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101 познавательная способность
1) General subject: cognition2) Psychology: cognitive power3) Aviation medicine: cognitive ability, cognitive capabilityУниверсальный русско-английский словарь > познавательная способность
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102 когнитивная карта
1) Computers: cognitive map2) Psychology: perceptual-conceptual repertory3) Aviation medicine: cognitive manual -
103 когнитивная установка
1) Linguistics: (препозитивная) cognitive (prepositional) attitude2) Psychology: cognitive attitudeУниверсальный русско-английский словарь > когнитивная установка
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104 когнитивный процесс
1) Psychology: cognitive2) Aviation medicine: cognitive processУниверсальный русско-английский словарь > когнитивный процесс
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105 познавательный процесс
1) Law: cognitive process2) Psychology: cognitiveУниверсальный русско-английский словарь > познавательный процесс
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106 Intelligence
There is no mystery about it: the child who is familiar with books, ideas, conversation-the ways and means of the intellectual life-before he begins school, indeed, before he begins consciously to think, has a marked advantage. He is at home in the House of intellect just as the stableboy is at home among horses, or the child of actors on the stage. (Barzun, 1959, p. 142)It is... no exaggeration to say that sensory-motor intelligence is limited to desiring success or practical adaptation, whereas the function of verbal or conceptual thought is to know and state truth. (Piaget, 1954, p. 359)ntelligence has two parts, which we shall call the epistemological and the heuristic. The epistemological part is the representation of the world in such a form that the solution of problems follows from the facts expressed in the representation. The heuristic part is the mechanism that on the basis of the information solves the problem and decides what to do. (McCarthy & Hayes, 1969, p. 466)Many scientists implicitly assume that, among all animals, the behavior and intelligence of nonhuman primates are most like our own. Nonhuman primates have relatively larger brains and proportionally more neocortex than other species... and it now seems likely that humans, chimpanzees, and gorillas shared a common ancestor as recently as 5 to 7 million years ago.... This assumption about the unique status of primate intelligence is, however, just that: an assumption. The relations between intelligence and measures of brain size is poorly understood, and evolutionary affinity does not always ensure behavioral similarity. Moreover, the view that nonhuman primates are the animals most like ourselves coexists uneasily in our minds with the equally pervasive view that primates differ fundamentally from us because they lack language; lacking language, they also lack many of the capacities necessary for reasoning and abstract thought. (Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990, p. 4)Few constructs are asked to serve as many functions in psychology as is the construct of human intelligence.... Consider four of the main functions addressed in theory and research on intelligence, and how they differ from one another.1. Biological. This type of account looks at biological processes. To qualify as a useful biological construct, intelligence should be a biochemical or biophysical process or at least somehow a resultant of biochemical or biophysical processes.2. Cognitive approaches. This type of account looks at molar cognitive representations and processes. To qualify as a useful mental construct, intelligence should be specifiable as a set of mental representations and processes that are identifiable through experimental, mathematical, or computational means.3. Contextual approaches. To qualify as a useful contextual construct, intelligence should be a source of individual differences in accomplishments in "real-world" performances. It is not enough just to account for performance in the laboratory. On [sic] the contextual view, what a person does in the lab may not even remotely resemble what the person would do outside it. Moreover, different cultures may have different conceptions of intelligence, which affect what would count as intelligent in one cultural context versus another.4. Systems approaches. Systems approaches attempt to understand intelligence through the interaction of cognition with context. They attempt to establish a link between the two levels of analysis, and to analyze what forms this link takes. (Sternberg, 1994, pp. 263-264)High but not the highest intelligence, combined with the greatest degrees of persistence, will achieve greater eminence than the highest degree of intelligence with somewhat less persistence. (Cox, 1926, p. 187)There are no definitive criteria of intelligence, just as there are none for chairness; it is a fuzzy-edged concept to which many features are relevant. Two people may both be quite intelligent and yet have very few traits in common-they resemble the prototype along different dimensions.... [Intelligence] is a resemblance between two individuals, one real and the other prototypical. (Neisser, 1979, p. 185)Given the complementary strengths and weaknesses of the differential and information-processing approaches, it should be possible, at least in theory, to synthesise an approach that would capitalise upon the strength of each approach, and thereby share the weakness of neither. (Sternberg, 1977, p. 65)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Intelligence
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107 Philosophy
And what I believe to be more important here is that I find in myself an infinity of ideas of certain things which cannot be assumed to be pure nothingness, even though they may have perhaps no existence outside of my thought. These things are not figments of my imagination, even though it is within my power to think of them or not to think of them; on the contrary, they have their own true and immutable natures. Thus, for example, when I imagine a triangle, even though there may perhaps be no such figure anywhere in the world outside of my thought, nor ever have been, nevertheless the figure cannot help having a certain determinate nature... or essence, which is immutable and eternal, which I have not invented and which does not in any way depend upon my mind. (Descartes, 1951, p. 61)Let us console ourselves for not knowing the possible connections between a spider and the rings of Saturn, and continue to examine what is within our reach. (Voltaire, 1961, p. 144)As modern physics started with the Newtonian revolution, so modern philosophy starts with what one might call the Cartesian Catastrophe. The catastrophe consisted in the splitting up of the world into the realms of matter and mind, and the identification of "mind" with conscious thinking. The result of this identification was the shallow rationalism of l'esprit Cartesien, and an impoverishment of psychology which it took three centuries to remedy even in part. (Koestler, 1964, p. 148)It has been made of late a reproach against natural philosophy that it has struck out on a path of its own, and has separated itself more and more widely from the other sciences which are united by common philological and historical studies. The opposition has, in fact, been long apparent, and seems to me to have grown up mainly under the influence of the Hegelian philosophy, or, at any rate, to have been brought out into more distinct relief by that philosophy.... The sole object of Kant's "Critical Philosophy" was to test the sources and the authority of our knowledge, and to fix a definite scope and standard for the researches of philosophy, as compared with other sciences.... [But Hegel's] "Philosophy of Identity" was bolder. It started with the hypothesis that not only spiritual phenomena, but even the actual world-nature, that is, and man-were the result of an act of thought on the part of a creative mind, similar, it was supposed, in kind to the human mind.... The philosophers accused the scientific men of narrowness; the scientific men retorted that the philosophers were crazy. And so it came about that men of science began to lay some stress on the banishment of all philosophic influences from their work; while some of them, including men of the greatest acuteness, went so far as to condemn philosophy altogether, not merely as useless, but as mischievous dreaming. Thus, it must be confessed, not only were the illegitimate pretensions of the Hegelian system to subordinate to itself all other studies rejected, but no regard was paid to the rightful claims of philosophy, that is, the criticism of the sources of cognition, and the definition of the functions of the intellect. (Helmholz, quoted in Dampier, 1966, pp. 291-292)Philosophy remains true to its classical tradition by renouncing it. (Habermas, 1972, p. 317)I have not attempted... to put forward any grand view of the nature of philosophy; nor do I have any such grand view to put forth if I would. It will be obvious that I do not agree with those who see philosophy as the history of "howlers" and progress in philosophy as the debunking of howlers. It will also be obvious that I do not agree with those who see philosophy as the enterprise of putting forward a priori truths about the world.... I see philosophy as a field which has certain central questions, for example, the relation between thought and reality.... It seems obvious that in dealing with these questions philosophers have formulated rival research programs, that they have put forward general hypotheses, and that philosophers within each major research program have modified their hypotheses by trial and error, even if they sometimes refuse to admit that that is what they are doing. To that extent philosophy is a "science." To argue about whether philosophy is a science in any more serious sense seems to me to be hardly a useful occupation.... It does not seem to me important to decide whether science is philosophy or philosophy is science as long as one has a conception of both that makes both essential to a responsible view of the world and of man's place in it. (Putnam, 1975, p. xvii)What can philosophy contribute to solving the problem of the relation [of] mind to body? Twenty years ago, many English-speaking philosophers would have answered: "Nothing beyond an analysis of the various mental concepts." If we seek knowledge of things, they thought, it is to science that we must turn. Philosophy can only cast light upon our concepts of those things.This retreat from things to concepts was not undertaken lightly. Ever since the seventeenth century, the great intellectual fact of our culture has been the incredible expansion of knowledge both in the natural and in the rational sciences (mathematics, logic).The success of science created a crisis in philosophy. What was there for philosophy to do? Hume had already perceived the problem in some degree, and so surely did Kant, but it was not until the twentieth century, with the Vienna Circle and with Wittgenstein, that the difficulty began to weigh heavily. Wittgenstein took the view that philosophy could do no more than strive to undo the intellectual knots it itself had tied, so achieving intellectual release, and even a certain illumination, but no knowledge. A little later, and more optimistically, Ryle saw a positive, if reduced role, for philosophy in mapping the "logical geography" of our concepts: how they stood to each other and how they were to be analyzed....Since that time, however, philosophers in the "analytic" tradition have swung back from Wittgensteinian and even Rylean pessimism to a more traditional conception of the proper role and tasks of philosophy. Many analytic philosophers now would accept the view that the central task of philosophy is to give an account, or at least play a part in giving an account, of the most general nature of things and of man. (Armstrong, 1990, pp. 37-38)8) Philosophy's Evolving Engagement with Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive ScienceIn the beginning, the nature of philosophy's engagement with artificial intelligence and cognitive science was clear enough. The new sciences of the mind were to provide the long-awaited vindication of the most potent dreams of naturalism and materialism. Mind would at last be located firmly within the natural order. We would see in detail how the most perplexing features of the mental realm could be supported by the operations of solely physical laws upon solely physical stuff. Mental causation (the power of, e.g., a belief to cause an action) would emerge as just another species of physical causation. Reasoning would be understood as a kind of automated theorem proving. And the key to both was to be the depiction of the brain as the implementation of multiple higher level programs whose task was to manipulate and transform symbols or representations: inner items with one foot in the physical (they were realized as brain states) and one in the mental (they were bearers of contents, and their physical gymnastics were cleverly designed to respect semantic relationships such as truth preservation). (A. Clark, 1996, p. 1)Socrates of Athens famously declared that "the unexamined life is not worth living," and his motto aptly explains the impulse to philosophize. Taking nothing for granted, philosophy probes and questions the fundamental presuppositions of every area of human inquiry.... [P]art of the job of the philosopher is to keep at a certain critical distance from current doctrines, whether in the sciences or the arts, and to examine instead how the various elements in our world-view clash, or fit together. Some philosophers have tried to incorporate the results of these inquiries into a grand synoptic view of the nature of reality and our human relationship to it. Others have mistrusted system-building, and seen their primary role as one of clarifications, or the removal of obstacles along the road to truth. But all have shared the Socratic vision of using the human intellect to challenge comfortable preconceptions, insisting that every aspect of human theory and practice be subjected to continuing critical scrutiny....Philosophy is, of course, part of a continuing tradition, and there is much to be gained from seeing how that tradition originated and developed. But the principal object of studying the materials in this book is not to pay homage to past genius, but to enrich one's understanding of central problems that are as pressing today as they have always been-problems about knowledge, truth and reality, the nature of the mind, the basis of right action, and the best way to live. These questions help to mark out the territory of philosophy as an academic discipline, but in a wider sense they define the human predicament itself; they will surely continue to be with us for as long as humanity endures. (Cottingham, 1996, pp. xxi-xxii)10) The Distinction between Dionysian Man and Apollonian Man, between Art and Creativity and Reason and Self- ControlIn his study of ancient Greek culture, The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche drew what would become a famous distinction, between the Dionysian spirit, the untamed spirit of art and creativity, and the Apollonian, that of reason and self-control. The story of Greek civilization, and all civilizations, Nietzsche implied, was the gradual victory of Apollonian man, with his desire for control over nature and himself, over Dionysian man, who survives only in myth, poetry, music, and drama. Socrates and Plato had attacked the illusions of art as unreal, and had overturned the delicate cultural balance by valuing only man's critical, rational, and controlling consciousness while denigrating his vital life instincts as irrational and base. The result of this division is "Alexandrian man," the civilized and accomplished Greek citizen of the later ancient world, who is "equipped with the greatest forces of knowledge" but in whom the wellsprings of creativity have dried up. (Herman, 1997, pp. 95-96)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Philosophy
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108 Behaviorism
A person is changed by the contingencies of reinforcement under which he behaves; he does not store the contingencies. In particular, he does not store copies of the stimuli which have played a part in the contingencies. There are no "iconic representations" in his mind; there are no "data structures stored in his memory"; he has no "cognitive map" of the world in which he has lived. He has simply been changed in such a way that stimuli now control particular kinds of perceptual behavior. (Skinner, 1974, p. 84)Psychology as the behaviorist views it is a purely objective natural science. Its theoretical goal is the prediction and control of behavior. Introspection forms no essential part of its method nor is the scientific value of its data dependent upon the readiness with which they lend themselves to interpretation in terms of consciousness. The behaviorist, in his efforts to get a unitary scheme of animal response, recognizes no dividing line between man and brute. The behavior of man, with all its refinement and complexity, forms only a part of the behaviorist's total scheme of investigation. (Watson, quoted in Fancher, 1979, p. 319)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Behaviorism
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109 Introspection
1) Experimental Introspection Is the One Reliable Method of Knowing OurselvesWhen we are trying to understand the mental processes of a child or a dog or an insect as shown by conduct and action, the outward signs of mental processes,... we must always fall back upon experimental introspection... [;] we cannot imagine processes in another mind that we do not find in our own. Experimental introspection is thus our one reliable method of knowing ourselves; it is the sole gateway to psychology. (Titchener, 1914, p. 32)There is a somewhat misleading point of view that one's own experience provides a sufficient understanding of mental life for scientific purposes. Indeed, early in the history of experimental psychology, the main method for studying cognition was introspection. By observing one's own mind, the argument went, one could say how one carried out cognitive activities....Yet introspection failed to be a good technique for the elucidation of mental processes in general. There are two simple reasons for this. First, so many things which we can do seem to be quite unrelated to conscious experience. Someone asks you your name. You do not know how you retrieve it, yet obviously there is some process by which the retrieval occurs. In the same way, when someone speaks to you, you understand what they say, but you do not know how you came to understand. Yet somehow processes take place in which words are picked out from the jumble of sound waves which reach your ears, in-built knowledge of syntax and semantics gives it meaning, and the significance of the message comes to be appreciated. Clearly, introspection is not of much use here, but it is undeniable that understanding language is as much a part of mental life as is thinking.As if these arguments were not enough, it is also the case that introspective data are notoriously difficult to evaluate. Because it is private to the experiencer, and experience may be difficult to convey in words to somebody else. Many early introspective protocols were very confusing to read and, even worse, the kinds of introspection reported tended to conform to the theoretical categories used in different laboratories. Clearly, what was needed was both a change in experimental method and a different (non-subjective) theoretical framework to describe mental life. (Sanford, 1987, pp. 2-3)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Introspection
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110 frustration
сущ.1) общ. расстройство, срыв (планов, мероприятий)2) общ. крушение, крах, провал (планов, надежд и т. д.)3) псих. фрустрация, разочарованиеа) (психологическое состояние гнетущего напряжения, тревожности, чувства безысходности и отчаяния, возникающее в ситуации, которая воспринимается личностью как неотвратимая угроза достижению значимой для нее цели, реализации той или иной ее потребности)б) (в политической психологии: ситуация дискомфорта из-за несоответствия внешней и внутренней картин общественно-политической действительности)See:4) юр. фрустрация ["тщетность"\] (договора) ( прекращение обязательства вследствие невозможности его исполнения) -
111 когнитивный стиль
1) Psychology: direction in thinking2) Aviation medicine: cognitive style (восприятия) -
112 любознательность
1) General subject: curiosity, inquisitiveness, intellectual ( as opposed to idle) curiosity2) Psychology: cognitive need -
113 познание
1) General subject: cognition, cognition, experience (experience bitterness of something - познать горечь чего-либо), intellection, kenning, knowing, knowledge, noesis, perception, the tree of knowledge2) Medicine: cognition (процесс, включающий восприятие, распознавание, понимание, суждение, осмысление, мотивацию и отражение)3) Engineering: awareness5) Automation: learning (напр. при обучении робота) -
114 спутанность сознания
1) Medicine: clouded state, confused mental state, confusion, mental confusion, mental fog, mental tog, obfuscation, obfuscation (помрачение сознания), obnubilation, obnubilation (помрачение сознания)2) Psychology: confused consciousness, brain fog, brain-fog, brains fog, brain’s fog, cognitive dysfunction, unfocused mind3) Aviation medicine: clouding of consciousness, confusion of consciousnessУниверсальный русско-английский словарь > спутанность сознания
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115 psicólogo
adj.psychologic, psychological.m.psychologist, shrink.* * *► nombre masculino,nombre femenino1 psychologist* * *(f. - psicóloga)noun* * *psicólogo, -aSM / F psychologist* * *- ga masculino, femeninoa) (Psic) psychologistb) (fam) ( persona perspicaz)* * *- ga masculino, femeninoa) (Psic) psychologistb) (fam) ( persona perspicaz)* * *psicólogo -gamasculine, feminine1 ( Psic) psychologist2 ( fam)(persona perspicaz): mi madre es buena psicóloga my mother's a good judge of character* * *
psicólogo◊ -ga sustantivo masculino, femenino (Psic) psychologist
psicólogo,-a sustantivo masculino y femenino psychologist
' psicólogo' also found in these entries:
Spanish:
psicóloga
English:
psychologist
- judge
* * *psicólogo, -a, sicólogo, -a nm,f1. [profesional] psychologistpsicólogo clínico clinical psychology;psicólogo cognitivo cognitive psychologist;psicólogo infantil child psychologist;psicólogo del trabajo occupational psychologist2. [persona perceptiva]el entrenador es un psicólogo excepcional the coach has an exceptional understanding of how players' minds work* * *m, psicóloga f psychologist* * *psicólogo, -ga n: psychologist* * *psicólogo n psychologist -
116 སེམས་
[sems]citta, (-, body-, finite) mind, minding, thoughts, noetic, responsiveness, mentation, spirituality, attitudinal cognition, cognitive act, mentation, experiencing, potential for experience, general forms of experience, attitude, perceptual readiness, noetic-noematic structure, psychology, soul, spirit, (sometimes abbr. for sems nyid or byang chub sems) -
117 Asch, Solomon Elliott
(1907-1996) Эш, Соломон ЭллиотПсихолог, представитель гештальтпсихологии. Выходец из Польши, с 13-летнего возраста - в США. Получил образование в Городском колледже Нью-Йорка [ City College, The], степень доктора в Колумбийском университете [ Columbia University] (1932). В 1966-72 - директор Института когнитивных исследований [Institute for Cognitive Studies] при Университете Ратджерса [ Rutgers University]. Профессор Пенсильванского университета [Pennylvania, University of]. Наиболее известны проведенные Эшем исследования влияния коллектива на поведение личности. Через серию экспериментов он показал, что люди часто могут занимать неразумную позицию просто для того, чтобы не противоречить другим. Автор известного учебника "Социальная пихология" ["Social Psychology"] (1952, 1987).English-Russian dictionary of regional studies > Asch, Solomon Elliott
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