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21 декларативен оператор

изч.

declarative statement

изч.

declarative statements

Български-Angleščina политехнически речник > декларативен оператор
22 оператор описания

1) Engineering: declarative statement, declarator, specification statement

2) Electronics: declaration statement

3) Information technology: generic clause

Универсальный русско-английский словарь > оператор описания
23 оператор описания

specification statement, declaration statement, declarative statement

Русско-английский словарь по электронике > оператор описания
24 оператор описания

declaration statement, declarative statement, specification statement

Русско-английский словарь по радиоэлектронике > оператор описания
25 utførende setning

(edb) executable statement, non declarative statement

Norsk-engelsk ordbok > utførende setning
26 Уведомительный счёт

Telecommunications: Declarative statement

Универсальный русско-английский словарь > Уведомительный счёт
27 декларативное высказывание

Programming: declarative statement

Универсальный русско-английский словарь > декларативное высказывание
28 декларативное заявление

Politics: declarative statement

Универсальный русско-английский словарь > декларативное заявление
29 декларативное утверждение

Programming: declarative statement

Универсальный русско-английский словарь > декларативное утверждение
30 декларативный оператор

Information technology: declarative statement

Универсальный русско-английский словарь > декларативный оператор
31 декларативный оператор, оператор объявления

Programming: declarative statement

Универсальный русско-английский словарь > декларативный оператор, оператор объявления
32 уведомительный счёт

Telecommunications: Declarative statement

Универсальный русско-английский словарь > уведомительный счёт
33 beschreibende Anweisung

f < edv> ■ declarative statement

German-english technical dictionary > beschreibende Anweisung
34 Vereinbarungsanweisung

f < edv> ■ declarative statement

German-english technical dictionary > Vereinbarungsanweisung
35 ἄρα

ἄρα (Hom.+ [s. Kühner-G. II p. 317ff]) transitional/inferential (illative) particle; in older Gk. (Hom., Hdt., Pla., X. et al. [Aristot., Mech. 851a 22 is corrupt]) never at the beginning of its clause (Denniston 41). Strengthened to ἄρα γε Gen 26:9; Mt 7:20; 17:26; Ac 17:27.—LfgrE s.v.; Rob. 1189f and index; s. also Denniston 32–43.

① marker of an inference made on the basis of what precedes

ⓐ in declarative statement, and w. colloqu. flavor so, then, consequently, you see (B-D-F §451, 2) Ac 11:18. εὑρίσκω ἄ. τὸν νόμον so I find the law Ro 7:21. οὐδὲν ἄρα νῦν κατάκριμα so there is no condemnation now 8:1. γινώσκετε ἄρα you may be sure, then Gal 3:7. After ἐπεί: for otherwise (B-D-F §456, 3) 1 Cor 5:10; 7:14. After εἰ: if then, if on the other hand (SIG 834, 12; Gen 18:3; s. B-D-F §454, 2) 15:15 (εἴπερ ἄρα— really is also prob. here); Hv 3, 4, 3; 3, 7, 5; Hs 6, 4, 1; 8, 3, 3; 9, 5, 7; s. εἰ 6a.

ⓑ freq. in questions which draw an inference fr. what precedes; but oft. simply to enliven the question (Jos., Ant. 6, 200; B-D-F §440, 2) τίς ἄρα who then Mt 18:1; 19:25; 24:45; Mk 4:41; Lk 8:25; 12:42; 22:23. τί ἄ. what then Mt 19:27; Lk 1:66; Ac 12:18; Hm 11:2; GJs 13:1; AcPl Ha 5, 20; 7, 2 and 3 (cp. GrBar 4:12). εἰ ἄρα then (X., An. 3, 2, 22) Ac 7:1 v.l.; οὐκ ἄ. are you not, then Ac 21:38; μήτι ἄ. 2 Cor 1:17. After οὖν 1 Cl 35:3; B 15:7. S. also 3 below.

② to express result

ⓐ then, as a result w. suggestion of emphasis (Herm. Wr. 11, 13 ed. Nock; B-D-F §451, 2d) Mt 12:28; Lk 11:20; 1 Cor 15:14; 2 Cor 5:14; Gal 2:21; 3:29; 5:11; Hb 12:8; 2 Cl 14:4; B 6:19; IEph 8:1. Also 1 Cor 15:18 ἄ. is used to emphasize a further result, and continues the apodosis of vs. 17.

ⓑ at the beg. of a sentence: so, as a result, consequently Lk 11:48; Ro 10:17; 2 Cor 7:12; Hb 4:9. Strengthened to ἄρα γε (Gen 26:9) Mt 7:20; 17:26; to ἄρα οὖν (never elided) so then; here ἄ. expresses the inference and οὖν the transition Ro 5:18; 7:3, 25 (s. ἆρα); 8:12; 9:16, 18; 14:12, 19; Gal 6:10; Eph 2:19; 1 Th 5:6; 2 Th 2:15; 2 Cl 8:6; 14:3; B 9:6; 10:2; ITr 10.

③ to express someth. tentative, perhaps, conceivably.—KClark, Gingrich Festschr. ’72, 70–84 (w. survey fr. LXX to Mod. Gk.): in addition to its inferential mng., ἄρα is employed in the context of the tentative, the uncertain, the unresolved, the contingent, e.g. possibly Ac 12:18; conceivably Mk 4:41, or it may be rendered by a phrase: would you say? Mt 24:45 (on these three last pass. s. 1b).—Also in indirect questions εἰ ἄ. whether (perhaps) (PPetr II, 13 [19] 9; Num 22:11) Mk 11:13; Ac 5:8 D; 8:22; 17:27 (εἰ ἄρα γε); s. εἰ 6a.—JGrimm, Die Partikel ἄρα im frühen griech. Epos, Glotta 40, ’62, 3–41; Denniston 32–43; JBlomqvist, Gk. Particles in Hell. Prose, diss. Lund, ’69.—EDNT. M-M.

Ελληνικά-Αγγλικά παλαιοχριστιανική Λογοτεχνία > ἄρα
36 повествовательное предложение

1. declarative sentence

бессвязное предложение — incoherent sentence

номинативное предложение — nominative sentence

однозначное предложение — unambiguous sentence

отмеченное предложение — well-formed sentence

предложение типа описания — declarative sentence

2. statement

командное предложение — command statement

целевое предложение — task-level statement

предложение комментария — comment statement

предложение о перемещениях — motion statement

протокольное предложение — protocol statement

Русско-английский большой базовый словарь > повествовательное предложение
37 Aussagesatz

m LING. declarative sentence, (clause of) statement

* * *
Aus|sa|ge|satz
m
statement
* * *

Aus·sa·ge·satz

m LING statement

* * *

der (Sprachw.) affirmative clause

* * *

Aussagesatz m LING declarative sentence, (clause of) statement

* * *

der (Sprachw.) affirmative clause

* * *

m.

clause of statement n.

Deutsch-Englisch Wörterbuch > Aussagesatz
38 заявление заявлени·е

1) statement, declaration, petition; (обыкн. необоснованное) allegation; (повторное) restatement; (официальное) pronouncement, deliverance

выступить с заявлением для печати — to make a statement for the press

делать заявление — to make a statement / declaration

доказывать справедливость заявления — to substantiate a statement

заносить заявление в протокол — to place a statement on record

использовать против кого-л. его собственное заявление — to nail smb. down to one's statement

объявить о неправомерности заявления — to proclaim a statement out of order

опровергать заявление — to refute a statement

опубликовать заявление — to publish / to issue a statement

оспаривать заявление — to contest / contravene a statement

отказываться от своего заявления — to repudiate one's statement

отмежеваться от чьего-л. заявления — to dissociate oneself from smb.'s statement

отметить заявление — to note a statement

оценивать заявление — to assess a statement

поддерживать заявление — to bear out a statement

подтвердить правильность заявления — to affirm the truth of the statement

подтверждать торжественным заявлением — to support by affirmation

принимать заявление к сведению — to acknowledge a statement

проверять заявление — to verify a statement

прокомментировать заявление — to comment on (smb.'s) statement

противоречить заявлению — to contradict a statement

сделать заявление (по поводу чего-л.) — to make a statement (on)

сделать заявление повторно — to renew one's declaration

согласиться с заявлением — to assent to a statement

соответствовать заявлению — to agree with the statement

ставить под сомнение заявление — to dispute (smb.'s) statement

упорно отстаивать своё заявление — to persist in one's statement

утверждать, что заявление не соответствует действительности — to deny the truth of the statement

в заявлении говорилось — the statement said

одно заявление противоречит другому — one statement clashes with another

это заявление нельзя проверить — this statement is not verifiable

авторитетное заявление — authoritative statement

агрессивное / воинственное заявление — bellicose statement

аргументированное заявление — well-founded / reasoned statement

вступительное заявление — opening statement

голословное заявление — allegation, groundless statement

опровергать голословные заявления — to refute allegations

отвергать голословные заявления — to dismiss allegations

дезориентирующее заявление — misleading statement

декларативное заявление — declarative announcement / pronouncement / statement

демагогическое заявление — demagogic statement

заключительное заявление — final statement

клеветническое заявление — libel

краткое заявление (о положении дел и т.п.) — summary statement

лаконичное заявление — close statement

лицемерное заявление — double talk

личное заявление — personal statement

многословное заявление — verbose / wordy statement

напыщенные заявления — highsounding declarations

не внушающее доверия заявление — questionable statement

недвусмысленное заявление — direct / explicit / unequivocal statement

необдуманное заявление — rash statement

необоснованное заявление — unfounded / unsupported / gratuitous statement / allegation

разоблачать необоснованные заявления — to expose allegations

распространять необоснованные заявления — to diffuse allegations

несущественное заявление — immaterial statement

нечётко сформулированное заявление — confused statement

обязывающее заявление — binding declaration

одностороннее заявление — unilateral statement

откровенное заявление — nude / revealing statement

официальное заявление — formal / official / solemn declaration

подстрекательское заявление — instigating statement

позитивное заявление — positive statement

политическое заявление — political statement

последующие заявления — consecutive statements

предварительное заявление — preliminary statement

программное заявление — policy / programme statement

противоречивое заявление — contradictory / inconsistent / irreconcilable statement

публичное заявление — public statement

выступить с публичным заявлением — to come out with / to make a public statement

совместное заявление — common / joint statement / declaration

подписать совместное заявление — to sign a joint statement

принять совместное заявление — to issue a joint statement

согласованное заявление — agreed statement

твёрдое заявление — unyielding statement

устное заявление — verbal statement

циничное заявление — cynical statement

ясное заявление — lucid statement

воспроизведение в отчётах заявлениий в стенографической форме — reproduction of statements verbatum in records

достоверность заявления — veracity of the statement

сомневаться в достоверности заявления — to doubt the veracity of the statement

заявление, допускающее двоякое толкование — ambiguous statement

ясное заявление — lucid statement

заявление о намерениях — statement of intentions

заявление о политическом курсе — statement of policy, policy statement

заявление общего характера — general statement

заявление по вопросам внешней политики — foreign policy statement

заявление представителя делегации — statement by a representative of the delegation

заявление президента / председателя — pronouncement / statement of the President / Chairman

заявление, соответствующее истине — veracious statement

отказ от своего заявления — repudiation of one's statement

подтверждение заявления — confirmation of a statement

смысл заявления — implication of the statement

2) юр. statement, application

передать заявление в суд — to hand over (one's) application to court

подавать заявление — to hand in / to lodge an application; to fill an application амер.

подать заявление о предоставлении гражданства — to apply for citizenship

принимать заявление — to have / to receive a petition

сделать заявление о признании или непризнании вины — to make a plea

подать заявление о разрешении на въезд — to make an application for admittance

подать заявление об отставке — to file a resignation

подавать заявление об уходе с работы — to give in one's notice

поддержать заявление — to approve / to support application

рассматривать заявление — to examine an application

считать заявление недействительным — to cancel an application

удовлетворять заявление — to grant an application

встречное заявление — counter statement

исковое заявление — bill of complaint, plaintiffs statement of claim

делать исковое заявление — to declare

письменное заявление — written application

путём письменного заявления — by a written application

торжественное заявление (вместо присяги) — affirmation

заявление, лишённое юридической силы — application without legal effect

заявление об исключительных обстоятельствах (при выходе из числа участников договора) — statement of extraordinary events / circumstances

заявление о предоставлении гражданства — application for citizenship; (США) declaration of intention, first paper

заявление о членстве — application for membership

заявление по вопросам гражданства — application relating to nationality

заявление, сделанное под пытками — statement made as a result of torture

заявление с просьбой о выдаче визы — application for a visa

представлять заявление с просьбой о выдаче визы — to submit an application for a visa

податель заявления — applicant

в ответ на заявление — in response to an application

Russian-english dctionary of diplomacy > заявление заявлени·е
39 μή

μή (Hom.+) negative particle, ‘not’: ‘μή is the negative of will, wish, doubt. If οὐ denies the fact, μή denies the idea’ (Rob. 1167). For the Koine of the NT the usage is simplified to such a degree that οὐ is generally the neg. used w. the indicative, and μή is used w. the other moods (B-D-F §426; Rob. 1167).

① marker of negation, not

ⓐ in negative clauses

α. in conditional clauses after ἐάν Mt 5:20; 6:15; 10:13; 12:29; 18:3, 16, 35; 26:42; Mk 3:27; 7:3f; 10:30; 12:19; Lk 13:3, 5; J 3:2f, 5, 27 al. After ὸ̔ς ἄν (=ἐάν) Mt 10:14; 11:6; 19:9; Mk 6:11; 10:15; 11:23; Lk 8:18; 18:17. After ὅσοι ἄν Lk 9:5; Rv 13:15. After ὅστις ἄν Ac 3:23. After εἰ in a simple condition (B-D-F §428, 1) Lk 6:4; 1 Ti 6:3. After εἰ in a contrary to fact condition (B-D-F §428, 2; Rob. 1169) Mt 24:22; Mk 13:20; J 9:33; 15:22, 24; 18:30; 19:11; Ac 26:32; Ro 7:7. εἰ μή if not, except (that), εἰ δὲ μήγε otherwise with verb and elliptically (B-D-F §428, 3; 439, 1; Rob. 1024f; cp. POxy 1185, 30) Mt 5:13; 6:1; 9:17; 11:27; 12:4, 24 and very oft. (GHarder, 1 Cor 7:17: TLZ 79, ’54, 367–72).

β. in purpose clauses ἵνα μή in order that…not Mt 5:29f; 7:1; 17:27; Mk 3:9; 4:12; Lk 8:10, 12; 16:28; J 3:20; 7:23; Ac 2:25 (Ps 15:8); 4:17; 24:4; Ro 11:25; 15:20 al. ὅπως μή in order that…not Mt 6:18; Lk 16:26; Ac 20:16; 1 Cor 1:29. μὴ ἵνα IRo 3:2. On the inf. w. neg. as periphrasis for purpose clauses s. below.

γ. in result clauses ὥστε μή w. inf. foll. (cp. PHib 66, 5) so that not Mt 8:28; Mk 3:20; 1 Cor 1:7; 2 Cor 3:7; 1 Th 1:8; w. impv. foll. 1 Cor 4:5.

δ. in interrog. clauses w. an element of doubt: δῶμεν ἢ μὴ δῶμεν; should we pay (them) or should we not? Mk 12:14.

ε. in a few relative clauses (B-D-F §428, 4; Mlt. 171; 239f) διδάσκοντες ἃ μὴ δεῖ Tit 1:11 (cp. Lucian, Dial. Deor. 13, 1; PGM 4, 2653 ὸ̔ μὴ θέμις γενέσθαι; CPR I, 19, 17; 2 Macc 12:14; Sir 13:24). The literary language is the source of ᾧ μὴ πάρεστιν ταῦτα τυφλός ἐστιν 2 Pt 1:9, where the relat. clause has a hypothetical sense. ὅσα μὴ θέλετε Ac 15:29 D. Cp. Col 2:18 v.l. On ὸ̔ μὴ ὁμολογεῖ (v.l. ὸ̔ λύει) 1J 4:3 s. ARahlfs, TLZ 40, 1915, 525.

ζ. in a causal clause contrary to the rule, which calls for οὐ: ὅτι μὴ πεπίστευκεν εἰς τὸ ὄνομα J 3:18 (cp. Epict. 4, 4, 8; Jos., C. Ap. 1, 217 διήμαρτον, ὅτι μὴ ταῖς ἱεραῖς ἡμῶν βίβλοις ἐνέτυχον; Ps.-Clem., Hom. 8, 4; 11, 8; 32; Ath. 14, 2 ὅτι μὴ κοινῶς ἐκείνοις θεοσεβοῦμεν; Dio Chrys. 31, 94; 110.—B-D-F §428, 5; Mlt. 171; 239; Mlt-Turner 284; Rahlfs, loc. cit.).

ⓑ w. various moods

α. w. inf. (B-D-F §399, 3; 400, 4; 5; Mlt-Turner 285f)

א. after verbs expressing a negative concept, usu. omitted in translation ἀντιλέγοντες ἀνάστασιν μὴ εἶναι Lk 20:27 (v.l. λέγοντες). ἀπαρνεῖσθαι 22:34. παραιτεῖσθαι Hb 12:19. ἐγκόπτειν τινά Gal 5:7. προσέχειν Mt 6:1. οὐ δύναμαι μὴ I can do nothing else than Ac 4:20.

ב. gener., after verbs of saying, reporting, ordering, judging, etc.—in declarative clauses: after ἀποκρίνεσθαι Lk 20:7. λέγειν Mt 22:23; Mk 12:18; Lk 20:27 v.l.; Ac 23:8; AcPlCor 2:19. ὀμνύναι Hb 3:18. θέλειν Ro 13:3. χρηματίζεσθαι Lk 2:26.—In clauses denoting a summons or challenge: after λέγειν Mt 5:34, 39; Ac 21:4; Ro 2:22; 12:3. γράφειν 1 Cor 5:9, 11. κηρύσσειν Ro 2:21. παραγγέλλειν Ac 1:4; 4:18; 5:28, 40; 1 Cor 7:10f (w. acc.); 1 Ti 1:3; 6:17. αἰτεῖσθαι Eph 3:13. εὔχεσθαι 2 Cor 13:7 (w. acc.). χρηματίζεσθαι Mt 2:12. ἀξιοῦν Ac 15:38. βοᾶν 25:24.

ג. after predicates that contain a judgment upon the thing expressed by the inf. (with or without the art.; cp. Just., D. 68, 8 ταῦτα τολμῶσι λέγειν μὴ οὕτως γεγράφθαι): καλόν (sc. ἐστιν) 1 Cor 7:1 (ApcEsdr 1, 6, 21); Gal 4:18; cp. Ro 14:21. ἄλογον Ac 25:27 (w. acc.). κρεῖττον ἦν 2 Pt 2:21. αἱρετώτερον ἦν αὐτοῖς τὸ μὴ γεννηθῆναι Hv 4, 2, 6. Cp. δεῖ Ac 27:21 (cp. use w. ἐχρῆν TestJob 37:6).

ד. w. gen. of the subst. inf.: τοῦ μή that not (Lat. ne): after verbs of hindering κατέχειν Lk 4:42. παύειν 1 Pt 3:10 (Ps 33:14). καταπαύειν Ac 14:18. κωλύειν 10:47. κρατεῖσθαι Lk 24:16; cp. ἀνένδεκτόν ἐστιν τοῦ…μὴ ἐλθεῖν 17:1.—Also after other expressions: ὀφθαλμοὶ τοῦ μὴ βλέπειν, ὦτα τοῦ μὴ ἀκούειν eyes that should not see, ears that should not hear Ro 11:8, 10 (Ps 68:24). In place of a result clause: τοῦ μὴ εἶναι αὐτὴν μοιχαλίδα so that she commits no adultery, if... 7:3.

ה. w. subst. inf. after prepositions: εἰς τὸ μή so that…not; to the end that…not Ac 7:19; 1 Cor 10:6; 2 Cor 4:4. W. acc. and inf. foll. 2 Th 2:2; 1 Pt 3:7.—διὰ τὸ μή because…not (PPetr II, 11, 1, 7 [III B.C.] τοῦτο δὲ γίνεται διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀθροῦν ἡμᾶς; 2 Macc 2:11; ApcMos 42 διὰ τὸ μὴ γινώσκειν; Just., D. 95, 1 διὰ τὸ μὴ πάντα φυλάξαι; Tat. 2, 1 διὰ τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι) Mt 13:5f; Mk 4:5f; Lk 8:6; Js 4:2 (w. acc.).—πρὸς τὸ μὴ in order that…not (Ptolem. Pap. aus Alexandria 4, 3 in Witkowski p. 51 πρὸς τὸ μὴ γίνεσθαι τῷ βασιλεῖ τὸ χρήσιμον; Esth 3:13d, e; Bar 1:19; 2:5) 2 Cor 3:13; 1 Th 2:9; 2 Th 3:8.

ו. w. dat. of the subst. inf. τῷ μή because…not 2 Cor 2:13.

ז. w. nom. or acc. of the subst. inf. (2 Esdr 6:8; s. B-D-F §399, 3; s. Rob. 1038) Ro 14:13; 2 Cor 2:1; 10:2; 1 Th 4:6.

β. very oft. w. the ptc., in keeping w. the tendency of later Gk. to prefer μή to οὐ; exceptions in B-D-F §430; s. Rob. 1172.

א. μή is regularly used to negative the ptc. used w. the article, when the ptc. has a hypothet. sense or refers to no particular person, and has a general mng. (Artem. 4, 22 p. 215, 14 οἱ μὴ νοσοῦντες; ParJer 6:24 ὁ δὲ μὴ ἀκούων; Just., A I, 4, 2 τοὺς μὴ ἐλεγχομένους): ὁ μὴ ὢν μετʼ ἐμοῦ every one who is not with me Mt 12:30ab; Lk 11:23ab; ὁ μὴ πιστεύων J 3:18. πᾶς ὁ μή... Mt 7:26; 1J 3:10ab; 2J 9. πάντες οἱ μή 2 Th 2:12. μακάριοι οἱ μή J 20:29; cp. Ro 14:22. τῶν τὴν ψυχὴν μὴ δυναμένων ἀποκτεῖναι Mt 10:28b and oft.

ב. w. the ptc. when it has conditional, causal, or concessive sense: πᾶν δένδρον μὴ ποιοῦν Mt 3:10; 7:19. Cp. 9:36; 13:19; Lk 11:24. θερίσομεν μὴ ἐκλυόμενοι we will reap, if we do not become weary (before the harvest) Gal 6:9. μὴ ὄντος νόμου when there is no law Ro 5:13. νόμον μὴ ἔχοντες although they have no law 2:14. μὴ ὢν αὐτὸς ὑπὸ νόμον though I am not under the law 1 Cor 9:20 (cp. TestAbr B 11 p. 115, 22 [Stone p. 78] μὴ ἰδὼν θάνατον). μὴ μεμαθηκώς without having learned (them) J 7:15 (cp. TestAbr B 2 p. 106, 1 [Stone p. 60] μὴ εἰδὼς τίς ἐστιν; TestJob 11:7 μὴ λαμβάνων…ἐνέχυρα; Just., A I, 5, 1 μὴ φροντίζοντες, D. 110, 2 μὴ συνιέντες). μὴ ἔχοντος δὲ αὐτοῦ ἀποδοῦναι but since he could not pay it back Mt 18:25. μὴ βουλόμενος since (God) did not wish to AcPlCor 2:12 (cp. TestAbrB 5 p. 109, 24f [Stone p. 66] μὴ θέλων…παρακοῦσαι).

ג. when it is to be indicated that the statement has subjective validity (Just., D. 115, 3 ὡς μὴ γεγενημένου ἱερέως): ὡς μὴ λαβών as though you had not received 1 Cor 4:7. ὡς μὴ ἐρχομένου μου vs. 18.

ד. but also very freq. where earlier Gk. would require οὐ (on developments s. Schwyzer II 595f; B-D-F §430, 3; Burton §485 [464 Z.]; cp. οὐ 2b; for μή here, cp. Just., A I, 3, 9, 3 ἄνδρες δεκαδύο…λαλεῖν μὴ δυνάμενοι; D. 85, 4 διὰ τοὺς μὴ…συνόντας ἡμῖν; Mel., P. 71, 518f): τὰ μὴ ὄντα what does not exist (in reality, not only in Paul’s opinion) Ro 4:17; 1 Cor 1:28 (Philo, Op. M. 81 τὸ τὰ μὴ ὄντα εἰς τὸ εἶναι παραγαγεῖν; Ath. 4:2 τὸ ὸ̓ν οὐ γίνεται ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ ὄν); Hv 1, 1, 6. τὰ μὴ βλεπόμενα what is unseen 2 Cor 4:18ab. τὰ μὴ δέοντα 1 Ti 5:13. τὰ μὴ καθήκοντα (3 Macc 4:16) Ro 1:28. τὰ μὴ σαλευόμενα Hb 12:27. τὸν μὴ γνόντα ἁμαρτίαν 2 Cor 5:21. τυφλὸς μὴ βλέπων Ac 13:11. S. also μὴ ἀσθενήσας τῇ πίστει κατενόησεν Ro 4:19 where, as oft., the main idea is expressed by the ptc.

ⓒ in a prohibitive sense in independent clauses, to express a negative wish or a warning

α. w. subjunctive let us not, we should not: pres. subj. μὴ γινώμεθα κενόδοξοι Gal 5:26. μὴ ἐγκακῶμεν 6:9. μὴ καθεύδωμεν 1 Th 5:6; cp. 1 Cor 5:8. W. aor. subj. μὴ σχίσωμεν αὐτόν J 19:24.

β. w. optative (B-D-F §427, 4; Rob. 1170) μὴ αὐτοῖς λογισθείη 2 Ti 4:16 (cp. Job 27:5). ἐμοὶ δὲ μὴ γένοιτο καυχᾶσθαι Gal 6:14 (cp. 1 Macc 9:10; 13:5). Esp. in the formula μὴ γένοιτο (s. γίνομαι 4a) Lk 20:16; Ro 3:4, 31; 6:2, 15; 7:7, 13; 9:14; 11:1, 11; 1 Cor 6:15; Gal 2:17; 3:21.

γ. w. pres. impv.

א. to express a command that is generally valid (TestReub 2:10) μὴ γίνεσθε ὡς οἱ ὑποκριταί Mt 6:16; cp. vs. 19. μὴ μεριμνᾶτε τῇ ψυχῇ ὑμῶν vs. 25; Lk 12:22.—Mt 7:1; 10:31; 19:6; Lk 6:30; 10:4, 7; 1 Cor 6:9; 7:5, 12f, 18; Eph 4:26 (Ps 4:5), 29 and oft.

ב. to bring to an end a condition now existing (Aeschyl., Sept. 1036; Chariton 2, 7, 5 μὴ ὀργίζου=‘be angry no longer’; PHib 56, 7 [249 B.C.]; PAmh 37, 7; POxy 295, 5; Wsd 1:12 and elsewh. LXX; TestAbr B 9 p. 113, 20 [Stone p. 74]; JosAs 14:11; GrBar 7:6 and ApcMos 16 μὴ φοβοῦ; Just., D. 87, 1 μὴ…λοιπὸν ὑπολάμβανε; Mlt. 122ff) μὴ φοβεῖσθε do not be afraid (any longer) Mt 14:27; 17:7; Lk 2:10; cp. 1:13, 30. μὴ κλαῖε do not weep (any more) 7:13; cp. 23:28 (GrBar16:1) μὴ σκύλλου do not trouble yourself (any further) 7:6; cp. 8:49 v.l. (TestAbr B 2 p. 107, 2 [Stone p. 62] μὴ σκύλλε τὸ παιδάριον).—9:50; Mk 9:39; J 2:16; 6:43. μὴ γράφε do not write (any longer)=it must no longer stand written 19:21. μή μου ἅπτου do not cling to me any longer = let go of me 20:17. μὴ γίνου ἄπιστος vs. 27.—Ac 10:15; 20:10; Ro 11:18, 20; 1 Th 5:19; Js 2:1 and oft.

δ. w. aor. impv. (Od. 16, 301; Lucian, Paras. μὴ δότε; 1 Km 17:32; TestJob 45:1 μὴ ἐπιλάθεσθε τοῦ κυρίου) μὴ ἐπιστρεψάτω Mt 24:18; Lk 17:31b. μὴ καταβάτω Mt 24:17; Mk 13:15; Lk 17:31a. μὴ γνώτω Mt 6:3.

ε. w. aor. subj.

א. almost always to prevent a forbidden action fr. beginning (Plut., Alex. 696 [54, 6] μὴ φιλήσῃς=‘don’t kiss’; PPetr II, 40a, 12 [III B.C.]; POxy 744, 11; BGU 380, 19; LXX; TestAbr A 2 p. 79, 8 [Stone p. 6] μὴ ἐνέγκωσιν ἵππους; 16 p. 97, 5 [Stone p. 42] μὴ ἐκφοβήσῃς αὐτόν; TestJob 39:11 μὴ κάμητε εἰκῇ; ParJer 3:5 μὴ ἀπολέσητε τὴν πόλιν; ApcEsdr 7:11 μὴ μνησθῇς; Just., D. 137, 1 μὴ κακόν τι εἴπητε.—This is the sense of μὴ θαυμάσῃς Herm. Wr. 11, 17; s. ב below) μὴ φοβηθῇς Mt 1:20; 10:26 (JosAs 23:15; cp. TestJob 17:6 μὴ φοβηθῆτε ὅλως). μὴ δόξητε 3:9; cp. 5:17. μὴ ἅψῃ Col 2:21. μὴ ἀποστραφῇς Mt 5:42. μὴ κτήσησθε 10:9 and oft. Also w. the third pers. of the aor. subj. μή τις αὐτὸν ἐξουθενήσῃ no one is to slight him 1 Cor 16:11. μή τίς με δόξῃ εἶναι 2 Cor 11:16. μή τις ὑμᾶς ἐξαπατήσῃ 2 Th 2:3. μὴ σκληρύνητε Hb 3:8, 15 (quot. fr. Ps 94:8) is hardly a pres. subj.; it is rather to be regarded as an aor.

ב. only rarely to put an end to a condition already existing (the pres. impv. is regularly used for this; s. above 1 cγב) (TestAbr B 7 p. 111, 19 [Stone p. 70] μὴ κλαύσῃς weep no more) μὴ θαυμάσῃς you need no longer wonder J 3:7 (‘you needn’t be surprised’: s. Mlt. 124; 126; and s. א above).

ζ. in abrupt expressions without a verb (ParJer 1:7 μὴ κύριέ μου): μὴ ἐν τῇ ἑορτῇ (we must) not (proceed against him) during the festival Mt 26:5; Mk 14:2. Cp. J 18:40. καὶ μὴ (ποιήσωμεν) Ro 3:8 (B-D-F §427, 4). μὴ ὀκνηροὶ (γίνεσθε) 12:11. Cp. 14:1; Gal 5:13; Eph 6:6 al. (B-D-F §481).

② marker of conjunction

ⓐ after verbs of fearing, etc. that…(not), lest B-D-F §370.

α. w. pres. subj. (3 Macc 2:23) ἐπισκοποῦντες…μή τις ῥίζα…ἐνοχλῇ Hb 12:15

β. w. aor. subj. (Pla., Apol. 1, 17a) φοβηθεὶς μὴ διασπασθῇ Ac 23:10. Also after a pres. 27:17 (cp. Tob 6:15). After βλέπειν in the mng. take care (PLond III, 964, 9 p. 212 [II/III A.D.] βλέπε μὴ ἐπιλάθῃ μηδέν) Mt 24:4; Mk 13:5; Lk 21:8; Ac 13:40; 1 Cor 10:12; Gal 5:15; Hb 12:25. σκοπῶν σεαυτὸν, μὴ καὶ σὺ πειρασθῇς Gal 6:1. στελλόμενοι τοῦτο, μή τις ἡμάς μωμήσηται 2 Cor 8:20. ὁρᾶν Mt 18:10; 1 Th 5:15. Elliptically, like an aposiopesis ὅρα μή take care! you must not do that! Rv 19:10; 22:9 (B-D-F §480, 5; Rob. 932; 1203).

γ. w. fut. ind. instead of the subj. following (X., Cyr. 4, 1, 18 ὅρα μὴ πολλῶν ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν χειρῶν δεήσει) βλέπετε μή τις ἔσται Col 2:8; cp. Hb 3:12

ⓑ taking the place of a purpose clause=so that…not: w. aor. subj. Mk 13:36; Ac 27:42; 2 Cor 12:6.

③ marker of expectation of a negative anwer to a question (B-D-F §427, 2; 4; 440; Rob. 1168; 1175; Mlt-Turner 283).

ⓐ in direct questions (X. Eph. 398, 26 H.; Job 1:9; 8:11; TestAbr A 2 p. 79, 9f [Stone p. 6]; B 6 p. 110, 6 [Stone p. 68]; TestJob 15, 6; 27, 1; ApcSed 7:2; ApcMos 8:27) somewhat along the lines ‘it isn’t so, is it, that...?’, with expectation of a neg. answer; in tr. the negation can in fact be variously expressed in a form suggesting that an inappropriate answer would be met with complete dismay, e.g. μή τινος ὑστερήσατε; you didn’t lack anything, did you? Lk 22:35; μὴ λίθον ἐπιδώσει αὐτῷ; will one give the person a stone? Mt 7:9; sim. vs. 10; 9:15; Mk 2:19; Lk 5:34; 11:11 v.l.; 17:9; J 3:4; 4:12, 33; 6:67; 7:35, 51f; 21:5 (cp. μήτι); Ac 7:28 (Ex 2:14), 42 (Am 5:25); Ro 3:3, 5 (cp. Job 8:3); 9:14, 20 (Is 29:16); 1 Cor 1:13; 9:8f; 10:22 al. μὴ γάρ J 7:41; 1 Cor 11:22.—In cases like Ro 10:18f; 1 Cor 9:4f μή is an interrog. word and οὐ negatives the verb. The double negative causes one to expect an affirmative answer (B-D-F §427, 2; s. Rob. 1173f; Tetrast. Iamb. 17, 2 p. 266 μὴ οὐκ ἔστι χλόη;=‘there is grass, is there not?’).

ⓑ in indirect questions whether…not Lk 11:35 (cp. Epict. 4, 5, 18a; Arrian, Anab. 4, 20, 2 μή τι βίαιον ξυνέβη=whether anything violent has happened [hopefully not]; Jos., Ant. 6, 115).

④ marker of reinforced negation, in combination w. οὐ, μή has the effect of strengthening the negation (Kühner-G. II 221–23; Schwyzer II 317; Mlt. 187–92 [a thorough treatment of NT usage]; B-D-F §365; RLudwig: D. prophet. Wort 31 ’37, 272–79; JLee, NovT 27, ’85, 18–23; B-D-F §365.—Pla., Hdt. et al. [Kühner-G. loc. cit.]; SIG 1042, 16; POxy 119, 5, 14f; 903, 16; PGM 5, 279; 13, 321; LXX; TestAbr A 8 p. 85, 11 [Stone p. 46]; JosAs 20:3; GrBar 1:7; ApcEsdr 2:7; Just., D. 141, 2). οὐ μή is the most decisive way of negativing someth. in the future.

ⓐ w. the subj.

α. w. aor. subj. (TestAbr A 17 p. 99, 7 οὐ μὴ δυνηθῇς θεάσασθαι; JosAs 20:3; ParJer 2:5; 8:5; ApcSed 12:5; 13:6; Just., D. 141, 2; Ael. Aristid. 50, 107 K.=26 p. 533 D.: οὐ μὴ ἡμῶν καταφρονήσωσι; Diogenes, Ep. 38, 5; UPZ 62, 34; 79, 19) never, certainly not, etc. Mt 5:18, 20, 26; 24:2; Mk 13:2; Lk 1:15; 6:37ab; 10:19; J 8:52; 10:28; 11:26; 13:8; 1 Cor 8:13; Hb 8:12 (Jer 38:34); 13:5; 1 Pt 2:6 (Is 28:16); Rv 2:11; 3:12; 18:21–23 al.—Also in a rhetorical question, when an affirmative answer is expected οὐ μὴ ποιήσῃ τὴν ἐκδίκησιν; will he not vindicate? Lk 18:7. οὐ μὴ πίω αὐτό; shall I not drink it? J 18:11. τίς οὐ μὴ φοβηθῇ; who shall not fear? Rv 15:4.—In relative clauses Mt 16:28; Mk 9:1; Ac 13:41 (Hab 1:5); Ro 4:8 (Ps 31:2); cp. Lk 18:30.—In declarative and interrogative sentences after ὅτι Mt 24:34; Lk 22:16 (οὐκέτι οὐ μή v.l.); J 11:56; without ὅτι Mt 26:29; Lk 13:35.—Combined w. οὐδέ: οὐδʼ οὐ μὴ γένηται (Mitt-Wilck. I/2, 122, 4 [6 A.D.]) Mt 24:21 (B-D-F §431, 3).

β. w. pres. subj. Hb 13:5 v.l. ἐγκαταλείπω (accepted by Tdf., whereas most edd. read ἐγκαταλίπω)

ⓑ w. fut. ind. (En 98:12; 99:10; TestAbr A 8 p. 85, 11 [Stone p. 20] οὐ μή σοι ἀκολουθήσω; GrBar 1:7 οὐ μὴ προσθήσω; ApcEsdr 2:7 οὐ μὴ παύσομαι) οὐ μὴ ἔσται σοι τοῦτο Mt 16:22.—Hm 9:5; Hs 1:5; 4:7. Cp. Mt 15:6; 26:35; Lk 10:19 v.l.; 21:33; J 4:14; 6:35b; 10:5 (ἀκολουθήσωσιν v.l.); Hb 10:17. οὐκέτι οὐ μὴ εὑρήσουσιν Rv 18:14. οὐ γὰρ μὴ κληρονομήσει Gal 4:30 (Gen 21:10 v.l.); but the tradition wavers mostly betw. the fut. and aor. subj. (s. Mlt. and B-D-F loc. cit.).—DELG. M-M. EDNT.

Ελληνικά-Αγγλικά παλαιοχριστιανική Λογοτεχνία > μή
40 Artificial Intelligence

   1) Programs and the Complexity of Human Mental Processes

   In my opinion, none of [these programs] does even remote justice to the complexity of human mental processes. Unlike men, "artificially intelligent" programs tend to be single minded, undistractable, and unemotional. (Neisser, 1967, p. 9)

   2) Artificial Intelligence Is an Engineering Discipline

   Future progress in [artificial intelligence] will depend on the development of both practical and theoretical knowledge.... As regards theoretical knowledge, some have sought a unified theory of artificial intelligence. My view is that artificial intelligence is (or soon will be) an engineering discipline since its primary goal is to build things. (Nilsson, 1971, pp. vii-viii)

   3) A Sceptical View of Artificial Intelligence

   Most workers in AI [artificial intelligence] research and in related fields confess to a pronounced feeling of disappointment in what has been achieved in the last 25 years. Workers entered the field around 1950, and even around 1960, with high hopes that are very far from being realized in 1972. In no part of the field have the discoveries made so far produced the major impact that was then promised.... In the meantime, claims and predictions regarding the potential results of AI research had been publicized which went even farther than the expectations of the majority of workers in the field, whose embarrassments have been added to by the lamentable failure of such inﬂated predictions....

   When able and respected scientists write in letters to the present author that AI, the major goal of computing science, represents "another step in the general process of evolution"; that possibilities in the 1980s include an all-purpose intelligence on a human-scale knowledge base; that awe-inspiring possibilities suggest themselves based on machine intelligence exceeding human intelligence by the year 2000 [one has the right to be skeptical]. (Lighthill, 1972, p. 17)

   4) Just as Astronomy Succeeded Astrology, the Discovery of Intellectual Processes in Machines Should Lead to a Science, Eventually

   Just as astronomy succeeded astrology, following Kepler's discovery of planetary regularities, the discoveries of these many principles in empirical explorations on intellectual processes in machines should lead to a science, eventually. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)

   5) Problems in Machine Intelligence Arise Because Things Obvious to Any Person Are Not Represented in the Program

   Many problems arise in experiments on machine intelligence because things obvious to any person are not represented in any program. One can pull with a string, but one cannot push with one.... Simple facts like these caused serious problems when Charniak attempted to extend Bobrow's "Student" program to more realistic applications, and they have not been faced up to until now. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 77)

   6) The Meaning of a Symbolic Description

   What do we mean by [a symbolic] "description"? We do not mean to suggest that our descriptions must be made of strings of ordinary language words (although they might be). The simplest kind of description is a structure in which some features of a situation are represented by single ("primitive") symbols, and relations between those features are represented by other symbols-or by other features of the way the description is put together. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)

   7) The Principle of Artificial Intelligence

   [AI is] the use of computer programs and programming techniques to cast light on the principles of intelligence in general and human thought in particular. (Boden, 1977, p. 5)

   8) Artificial Intelligence Recognizes the Need for Knowledge in Its Systems

   The word you look for and hardly ever see in the early AI literature is the word knowledge. They didn't believe you have to know anything, you could always rework it all.... In fact 1967 is the turning point in my mind when there was enough feeling that the old ideas of general principles had to go.... I came up with an argument for what I called the primacy of expertise, and at the time I called the other guys the generalists. (Moses, quoted in McCorduck, 1979, pp. 228-229)

   9) Artificial Intelligence Is Psychology in a Particularly Pure and Abstract Form

   The basic idea of cognitive science is that intelligent beings are semantic engines-in other words, automatic formal systems with interpretations under which they consistently make sense. We can now see why this includes psychology and artificial intelligence on a more or less equal footing: people and intelligent computers (if and when there are any) turn out to be merely different manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon. Moreover, with universal hardware, any semantic engine can in principle be formally imitated by a computer if only the right program can be found. And that will guarantee semantic imitation as well, since (given the appropriate formal behavior) the semantics is "taking care of itself" anyway. Thus we also see why, from this perspective, artificial intelligence can be regarded as psychology in a particularly pure and abstract form. The same fundamental structures are under investigation, but in AI, all the relevant parameters are under direct experimental control (in the programming), without any messy physiology or ethics to get in the way. (Haugeland, 1981b, p. 31)

    10) There Are Many Types of Reasoning

   There are many different kinds of reasoning one might imagine:

    Formal reasoning involves the syntactic manipulation of data structures to deduce new ones following prespecified rules of inference. Mathematical logic is the archetypical formal representation. Procedural reasoning uses simulation to answer questions and solve problems. When we use a program to answer What is the sum of 3 and 4? it uses, or "runs," a procedural model of arithmetic. Reasoning by analogy seems to be a very natural mode of thought for humans but, so far, difficult to accomplish in AI programs. The idea is that when you ask the question Can robins ﬂy? the system might reason that "robins are like sparrows, and I know that sparrows can ﬂy, so robins probably can ﬂy."

    Generalization and abstraction are also natural reasoning process for humans that are difficult to pin down well enough to implement in a program. If one knows that Robins have wings, that Sparrows have wings, and that Blue jays have wings, eventually one will believe that All birds have wings. This capability may be at the core of most human learning, but it has not yet become a useful technique in AI.... Meta- level reasoning is demonstrated by the way one answers the question What is Paul Newman's telephone number? You might reason that "if I knew Paul Newman's number, I would know that I knew it, because it is a notable fact." This involves using "knowledge about what you know," in particular, about the extent of your knowledge and about the importance of certain facts. Recent research in psychology and AI indicates that meta-level reasoning may play a central role in human cognitive processing. (Barr & Feigenbaum, 1981, pp. 146-147)

    11) Programs Are Beginning to Do Things That Critics Have Asserted to Be Impossible

   Suffice it to say that programs already exist that can do things-or, at the very least, appear to be beginning to do things-which ill-informed critics have asserted a priori to be impossible. Examples include: perceiving in a holistic as opposed to an atomistic way; using language creatively; translating sensibly from one language to another by way of a language-neutral semantic representation; planning acts in a broad and sketchy fashion, the details being decided only in execution; distinguishing between different species of emotional reaction according to the psychological context of the subject. (Boden, 1981, p. 33)

    12) The Synthesis of Man and Machine

   Can the synthesis of Man and Machine ever be stable, or will the purely organic component become such a hindrance that it has to be discarded? If this eventually happens-and I have... good reasons for thinking that it must-we have nothing to regret and certainly nothing to fear. (Clarke, 1984, p. 243)

    13) The Thesis of Good Old-Fashioned Artificial Intelligence (GOFAI)

   The thesis of GOFAI... is not that the processes underlying intelligence can be described symbolically... but that they are symbolic. (Haugeland, 1985, p. 113)

    14) Artificial Intelligence Provides a Useful Approach to Psychological and Psychiatric Theory Formation

   It is all very well formulating psychological and psychiatric theories verbally but, when using natural language (even technical jargon), it is difficult to recognise when a theory is complete; oversights are all too easily made, gaps too readily left. This is a point which is generally recognised to be true and it is for precisely this reason that the behavioural sciences attempt to follow the natural sciences in using "classical" mathematics as a more rigorous descriptive language. However, it is an unfortunate fact that, with a few notable exceptions, there has been a marked lack of success in this application. It is my belief that a different approach-a different mathematics-is needed, and that AI provides just this approach. (Hand, quoted in Hand, 1985, pp. 6-7)

    15) Four Kinds of Artificial Intelligence

   We might distinguish among four kinds of AI.

   ♦ Nonpsychological AI

   Research of this kind involves building and programming computers to perform tasks which, to paraphrase Marvin Minsky, would require intelligence if they were done by us. Researchers in nonpsychological AI make no claims whatsoever about the psychological realism of their programs or the devices they build, that is, about whether or not computers perform tasks as humans do.

   ♦ Weak Psychological AI

   Research here is guided by the view that the computer is a useful tool in the study of mind. In particular, we can write computer programs or build devices that simulate alleged psychological processes in humans and then test our predictions about how the alleged processes work. We can weave these programs and devices together with other programs and devices that simulate different alleged mental processes and thereby test the degree to which the AI system as a whole simulates human mentality. According to weak psychological AI, working with computer models is a way of refining and testing hypotheses about processes that are allegedly realized in human minds.

   ♦ Strong Psychological AI

... According to this view, our minds are computers and therefore can be duplicated by other computers. Sherry Turkle writes that the "real ambition is of mythic proportions, making a general purpose intelligence, a mind." (Turkle, 1984, p. 240) The authors of a major text announce that "the ultimate goal of AI research is to build a person or, more humbly, an animal." (Charniak & McDermott, 1985, p. 7)

   ♦ Suprapsychological AI

   Research in this field, like strong psychological AI, takes seriously the functionalist view that mentality can be realized in many different types of physical devices. Suprapsychological AI, however, accuses strong psychological AI of being chauvinisticof being only interested in human intelligence! Suprapsychological AI claims to be interested in all the conceivable ways intelligence can be realized. (Flanagan, 1991, pp. 241-242)

    16) Determination of Relevance of Rules in Particular Contexts

   Even if the [rules] were stored in a context-free form the computer still couldn't use them. To do that the computer requires rules enabling it to draw on just those [ rules] which are relevant in each particular context. Determination of relevance will have to be based on further facts and rules, but the question will again arise as to which facts and rules are relevant for making each particular determination. One could always invoke further facts and rules to answer this question, but of course these must be only the relevant ones. And so it goes. It seems that AI workers will never be able to get started here unless they can settle the problem of relevance beforehand by cataloguing types of context and listing just those facts which are relevant in each. (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p. 80)

    17) Form and Content Are Not Fundamentally Different

   Perhaps the single most important idea to artificial intelligence is that there is no fundamental difference between form and content, that meaning can be captured in a set of symbols such as a semantic net. (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)

    18) The Assumption That the Mind Is a Formal System

   Artificial intelligence is based on the assumption that the mind can be described as some kind of formal system manipulating symbols that stand for things in the world. Thus it doesn't matter what the brain is made of, or what it uses for tokens in the great game of thinking. Using an equivalent set of tokens and rules, we can do thinking with a digital computer, just as we can play chess using cups, salt and pepper shakers, knives, forks, and spoons. Using the right software, one system (the mind) can be mapped into the other (the computer). (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)

    19) A Statement of the Primary and Secondary Purposes of Artificial Intelligence

   The primary goal of Artificial Intelligence is to make machines smarter.

   The secondary goals of Artificial Intelligence are to understand what intelligence is (the Nobel laureate purpose) and to make machines more useful (the entrepreneurial purpose). (Winston, 1987, p. 1)

    20) Mathematical Logic Provides the Basis for Theory in AI

   The theoretical ideas of older branches of engineering are captured in the language of mathematics. We contend that mathematical logic provides the basis for theory in AI. Although many computer scientists already count logic as fundamental to computer science in general, we put forward an even stronger form of the logic-is-important argument....

   AI deals mainly with the problem of representing and using declarative (as opposed to procedural) knowledge. Declarative knowledge is the kind that is expressed as sentences, and AI needs a language in which to state these sentences. Because the languages in which this knowledge usually is originally captured (natural languages such as English) are not suitable for computer representations, some other language with the appropriate properties must be used. It turns out, we think, that the appropriate properties include at least those that have been uppermost in the minds of logicians in their development of logical languages such as the predicate calculus. Thus, we think that any language for expressing knowledge in AI systems must be at least as expressive as the first-order predicate calculus. (Genesereth & Nilsson, 1987, p. viii)

    21) Perceptual Structures Can Be Represented as Lists of Elementary Propositions

   In artificial intelligence studies, perceptual structures are represented as assemblages of description lists, the elementary components of which are propositions asserting that certain relations hold among elements. (Chase & Simon, 1988, p. 490)

    22) Definitions of Artificial Intelligence

   Artificial intelligence (AI) is sometimes defined as the study of how to build and/or program computers to enable them to do the sorts of things that minds can do. Some of these things are commonly regarded as requiring intelligence: offering a medical diagnosis and/or prescription, giving legal or scientific advice, proving theorems in logic or mathematics. Others are not, because they can be done by all normal adults irrespective of educational background (and sometimes by non-human animals too), and typically involve no conscious control: seeing things in sunlight and shadows, finding a path through cluttered terrain, fitting pegs into holes, speaking one's own native tongue, and using one's common sense. Because it covers AI research dealing with both these classes of mental capacity, this definition is preferable to one describing AI as making computers do "things that would require intelligence if done by people." However, it presupposes that computers could do what minds can do, that they might really diagnose, advise, infer, and understand. One could avoid this problematic assumption (and also side-step questions about whether computers do things in the same way as we do) by defining AI instead as "the development of computers whose observable performance has features which in humans we would attribute to mental processes." This bland characterization would be acceptable to some AI workers, especially amongst those focusing on the production of technological tools for commercial purposes. But many others would favour a more controversial definition, seeing AI as the science of intelligence in general-or, more accurately, as the intellectual core of cognitive science. As such, its goal is to provide a systematic theory that can explain (and perhaps enable us to replicate) both the general categories of intentionality and the diverse psychological capacities grounded in them. (Boden, 1990b, pp. 1-2)

    23) The Computer Can Not Be a Model of the Mind

   Because the ability to store data somewhat corresponds to what we call memory in human beings, and because the ability to follow logical procedures somewhat corresponds to what we call reasoning in human beings, many members of the cult have concluded that what computers do somewhat corresponds to what we call thinking. It is no great difficulty to persuade the general public of that conclusion since computers process data very fast in small spaces well below the level of visibility; they do not look like other machines when they are at work. They seem to be running along as smoothly and silently as the brain does when it remembers and reasons and thinks. On the other hand, those who design and build computers know exactly how the machines are working down in the hidden depths of their semiconductors. Computers can be taken apart, scrutinized, and put back together. Their activities can be tracked, analyzed, measured, and thus clearly understood-which is far from possible with the brain. This gives rise to the tempting assumption on the part of the builders and designers that computers can tell us something about brains, indeed, that the computer can serve as a model of the mind, which then comes to be seen as some manner of information processing machine, and possibly not as good at the job as the machine. (Roszak, 1994, pp. xiv-xv)

    24) Computers Will Not Always Be Inferior to Human Brains

   The inner workings of the human mind are far more intricate than the most complicated systems of modern technology. Researchers in the field of artificial intelligence have been attempting to develop programs that will enable computers to display intelligent behavior. Although this field has been an active one for more than thirty-five years and has had many notable successes, AI researchers still do not know how to create a program that matches human intelligence. No existing program can recall facts, solve problems, reason, learn, and process language with human facility. This lack of success has occurred not because computers are inferior to human brains but rather because we do not yet know in sufficient detail how intelligence is organized in the brain. (Anderson, 1995, p. 2)

Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Artificial Intelligence

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declarative — declaratively, adv. /di klar euh tiv/, adj. serving to declare, make known, or explain: a declarative statement. Also, declaratory /di klar euh tawr ee, tohr ee/. [1530 40; < L declarativus explanatory, equiv. to declarat(us) (see DECLARATION) +… … Universalium
Declarative memory — (sometimes referred to as explicit memory) is one of two types of long term human memory. It refers to memories which can be consciously recalled such as facts and knowledge.[1] Its counterpart is known as non declarative or Procedural memory,… … Wikipedia
declarative — [dē kler′ə tiv, dikler′ə tiv] adj. [LL declarativus: see DECLARE] making a statement or assertion [a declarative sentence] declaratively adv … English World dictionary
declarative — ► ADJECTIVE 1) of the nature of a declaration. 2) (of a sentence or phrase) taking the form of a simple statement … English terms dictionary
Statement (logic) — In the area of mathematics called symbolic logic a statement is a declarative sentence that is either true or false.Examples of statements:* Socrates is a man. * A triangle has three sides. * Paris is the capital of England. The first two… … Wikipedia
declarative — de|clar|a|tive [dıˈklærətıv] adj a declarative sentence has the form of a statement … Dictionary of contemporary English
declarative — de|clar|a|tive [ dı klerətıv ] adjective LINGUISTICS a declarative sentence is expressed as a statement … Usage of the words and phrases in modern English
declarative — adjective technical a declarative sentence has the form of a statement … Longman dictionary of contemporary English
declarative — UK [dɪˈklærətɪv] / US [dɪˈklerətɪv] adjective linguistics a declarative sentence is expressed as a statement … English dictionary
declarative — /dəˈklærətɪv/ (say duh klaruhtiv) adjective 1. serving to declare, make clear, or assert; declaratory. 2. Grammar a. designating a sentence which functions as a statement, as opposed to a question or command. b. designating the mood of the verb… …
declarative — [dɪ klarətɪv] adjective of the nature of or making a declaration. ↘Grammar (of a sentence or phrase) taking the form of a simple statement. Derivatives declaratively adverb … English new terms dictionary

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