends, the homely locutions "and," "or," "if-then," "if and only if," "not," "for all x," "for some x," and "is identical with," plus the calculus of individuals, event-logic, syntax, denotational semantics, and... various parts of pragmatics.... It is to these that the linguist can most profitably turn for help. These are his tools. And they are "clean tools," to borrow a phrase of the late J. L. Austin in another context, in fact, the only really clean ones we have, so that we might as well use them as much as we can. But they constitute only what may be called "baby logic." Baby logic is to the linguist what "baby mathematics" (in the phrase of Murray Gell-Mann) is to the theoretical physicist-very elementary but indispensable domains of theory in both cases. (Martin, 1969, pp. 261-262)There appears to be no branch of deductive inference that requires us to assume the existence of a mental logic in order to do justice to the psychological phenomena. To be logical, an individual requires, not formal rules of inference, but a tacit knowledge of the fundamental semantic principle governing any inference; a deduction is valid provided that there is no way of interpreting the premises correctly that is inconsistent with the conclusion. Logic provides a systematic method for searching for such counter-examples. The empirical evidence suggests that ordinary individuals possess no such methods. (Johnson-Laird, quoted in Mehler, Walker & Garrett, 1982, p. 130)The fundamental paradox of logic [that "there is no class (as a totality) of those classes which, each taken as a totality, do not belong to themselves" (Russell to Frege, 16 June 1902, in van Heijenoort, 1967, p. 125)] is with us still, bequeathed by Russell-by way of philosophy, mathematics, and even computer science-to the whole of twentieth-century thought. Twentieth-century philosophy would begin not with a foundation for logic, as Russell had hoped in 1900, but with the discovery in 1901 that no such foundation can be laid. (Everdell, 1997, p. 184)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Logic
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15 дедуктивное умозаключение
General subject: deductive inferenceУниверсальный русско-английский словарь > дедуктивное умозаключение
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16 Thinking
But what then am I? A thing which thinks. What is a thing which thinks? It is a thing which doubts, understands, [conceives], affirms, denies, wills, refuses, which also imagines and feels. (Descartes, 1951, p. 153)I have been trying in all this to remove the temptation to think that there "must be" a mental process of thinking, hoping, wishing, believing, etc., independent of the process of expressing a thought, a hope, a wish, etc.... If we scrutinize the usages which we make of "thinking," "meaning," "wishing," etc., going through this process rids us of the temptation to look for a peculiar act of thinking, independent of the act of expressing our thoughts, and stowed away in some particular medium. (Wittgenstein, 1958, pp. 41-43)Analyse the proofs employed by the subject. If they do not go beyond observation of empirical correspondences, they can be fully explained in terms of concrete operations, and nothing would warrant our assuming that more complex thought mechanisms are operating. If, on the other hand, the subject interprets a given correspondence as the result of any one of several possible combinations, and this leads him to verify his hypotheses by observing their consequences, we know that propositional operations are involved. (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958, p. 279)In every age, philosophical thinking exploits some dominant concepts and makes its greatest headway in solving problems conceived in terms of them. The seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophers construed knowledge, knower, and known in terms of sense data and their association. Descartes' self-examination gave classical psychology the mind and its contents as a starting point. Locke set up sensory immediacy as the new criterion of the real... Hobbes provided the genetic method of building up complex ideas from simple ones... and, in another quarter, still true to the Hobbesian method, Pavlov built intellect out of conditioned reflexes and Loeb built life out of tropisms. (S. Langer, 1962, p. 54)Experiments on deductive reasoning show that subjects are influenced sufficiently by their experience for their reasoning to differ from that described by a purely deductive system, whilst experiments on inductive reasoning lead to the view that an understanding of the strategies used by adult subjects in attaining concepts involves reference to higher-order concepts of a logical and deductive nature. (Bolton, 1972, p. 154)There are now machines in the world that think, that learn and create. Moreover, their ability to do these things is going to increase rapidly until-in the visible future-the range of problems they can handle will be coextensive with the range to which the human mind has been applied. (Newell & Simon, quoted in Weizenbaum, 1976, p. 138)But how does it happen that thinking is sometimes accompanied by action and sometimes not, sometimes by motion, and sometimes not? It looks as if almost the same thing happens as in the case of reasoning and making inferences about unchanging objects. But in that case the end is a speculative proposition... whereas here the conclusion which results from the two premises is an action.... I need covering; a cloak is a covering. I need a cloak. What I need, I have to make; I need a cloak. I have to make a cloak. And the conclusion, the "I have to make a cloak," is an action. (Nussbaum, 1978, p. 40)It is well to remember that when philosophy emerged in Greece in the sixth century, B.C., it did not burst suddenly out of the Mediterranean blue. The development of societies of reasoning creatures-what we call civilization-had been a process to be measured not in thousands but in millions of years. Human beings became civilized as they became reasonable, and for an animal to begin to reason and to learn how to improve its reasoning is a long, slow process. So thinking had been going on for ages before Greece-slowly improving itself, uncovering the pitfalls to be avoided by forethought, endeavoring to weigh alternative sets of consequences intellectually. What happened in the sixth century, B.C., is that thinking turned round on itself; people began to think about thinking, and the momentous event, the culmination of the long process to that point, was in fact the birth of philosophy. (Lipman, Sharp & Oscanyan, 1980, p. xi)The way to look at thought is not to assume that there is a parallel thread of correlated affects or internal experiences that go with it in some regular way. It's not of course that people don't have internal experiences, of course they do; but that when you ask what is the state of mind of someone, say while he or she is performing a ritual, it's hard to believe that such experiences are the same for all people involved.... The thinking, and indeed the feeling in an odd sort of way, is really going on in public. They are really saying what they're saying, doing what they're doing, meaning what they're meaning. Thought is, in great part anyway, a public activity. (Geertz, quoted in J. Miller, 1983, pp. 202-203)Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler. (Einstein, quoted in Minsky, 1986, p. 17)What, in effect, are the conditions for the construction of formal thought? The child must not only apply operations to objects-in other words, mentally execute possible actions on them-he must also "reflect" those operations in the absence of the objects which are replaced by pure propositions. Thus, "reflection" is thought raised to the second power. Concrete thinking is the representation of a possible action, and formal thinking is the representation of a representation of possible action.... It is not surprising, therefore, that the system of concrete operations must be completed during the last years of childhood before it can be "reflected" by formal operations. In terms of their function, formal operations do not differ from concrete operations except that they are applied to hypotheses or propositions [whose logic is] an abstract translation of the system of "inference" that governs concrete operations. (Piaget, quoted in Minsky, 1986, p. 237)[E]ven a human being today (hence, a fortiori, a remote ancestor of contemporary human beings) cannot easily or ordinarily maintain uninterrupted attention on a single problem for more than a few tens of seconds. Yet we work on problems that require vastly more time. The way we do that (as we can observe by watching ourselves) requires periods of mulling to be followed by periods of recapitulation, describing to ourselves what seems to have gone on during the mulling, leading to whatever intermediate results we have reached. This has an obvious function: namely, by rehearsing these interim results... we commit them to memory, for the immediate contents of the stream of consciousness are very quickly lost unless rehearsed.... Given language, we can describe to ourselves what seemed to occur during the mulling that led to a judgment, produce a rehearsable version of the reaching-a-judgment process, and commit that to long-term memory by in fact rehearsing it. (Margolis, 1987, p. 60)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Thinking
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17 συλλογισμός
συλλογ-ισμός, ὁ,A computation, calculation, κατὰ τοὺς τῶν πατέρων ς. according to the (military) ratings of their fathers, D.S.17.94; κατὰ τὸν σ. τοῦ κοινοῦ πολέμου ἔχειν τὰ κτήματα shall have the property according to the assessment of.., SIG364.38 (Ephesus, iii B.C.).3 plan, scheme,συνελογίσατο.. συλλογισμὸν Ἰβηρικὸν καὶ βαρβαρικόν Plb.3.98.3
; οὐ τῇ τύχῃ πιστεύων ἀλλὰ τοῖς ς. Id.10.7.3.II putting together of observed facts, Pl.Cra. 412a;σ. ἐστιν ὅτι τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο Arist.Rh. 1371b9
: generally, inference, Phld.Sign.14, al.2 in the Logic of Arist., a syllogism or deductive argument, defined provisionally as an argument in which, certain things being posited, something different from them necessarily follows, APr. 24b18, cf. 47a34, al.; of several kinds, e.g. ὁ ἀποδεικτικὸς ς. APo. 74b11; ὁ διαλεκτικὸς ς. Top. 100a22; ἐριστικὸς ς. ib. b24; sts. opposed to ἐπαγωγή (q.v.); ὁ ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς ς. the syllogism which springs out of induction, APr. 68b15;τὸ ἐνθύμημα σ. τις Rh. 1355a8
.III Rhet., inference from written to unwritten law, Hermog.Stat.2, al. (cf. Syrian.in Hermog.2.198 R., al.): pl., ib.11.Greek-English dictionary (Αγγλικά Ελληνικά-λεξικό) > συλλογισμός
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18 дедуктивная машина
Information technology: deductive machine, inference engineУниверсальный русско-английский словарь > дедуктивная машина
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19 дедуктивное правило
1) Mathematics: deductive rule2) Microelectronics: inference ruleУниверсальный русско-английский словарь > дедуктивное правило
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20 умовивід
чconclusion, deduction
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См. также в других словарях:
deductive inference — noun a) inference in which the conclusion is of no greater generality than the premises b) inference in which the conclusion is just as certain as the premises … Wiktionary
Inference — is the act or process of deriving a conclusion based solely on what one already knows. Inference is studied within several different fields. * Human inference (i.e. how humans draw conclusions) is traditionally studied within the field of… … Wikipedia
Deductive reasoning — Deductive reasoning, also called deductive logic, is reasoning which constructs or evaluates deductive arguments. Deductive arguments are attempts to show that a conclusion necessarily follows from a set of premises or hypotheses. A deductive… … Wikipedia
INFÉRENCE — Opération de l’esprit qui passe de propositions assertives, comme prémisses, à des propositions assertives, comme conclusions. Au sens strict, on distingue l’inférence du raisonnement en ce qu’elle peut être soit médiate soit immédiate (passer de … Encyclopédie Universelle
inference — in·fer·ence / in fə rəns/ n 1: the act or process of inferring; specif: the act of passing from one proposition, statement, or judgment considered as true to another whose truth is believed to follow logically from that of the former 2: something … Law dictionary
deductive — inductive (see under DEDUCTION 3) Analogous words: inferential, ratiocinative (see under INFERENCE) … New Dictionary of Synonyms
Deductive system — A deductive system (also called a deductive apparatus of a formal system) consists of the axioms (or axiom schemata) and rules of inference that can be used to derive the theorems of the system.[1] Such a deductive system is intended to preserve… … Wikipedia
Deductive fallacy — A deductive fallacy is defined as a deductive argument that is invalid. The argument itself could have true premises, but still have a false conclusion.[1] Thus, a deductive fallacy is a fallacy where deduction goes wrong, and is no longer a… … Wikipedia
Deductive-nomological model — The deductive nomological model (or D N model) is a formalized[citation needed] view of scientific explanation in natural language. It characterizes scientific explanations primarily as deductive arguments with at least one natural law statement… … Wikipedia
Deductive-nomological — The deductive nomological (or D N) model is a formalized view of scientific explanation in natural language. It characterizes scientific explanations primarily as deductive arguments with at least one natural law statement among its premises.… … Wikipedia
deductive — deduction ► NOUN 1) the action of deducting. 2) an amount that is or may be deducted. 3) the inference of particular instances by reference to a general law or principle. Often contrasted with INDUCTION(Cf. ↑induction). DERIVATIVES deductive… … English terms dictionary