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  • 61 μετά

    μετά (Hom.+) prep. w. gen. and acc., in the NT not (B-D-F §203; Rob. 610) w. dat.—For lit. s. ἀνά, beg.; also for μετά (and σύν) Tycho Mommsen, Beiträge zu d. Lehre v. den griech. Präp. 1895. Basic idea: ‘in the vicinity of ’.
    A. w. gen. with
    ① marker of placement, with, among, in company with someone (Gen 42:5; EpArist 180; En 22:13; 99:10; PsSol 4:6; JosAs 10:3 al.) or someth. ἦν μετὰ τῶν θηρίων he was among the wild animals Mk 1:13 (Diog. L. 6, 92 μόσχοι μετὰ λύκων). ἦν συγκαθήμενος μ. τῶν ὑπηρετῶν he sat down among the servants 14:54. μετὰ ἀνόμων ἐλογίσθη he was classed among the criminals Mk 15:28; Lk 22:37. τὸ μέρος αὐτοῦ μ. τῶν ἀπίστων θήσει he will assign him his lot among the faithless (unbelievers?) Lk 12:46; cp. Mt 24:51. ζῆτειν τὸν ζῶντα μ. τῶν νεκρῶν seek the living among the dead Lk 24:5. μὴ γογγύζετε μετʼ ἀλλήλων do not grumble among yourselves J 6:43. εἱστήκει Ἰούδας μετʼ αὐτῶν 18:5. ἡ σκηνὴ τ. θεοῦ μετὰ τ. ἀνθρώπων Rv 21:3a. μετὰ τῶν νεφελῶν in the midst of the clouds 1:7.
    ② marker of assoc. in gener. sense denoting the company within which someth. takes place, with
    ⓐ w. gen. of pers. in company w. whom someth. takes place
    α. w. verbs of going, remaining, etc. προσέρχεσθαι μ. τινος come (in company) with someone Mt 20:20; cp. 5:41; Mk 1:29; 3:7; 5:24, 37; 11:11; 14:17; Lk 2:51; 6:17; 9:49; 14:31; J 3:22b; 11:54; Ac 24:1; Gal 2:1. Angels accompanying the Messiah Mt 25:31; cp. 16:27; Mk 8:38; 1 Th 3:13; 2 Th 1:7. περιπατεῖν μ. τινος (Menand., Fgm. 178 Kö., Sam. 587f S. [242f Kö.]; ApcEsdr 6:12) J 6:66. γίνεσθαι μ. τινος be, remain with someone Ac 7:38; 9:19; 20:18; AcPlCor 2:4 (ApcMos 2 ἐγένοντο μ. ἀλλήλων). οἱ μ. αὐτοῦ γενόμενοι his companions Mk 16:10. μένειν μ. τινος stay with someone 1J 2:19 (ParJer 3:15). ζήσασα μ. ἀνδρός Lk 2:36. ἀκολουθεῖν μ. τινος follow (after) someone Rv 6:8; 14:13 (s. ἀκολουθέω 2).
    β. used w. trans. verbs ἄγειν τινὰ μ. ἑαυτοῦ bring someone along (s. ἄγω 1b) 2 Ti 4:11. παραλαμβάνειν τινὰ μεθʼ ἑαυτοῦ take or bring someone along (as a companion) (Gen 22:3) Mt 12:45; 18:16; Mk 14:33. ἔχειν τι μ. ἑαυτοῦ have someth. with oneself: bread 8:14; τινά someone (PGM 4, 1952): the lame Mt 15:30; the poor Mk 14:7; Mt 26:11; J 12:8; the bridegroom Mk 2:19b. Pass. συγκατεψηφίσθη μετὰ τ. ἕνδεκα ἀποστόλων he was chosen (to serve) with the eleven apostles Ac 1:26 (cp. Himerius, Or. 44 [=Or. 8], 3 μετὰ τῶν θεῶν ἀριθμούμενος=numbered with the gods).
    γ. esp. εἶναι μ. τινος be with someone, in someone’s company.
    א. lit. of close association: the disciples w. Jesus Mt 26:69, 71; Mk 3:14; 14:67; Lk 22:59; J 15:27; 17:24. Also of accompaniment for a short time Mt 5:25; J 3:26; 9:40; 12:17; 20:24, 26. Of Jesus’ association w. his disciples 13:33; 14:9; 16:4; 17:12. Of relations between the superintendent and the congregation μετὰ τ. ἐπισκόπου εἶναι be with, on the side of, the supervisor/bishop IPhld 3:2. οἱ μ. τινος (sc. ὄντες) someone’s friends, companions, etc. (Diod S 17, 96, 2 οἱ μεθʼ Ἡρακλέους; SIG 175, 5; 659, 5; 826e II, 30; Am 4:2; 8:10; Gen 24:59; 1 Macc 7:23; JosAs 27:7; AscIs 2:15; 3:6, 14; Jos., Vi. 397, Ant. 7, 20; Just., D. 8, 3 al.) Mt 12:3f; 26:51; Mk 1:36; 2:25; Lk 6:3f. Of things ἄλλα πλοῖα ἦν μ. αὐτοῦ other boats were with him, accompanied him Mk 4:36. ὁ μισθός μου μετʼ ἐμοῦ (sc. ἐστιν) Rv 22:12. τὸ πῦρ ἐστι μετʼ αὐτοῦ the fire (of judgment) awaits him (the interpretation of the Armenian text; sim. the Lat.) AcPlCor 2:37.
    ב. in ref. to supportiveness be with someone, stand by, help someone of God’s help (Gen 21:20; 26:3; 28:20 al.; Jos., Ant. 15, 138) J 3:2; 8:29; 16:32; Ac 7:9 (cp. Gen 39:2, 21); 10:38; cp. Mt 1:23 (Is 8:8); Lk 1:28; Ro 15:33. Of God’s hand (1 Ch 4:10) Lk 1:66; Ac 11:21. Of Christ: Mt 28:20; Ac 18:10.
    ג. a favorite expr. in conclusions of letters ὁ θεὸς τῆς ἀγάπης καὶ εἰρήνης ἔσται μ. ὑμῶν will be with you 2 Cor 13:11; cp. Phil 4:9; ὁ κύριος κτλ. 2 Th 3:16 (cp. Ruth 2:4); 2 Ti 4:22. ἡ χάρις τοῦ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ μ. ὑμῶν (sc. ἔσται) 1 Cor 16:23; cp. 1 Th 5:28; 1 Cl 65:2. μ. τοῦ πνεύματος ὑμῶν Gal 6:18; Phil 4:23; Phlm 25; 21:9. μ. πάντων ὑμῶν 2 Th 3:18; cp. Eph 6:24. Short and to the point: ἡ χάρις μ. ὑμῶν Col 4:18; 1 Ti 6:21; cp. Tit 3:15; Hb 13:25. ἔσται μεθʼ ἡμῶν χάρις ἔλεος εἰρήνη 2J 3.—ἡ ἀγάπη μου μ. πάντων ὑμῶν ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ my love is with you all in Christ Jesus 1 Cor 16:24. ἡ χάρις τοῦ κυρίου Ἰ. Χρ. καὶ ἡ ἀγάπη τ. θεοῦ καὶ ἡ κοινωνία τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος μετὰ πάντων ὑμῶν 2 Cor 13:13 (WvanUnnik, Dominus Vobiscum: liturg. formula, TManson memorial vol., ’59, 270–305; on the Trinitarian formula s. the lit. on πνεῦμα 8).—In the expr. ὅσα ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς μ. αὐτῶν Ac 14:27; 15:4 (cp. Hs 5, 1, 1) ὤν could be supplied what God has done in helping them; but ποιεῖν can just as well go w. μ. αὐτῶν has done for them, after the analogy of עָשָׂה עִם פּ׳ (Tob 12:6; 13:7 ἃ ποιήσει μεθʼ ὑμῶν; Jdth 8:26 ὅσα ἐποίησεν μετὰ Ἀβραάμ; 15:10; 1 Macc 10:27. In addition, cp. BGU 798, 8 εὐχαριστοῦμεν τῇ ἡμῶν δεσποίνῃ εἰς πάντα τὰ καλὰ ἃ ἐποίησεν μετὰ τ. δούλων αὐτῆς. But s. also LMaloney, ‘All That God Had Done with Them’ ’91, 118–21: God works ‘with’ the apostles and ‘through’ them). Here also belongs ποιεῖν ἔλεος μ. τινος have mercy on someone, show mercy to someone (Gen 24:12; 2 Km 3:8; JosAs 23:4) Lk 1:72; 10:37 (MWilcox, The Semitisms in Ac, ’65, 84f). ἐμεγάλυνεν κύριος τὸ ἔλεος αὐτοῦ μετʼ αὐτῆς the Lord has shown great mercy to her 1:58 (cp. 1 Km 12:24; Ps 125:2f).—In πληρώσεις με εὐφροσύνης μ. τοῦ προσώπου σου Ac 2:28=Ps 15:11 the LXX has literally translated אֶת־פָּנֶיךָ; it means in your presence.
    ד. in ref. to taking sides or being allied in some way with someone: in contrast to εἶναι κατά τινος be against someone is εἶναι μ. τινος be with someone, on someone’s side Mt 12:30a; Lk 11:23a (AFridrichsen, ZNW 13, 1912, 273–80).
    ⓑ to denote the company in which an activity or experience takes place: ἀνακεῖσθαι μ. τινος recline at table with someone (for a meal) Mt 26:20. ἀνακλιθῆναι 8:11; cp. Lk 24:30. βασιλεύειν Rv 20:4, 6. γρηγορεῖν Mt 26:38, 40. δειπνεῖν Rv 3:20 (TestJob 15:2). δουλεύειν Gal 4:25. ἐμπαίζειν Mt 27:41. ἐσθίειν 9:11; 24:49; Mk 2:16ab; 14:14, 18; Lk 5:30 (TestAbr A 4 p. 81, 9 [Stone p. 10]). ἠρώτα … ἵνα φάγῃ μ. αὐτοῦ he asked (him) to eat with him 7:36 (cp. TestAbr B 6 p. 110, 21 [Stone p. 68]; JosAs 7:1). εὐφραίνεσθαι 15:29; Ro 15:10 (Dt 32:43). κλαίειν 12:15b. κληρονομεῖν Gal 4:30 (Gen 21:10; Just., D. 26, 1; cp. συγκληρονομεῖν JosAs 24:9). πίνειν Mt 26:29. ποιεῖν τὸ πάσχα celebrate the Passover (with someone) 26:18. συνάγειν 12:30b; Lk 11:23b. συνεσθίειν Gal 2:12. ταράττεσθαι Mt 2:3. τρώγειν J 13:1 v.l. χαίρειν Ro 12:15a.
    ⓒ The associative aspect can also derive expression from the fact that two opposite parties exert influence upon one another or that one party brings the other to adopt a corresponding, and therefore common, attitude
    α. in friendly, or at least not in hostile, fashion: εἰρηνεύειν (3 Km 22:45) Ro 12:18; cp. 2 Ti 2:22; Hb 12:14. εὐθηνίαν ἔχειν Hm 2:3. κοινωνίαν ἔχειν 1J 1:3a, 7. λαλεῖν μετά τινος (cp. Gen 31:24, 29; 1 Macc 7:15) Mk 6:50; J 4:27ab. συλλαλεῖν μ. τινος Mt 17:3; Ac 25:12. συμβούλιον διδόναι Mk 3:6. συνάγεσθαι Mt 28:12; J 18:2. συνᾶραι λόγον Mt 18:23; 25:19. ἐγένοντο φίλοι ὅ τε. Ἡρῴδης καὶ ὁ Πιλᾶτος μετʼ ἀλλήλων Lk 23:12. οἱ μοιχεύοντες μετʼ αὐτῆς those who commit adultery with her Rv 2:22. πορνεύειν (cp. Ezk 16:34; TestAbr A 10 p. 88, 7 [Stone p. 24]) 17:2; 18:3, 9. μολύνεσθαι 14:4 (cp. En 12:4 τῶν γυναικῶν ἐμιάνθησαν).
    β. in hostile fashion; after verbs of fighting, quarreling, etc. to denote the pers. w. whom the strife is being carried on πολεμεῖν μ. τινος carry on war with = against someone (נִלְחַם עִם פּ׳ 1 Km 17:33; 3 Km 12:24; ParJer 7:10. But s. also OGI 201, 3 ἐπολέμησα μετὰ τῶν Βλεμύων; BGU 1035, 9; 11. Also in Mod. Gk. [AThumb, Hdb. der neugriech. Volkssprache2 1910 §162, 1 note]) Rv 2:16; 12:7; 13:4; 17:14 (B-D-F §193, 4; Rob. 610). Also πόλεμον ποιεῖν (Gen 14:2; 1 Ch 5:19) 11:7; 12:17; 13:7 (Da 7:21 Theod.); 19:19. ζητεῖν μ. τινος deliberate or dispute w. someone J 16:19; cp. 3:25 (cp. ApcEsdr 2:6 δικάζου μεθʼ ἡμῶν). κρίνεσθαι go to law w. someone 1 Cor 6:6. κρίματα ἔχειν μ. τινος have lawsuits w. someone vs. 7.
    ⓓ of any other relation betw. persons, whether already existing or brought about in some manner εἶδον τὸ παιδίον μ. Μαρίας Mt 2:11. ἀνταποδοῦναι ὑμῖν ἄνεσιν μ. ἡμῶν 2 Th 1:7. ἐκδέχομαι αὐτὸν μ. τῶν ἀδελφῶν 1 Cor 16:11. Of delegations, composed of several units Mt 22:16; 2 Cor 8:18. συμφωνεῖν Mt 20:2.
    ⓔ of things ὧν τὸ αἷμα ἔμιξεν μ. τῶν θυσιῶν αὐτῶν Lk 13:1. Pass. πιεῖν οἶνον μ. χολῆς μεμιγμένον Mt 27:34.
    ⓕ to show a close connection betw. two nouns, upon the first of which the main emphasis lies (Thu. 7, 75, 3 λύπη μ. φόβου; Pla., Rep. 9, 591b ἰσχύν τε καὶ κάλλος μετὰ ὑγιείας λαμβάνειν; Ar. 11:2 τόξον ἔχειν μ. φαρέτρας) ἀγάπη μ. πίστεως Eph 6:23. πίστις μ. σωφροσύνης 1 Ti 2:15. εὐσέβεια μ. αὐταρκείας 6:6. Cp. Eph 4:2b; Col 1:11; 1 Ti 1:14. φάρμακον μ. οἰνομέλιτος ITr 6:2.
    ③ marker of attendant circumstances of someth. that takes place, with
    ⓐ of moods, emotions, wishes, feelings, excitement, states of mind or body (Xenophon Eph. 1, 15, 5 μ. ἀδείας; 2, 10, 4 μ. ἐπιμελείας; PAmh II, 133, 11 μετὰ πολλῶν κόπων; PLond II, 358, 8 p. 172 [II A.D.]; SIG index IV p. 445f; LXX [Johannessohn, Präp. 209ff]; En et al.) μ. αἰδοῦς with modesty 1 Ti 2:9. μ. αἰσχύνης with shame (s. αἰσχύνη 2) Lk 14:9. μ. εὐνοίας Eph 6:7. μ. εὐχαριστίας Phil 4:6; 1 Ti 4:3f; cp. Ac 24:3. μετὰ χαρᾶς (2 Macc 15:28; 3 Macc 5:21; 6:34; En 10:16; PsSol 8:16 al.; s. χαρά 1a) 1 Th 1:6; Hb 10:34; 13:17; cp. Phil 2:29. μ. φόβου καὶ τρόμου 2 Cor 7:15; Eph 6:5; Phil 2:12. μ. φόβου καὶ χαρᾶς Mt 28:8. μ. πραΰτητος καὶ φόβου 1 Pt 3:16. μ. παρρησίας (Lev 26:13; 1 Macc 4:18; s. παρρησία 3a) Ac 2:29; 4:29, 31; 28:31; Hb 4:16. μ. πεποιθήσεως 1 Cl 31:3. μ. σπουδῆς (3 Macc 5:24, 27; Mel., P. 12, 80) Mk 6:25; Lk 1:39. μ. ταπεινοφροσύνης Eph 4:2a; cp. Ac 20:19. μ. ὀργῆς (3 Macc 6:23; TestJob 4:4) Mk 3:5. μ. δακρύων in tears (3 Macc 1:16; 4:2; 5:7; TestAbr A 9 p. 86, 19 [Stone p. 20]; 14 p. 94, 21 [St. p. 36]; JosAs 28:8; ApcEsdr 6:23; s. δάκρυον) Mk 9:24 v.l.; Hb 5:7; 12:17. μ. εἰρήνης (s. εἰρήνη 1b) Ac 15:33; Hb 11:31.
    ⓑ of other accompanying phenomena (Antig. Car. 148 μετὰ φλογὸς καίεσθαι) μ. διωγμῶν though with persecutions Mk 10:30. μ. ἐπιθέσεως τῶν χειρῶν 1 Ti 4:14. μ. νηστειῶν Ac 14:23. μ. θορύβου (Jos., Ant. 5, 216) 24:18. μ. παρακλήσεως 2 Cor 8:4. μ. παρατηρήσεως Lk 17:20. μ. ὕβρεως καὶ πολλῆς ζημίας Ac 27:10 (s. ὕβρις 3). μ. φαντασίας 25:23. μ. δυνάμεως καὶ δόξης Mt 24:30; Mk 13:26; Lk 21:27 (Just., A I, 50, 1 al. μ. δόξης, D. 132, 1 w. δυνάμεως). μ. ἐξουσίας καὶ ἐπιτροπῆς Ac 26:12 (Jos., Ant. 20, 180 μετʼ ἐξουσίας). μ. βραχίονος ὑψηλοῦ ἐξάγειν τινά (s. βραχίων) Ac 13:17. μ. φωνῆς μεγάλης w. a loud voice Lk 17:15 (cp. EpArist 235; 281; JosAs 28:9). μ. σάλπιγγος with a trumpet call Mt 24:31 (Plut., Mor. 1135f μετʼ αὐλῶν=with the sound of flutes). σφραγίσαντες τ. λίθον μετὰ τ. κουστωδίας makes the stationing of the guard an accompaniment to the sealing of the stone Mt 27:66 (another possibility here is the instrumental use of μετά [Lycurgus the orator 124 μ. παραδειγμάτων διδάσκειν; SEG VIII, 246, 8 μετὰ κυνῶν—an instrument of torture—βασανίσαι; CWessely, Neue griech. Zauberpap. 1893, 234 γράφε μ. μέλανος; 2 Macc 6:16]: secure the stone by means of a guard; s. σφραγίζω 1).
    ⓒ of concrete objects, which serve as equipment (Appian, Maced. 9 §4 μετὰ χρυσῶν στεφάνων; POxy 123, 15; 19 μετὰ τῶν χλαμύδων εἰσβῆναι; 1 Esdr 5:57; Jdth 15:13; TestJob 24:10 μ. ψαλίδος; JosAs 7:4 μ. χρυσίου καὶ ἀργύριου; ParJer 9:31 μ. πολλῶν λίθων; ApcSed 7:10 μ. χαλιναρίου; ApcMos 40 μ. τῶν σινδόνων) μ. μαχαιρῶν καὶ ξύλων Mt 26:47; 55; Mk 14:43, 48; Lk 22:52. μ. φανῶν καὶ λαμπάδων καὶ ὅπλων (Xenophon Eph. p. 336, 20 μ. λαμπάδων) J 18:3.
    B. w. acc. In our lit. only in the mng. after, behind
    ① marker of position that is behind someth., behind (Hom.+; Polyb.; Just., A I, 13, 4; Tat. 2, 2; not LXX) μ. τὸ δεύτερον καταπέτασμα behind the second curtain Hb 9:3.
    ② marker of time after another point of time, after (Hom.+; ins, pap, LXX)
    ⓐ with the time expressly given μ. πολὺν χρόνον (2 Macc 6:1.—μετʼ οὐ πολὺν χρ.: Hero Alex. I p. 340, 6; SIG 1169, 54; Jos., Vi. 407) Mt 25:19. μ. τοσοῦτον χρόνον (4 Macc 5:7; ParJer 5:18) Hb 4:7. μ. χρόνον τινά (Diod S 9, 10, 2; Witkowski 26, 9 [III B.C.]; Jos., Ant. 8, 398; cp. En 106:1 μ. δὲ χρόνον; ApcSed 13:3 μ. χρόνον) Hv 1, 1, 2f; Hs 5, 2, 5; 9, 13, 8. μ. ἡμέρας ἕξ after six days Mt 17:1; Mk 9:2 (ApcMos 42 μ. τὰς ἓξ ἡμέρας). μ. τρεῖς ἡμέρας (Artem. 4, 33 p. 224, 5; Polyaenus 6, 53; 8, 62; EpArist 301; TestJob 52:1f; 53:7; ParJer 9:14; Jos., Ant 7, 280) Mt 27:63; Mk 8:31; 10:34; Lk 2:46; cp. μ. τρεῖς ἡμέρας καὶ τρεῖς νύκτας AcPlCor 2:30. μ. δύο ἡμέρας Mt 26:2; Mk 14:1 (cp. Caesar, Bell. Gall. 4, 9, 1 post tertiam diem=on the third day). μ. τινας ἡμέρας Ac 15:36; 24:24. μετʼ οὐ πολλὰς ἡμέρας (Artem. 1, 78 p. 72, 30; Jos., Ant. 5, 328, Vi. 309) Lk 15:13. οὐ μ. πολλὰς ταύτας ἡμέρας not long after these days = within a few days Ac 1:5 (B-D-F §226; 433, 3; Rob. 612; 1158; Dssm., ZVS 45, 1913, 60). W. gen. foll. μ. ἡμέρας εἴκοσι τῆς προτέρας ὁράσεως twenty days after the former vision Hv 4, 1, 1 (cp. Biogr. p. 31 μετὰ ξ´ ἔτη τοῦ Ἰλιακοῦ πολέμου; Gen 16:3). μ. τρεῖς μῆνας Ac 28:11. μ. τρία ἔτη Gal 1:18. ὁ μ. τετρακόσια καὶ τριάκοντα ἔτη γεγονὼς νόμος 3:17.
    ⓑ w. designations that are general, but include the idea of time: μ. τὴν ἄφιξίν μου Ac 20:29. μ. τὸ πάσχα after the Passover 12:4. μ. τὴν μετοικεσίαν Βαβυλῶνος Mt 1:12.
    ⓒ gener. μ. τὴν θλῖψιν after the (time of) tribulation Mk 13:24; cp. μ. τὴν θλῖψιν τῶν ἡμερῶν ἐκείνων Mt 24:29. μ. τὴν ἔγερσιν 27:53. μ. τὴν ἀνάγνωσιν Ac 13:15. μ. τὸ βάπτισμα 10:37. μ. μίαν καὶ δευτέραν νουθεσίαν Tit 3:10. μ. τὸ ψωμίον after he had eaten the piece of bread J 13:27.—Quite gener. μ. τοῦτο after this, afterward (Lucian, Hermot. 31; Gen 18:5; Lev 14:19; EpArist 258; TestJob 11:4; TestReub 1:9; TestLevi 6:3; Just., D. 57, 4) J 2:12; 11:7, 11; 19:28; Hb 9:27; Rv 7:1. μ. ταῦτα after this (Aeneas Tact. 240; 350; Diod S 1, 7, 1; Ex 3:20; 11:8 and oft.; TestJob 21:4; TestLevi 6:5; TestJos 19:5; JosAs 10:15; ParJer 3:10; ApcEsdr 4:36; ApcMos 2; Just., A I, 32, 6) Mk 16:12; Lk 5:27; 10:1 and oft. μ. οὐ πολύ (Dio Chrys. 56 [73], 8; Lucian, Scyth. 1; Herodian 1, 9, 7; BGU 614, 14; Mitt-Wilck. II/2, 96 II, 9; 1 Esdr 3:22; Jos., Ant. 12, 132) not long afterward Ac 27:14. μ. μικρόν a short while afterward Mt 26:73; Mk 14:70 (Just., D. 56, 17). Also μ. βραχύ Lk 22:58 (cp. μετʼ ὀλίγον: Lucian, Dial, Mort. 15, 3; PRyl 77, 41; Wsd 15:8; Jdth 13:9; TestAbrA 7 p. 84, 8 [Stone p. 16]; GrBar 9:3; Jos., Ant. 12, 136; 10:15; Just., D. 56, 18).
    ⓓ w. subst. aor. inf. foll.
    α. w. acc. (SIG 633, 105; 640, 13; 695, 78; 1233, 1; Sir 46:20; Jdth 16:25; Bar 1:9; 1 Macc 1:1, 9; TestAbr B 12 p. 116, 11 [Stone p. 80]; 117, 5 [St. p. 82]; TestJob 5:2; TestLevi 18:1; ApcMos 1; Just., A I, 50, 12.—B-D-F §406, 3; Rob. 979) μ. τὸ ἐγερθῆναί με after I am raised up Mt 26:32; Mk 14:28. μ. τὸ παραδοθῆναι τὸν Ἰωάννην after John was arrested Mk 1:14.—Ac 1:3; 7:4; 10:41; 15:13; 19:21; 20:1; Hv 2, 1, 3; m 4, 1, 7; Hs 8, 1, 3; 8, 2, 5.
    β. without acc. (Aelian, VH 12, 1 p. 118, 27; Herodian 2, 9, 5; SIG 976, 39; UPZ 110, 193 [164 B.C.]; Sir 23:20; 32:18 v.l.; 1 Macc 1:20; ApcMos 26:42f; Just., A I, 14, 1; Tat. 16, 1) μ. τὸ λαλῆσαι αὐτοῖς after he had spoken to them Mk 16:19.—Lk 12:5; 1 Cor 11:25; Hb 10:26.—W. perf. inf. 10:15.—M-M. EDNT. TW.

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  • 62 συνίστημι

    συνίστημι (Hom.+) Ro 3:5; 5:8; 16:1; 2 Cor 4:2 v.l.; 6:4 v.l.; 10:18b; Gal 2:18 v.l. Beside it συνιστάνω (Polyb. 4, 82, 5; 31, 29, 8; Jos., Bell. 1, 15, Ant. 6, 272.—Schweizer 177; Nachmanson 157; KDieterich, Untersuchungen 1898, 218; B-D-F §93; W-S. §14, 14; Rob. 315f) 2 Cor 3:1; 4:2; 6:4 v.l.; 10:12, 18a; Gal 2:18 and συνιστάω (Sb 4512, 77 [II B.C.] impf. συνίστων) 2 Cor 4:2 v.l.; 6:4 v.l.; 10:18a v.l.—1 aor. συνέστησα; 2 aor. συνέστην LXX; pf. συνέστηκα, ptc. συνεστηκώς (LXX) and συνεστώς; inf. συνεστάναι (Tat. 30, 1; Ath. 25, 3); 1 aor. mid. συνεστησάμην (s. Schwyzer I 758, 760); 1 aor. pass. ptc. συσταθείς. The basic semantic component refers to coherence or being in a state of close relationship.
    A. transitive, act., pass., and mid.
    ① to bring together by gathering, unite, collect pass. of the water of the boundless sea συσταθὲν εἰς τὰς συναγωγάς collected in its gathering-places 1 Cl 20:6.
    ② to bring together as friends or in a trusting relationship by commending/recommending, present, introduce/recommend someone to someone else (X., Pla.; PHamb 27, 3; PHib 65, 3; POxy 292, 6; PGiss 71, 4 al.; 1 Macc 12:43; 2 Macc 4:24; 9:25; Jos., Ant. 16, 85; Just., D. 2, 1 θεῷ) τινά τινι (re)commend someone to someone (PSI 589, 14 [III B.C.] σύστησόν με Σώσῳ; PBrem 5, 7 [117–19 A.D.]) ὑμῖν Φοίβην Ro 16:1 (in a letter, as Chion, Ep. 8 ὅπως αὐτὸν συστήσαιμί σοι). Self-commendation (ἑαυτὸν/ἑαυτοὺς ς.) may be construed either as inappropriate 2 Cor 3:1; οὐ πάλιν ἑαυτοὺς συνιστάνομεν ὑμῖν 5:12; 10:12 (ἑαυτούς), 18a (ἑαυτόν); or as appropriate (ὡς θεοῦ διάκονοι) 6:4 (but s. 3 below). συνιστάνοντες ἑαυτοὺς πρὸς πᾶσαν συνείδησιν ἀνθρώπων we commend ourselves to every human conscience 4:2=to every person’s awareness of what is right (s. πρός w. acc. 3eβ as PMich 210, 4 [c. 200 A.D.]). (The juxtaposition of apparently contradictory approaches to self-commendation is true to Gr-Rom. perspectives: contrast Pind., O. 9, 38f ‘an untimely boast plays in tune with madness’ and O. 1, 115f in which the poet celebrates his own power of song. The subject of appropriate and inappropriate self-commendation is discussed at length by Plut., Mor. 539–47 [On Inoffensive Self-Praise]. τινά someone ὸ̔ν ὁ κύριος συνίστησιν 10:18b. Pass. συνίστασθαι ὑπό τινος be recommended by someone (Epict. 3, 23, 22; PPetr II 2, 4, 4 [III B.C.]) 12:11.
    ③ to provide evidence of a personal characteristic or claim through action, demonstrate, show, bring out τὶ someth. (Polyb. 4, 5, 6 εὔνοιαν) Ro 3:5. Cp. 2 Cor 6:4 (see comm. and 2 above). συνίστησιν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀγάπην εἰς ἡμᾶς ὁ θεός 5:8. Difficult and perh. due to a damaged text (B-D-F §197) is the constr. w. acc. and inf. (cp. Diod S 14, 45, 4) συνεστήσατε ἑαυτοὺς ἁγνοὺς εἶναι τῷ πράγματι 2 Cor 7:11. W. a double acc. (Diod S 13, 91, 4; Sus 61 Theod.; Philo, Rer. Div. Her. 258 συνίστησιν αὐτὸν προφήτην [so in the mss.]; Jos., Ant. 7, 49) παραβάτην ἐμαυτὸν συνιστάνω I demonstrate that I am a wrongdoer Gal 2:18 (WMundle, ZNW 23, 1924, 152f).
    ④ to bring into existence in an organized manner, put together, constitute, establish, prepare, mid. τὶ someth. (Pla. et al.; Tat. 1, 2; pap) of God’s creative activity (Lucian, Hermot. 20 Ἥφαιστος ἄνθρωπον συνεστήσατο; En 101:6; Philo, Leg. All. 3, 10 θεὸν τὸν τὰ ὅλα συστησάμενον ἐκ μὴ ὄντων; Jos., Ant. 12, 22 τὸν ἅπαντα συστησάμενον θεόν) ἐν λόγῳ συνεστήσατο τὰ πάντα 1 Cl 27:4 (Herm. Wr. 1, 31 ἅγιος εἶ, ὁ λόγῳ συστησάμενος τὰ ὄντα).
    B. intransitive, in our lit. the pres. mid. and pf. act.
    ① to stand in close association with, stand with/by (1 Km 17:26), perf. act. τινί someone Lk 9:32 (οἱ συνεστῶτες as Apollon. Paradox. 5).
    ② to be composed or compounded of various parts, consist, pres. mid., ἔκ τινος of someth. (Pla., X. et al.; Herm. Wr. 13, 2; Jos., Vi. 35; Ar. 4, 2; Ath. 8, 2, R. 25 p. 78, 9) ἡ μῆνις ἐκ τοσούτων κακῶν συνισταμένη Hm 5, 2, 4.
    ③ to come to be in a condition of coherence, continue, endure, exist, hold together, pres. mid. and perf. act. (EpArist 154 τὸ ζῆν διὰ τῆς τροφῆς συνεστάναι; Tat. 30, 1; Mel., P. 91, 681) γῆ ἐξ ὕδατος καὶ διʼ ὕδατος συνεστῶσα 2 Pt 3:5 (mngs. 2 and 3 are prob. blended here and in the next pass.; s. also Philo, Plant. 6). τὰ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ συνέστηκεν Col 1:17 (cp. Pla., Rep. 7, 530a, Tim. 61a; Ps.-Aristot. DeMundo 6, 2 ἐκ θεοῦ τὰ πάντα καὶ διὰ θεὸν συνέστηκεν; Philo, Rer. Div. Her. 58; PGM 4, 1769 τὰ πάντα συνέστηκεν; Ar. 1, 5 διʼ αὐτοῦ δὲ τὰ πάντα συνέστηκεν). SHanson, The Unity of the Church in the NT ’46, 112.—RWard, Aristotelian Terms in the NT: Baptist Quarterly 11, ’45, 398–403 (συνίστημι).—M-M. EDNT. TW.

    Ελληνικά-Αγγλικά παλαιοχριστιανική Λογοτεχνία > συνίστημι

  • 63 Artificial Intelligence

       In my opinion, none of [these programs] does even remote justice to the complexity of human mental processes. Unlike men, "artificially intelligent" programs tend to be single minded, undistractable, and unemotional. (Neisser, 1967, p. 9)
       Future progress in [artificial intelligence] will depend on the development of both practical and theoretical knowledge.... As regards theoretical knowledge, some have sought a unified theory of artificial intelligence. My view is that artificial intelligence is (or soon will be) an engineering discipline since its primary goal is to build things. (Nilsson, 1971, pp. vii-viii)
       Most workers in AI [artificial intelligence] research and in related fields confess to a pronounced feeling of disappointment in what has been achieved in the last 25 years. Workers entered the field around 1950, and even around 1960, with high hopes that are very far from being realized in 1972. In no part of the field have the discoveries made so far produced the major impact that was then promised.... In the meantime, claims and predictions regarding the potential results of AI research had been publicized which went even farther than the expectations of the majority of workers in the field, whose embarrassments have been added to by the lamentable failure of such inflated predictions....
       When able and respected scientists write in letters to the present author that AI, the major goal of computing science, represents "another step in the general process of evolution"; that possibilities in the 1980s include an all-purpose intelligence on a human-scale knowledge base; that awe-inspiring possibilities suggest themselves based on machine intelligence exceeding human intelligence by the year 2000 [one has the right to be skeptical]. (Lighthill, 1972, p. 17)
       4) Just as Astronomy Succeeded Astrology, the Discovery of Intellectual Processes in Machines Should Lead to a Science, Eventually
       Just as astronomy succeeded astrology, following Kepler's discovery of planetary regularities, the discoveries of these many principles in empirical explorations on intellectual processes in machines should lead to a science, eventually. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)
       Many problems arise in experiments on machine intelligence because things obvious to any person are not represented in any program. One can pull with a string, but one cannot push with one.... Simple facts like these caused serious problems when Charniak attempted to extend Bobrow's "Student" program to more realistic applications, and they have not been faced up to until now. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 77)
       What do we mean by [a symbolic] "description"? We do not mean to suggest that our descriptions must be made of strings of ordinary language words (although they might be). The simplest kind of description is a structure in which some features of a situation are represented by single ("primitive") symbols, and relations between those features are represented by other symbols-or by other features of the way the description is put together. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)
       [AI is] the use of computer programs and programming techniques to cast light on the principles of intelligence in general and human thought in particular. (Boden, 1977, p. 5)
       The word you look for and hardly ever see in the early AI literature is the word knowledge. They didn't believe you have to know anything, you could always rework it all.... In fact 1967 is the turning point in my mind when there was enough feeling that the old ideas of general principles had to go.... I came up with an argument for what I called the primacy of expertise, and at the time I called the other guys the generalists. (Moses, quoted in McCorduck, 1979, pp. 228-229)
       9) Artificial Intelligence Is Psychology in a Particularly Pure and Abstract Form
       The basic idea of cognitive science is that intelligent beings are semantic engines-in other words, automatic formal systems with interpretations under which they consistently make sense. We can now see why this includes psychology and artificial intelligence on a more or less equal footing: people and intelligent computers (if and when there are any) turn out to be merely different manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon. Moreover, with universal hardware, any semantic engine can in principle be formally imitated by a computer if only the right program can be found. And that will guarantee semantic imitation as well, since (given the appropriate formal behavior) the semantics is "taking care of itself" anyway. Thus we also see why, from this perspective, artificial intelligence can be regarded as psychology in a particularly pure and abstract form. The same fundamental structures are under investigation, but in AI, all the relevant parameters are under direct experimental control (in the programming), without any messy physiology or ethics to get in the way. (Haugeland, 1981b, p. 31)
       There are many different kinds of reasoning one might imagine:
        Formal reasoning involves the syntactic manipulation of data structures to deduce new ones following prespecified rules of inference. Mathematical logic is the archetypical formal representation. Procedural reasoning uses simulation to answer questions and solve problems. When we use a program to answer What is the sum of 3 and 4? it uses, or "runs," a procedural model of arithmetic. Reasoning by analogy seems to be a very natural mode of thought for humans but, so far, difficult to accomplish in AI programs. The idea is that when you ask the question Can robins fly? the system might reason that "robins are like sparrows, and I know that sparrows can fly, so robins probably can fly."
        Generalization and abstraction are also natural reasoning process for humans that are difficult to pin down well enough to implement in a program. If one knows that Robins have wings, that Sparrows have wings, and that Blue jays have wings, eventually one will believe that All birds have wings. This capability may be at the core of most human learning, but it has not yet become a useful technique in AI.... Meta- level reasoning is demonstrated by the way one answers the question What is Paul Newman's telephone number? You might reason that "if I knew Paul Newman's number, I would know that I knew it, because it is a notable fact." This involves using "knowledge about what you know," in particular, about the extent of your knowledge and about the importance of certain facts. Recent research in psychology and AI indicates that meta-level reasoning may play a central role in human cognitive processing. (Barr & Feigenbaum, 1981, pp. 146-147)
       Suffice it to say that programs already exist that can do things-or, at the very least, appear to be beginning to do things-which ill-informed critics have asserted a priori to be impossible. Examples include: perceiving in a holistic as opposed to an atomistic way; using language creatively; translating sensibly from one language to another by way of a language-neutral semantic representation; planning acts in a broad and sketchy fashion, the details being decided only in execution; distinguishing between different species of emotional reaction according to the psychological context of the subject. (Boden, 1981, p. 33)
       Can the synthesis of Man and Machine ever be stable, or will the purely organic component become such a hindrance that it has to be discarded? If this eventually happens-and I have... good reasons for thinking that it must-we have nothing to regret and certainly nothing to fear. (Clarke, 1984, p. 243)
       The thesis of GOFAI... is not that the processes underlying intelligence can be described symbolically... but that they are symbolic. (Haugeland, 1985, p. 113)
        14) Artificial Intelligence Provides a Useful Approach to Psychological and Psychiatric Theory Formation
       It is all very well formulating psychological and psychiatric theories verbally but, when using natural language (even technical jargon), it is difficult to recognise when a theory is complete; oversights are all too easily made, gaps too readily left. This is a point which is generally recognised to be true and it is for precisely this reason that the behavioural sciences attempt to follow the natural sciences in using "classical" mathematics as a more rigorous descriptive language. However, it is an unfortunate fact that, with a few notable exceptions, there has been a marked lack of success in this application. It is my belief that a different approach-a different mathematics-is needed, and that AI provides just this approach. (Hand, quoted in Hand, 1985, pp. 6-7)
       We might distinguish among four kinds of AI.
       Research of this kind involves building and programming computers to perform tasks which, to paraphrase Marvin Minsky, would require intelligence if they were done by us. Researchers in nonpsychological AI make no claims whatsoever about the psychological realism of their programs or the devices they build, that is, about whether or not computers perform tasks as humans do.
       Research here is guided by the view that the computer is a useful tool in the study of mind. In particular, we can write computer programs or build devices that simulate alleged psychological processes in humans and then test our predictions about how the alleged processes work. We can weave these programs and devices together with other programs and devices that simulate different alleged mental processes and thereby test the degree to which the AI system as a whole simulates human mentality. According to weak psychological AI, working with computer models is a way of refining and testing hypotheses about processes that are allegedly realized in human minds.
    ... According to this view, our minds are computers and therefore can be duplicated by other computers. Sherry Turkle writes that the "real ambition is of mythic proportions, making a general purpose intelligence, a mind." (Turkle, 1984, p. 240) The authors of a major text announce that "the ultimate goal of AI research is to build a person or, more humbly, an animal." (Charniak & McDermott, 1985, p. 7)
       Research in this field, like strong psychological AI, takes seriously the functionalist view that mentality can be realized in many different types of physical devices. Suprapsychological AI, however, accuses strong psychological AI of being chauvinisticof being only interested in human intelligence! Suprapsychological AI claims to be interested in all the conceivable ways intelligence can be realized. (Flanagan, 1991, pp. 241-242)
        16) Determination of Relevance of Rules in Particular Contexts
       Even if the [rules] were stored in a context-free form the computer still couldn't use them. To do that the computer requires rules enabling it to draw on just those [ rules] which are relevant in each particular context. Determination of relevance will have to be based on further facts and rules, but the question will again arise as to which facts and rules are relevant for making each particular determination. One could always invoke further facts and rules to answer this question, but of course these must be only the relevant ones. And so it goes. It seems that AI workers will never be able to get started here unless they can settle the problem of relevance beforehand by cataloguing types of context and listing just those facts which are relevant in each. (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p. 80)
       Perhaps the single most important idea to artificial intelligence is that there is no fundamental difference between form and content, that meaning can be captured in a set of symbols such as a semantic net. (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)
        18) The Assumption That the Mind Is a Formal System
       Artificial intelligence is based on the assumption that the mind can be described as some kind of formal system manipulating symbols that stand for things in the world. Thus it doesn't matter what the brain is made of, or what it uses for tokens in the great game of thinking. Using an equivalent set of tokens and rules, we can do thinking with a digital computer, just as we can play chess using cups, salt and pepper shakers, knives, forks, and spoons. Using the right software, one system (the mind) can be mapped into the other (the computer). (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)
        19) A Statement of the Primary and Secondary Purposes of Artificial Intelligence
       The primary goal of Artificial Intelligence is to make machines smarter.
       The secondary goals of Artificial Intelligence are to understand what intelligence is (the Nobel laureate purpose) and to make machines more useful (the entrepreneurial purpose). (Winston, 1987, p. 1)
       The theoretical ideas of older branches of engineering are captured in the language of mathematics. We contend that mathematical logic provides the basis for theory in AI. Although many computer scientists already count logic as fundamental to computer science in general, we put forward an even stronger form of the logic-is-important argument....
       AI deals mainly with the problem of representing and using declarative (as opposed to procedural) knowledge. Declarative knowledge is the kind that is expressed as sentences, and AI needs a language in which to state these sentences. Because the languages in which this knowledge usually is originally captured (natural languages such as English) are not suitable for computer representations, some other language with the appropriate properties must be used. It turns out, we think, that the appropriate properties include at least those that have been uppermost in the minds of logicians in their development of logical languages such as the predicate calculus. Thus, we think that any language for expressing knowledge in AI systems must be at least as expressive as the first-order predicate calculus. (Genesereth & Nilsson, 1987, p. viii)
        21) Perceptual Structures Can Be Represented as Lists of Elementary Propositions
       In artificial intelligence studies, perceptual structures are represented as assemblages of description lists, the elementary components of which are propositions asserting that certain relations hold among elements. (Chase & Simon, 1988, p. 490)
       Artificial intelligence (AI) is sometimes defined as the study of how to build and/or program computers to enable them to do the sorts of things that minds can do. Some of these things are commonly regarded as requiring intelligence: offering a medical diagnosis and/or prescription, giving legal or scientific advice, proving theorems in logic or mathematics. Others are not, because they can be done by all normal adults irrespective of educational background (and sometimes by non-human animals too), and typically involve no conscious control: seeing things in sunlight and shadows, finding a path through cluttered terrain, fitting pegs into holes, speaking one's own native tongue, and using one's common sense. Because it covers AI research dealing with both these classes of mental capacity, this definition is preferable to one describing AI as making computers do "things that would require intelligence if done by people." However, it presupposes that computers could do what minds can do, that they might really diagnose, advise, infer, and understand. One could avoid this problematic assumption (and also side-step questions about whether computers do things in the same way as we do) by defining AI instead as "the development of computers whose observable performance has features which in humans we would attribute to mental processes." This bland characterization would be acceptable to some AI workers, especially amongst those focusing on the production of technological tools for commercial purposes. But many others would favour a more controversial definition, seeing AI as the science of intelligence in general-or, more accurately, as the intellectual core of cognitive science. As such, its goal is to provide a systematic theory that can explain (and perhaps enable us to replicate) both the general categories of intentionality and the diverse psychological capacities grounded in them. (Boden, 1990b, pp. 1-2)
       Because the ability to store data somewhat corresponds to what we call memory in human beings, and because the ability to follow logical procedures somewhat corresponds to what we call reasoning in human beings, many members of the cult have concluded that what computers do somewhat corresponds to what we call thinking. It is no great difficulty to persuade the general public of that conclusion since computers process data very fast in small spaces well below the level of visibility; they do not look like other machines when they are at work. They seem to be running along as smoothly and silently as the brain does when it remembers and reasons and thinks. On the other hand, those who design and build computers know exactly how the machines are working down in the hidden depths of their semiconductors. Computers can be taken apart, scrutinized, and put back together. Their activities can be tracked, analyzed, measured, and thus clearly understood-which is far from possible with the brain. This gives rise to the tempting assumption on the part of the builders and designers that computers can tell us something about brains, indeed, that the computer can serve as a model of the mind, which then comes to be seen as some manner of information processing machine, and possibly not as good at the job as the machine. (Roszak, 1994, pp. xiv-xv)
       The inner workings of the human mind are far more intricate than the most complicated systems of modern technology. Researchers in the field of artificial intelligence have been attempting to develop programs that will enable computers to display intelligent behavior. Although this field has been an active one for more than thirty-five years and has had many notable successes, AI researchers still do not know how to create a program that matches human intelligence. No existing program can recall facts, solve problems, reason, learn, and process language with human facility. This lack of success has occurred not because computers are inferior to human brains but rather because we do not yet know in sufficient detail how intelligence is organized in the brain. (Anderson, 1995, p. 2)

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