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1 Philosophy
And what I believe to be more important here is that I find in myself an infinity of ideas of certain things which cannot be assumed to be pure nothingness, even though they may have perhaps no existence outside of my thought. These things are not figments of my imagination, even though it is within my power to think of them or not to think of them; on the contrary, they have their own true and immutable natures. Thus, for example, when I imagine a triangle, even though there may perhaps be no such figure anywhere in the world outside of my thought, nor ever have been, nevertheless the figure cannot help having a certain determinate nature... or essence, which is immutable and eternal, which I have not invented and which does not in any way depend upon my mind. (Descartes, 1951, p. 61)Let us console ourselves for not knowing the possible connections between a spider and the rings of Saturn, and continue to examine what is within our reach. (Voltaire, 1961, p. 144)As modern physics started with the Newtonian revolution, so modern philosophy starts with what one might call the Cartesian Catastrophe. The catastrophe consisted in the splitting up of the world into the realms of matter and mind, and the identification of "mind" with conscious thinking. The result of this identification was the shallow rationalism of l'esprit Cartesien, and an impoverishment of psychology which it took three centuries to remedy even in part. (Koestler, 1964, p. 148)It has been made of late a reproach against natural philosophy that it has struck out on a path of its own, and has separated itself more and more widely from the other sciences which are united by common philological and historical studies. The opposition has, in fact, been long apparent, and seems to me to have grown up mainly under the influence of the Hegelian philosophy, or, at any rate, to have been brought out into more distinct relief by that philosophy.... The sole object of Kant's "Critical Philosophy" was to test the sources and the authority of our knowledge, and to fix a definite scope and standard for the researches of philosophy, as compared with other sciences.... [But Hegel's] "Philosophy of Identity" was bolder. It started with the hypothesis that not only spiritual phenomena, but even the actual world-nature, that is, and man-were the result of an act of thought on the part of a creative mind, similar, it was supposed, in kind to the human mind.... The philosophers accused the scientific men of narrowness; the scientific men retorted that the philosophers were crazy. And so it came about that men of science began to lay some stress on the banishment of all philosophic influences from their work; while some of them, including men of the greatest acuteness, went so far as to condemn philosophy altogether, not merely as useless, but as mischievous dreaming. Thus, it must be confessed, not only were the illegitimate pretensions of the Hegelian system to subordinate to itself all other studies rejected, but no regard was paid to the rightful claims of philosophy, that is, the criticism of the sources of cognition, and the definition of the functions of the intellect. (Helmholz, quoted in Dampier, 1966, pp. 291-292)Philosophy remains true to its classical tradition by renouncing it. (Habermas, 1972, p. 317)I have not attempted... to put forward any grand view of the nature of philosophy; nor do I have any such grand view to put forth if I would. It will be obvious that I do not agree with those who see philosophy as the history of "howlers" and progress in philosophy as the debunking of howlers. It will also be obvious that I do not agree with those who see philosophy as the enterprise of putting forward a priori truths about the world.... I see philosophy as a field which has certain central questions, for example, the relation between thought and reality.... It seems obvious that in dealing with these questions philosophers have formulated rival research programs, that they have put forward general hypotheses, and that philosophers within each major research program have modified their hypotheses by trial and error, even if they sometimes refuse to admit that that is what they are doing. To that extent philosophy is a "science." To argue about whether philosophy is a science in any more serious sense seems to me to be hardly a useful occupation.... It does not seem to me important to decide whether science is philosophy or philosophy is science as long as one has a conception of both that makes both essential to a responsible view of the world and of man's place in it. (Putnam, 1975, p. xvii)What can philosophy contribute to solving the problem of the relation [of] mind to body? Twenty years ago, many English-speaking philosophers would have answered: "Nothing beyond an analysis of the various mental concepts." If we seek knowledge of things, they thought, it is to science that we must turn. Philosophy can only cast light upon our concepts of those things.This retreat from things to concepts was not undertaken lightly. Ever since the seventeenth century, the great intellectual fact of our culture has been the incredible expansion of knowledge both in the natural and in the rational sciences (mathematics, logic).The success of science created a crisis in philosophy. What was there for philosophy to do? Hume had already perceived the problem in some degree, and so surely did Kant, but it was not until the twentieth century, with the Vienna Circle and with Wittgenstein, that the difficulty began to weigh heavily. Wittgenstein took the view that philosophy could do no more than strive to undo the intellectual knots it itself had tied, so achieving intellectual release, and even a certain illumination, but no knowledge. A little later, and more optimistically, Ryle saw a positive, if reduced role, for philosophy in mapping the "logical geography" of our concepts: how they stood to each other and how they were to be analyzed....Since that time, however, philosophers in the "analytic" tradition have swung back from Wittgensteinian and even Rylean pessimism to a more traditional conception of the proper role and tasks of philosophy. Many analytic philosophers now would accept the view that the central task of philosophy is to give an account, or at least play a part in giving an account, of the most general nature of things and of man. (Armstrong, 1990, pp. 37-38)8) Philosophy's Evolving Engagement with Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive ScienceIn the beginning, the nature of philosophy's engagement with artificial intelligence and cognitive science was clear enough. The new sciences of the mind were to provide the long-awaited vindication of the most potent dreams of naturalism and materialism. Mind would at last be located firmly within the natural order. We would see in detail how the most perplexing features of the mental realm could be supported by the operations of solely physical laws upon solely physical stuff. Mental causation (the power of, e.g., a belief to cause an action) would emerge as just another species of physical causation. Reasoning would be understood as a kind of automated theorem proving. And the key to both was to be the depiction of the brain as the implementation of multiple higher level programs whose task was to manipulate and transform symbols or representations: inner items with one foot in the physical (they were realized as brain states) and one in the mental (they were bearers of contents, and their physical gymnastics were cleverly designed to respect semantic relationships such as truth preservation). (A. Clark, 1996, p. 1)Socrates of Athens famously declared that "the unexamined life is not worth living," and his motto aptly explains the impulse to philosophize. Taking nothing for granted, philosophy probes and questions the fundamental presuppositions of every area of human inquiry.... [P]art of the job of the philosopher is to keep at a certain critical distance from current doctrines, whether in the sciences or the arts, and to examine instead how the various elements in our world-view clash, or fit together. Some philosophers have tried to incorporate the results of these inquiries into a grand synoptic view of the nature of reality and our human relationship to it. Others have mistrusted system-building, and seen their primary role as one of clarifications, or the removal of obstacles along the road to truth. But all have shared the Socratic vision of using the human intellect to challenge comfortable preconceptions, insisting that every aspect of human theory and practice be subjected to continuing critical scrutiny....Philosophy is, of course, part of a continuing tradition, and there is much to be gained from seeing how that tradition originated and developed. But the principal object of studying the materials in this book is not to pay homage to past genius, but to enrich one's understanding of central problems that are as pressing today as they have always been-problems about knowledge, truth and reality, the nature of the mind, the basis of right action, and the best way to live. These questions help to mark out the territory of philosophy as an academic discipline, but in a wider sense they define the human predicament itself; they will surely continue to be with us for as long as humanity endures. (Cottingham, 1996, pp. xxi-xxii)10) The Distinction between Dionysian Man and Apollonian Man, between Art and Creativity and Reason and Self- ControlIn his study of ancient Greek culture, The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche drew what would become a famous distinction, between the Dionysian spirit, the untamed spirit of art and creativity, and the Apollonian, that of reason and self-control. The story of Greek civilization, and all civilizations, Nietzsche implied, was the gradual victory of Apollonian man, with his desire for control over nature and himself, over Dionysian man, who survives only in myth, poetry, music, and drama. Socrates and Plato had attacked the illusions of art as unreal, and had overturned the delicate cultural balance by valuing only man's critical, rational, and controlling consciousness while denigrating his vital life instincts as irrational and base. The result of this division is "Alexandrian man," the civilized and accomplished Greek citizen of the later ancient world, who is "equipped with the greatest forces of knowledge" but in whom the wellsprings of creativity have dried up. (Herman, 1997, pp. 95-96)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Philosophy
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4 Bibliography
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The creative circle: Sketches on the natural history of circularity. In P. Watzlawick (Ed.), The invented reality (pp. 309-324). New York: W. W. Norton.■ Voltaire (1961). On the Penseґs of M. Pascal. In Philosophical letters (pp. 119-146). E. Dilworth (Trans.). Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.■ Wagman, M. (1991a). Artificial intelligence and human cognition: A theoretical inter comparison of two realms of intellect. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1991b). Cognitive science and concepts of mind: Toward a general theory of human and artificial intelligence. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1993). Cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence: Theory and re search in cognitive science. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1995). The sciences of cognition: Theory and research in psychology and artificial intelligence. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1996). Human intellect and cognitive science: Toward a general unified theory of intelligence. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1997a). Cognitive science and the symbolic operations of human and artificial intelligence: Theory and research into the intellective processes. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1997b). The general unified theory of intelligence: Central conceptions and specific application to domains of cognitive science. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1998a). Cognitive science and the mind- body problem: From philosophy to psychology to artificial intelligence to imaging of the brain. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1998b). Language and thought in humans and computers: Theory and research in psychology, artificial intelligence, and neural science. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1998c). The ultimate objectives of artificial intelligence: Theoretical and research foundations, philosophical and psychological implications. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1999). The human mind according to artificial intelligence: Theory, re search, and implications. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (2000). Scientific discovery processes in humans and computers: Theory and research in psychology and artificial intelligence. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wall, R. (1972). Introduction to mathematical linguistics. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.■ Wallas, G. (1926). The Art of Thought. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.■ Wason, P. (1977). Self contradictions. In P. Johnson-Laird & P. Wason (Eds.), Thinking: Readings in cognitive science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.■ Wason, P. C., & P. N. Johnson-Laird. (1972). Psychology of reasoning: Structure and content. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.■ Watson, J. (1930). Behaviorism. New York: W. W. Norton.■ Watzlawick, P. (1984). Epilogue. In P. Watzlawick (Ed.), The invented reality. New York: W. W. Norton, 1984.■ Weinberg, S. (1977). The first three minutes: A modern view of the origin of the uni verse. New York: Basic Books.■ Weisberg, R. W. (1986). Creativity: Genius and other myths. New York: W. H. Freeman.■ Weizenbaum, J. (1976). Computer power and human reason: From judgment to cal culation. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.■ Wertheimer, M. (1945). Productive thinking. New York: Harper & Bros.■ Whitehead, A. N. (1925). Science and the modern world. New York: Macmillan.■ Whorf, B. L. (1956). In J. B. Carroll (Ed.), Language, thought and reality: Selected writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Whyte, L. L. (1962). The unconscious before Freud. New York: Anchor Books.■ Wiener, N. (1954). The human use of human beings. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.■ Wiener, N. (1964). God & Golem, Inc.: A comment on certain points where cybernetics impinges on religion. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Winograd, T. (1972). Understanding natural language. New York: Academic Press.■ Winston, P. H. (1987). Artificial intelligence: A perspective. In E. L. Grimson & R. S. Patil (Eds.), AI in the 1980s and beyond (pp. 1-12). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Winston, P. H. (Ed.) (1975). The psychology of computer vision. New York: McGrawHill.■ Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical investigations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.■ Wittgenstein, L. (1958). The blue and brown books. New York: Harper Colophon.■ Woods, W. A. (1975). What's in a link: Foundations for semantic networks. In D. G. Bobrow & A. Collins (Eds.), Representations and understanding: Studies in cognitive science (pp. 35-84). New York: Academic Press.■ Woodworth, R. S. (1938). Experimental psychology. New York: Holt; London: Methuen (1939).■ Wundt, W. (1904). Principles of physiological psychology (Vol. 1). E. B. Titchener (Trans.). New York: Macmillan.■ Wundt, W. (1907). Lectures on human and animal psychology. J. E. Creighton & E. B. Titchener (Trans.). New York: Macmillan.■ Young, J. Z. (1978). Programs of the brain. New York: Oxford University Press.■ Ziman, J. (1978). Reliable knowledge: An exploration of the grounds for belief in science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Bibliography
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5 Logical Empiricism
Modern analytical empiricism... differs from that of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume by its incorporation of mathematics and its development of a powerful logical technique. It is thus able, in regard to certain problems, to achieve definite answers, which have the quality of science rather than of philosophy. It has the advantage, as compared with the philosophies of the system-builders, of being able to tackle its problems one at a time, instead of having to invent at one stroke a block theory of the whole universe. Its methods, in this respect, resemble those of science. I have no doubt that, in so far as philosophical knowledge is possible, it is by such methods that it must be sought: I also have no doubt that, by these methods, many ancient problems are completely soluble.... Take such questions as: What is number? What are space and time? What is mind, and what is matter? I do not say that we can here and now give definitive answers to all these ancient questions, but I do say that a method has been discovered by which, as in science, we can make successive approximations to the truth, in which each new stage results from an improvement, not a rejection, of what has gone before. (Russell, 1961, pp. 788-789)Not a single one of the great theses of Logical Empiricism (that Meaning is Method of Verification; that metaphysical propositions are literally without sense; that Mathematics is True by Convention) has turned out to be correct. It detracts from the excitement of the fact that, by turning philosophical theses into linguistic ones [as Carnap had tried to do]... one can make philosophy more scientific and settle the truth value of philosophical propositions by hard scientific research, if the results one obtains are uniformly negative. (Putnam, 1975, p. 20)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Logical Empiricism
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6 Psychology
We come therefore now to that knowledge whereunto the ancient oracle directeth us, which is the knowledge of ourselves; which deserveth the more accurate handling, by how much it toucheth us more nearly. This knowledge, as it is the end and term of natural philosophy in the intention of man, so notwithstanding it is but a portion of natural philosophy in the continent of nature.... [W]e proceed to human philosophy or Humanity, which hath two parts: the one considereth man segregate, or distributively; the other congregate, or in society. So as Human philosophy is either Simple and Particular, or Conjugate and Civil. Humanity Particular consisteth of the same parts whereof man consisteth; that is, of knowledges which respect the Body, and of knowledges that respect the Mind... how the one discloseth the other and how the one worketh upon the other... [:] the one is honored with the inquiry of Aristotle, and the other of Hippocrates. (Bacon, 1878, pp. 236-237)The claims of Psychology to rank as a distinct science are... not smaller but greater than those of any other science. If its phenomena are contemplated objectively, merely as nervo-muscular adjustments by which the higher organisms from moment to moment adapt their actions to environing co-existences and sequences, its degree of specialty, even then, entitles it to a separate place. The moment the element of feeling, or consciousness, is used to interpret nervo-muscular adjustments as thus exhibited in the living beings around, objective Psychology acquires an additional, and quite exceptional, distinction. (Spencer, 1896, p. 141)Kant once declared that psychology was incapable of ever raising itself to the rank of an exact natural science. The reasons that he gives... have often been repeated in later times. In the first place, Kant says, psychology cannot become an exact science because mathematics is inapplicable to the phenomena of the internal sense; the pure internal perception, in which mental phenomena must be constructed,-time,-has but one dimension. In the second place, however, it cannot even become an experimental science, because in it the manifold of internal observation cannot be arbitrarily varied,-still less, another thinking subject be submitted to one's experiments, comformably to the end in view; moreover, the very fact of observation means alteration of the observed object. (Wundt, 1904, p. 6)It is [Gustav] Fechner's service to have found and followed the true way; to have shown us how a "mathematical psychology" may, within certain limits, be realized in practice.... He was the first to show how Herbart's idea of an "exact psychology" might be turned to practical account. (Wundt, 1904, pp. 6-7)"Mind," "intellect," "reason," "understanding," etc. are concepts... that existed before the advent of any scientific psychology. The fact that the naive consciousness always and everywhere points to internal experience as a special source of knowledge, may, therefore, be accepted for the moment as sufficient testimony to the rights of psychology as science.... "Mind," will accordingly be the subject, to which we attribute all the separate facts of internal observation as predicates. The subject itself is determined p. 17) wholly and exclusively by its predicates. (Wundt, 1904,The study of animal psychology may be approached from two different points of view. We may set out from the notion of a kind of comparative physiology of mind, a universal history of the development of mental life in the organic world. Or we may make human psychology the principal object of investigation. Then, the expressions of mental life in animals will be taken into account only so far as they throw light upon the evolution of consciousness in man.... Human psychology... may confine itself altogether to man, and generally has done so to far too great an extent. There are plenty of psychological text-books from which you would hardly gather that there was any other conscious life than the human. (Wundt, 1907, pp. 340-341)The Behaviorist began his own formulation of the problem of psychology by sweeping aside all medieval conceptions. He dropped from his scientific vocabulary all subjective terms such as sensation, perception, image, desire, purpose, and even thinking and emotion as they were subjectively defined. (Watson, 1930, pp. 5-6)According to the medieval classification of the sciences, psychology is merely a chapter of special physics, although the most important chapter; for man is a microcosm; he is the central figure of the universe. (deWulf, 1956, p. 125)At the beginning of this century the prevailing thesis in psychology was Associationism.... Behavior proceeded by the stream of associations: each association produced its successors, and acquired new attachments with the sensations arriving from the environment.In the first decade of the century a reaction developed to this doctrine through the work of the Wurzburg school. Rejecting the notion of a completely self-determining stream of associations, it introduced the task ( Aufgabe) as a necessary factor in describing the process of thinking. The task gave direction to thought. A noteworthy innovation of the Wurzburg school was the use of systematic introspection to shed light on the thinking process and the contents of consciousness. The result was a blend of mechanics and phenomenalism, which gave rise in turn to two divergent antitheses, Behaviorism and the Gestalt movement. The behavioristic reaction insisted that introspection was a highly unstable, subjective procedure.... Behaviorism reformulated the task of psychology as one of explaining the response of organisms as a function of the stimuli impinging upon them and measuring both objectively. However, Behaviorism accepted, and indeed reinforced, the mechanistic assumption that the connections between stimulus and response were formed and maintained as simple, determinate functions of the environment.The Gestalt reaction took an opposite turn. It rejected the mechanistic nature of the associationist doctrine but maintained the value of phenomenal observation. In many ways it continued the Wurzburg school's insistence that thinking was more than association-thinking has direction given to it by the task or by the set of the subject. Gestalt psychology elaborated this doctrine in genuinely new ways in terms of holistic principles of organization.Today psychology lives in a state of relatively stable tension between the poles of Behaviorism and Gestalt psychology.... (Newell & Simon, 1963, pp. 279-280)As I examine the fate of our oppositions, looking at those already in existence as guide to how they fare and shape the course of science, it seems to me that clarity is never achieved. Matters simply become muddier and muddier as we go down through time. Thus, far from providing the rungs of a ladder by which psychology gradually climbs to clarity, this form of conceptual structure leads rather to an ever increasing pile of issues, which we weary of or become diverted from, but never really settle. (Newell, 1973b, pp. 288-289)The subject matter of psychology is as old as reflection. Its broad practical aims are as dated as human societies. Human beings, in any period, have not been indifferent to the validity of their knowledge, unconcerned with the causes of their behavior or that of their prey and predators. Our distant ancestors, no less than we, wrestled with the problems of social organization, child rearing, competition, authority, individual differences, personal safety. Solving these problems required insights-no matter how untutored-into the psychological dimensions of life. Thus, if we are to follow the convention of treating psychology as a young discipline, we must have in mind something other than its subject matter. We must mean that it is young in the sense that physics was young at the time of Archimedes or in the sense that geometry was "founded" by Euclid and "fathered" by Thales. Sailing vessels were launched long before Archimedes discovered the laws of bouyancy [ sic], and pillars of identical circumference were constructed before anyone knew that C IID. We do not consider the ship builders and stone cutters of antiquity physicists and geometers. Nor were the ancient cave dwellers psychologists merely because they rewarded the good conduct of their children. The archives of folk wisdom contain a remarkable collection of achievements, but craft-no matter how perfected-is not science, nor is a litany of successful accidents a discipline. If psychology is young, it is young as a scientific discipline but it is far from clear that psychology has attained this status. (Robinson, 1986, p. 12)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Psychology
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7 real
real [rɪəl](a) (authentic) vrai, véritable; (not imitation → diamond, pearl) vrai; (→ gold, leather) véritable; (→ silk, flowers) naturel;∎ a real friend/idiot un véritable ami/idiot;∎ a real disaster/shock un véritable ou vrai désastre/choc;∎ a real man un vrai homme;∎ I don't know his real name je ne connais pas son vrai nom;∎ my first real job mon premier vrai travail;∎ we have no real cause for concern nous n'avons aucune raison de nous inquiéter;∎ we'll never know her real feelings nous ne saurons jamais quels étaient vraiment ses sentiments;∎ she has no real feeling for poetry elle n'a pas le sens de la poésie;∎ he's made a real effort il a fait un véritable effort, il a fait un effort réel;∎ they're real silver ils sont en argent véritable;∎ are her pearls real? ses perles sont-elles vraies?;∎ that's what I call a real cup of tea! ça, c'est ce que j'appelle une tasse de thé!;∎ this orange drink is not bad but it's poor stuff compared to the real thing cette boisson à l'orange n'est pas mauvaise, mais ça ne vaut pas le vrai jus d'orange;∎ this is not a drill, it's the real thing ce n'est pas un exercice, c'est pour de vrai;∎ familiar get real! arrête de délirer ou de rêver!, redescends sur terre!∎ the real world le monde réel;∎ the threat is a very real one la menace est bien réelle;∎ what does that mean in real terms? qu'est-ce que ça signifie au bout du compte?;∎ salaries have fallen in real terms les salaires ont baissé en termes réels;∎ in real life dans la réalité, dans la vie(d) (as intensifier) vrai, véritable;∎ it was a real surprise ce fut une vraie surprise;∎ she's a real pain elle est vraiment rasante2 adverb∎ you were real lucky t'as eu une sacré veine;∎ it's real hot il fait vachement chaud;∎ we had a real good time on s'est vachement bien amusés;∎ that's real nice of you c'est vraiment ou très gentil de votre part□ ;∎ I'll see you real soon à très bientôt□3 noun∎ Philosophy the real le réelfamiliar pour de vrai□, pour de bon;∎ this time it's for real cette fois-ci c'est la bonne;∎ is he for real? d'où il sort, celui-là?;∎ is that for real? c'est vrai?►► Finance real accounts comptes mpl de valeur;British real ale bière f artisanale;Finance real assets biens mpl immobiliers;∎ he works in real estate il travaille dans l'immobilier;real estate agent agent m immobilier;Finance real estate mortgage investment conduit obligation f garantie par hypothèque;real estate leasing crédit-bail m immobilier;real estate office agence f immobilière;Computing, Mathematics, Philosophy & Physics real image image f réelle;Mathematics real number nombre m réel;Computing Real Player lecteur m Real Media;Marketing real repositioning repositionnement m réel;real property (UNCOUNT) biens mpl immobiliers ou immeubles;real tennis jeu m de paume;∎ to play real tennis jouer à la paume;Computing real time temps m réel;real value valeur f effective -
8 MVP
1) Общая лексика: основной игрок2) Компьютерная техника: Mpeg Video Peripheral, Наиболее ценный специалист4) Американизм: Most Valuable Person, Most Visible Person5) Спорт: Most Valuable Player6) Военный термин: Mission Values And Philosophy, maintenance verification plan, manpower validation program, master verification plan7) Техника: Music And Video Player, Music Video Player, mechanical vacuum pump8) Шутливое выражение: A Most Valuable Program, Most Valuable Pundit, Most Volatile Player9) Метеорология: Maximum Vertical Pocket10) Юридический термин: Most Victimized Persons11) Бухгалтерия: Money Very Promptly12) Ветеринария: Most Valuable Primate13) Грубое выражение: Most Vacuous Proposition, Mr Very Pissed14) Сокращение: Bell and Howell tabletop Mail Verifier Plus, Military VME Processor, Mobile Voice Pack, Motor Vehicle Plant, methyl-violet paper, mitral valve prolapse15) Вычислительная техника: Most Value Product, Multimedia Video Processor, Multimedia for PS/ValuePoint, Most Valuable Professional (bonus program, MS)16) Космонавтика: MOS-1 Verification Programme17) Транспорт: Maximum Velocity Performance18) Экология: Monitoring and Verification Plan19) СМИ: Memphis Video Production, Most Vacant Personality, Most Versatile Performer, Multi Venue Programming, Music Video Pictures, Music Video Producer, Music Videos And Pictures20) Деловая лексика: Marginal Value Product, Maximum Value And Performance, Men Of Vision And Power, Most Valuable People, Most Valued Professional21) Образование: Mentor Violence Prevention22) Медицинская техника: mitral valve plasty (ЭхоКГ), mitral valve prolapse (ЭхоКГ)23) Фармация: Manufacturing validation procedure24) НАСА: Mission Volume Performance25) Программное обеспечение: Most Valuable Professional, Multi Vendor Platform, Multiprocessing Verification Platform, продукт с минимальным функционалом (Minimum Viable Product) -
9 Thing
nounwhat's that thing in your hand? — was hast du da in der Hand?
not a thing — überhaupt od. gar nichts
2) (action)that was a foolish thing to do — das war eine große Dummheit
it was the right thing to do — es war das einzig Richtige
do things to somebody/something — (fig. coll.) auf jemanden/etwas eine enorme Wirkung haben (ugs.)
3) (fact) [Tat]sache, dieit's a strange thing that... — es ist seltsam, dass...
for one thing, you don't have enough money[, for another thing...] — zunächst einmal hast du nicht genügend Geld [, außerdem...]
the best/worst thing about the situation/her — das Beste/Schlimmste an der Situation/an ihr
know/learn a thing or two about something/somebody — sich mit etwas/jemandem auskennen/einiges über etwas (Akk.) lernen/über jemanden erfahren
the [only] thing is that... — die Sache ist [nur] die, dass...
4) (idea)say the first thing that comes into one's head — das sagen, was einem gerade so einfällt
what a thing to say! — wie kann man nur so etwas sagen!
have a thing about somebody/something — (coll.) (be obsessed about) auf jemanden/etwas abfahren (salopp); (be prejudiced about) etwas gegen jemanden/etwas haben; (be afraid of or repulsed by) einen Horror vor jemandem/etwas haben (ugs.)
5) (task)make a mess of things — alles vermasseln (salopp)
make a [big] thing of something — (regard as essential) auf etwas besonderen Wert legen; (get excited about) sich über etwas (Akk.) aufregen
7) (circumstance)how are things? — wie geht's [dir]?
as things stand [with me] — so wie die Dinge [bei mir] liegen
it's just one of those things — (coll.) so was kommt schon mal vor (ugs.)
8) (individual, creature) Ding, dasshe is in hospital, poor thing — sie ist im Krankenhaus, das arme Ding
you spiteful thing! — du [gemeines] Biest!
10) in pl. (matters)an expert/authority on things historical — ein Fachmann/eine Autorität in geschichtlichen Fragen
11) (product of work) Sache, die12) (special interest)do one's own thing — (coll.) sich selbst verwirklichen
13) (coll.): (something remarkable)now there's a thing! — das ist ja ein Ding! (ugs.)
14)blue jeans are the thing among teenagers — Bluejeans sind der Hit (ugs.) unter den Teenagern
but the thing is, will she come in fact? — aber die Frage ist, wird sie auch tatsächlich kommen?
* * *[θɪŋ]nI haven't got a \thing to wear ich habe nichts zum Anziehen [o SCHWEIZ a. Anlegen]she behaved like a mad \thing sie benahm sich wie eine Verrückteyou cannot be all \things to all men man kann es nicht allen recht machen▪ \things pl Besitz m kein pl, Habe f kein pl; (objects for special purpose) Sachen pl, Zeug nt kein plshe put all his \things in suitcases and put them outside the door sie packte alle seine Sachen in Koffer und stellte diese vor die Türthis \thing called love das, was man so Liebe nenntif there's one \thing I want to know it's this wenn es etwas gibt, das ich wissen will, dann ist es dasit was just one \thing after another da kam eben eins zum anderenone \thing leads to another das Eine führt zum Anderndon't worry about a \thing! mach dir keine Sorgen!learning to ride a bike was a difficult \thing for me to do ich habe lange gebraucht, bis ich Rad fahren konnteI value my freedom above all \things meine Freiheit steht für mich an erster Stelleif it's not one \thing, it's another ständig ist [et]was losto not be sb's \thing nicht jds Ding sein famto be a \thing of the past der Vergangenheit angehörenin all \things in jeder Hinsicht, in [o bei] allemthe whole \thing das Ganzethe last \thing I want to do is hurt his feelings ich möchte auf keinen Fall seine Gefühle verletzenthat was a close \thing! das war knapp!walking in stormy weather along a beach just does \things to me bei stürmischem Wetter am Strand spazieren zu gehen macht mir unheimlich Spaßplenty of \things vielesto do sth first/last \thing etw als Erstes/Letztes tunI'll phone him first \thing tomorrow ich rufe ihn morgen gleich als Erstes anto call sb last \thing at night jdn spät nachts noch anrufenthe real \thing das einzig Wahresure \thing! esp AM na klar!what a lovely \thing to say! wie nett, so etwas zu sagen!I have a \thing or two on my mind mir geht so einiges durch den Kopfand another \thing,... und noch [et]was,...why don't you come with me? — for one \thing, I don't like flying, and for another, I can't afford it warum kommst du nicht mit? — einerseits fliege ich nicht gerne und außerdem kann ich es mir nicht leistento be able to tell sb a \thing or two jdm noch so einiges [o manches] erzählen könnento know a \thing or two eine ganze Menge wissen, sich akk gut auskennen7. (social behaviour)▪ the \thing das Richtigeit's the done \thing ( also iron) das gehört sich so [o gehört zum guten Ton]smoking during meals is not the done \thing es gehört sich nicht, während des Essens zu rauchen8. (the important point)9. (something non-existent)▪ \things pl:to be hearing [or imagining] \things Gespenster sehen fig10. (the situation)▪ \things pl die Dinge, die Lagewhat are \things like? wie sieht's aus? [o läuft's?] famall \things considered alles in allemas \things stand, the way \things are so wie die Dinge stehen11. (confectionery)sweet \things Süßigkeiten pl12. (person)you lucky \thing! du Glückliche(r) [o Glückspilz]!she's a dear little \thing sie ist ein Schatzlazy \thing Faulpelz mthe poor \things die Ärmstenstupid \thing Dummkopf m, Idiot m13.▶ you can have too much of a good \thing man kann es auch übertreiben▶ to have a [or this] \thing about sb ( fam: dislike) jdn nicht ausstehen können fam; (like very much) verrückt nach jdm sein fam▶ there are more \things in heaven and earth [than are dreamt of in your philosophy] BRIT ( saying) es gibt mehr Dinge zwischen Himmel und Erde [als deine Schulweisheit sich träumen lässt]▶ a little learning [or knowledge] is a dangerous \thing ( saying) zu wenig Wissen kann gefährlich werden▶ to make a [big] \thing out of sth aus etw dat eine große Sache machen, um etw akk viel Wirbel machen▶ the next big \thing der neueste Trend▶ to be just one of those \things (be unavoidable) einfach unvermeidlich sein; (typical happening) typisch seinthis is just one of those \things da kann man halt nichts machen fam▶ these \things are sent to try us BRIT ( saying) das sind die Prüfungen, die uns das Schicksal auferlegt* * *[ɵɪŋ]n1) (= any material object) Ding nta thing of beauty/great value — etwas Schönes/sehr Wertvolles
she likes sweet things — sie mag Süßes or süße Sachen
2) pl (= clothes, equipment, belongings) Sachen pl3) (non material = affair, subject) Sache fyou know, it's a funny thing — wissen Sie, es ist schon seltsam
the odd/best thing about it is... — das Seltsame/Beste daran ist,...
it's a good thing I came —
it's a bad/strange thing but... — es ist schlecht/seltsam, aber...
to make a big thing of or about doing sth — eine große Sache daraus machen, dass man etw tut
he's on to or onto a good thing (inf) — er hat da was Gutes aufgetan (inf)
there is one/one other thing I want to ask you —
and there's another thing, why didn't you...? — und noch etwas, warum haben Sie nicht...?
it's one thing to talk about it, it's another to do it — es ist eine Sache, davon zu reden, eine völlig andere, es dann auch zu tun
the things you do/say! — was du so machst/sagst!
I must be hearing/seeing things! — ich glaube, ich höre/sehe nicht richtig, ich glaube, ich spinne! (inf)
all the things I meant to say/do —
to expect great things of sb/sth — Großes or große Dinge von jdm/etw erwarten
I must think things over — ich muss mir die Sache or das überlegen
as things stand at the moment, as things are... — so wie die Dinge im Moment liegen
how are things ( with you)? — wie gehts (bei) Ihnen?
since that's how things are... — wenn das so ist..., in dem Fall...
taking one thing with another — im Großen und Ganzen, alles in allem
it's been one thing after the other (going wrong) — es kam eins zum anderen
(what) with one thing and another I haven't had time to do it yet — ich bin einfach noch nicht dazu gekommen
for one thing it doesn't make sense — erst einmal ergibt das überhaupt keinen Sinn
not to see/understand a thing — (absolut) nichts sehen/verstehen
not to know a thing — (absolut) nichts wissen, keine Ahnung haben
See:→ academic.ru/73641/teach">teachI say, old thing (dated inf) — na, du altes Haus (inf)
lucky thing! — der/die Glückliche/du Glückliche(r)!
5)that's not the thing to do —
the thing to do now would be... — was wir jetzt machen sollten, wäre...
that would be the honourable thing to do — es wäre nur anständig, das zu tun
6)I'm not at my best first thing in the morning — so früh am Morgen bin ich nicht gerade in Hochformthe thing is to know when... — man muss wissen, wann...
yes, but the thing is... — ja, aber...
the thing is we haven't got enough money —
the thing is, you see, he loves her — das Problem ist, dass er sie liebt
yes but the thing is it won't work — ja, aber das Dumme ist, es funktioniert nicht
7)(all) things German/mystical/mechanical — alles Deutsche/Geheimnisvolle/Mechanische
* * *thing, oft Thing [θıŋ] s PARL Thing n (in Skandinavien und Island: Reichstag oder Volksgerichtsversammlung)* * *nounnot a thing — überhaupt od. gar nichts
2) (action)do things to somebody/something — (fig. coll.) auf jemanden/etwas eine enorme Wirkung haben (ugs.)
3) (fact) [Tat]sache, dieit's a strange thing that... — es ist seltsam, dass...
for one thing, you don't have enough money[, for another thing...] — zunächst einmal hast du nicht genügend Geld [, außerdem...]
the best/worst thing about the situation/her — das Beste/Schlimmste an der Situation/an ihr
know/learn a thing or two about something/somebody — sich mit etwas/jemandem auskennen/einiges über etwas (Akk.) lernen/über jemanden erfahren
the [only] thing is that... — die Sache ist [nur] die, dass...
4) (idea)say the first thing that comes into one's head — das sagen, was einem gerade so einfällt
have a thing about somebody/something — (coll.) (be obsessed about) auf jemanden/etwas abfahren (salopp); (be prejudiced about) etwas gegen jemanden/etwas haben; (be afraid of or repulsed by) einen Horror vor jemandem/etwas haben (ugs.)
5) (task)make a mess of things — alles vermasseln (salopp)
make a [big] thing of something — (regard as essential) auf etwas besonderen Wert legen; (get excited about) sich über etwas (Akk.) aufregen
how are things? — wie geht's [dir]?
as things stand [with me] — so wie die Dinge [bei mir] liegen
it's just one of those things — (coll.) so was kommt schon mal vor (ugs.)
8) (individual, creature) Ding, dasshe is in hospital, poor thing — sie ist im Krankenhaus, das arme Ding
you spiteful thing! — du [gemeines] Biest!
9) in pl. (personal belongings, outer clothing) Sachen10) in pl. (matters)an expert/authority on things historical — ein Fachmann/eine Autorität in geschichtlichen Fragen
11) (product of work) Sache, diedo one's own thing — (coll.) sich selbst verwirklichen
13) (coll.): (something remarkable)now there's a thing! — das ist ja ein Ding! (ugs.)
14)the thing — (what is proper or needed or important) das Richtige
blue jeans are the thing among teenagers — Bluejeans sind der Hit (ugs.) unter den Teenagern
but the thing is, will she come in fact? — aber die Frage ist, wird sie auch tatsächlich kommen?
* * *n.Ding -e n.Sache -n f. -
10 thing
nounwhat's that thing in your hand? — was hast du da in der Hand?
not a thing — überhaupt od. gar nichts
2) (action)that was a foolish thing to do — das war eine große Dummheit
it was the right thing to do — es war das einzig Richtige
do things to somebody/something — (fig. coll.) auf jemanden/etwas eine enorme Wirkung haben (ugs.)
3) (fact) [Tat]sache, dieit's a strange thing that... — es ist seltsam, dass...
for one thing, you don't have enough money[, for another thing...] — zunächst einmal hast du nicht genügend Geld [, außerdem...]
the best/worst thing about the situation/her — das Beste/Schlimmste an der Situation/an ihr
know/learn a thing or two about something/somebody — sich mit etwas/jemandem auskennen/einiges über etwas (Akk.) lernen/über jemanden erfahren
the [only] thing is that... — die Sache ist [nur] die, dass...
4) (idea)say the first thing that comes into one's head — das sagen, was einem gerade so einfällt
what a thing to say! — wie kann man nur so etwas sagen!
have a thing about somebody/something — (coll.) (be obsessed about) auf jemanden/etwas abfahren (salopp); (be prejudiced about) etwas gegen jemanden/etwas haben; (be afraid of or repulsed by) einen Horror vor jemandem/etwas haben (ugs.)
5) (task)make a mess of things — alles vermasseln (salopp)
make a [big] thing of something — (regard as essential) auf etwas besonderen Wert legen; (get excited about) sich über etwas (Akk.) aufregen
7) (circumstance)how are things? — wie geht's [dir]?
as things stand [with me] — so wie die Dinge [bei mir] liegen
it's just one of those things — (coll.) so was kommt schon mal vor (ugs.)
8) (individual, creature) Ding, dasshe is in hospital, poor thing — sie ist im Krankenhaus, das arme Ding
you spiteful thing! — du [gemeines] Biest!
10) in pl. (matters)an expert/authority on things historical — ein Fachmann/eine Autorität in geschichtlichen Fragen
11) (product of work) Sache, die12) (special interest)do one's own thing — (coll.) sich selbst verwirklichen
13) (coll.): (something remarkable)now there's a thing! — das ist ja ein Ding! (ugs.)
14)blue jeans are the thing among teenagers — Bluejeans sind der Hit (ugs.) unter den Teenagern
but the thing is, will she come in fact? — aber die Frage ist, wird sie auch tatsächlich kommen?
* * *[θɪŋ]nI haven't got a \thing to wear ich habe nichts zum Anziehen [o SCHWEIZ a. Anlegen]she behaved like a mad \thing sie benahm sich wie eine Verrückteyou cannot be all \things to all men man kann es nicht allen recht machen▪ \things pl Besitz m kein pl, Habe f kein pl; (objects for special purpose) Sachen pl, Zeug nt kein plshe put all his \things in suitcases and put them outside the door sie packte alle seine Sachen in Koffer und stellte diese vor die Türthis \thing called love das, was man so Liebe nenntif there's one \thing I want to know it's this wenn es etwas gibt, das ich wissen will, dann ist es dasit was just one \thing after another da kam eben eins zum anderenone \thing leads to another das Eine führt zum Anderndon't worry about a \thing! mach dir keine Sorgen!learning to ride a bike was a difficult \thing for me to do ich habe lange gebraucht, bis ich Rad fahren konnteI value my freedom above all \things meine Freiheit steht für mich an erster Stelleif it's not one \thing, it's another ständig ist [et]was losto not be sb's \thing nicht jds Ding sein famto be a \thing of the past der Vergangenheit angehörenin all \things in jeder Hinsicht, in [o bei] allemthe whole \thing das Ganzethe last \thing I want to do is hurt his feelings ich möchte auf keinen Fall seine Gefühle verletzenthat was a close \thing! das war knapp!walking in stormy weather along a beach just does \things to me bei stürmischem Wetter am Strand spazieren zu gehen macht mir unheimlich Spaßplenty of \things vielesto do sth first/last \thing etw als Erstes/Letztes tunI'll phone him first \thing tomorrow ich rufe ihn morgen gleich als Erstes anto call sb last \thing at night jdn spät nachts noch anrufenthe real \thing das einzig Wahresure \thing! esp AM na klar!what a lovely \thing to say! wie nett, so etwas zu sagen!I have a \thing or two on my mind mir geht so einiges durch den Kopfand another \thing,... und noch [et]was,...why don't you come with me? — for one \thing, I don't like flying, and for another, I can't afford it warum kommst du nicht mit? — einerseits fliege ich nicht gerne und außerdem kann ich es mir nicht leistento be able to tell sb a \thing or two jdm noch so einiges [o manches] erzählen könnento know a \thing or two eine ganze Menge wissen, sich akk gut auskennen7. (social behaviour)▪ the \thing das Richtigeit's the done \thing ( also iron) das gehört sich so [o gehört zum guten Ton]smoking during meals is not the done \thing es gehört sich nicht, während des Essens zu rauchen8. (the important point)9. (something non-existent)▪ \things pl:to be hearing [or imagining] \things Gespenster sehen fig10. (the situation)▪ \things pl die Dinge, die Lagewhat are \things like? wie sieht's aus? [o läuft's?] famall \things considered alles in allemas \things stand, the way \things are so wie die Dinge stehen11. (confectionery)sweet \things Süßigkeiten pl12. (person)you lucky \thing! du Glückliche(r) [o Glückspilz]!she's a dear little \thing sie ist ein Schatzlazy \thing Faulpelz mthe poor \things die Ärmstenstupid \thing Dummkopf m, Idiot m13.▶ you can have too much of a good \thing man kann es auch übertreiben▶ to have a [or this] \thing about sb ( fam: dislike) jdn nicht ausstehen können fam; (like very much) verrückt nach jdm sein fam▶ there are more \things in heaven and earth [than are dreamt of in your philosophy] BRIT ( saying) es gibt mehr Dinge zwischen Himmel und Erde [als deine Schulweisheit sich träumen lässt]▶ a little learning [or knowledge] is a dangerous \thing ( saying) zu wenig Wissen kann gefährlich werden▶ to make a [big] \thing out of sth aus etw dat eine große Sache machen, um etw akk viel Wirbel machen▶ the next big \thing der neueste Trend▶ to be just one of those \things (be unavoidable) einfach unvermeidlich sein; (typical happening) typisch seinthis is just one of those \things da kann man halt nichts machen fam▶ these \things are sent to try us BRIT ( saying) das sind die Prüfungen, die uns das Schicksal auferlegt* * *[ɵɪŋ]n1) (= any material object) Ding nta thing of beauty/great value — etwas Schönes/sehr Wertvolles
she likes sweet things — sie mag Süßes or süße Sachen
2) pl (= clothes, equipment, belongings) Sachen pl3) (non material = affair, subject) Sache fyou know, it's a funny thing — wissen Sie, es ist schon seltsam
the odd/best thing about it is... — das Seltsame/Beste daran ist,...
it's a good thing I came —
it's a bad/strange thing but... — es ist schlecht/seltsam, aber...
to make a big thing of or about doing sth — eine große Sache daraus machen, dass man etw tut
he's on to or onto a good thing (inf) — er hat da was Gutes aufgetan (inf)
there is one/one other thing I want to ask you —
and there's another thing, why didn't you...? — und noch etwas, warum haben Sie nicht...?
it's one thing to talk about it, it's another to do it — es ist eine Sache, davon zu reden, eine völlig andere, es dann auch zu tun
the things you do/say! — was du so machst/sagst!
I must be hearing/seeing things! — ich glaube, ich höre/sehe nicht richtig, ich glaube, ich spinne! (inf)
all the things I meant to say/do —
to expect great things of sb/sth — Großes or große Dinge von jdm/etw erwarten
I must think things over — ich muss mir die Sache or das überlegen
as things stand at the moment, as things are... — so wie die Dinge im Moment liegen
how are things ( with you)? — wie gehts (bei) Ihnen?
since that's how things are... — wenn das so ist..., in dem Fall...
taking one thing with another — im Großen und Ganzen, alles in allem
it's been one thing after the other (going wrong) — es kam eins zum anderen
(what) with one thing and another I haven't had time to do it yet — ich bin einfach noch nicht dazu gekommen
for one thing it doesn't make sense — erst einmal ergibt das überhaupt keinen Sinn
not to see/understand a thing — (absolut) nichts sehen/verstehen
not to know a thing — (absolut) nichts wissen, keine Ahnung haben
See:→ academic.ru/73641/teach">teachI say, old thing (dated inf) — na, du altes Haus (inf)
lucky thing! — der/die Glückliche/du Glückliche(r)!
5)that's not the thing to do —
the thing to do now would be... — was wir jetzt machen sollten, wäre...
that would be the honourable thing to do — es wäre nur anständig, das zu tun
6)I'm not at my best first thing in the morning — so früh am Morgen bin ich nicht gerade in Hochformthe thing is to know when... — man muss wissen, wann...
yes, but the thing is... — ja, aber...
the thing is we haven't got enough money —
the thing is, you see, he loves her — das Problem ist, dass er sie liebt
yes but the thing is it won't work — ja, aber das Dumme ist, es funktioniert nicht
7)(all) things German/mystical/mechanical — alles Deutsche/Geheimnisvolle/Mechanische
* * *thing1, oft Thing [θıŋ] s PARL Thing n (in Skandinavien und Island: Reichstag oder Volksgerichtsversammlung)thing2 [θıŋ] s1. Ding n, Gegenstand m:the law of things JUR das Sachenrecht;just the thing I wanted genau (das), was ich haben wollte;it was so dark that I could not see a thing dass ich überhaupt nichts sehen konnte;she says she hasn’t got a thing to wear sie hat (überhaupt) nichts anzuziehen2. umga) Ding n, Dings(da) nb) euph Ding n (männliches oder weibliches Geschlechtsteil)3. Ding n, Sache f, Angelegenheit f:above all things vor allen Dingen, vor allem;things political politische Dinge, alles Politische;that was a close thing das hätte ins Auge gehen können umg, das ist gerade noch einmal gut gegangen;a pretty thing iron eine schöne Geschichte;for one thing (erstens) einmal;for one thing … and for another zum einen … und zum anderen;the latest thing in hats das Neueste in oder an Hüten;in all things in jeder Hinsicht;no small thing keine Kleinigkeit;not a thing (rein) gar nichts;of all things ausgerechnet (dieses etc);it’s one of those things da kann man (halt) nichts machen;that’s one of those little things that are sent to try us wenn es solche Dinge nicht gäbe, ginge es uns wahrscheinlich viel zu gut;be a thing of the past der Vergangenheit angehören;be too much of a good thing zu viel des Guten sein;I’ve got better things to do than … ich habe Wichtigeres zu tun als …;do great things große Dinge tun, Großes vollbringen;do one’s (own) thing umg tun, was man will;expect great things from sb große Dinge von jemandem erwarten;we had expected better things from him wir hatten mehr von ihm erwartet;a) jemanden, etwas wahnsinnig gern mögen,b) jemanden, etwas überhaupt nicht ausstehen können;if I hate one thing, it is … wenn ich eines hasse, dann ist es …;make a big thing out of viel Aufhebens machen von;this proves three things das beweist dreierlei;he can still teach them a thing or two er kann ihnen noch immer etwas oder das eine od andere beibringen;I could tell you a thing or two about him ich könnte dir (so) einiges über ihn erzählen; → first A 1, last1 A 14. pl Dinge pl, Umstände pl, (Sach)Lage f:things are improving die Dinge oder Verhältnisse bessern sich5. pl Sachen pl, Zeug n (Gepäck, Gerät, Kleider etc):put on one’s things sich anziehen6. pl Sachen pl (Getränke, Essen, Medizin):a lot of good things viele gute Sachen (zum Essen und Trinken)7. Wesen n, Geschöpf n:8. a) Ding n (Mädchen etc):b) Kerl m:(the) poor thing das arme Ding, der arme Kerl;* * *nounnot a thing — überhaupt od. gar nichts
2) (action)do things to somebody/something — (fig. coll.) auf jemanden/etwas eine enorme Wirkung haben (ugs.)
3) (fact) [Tat]sache, dieit's a strange thing that... — es ist seltsam, dass...
for one thing, you don't have enough money[, for another thing...] — zunächst einmal hast du nicht genügend Geld [, außerdem...]
the best/worst thing about the situation/her — das Beste/Schlimmste an der Situation/an ihr
know/learn a thing or two about something/somebody — sich mit etwas/jemandem auskennen/einiges über etwas (Akk.) lernen/über jemanden erfahren
the [only] thing is that... — die Sache ist [nur] die, dass...
4) (idea)say the first thing that comes into one's head — das sagen, was einem gerade so einfällt
have a thing about somebody/something — (coll.) (be obsessed about) auf jemanden/etwas abfahren (salopp); (be prejudiced about) etwas gegen jemanden/etwas haben; (be afraid of or repulsed by) einen Horror vor jemandem/etwas haben (ugs.)
5) (task)make a mess of things — alles vermasseln (salopp)
make a [big] thing of something — (regard as essential) auf etwas besonderen Wert legen; (get excited about) sich über etwas (Akk.) aufregen
how are things? — wie geht's [dir]?
as things stand [with me] — so wie die Dinge [bei mir] liegen
it's just one of those things — (coll.) so was kommt schon mal vor (ugs.)
8) (individual, creature) Ding, dasshe is in hospital, poor thing — sie ist im Krankenhaus, das arme Ding
you spiteful thing! — du [gemeines] Biest!
9) in pl. (personal belongings, outer clothing) Sachen10) in pl. (matters)an expert/authority on things historical — ein Fachmann/eine Autorität in geschichtlichen Fragen
11) (product of work) Sache, diedo one's own thing — (coll.) sich selbst verwirklichen
13) (coll.): (something remarkable)now there's a thing! — das ist ja ein Ding! (ugs.)
14)the thing — (what is proper or needed or important) das Richtige
blue jeans are the thing among teenagers — Bluejeans sind der Hit (ugs.) unter den Teenagern
but the thing is, will she come in fact? — aber die Frage ist, wird sie auch tatsächlich kommen?
* * *n.Ding -e n.Sache -n f. -
11 Cognitivism
Cognitivism in psychology and philosophy is roughly the position that intelligent behavior can (only) be explained by appeal to internal "cognitive processes." (Haugeland, 1981a, p. 243)Cognitive science is an interdisciplinary effort drawing on psychology and linguistics, and philosophy. Emboldened by an apparent convergence of interests, some scientists in these fields have chosen not to reject mental functions out of hand as the behaviorists did. Instead, they have relied on the concept of mental representations and on a set of assumptions collectively called the functionalist positions. From this viewpoint, people behave according to knowledge made up of symbolic mental representations. Cognition consists of the manipulation of these symbols. Psychological phenomena are described in terms of functional processes.The efficacy of such processes resides in the possibility of interpreting items as symbols in an abstract and well-defined way, according to a set of unequivocal rules. Such a set of rules constitutes what is known as a syntax.The exercise of these syntactical rules is a form of computation.... Computation is assumed to be largely independent of the structure and the mode of development of the nervous system, just as a piece of computer software can run on different machines with different architectures and is thus "independent" of them....This point of view-called cognitivism by some-has had a great vogue and has prompted a burst of psychological work of great interest and value. Accompanying it have been a set of remarkable ideas.... I cannot overemphasize the degree to which these ideas or their variants pervade modern science.... But I must also add that the cognitivist enterprise rests on a set of unexamined assumptions. One of its most curious deficiencies is that it makes only marginal reference to the biological foundations that underlie the mechanisms it purports to explain. The result is a scientific deviation as great as that of the behaviorism it has attempted to supplant. (Edelman, 1992, pp. 13-14)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Cognitivism
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12 force
1. n сила, мощь2. n сила, воздействие3. n авторитет, престижto be a force — быть силой, иметь вес, пользоваться большим влиянием
4. n действенность; действительностьin force — действующий, имеющий силу
to put in force — вводить в силу; делать действительным; проводить в жизнь, осуществлять
to remain in force — оставаться в силе; действовать
5. n насилие, принуждениеbrutal force — грубая сила, насилие
by force — силой, насильно
act of force — применение силы; насилие
6. n вооружённый отряд; соединение7. n полицияdetective force — сыскная, уголовная полиция
8. n войска; вооружённые силы9. n убедительность; смысл, резонthere is force in what you say — в том, что вы говорите, есть смысл
10. n смысл; значение11. n физ. усилие, силаforce of gravity — сила тяжести; земное притяжение
to join forces — объединить усилия, объединиться
12. v заставлять, принуждать, вынуждать13. v применять силу, брать силойto force an entry — ворваться, вломиться
sheet buckling force — сила, необходимая для выгибания листа
to yield to force — подчиниться силе, отступить перед силой
14. v взломать15. v насиловать16. v делать через силуto force a smile — принуждённо улыбнуться, выдавить улыбку
17. v чрезмерно напрягать; перенапрягатьСинонимический ряд:1. attraction (noun) attraction; charisma; magnetism2. battalion (noun) battalion; detachment; squadron; troop3. body (noun) body; corps; crew; group; team; unit4. effectiveness (noun) effect; effectiveness; efficacy; efficiency; operation; potential5. enforcement (noun) coercion; compulsion; constraint; duress; enforcement; violence6. impact (noun) impact; import; muscle; repercussion; significance; value; weight7. point (noun) cogency; point; punch; validity; validness8. potency (noun) potency; pressure; stress9. power (noun) animation; arm; beef; dint; dynamism; energy; forcefulness; impetus; intensity; might; muscle; power; puissance; sinew; sprightliness; steam; strength; strong arm; vigor; vigour; vim; virtue; vitality10. coerce (verb) coerce; compel; concuss; constrain; demand; elicit; enforce; extort; inflict; make; oblige; pressure; pry; require; shotgun11. drive (verb) drive; impel; propel; push; thrust12. rape (verb) defile; deflorate; deflower; outrage; overcome; overpower; rape; ravish; spoil; violateАнтонимический ряд:block; check; counteraction; debility; delay; feebleness; frailty; hamper; hinder; hold; impede; impotence; inability; incapability; persuade -
13 bias
1. сущ.1) общ. наклон, покатость2) общ. предрассудок, пристрастие, предубеждение, предвзятостьSee:3)а) общ. склонность, уклонHis work showed a discernible bias towards philosophy. — Его работа продемонстрировала заметную склонность к философии.
See:б) эк., амер. курс*, уклон* (определенное направление политики Федеральной резервной системы, предполагающее поддержание более высокого или более низкого уровня процентных ставок)A bias toward higher rates means the Federal Open Market Committee, the Fed's rate-setting committee, may raise the federal funds target rate at its next meeting. — Курс на более высокие ставки означает, что Федеральный комитет по операциям на открытом рынке (комитет ФРС, устанавливающий ставки) может поднять целевую ставку по федеральным фондам на своем следующем заседании.
The Fed maintains a tightening bias if it perceives inflation to be a risk to the overall health of the economy. Similarly, it could maintain a loosening bias if the greater risk is a slowdown in economic growth. If the Fed believes a proper balance is being maintained, its bias is said to be neutral. — Федеральная резервная система придерживается сдерживающегося курса, если она считает, что инфляция представляет опасность для общего благополучия экономики. Аналогично, она может придерживаться более свободного кредитного курса, если более существенной опасностью является спад экономического роста. Если федеральная резервная система полагает, что поддерживается надлежащий баланс, то ее курс называют "нейтральным".
See:4)а) общ. отклонение, смещение, сдвигSee:б) фин., бирж. ценовое отклонение, ценовой дрейф, смещение цены (изменение цены, которое выражается в разнице между ожидаемой стоимостью, согласно произведенной оценке, и действительной стоимостью, определенной иным путем; в практике технического анализа данным словом иногда определяется изменение мнения рынка)See:5) стат. погрешность (измерения), (систематическая) ошибка (снижение точности и надежности измерения за счет исходных допущений и/или ограничений используемого метода исследования)See:2. гл.общ. влиять, искажатьThe judge withheld the information on the grounds that it would bias the jury. — Судья не сообщил эту информацию, руководствуясь тем, что она может повлиять на присяжных.
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14 thing
[ɵɪŋ] nshe behaved like a mad \thing sie benahm sich wie eine Verrückte;you cannot be all \things to all men man kann es nicht allen recht machen2) ( possessions)\things pl Besitz m kein pl, Habe f kein pl, ( objects for special purpose) Sachen fpl, Zeug nt kein pl;I haven't got a \thing to wear ich habe nichts zum Anziehen;she put all his \things in suitcases and put them outside the door sie packte alle seine Sachen in Koffer und stellte diese vor die Tür;3) (unspecified idea, event) Sache f;this \thing called love das, was man so Liebe nennt;if there's one \thing I want to know it's this wenn es etwas gibt, das ich wissen will, dann ist es das;it was just one \thing after another da kam eben eins zum anderen;one \thing leads to another das Eine führt zum Andern;don't worry about a \thing! mach dir keine Sorgen!;learning to ride a bike was a difficult \thing for me to do ich habe lange gebraucht, bis ich Rad fahren konnte;I value my freedom above all \things meine Freiheit steht für mich an erster Stelle;if it's not one \thing, it's another ständig ist [et]was los;to be a \thing of the past der Vergangenheit angehören;in all \things in jeder Hinsicht, in [o bei] allem;the whole \thing das Ganzethe last \thing I want to do is hurt his feelings ich möchte auf keinen Fall seine Gefühle verletzen;that was a close \thing! das war knapp!;walking in stormy weather along a beach just does \things to me bei stürmischem Wetter am Strand spazieren zu gehen macht mir unheimlich Spaß;plenty of \things vieles;to do sth first/last \thing etw als Erstes/Letztes tun;I'll phone him first \thing tomorrow ich rufe ihn morgen gleich als Erstes an;to call sb last \thing at night jdn spät nachts noch anrufen;the real \thing das einzig Wahre;sure \thing! ( esp Am) na klar!;what a lovely \thing to say! wie nett, so etwas zu sagen!;I have a \thing or two on my mind mir geht so einiges durch den Kopf;and another \thing,... und noch [et]was,...;why don't you come with me? - for one \thing, I don't like flying, and for another, I can't afford it warum kommst du nicht mit? - einerseits fliege ich nicht gerne und außerdem kann ich es mir nicht leisten;to be able to tell sb a \thing or two jdm noch so einiges [o manches] erzählen können;to know a \thing or two eine ganze Menge wissen, sich akk gut auskennen7) ( social behaviour)the \thing das Richtige;it's the done \thing (a. iron) das gehört sich so [o gehört zum guten Ton];smoking during meals is not the done \thing es gehört sich nicht, während des Essens zu rauchen;8) ( the important point)the \thing about doing sth is... das Wichtigste bei etw dat ist...9) ( something non-existent)\things pl10) ( the situation)\things pl die Dinge, die Lage;\things ain't what they used to be ( fam) nichts ist mehr so wie es war;all \things considered alles in allem;as \things stand, the way \things are so wie die Dinge stehen11) ( confectionery)sweet \things Süßigkeiten plyou lucky \thing! du Glückliche(r) [o Glückspilz] !;she's a dear little \thing sie ist ein Schatz;lazy \thing Faulpelz m;the poor \thing ( fam) der/die Ärmste;( man) der arme Kerl;(young woman, child) das arme Ding;the poor \things die Ärmsten;stupid \thing Dummkopf m, Idiot mPHRASES:a \thing of beauty is a joy forever ( is a joy forever) etwas Schönes macht immer wieder Freude;there are more \things in heaven and earth [than are dreamt of in your philosophy] ( Brit) ( saying) es gibt mehr Dinge zwischen Himmel und Erde [als deine Schulweisheit sich träumen lässt];a little learning [or knowledge] is a dangerous \thing (is a dangerous \thing) zu wenig Wissen kann gefährlich werden;the best \things in life are free ( are free) die besten Dinge im Leben sind umsonst;to be just one of those \things ( be unavoidable) einfach unvermeidlich sein;( typical happening) typisch sein;this is just one of those \things da kann man halt nichts machen ( fam)to the pure all \things are pure (all \things are pure) dem Reinen ist alles rein;to be onto a good \thing ( fam) etwas Gutes auftun;you can have too much of a good \thing man kann es auch übertreiben;to do one's own \thing sich akk selbst verwirklichen;to have a [or this] \thing about sb (fam: dislike) jdn nicht ausstehen können ( fam) ( like very much) verrückt nach jdm sein ( fam)to make a [big] \thing out of sth aus etw dat eine große Sache machen, um etw akk viel Wirbel machen;these \things are sent to try us ( Brit) ( saying) das sind die Prüfungen, die uns das Schicksal auferlegt;to take \things easy nicht alles so schwer nehmen -
15 design
расчет, проектирование, проект, план, проектировать, конструкция, схема, эскиз, дизайн
– design constraints
– design cycle
– design database
– design decision
– design defect
– design development
– design diversity
– design drawing
– design engineer
– design error
– design fault
– design formula
– design lifetime
– design method
– design modularity
– design objective
– design parameters
– design phase
– design philosophy
– design power
– design presentation
– design review
– design rule check
– design rules
– design staff
– design standards
– design stress
– design study
– design technique
– design testing
– design trade-off
– design validation
– design value
– design verification
– design weight
– design-engineering
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16 moral
1. n мораль, поучение, нравоучениеa story with a moral — рассказ с моралью, нравоучительный рассказ
2. n нравы; нравственность; нравственный облик; правила, нормы нравственного поведенияbourgeois morals — нравы буржуазного общества, буржуазная мораль
a man of good morals — высоконравственный человек, человек высокой морали
3. a моральный, нравственный; этическийmoral environment — моральная атмосфера, моральный климат
moral suasion — увещевание, моральное воздействие
4. a нравственный; добродетельный5. a этичный, вежливый6. a духовный, моральный7. a внутренний, духовныйmoral courage — духовные силы, сила духа
moral virtues — внутренние качества, добродетели
8. a нравоучительный, наставительныйСинонимический ряд:1. chaste (adj.) chaste; pure2. didactic (adj.) didactic; moralizing; preachy; schoolmasterish; sermonic; sermonizing; teachy3. ethical (adj.) elevated; ethical; honest; honorable; meritorious; moralistic; noble; principled; proper; right; right-minded; scrupulous; truthful; virtuous4. good (adj.) blameless; conscientious; exemplary; good; righteous; upright; worthy5. adage (noun) adage; epigram; lesson; precept6. maxim (noun) aphorism; apothegm; axiom; brocard; dictum; gnome; maxim; rule; truismАнтонимический ряд:evil; immoral; unethical; vicious -
17 European Union
(EU)In 1978, Portugal began accession negotiations with the EU. In January 1986, along with Spain, Portugal joined that organization. Since joining the EU, Portugal's economy has received many benefits: loans, grants, technical assistance, and other economic, social, and educational advantages that are worth billions of dollars. Most of Portugal's trade is with EU members, and Portugal's economy is tied now to EU plans and planning, standards and rules, and philosophy. Starting in January 1993, by previous agreement, all EU tariff barriers for many goods (excluding agricultural goods until 1995-96, in Portugal's case) were removed, and there is concern in Portugal that many small and medium-sized businesses (which are the norm) will not survive the new competition from richer member state. Next to Greece, Portugal remains the poorest, least-developed EU member state, and there is anxiety in Lisbon that, following new pressures for the EU to give massive assistance to former Soviet bloc countries in Eastern Europe and to allow them in time to join the EU, Portugal will be at a disadvantage. Despite complaints about the bureaucracy inherent in the EU, many Portuguese value the connection and acknowledge that Portugal has benefited from EU technical assistance, networking, loans, and grants. In 1999, Portugal joined the European Monetary Union (EMU) and, in January 2000, adopted the euro. This has helped Portugal stabilize its currency and financial connections. In 2004, José Durão Barroso, a Portuguese politician, was elected President of the Commission of the European Union. -
18 Graham method
Метод, разработанный профессором финансов Колумбийского университета Бенджамином Грэхэмом в 1934 г. Он был уверен, что единственной последовательной инвестиционной стратегией может быть только стратегия формирования инвестиционного портфеля путем покупки акций, рыночные цены которых ниже их "внутренней" стоимости, что, в конце концов, будет признано и другими инвесторами. Метод часто называют философией инвестирования, ориентированной на стоимость (value-oriented investing philosophy) -
19 contingent
contingent [kən'tɪndʒənt](a) (dependent) contingent;∎ to be contingent on or upon sth dépendre de qch(b) (accidental) accidentel, fortuit(c) (uncertain) éventuel(d) Philosophy contingent2 noun(b) (representative group) groupe m représentatif►► Accountancy contingent liability passif m éventuel ou exigible;Stock Exchange contingent order ordre m conditionnel;Accountancy contingent profit profit m aléatoire;Stock Exchange contingent value right certificat m de valeur garantie -
20 Language
Philosophy is written in that great book, the universe, which is always open, right before our eyes. But one cannot understand this book without first learning to understand the language and to know the characters in which it is written. It is written in the language of mathematics, and the characters are triangles, circles, and other figures. Without these, one cannot understand a single word of it, and just wanders in a dark labyrinth. (Galileo, 1990, p. 232)It never happens that it [a nonhuman animal] arranges its speech in various ways in order to reply appropriately to everything that may be said in its presence, as even the lowest type of man can do. (Descartes, 1970a, p. 116)It is a very remarkable fact that there are none so depraved and stupid, without even excepting idiots, that they cannot arrange different words together, forming of them a statement by which they make known their thoughts; while, on the other hand, there is no other animal, however perfect and fortunately circumstanced it may be, which can do the same. (Descartes, 1967, p. 116)Human beings do not live in the object world alone, nor alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression for their society. It is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially without the use of language and that language is merely an incidental means of solving specific problems of communication or reflection. The fact of the matter is that the "real world" is to a large extent unconsciously built on the language habits of the group.... We see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do because the language habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation. (Sapir, 1921, p. 75)It powerfully conditions all our thinking about social problems and processes.... No two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the same social reality. The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same worlds with different labels attached. (Sapir, 1985, p. 162)[A list of language games, not meant to be exhaustive:]Giving orders, and obeying them- Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements- Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)Reporting an eventSpeculating about an eventForming and testing a hypothesisPresenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagramsMaking up a story; and reading itPlay actingSinging catchesGuessing riddlesMaking a joke; and telling itSolving a problem in practical arithmeticTranslating from one language into anotherLANGUAGE Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, and praying-. (Wittgenstein, 1953, Pt. I, No. 23, pp. 11 e-12 e)We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages.... The world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds-and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds.... No individual is free to describe nature with absolute impartiality but is constrained to certain modes of interpretation even while he thinks himself most free. (Whorf, 1956, pp. 153, 213-214)We dissect nature along the lines laid down by our native languages.The categories and types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do not find there because they stare every observer in the face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds-and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds.... We are thus introduced to a new principle of relativity, which holds that all observers are not led by the same physical evidence to the same picture of the universe, unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar or can in some way be calibrated. (Whorf, 1956, pp. 213-214)9) The Forms of a Person's Thoughts Are Controlled by Unperceived Patterns of His Own LanguageThe forms of a person's thoughts are controlled by inexorable laws of pattern of which he is unconscious. These patterns are the unperceived intricate systematizations of his own language-shown readily enough by a candid comparison and contrast with other languages, especially those of a different linguistic family. (Whorf, 1956, p. 252)It has come to be commonly held that many utterances which look like statements are either not intended at all, or only intended in part, to record or impart straightforward information about the facts.... Many traditional philosophical perplexities have arisen through a mistake-the mistake of taking as straightforward statements of fact utterances which are either (in interesting non-grammatical ways) nonsensical or else intended as something quite different. (Austin, 1962, pp. 2-3)In general, one might define a complex of semantic components connected by logical constants as a concept. The dictionary of a language is then a system of concepts in which a phonological form and certain syntactic and morphological characteristics are assigned to each concept. This system of concepts is structured by several types of relations. It is supplemented, furthermore, by redundancy or implicational rules..., representing general properties of the whole system of concepts.... At least a relevant part of these general rules is not bound to particular languages, but represents presumably universal structures of natural languages. They are not learned, but are rather a part of the human ability to acquire an arbitrary natural language. (Bierwisch, 1970, pp. 171-172)In studying the evolution of mind, we cannot guess to what extent there are physically possible alternatives to, say, transformational generative grammar, for an organism meeting certain other physical conditions characteristic of humans. Conceivably, there are none-or very few-in which case talk about evolution of the language capacity is beside the point. (Chomsky, 1972, p. 98)[It is] truth value rather than syntactic well-formedness that chiefly governs explicit verbal reinforcement by parents-which renders mildly paradoxical the fact that the usual product of such a training schedule is an adult whose speech is highly grammatical but not notably truthful. (R. O. Brown, 1973, p. 330)he conceptual base is responsible for formally representing the concepts underlying an utterance.... A given word in a language may or may not have one or more concepts underlying it.... On the sentential level, the utterances of a given language are encoded within a syntactic structure of that language. The basic construction of the sentential level is the sentence.The next highest level... is the conceptual level. We call the basic construction of this level the conceptualization. A conceptualization consists of concepts and certain relations among those concepts. We can consider that both levels exist at the same point in time and that for any unit on one level, some corresponding realizate exists on the other level. This realizate may be null or extremely complex.... Conceptualizations may relate to other conceptualizations by nesting or other specified relationships. (Schank, 1973, pp. 191-192)The mathematics of multi-dimensional interactive spaces and lattices, the projection of "computer behavior" on to possible models of cerebral functions, the theoretical and mechanical investigation of artificial intelligence, are producing a stream of sophisticated, often suggestive ideas.But it is, I believe, fair to say that nothing put forward until now in either theoretic design or mechanical mimicry comes even remotely in reach of the most rudimentary linguistic realities. (Steiner, 1975, p. 284)The step from the simple tool to the master tool, a tool to make tools (what we would now call a machine tool), seems to me indeed to parallel the final step to human language, which I call reconstitution. It expresses in a practical and social context the same understanding of hierarchy, and shows the same analysis by function as a basis for synthesis. (Bronowski, 1977, pp. 127-128)t is the language donn eґ in which we conduct our lives.... We have no other. And the danger is that formal linguistic models, in their loosely argued analogy with the axiomatic structure of the mathematical sciences, may block perception.... It is quite conceivable that, in language, continuous induction from simple, elemental units to more complex, realistic forms is not justified. The extent and formal "undecidability" of context-and every linguistic particle above the level of the phoneme is context-bound-may make it impossible, except in the most abstract, meta-linguistic sense, to pass from "pro-verbs," "kernals," or "deep deep structures" to actual speech. (Steiner, 1975, pp. 111-113)A higher-level formal language is an abstract machine. (Weizenbaum, 1976, p. 113)Jakobson sees metaphor and metonymy as the characteristic modes of binarily opposed polarities which between them underpin the two-fold process of selection and combination by which linguistic signs are formed.... Thus messages are constructed, as Saussure said, by a combination of a "horizontal" movement, which combines words together, and a "vertical" movement, which selects the particular words from the available inventory or "inner storehouse" of the language. The combinative (or syntagmatic) process manifests itself in contiguity (one word being placed next to another) and its mode is metonymic. The selective (or associative) process manifests itself in similarity (one word or concept being "like" another) and its mode is metaphoric. The "opposition" of metaphor and metonymy therefore may be said to represent in effect the essence of the total opposition between the synchronic mode of language (its immediate, coexistent, "vertical" relationships) and its diachronic mode (its sequential, successive, lineal progressive relationships). (Hawkes, 1977, pp. 77-78)It is striking that the layered structure that man has given to language constantly reappears in his analyses of nature. (Bronowski, 1977, p. 121)First, [an ideal intertheoretic reduction] provides us with a set of rules"correspondence rules" or "bridge laws," as the standard vernacular has it-which effect a mapping of the terms of the old theory (T o) onto a subset of the expressions of the new or reducing theory (T n). These rules guide the application of those selected expressions of T n in the following way: we are free to make singular applications of their correspondencerule doppelgangers in T o....Second, and equally important, a successful reduction ideally has the outcome that, under the term mapping effected by the correspondence rules, the central principles of T o (those of semantic and systematic importance) are mapped onto general sentences of T n that are theorems of Tn. (P. Churchland, 1979, p. 81)If non-linguistic factors must be included in grammar: beliefs, attitudes, etc. [this would] amount to a rejection of the initial idealization of language as an object of study. A priori such a move cannot be ruled out, but it must be empirically motivated. If it proves to be correct, I would conclude that language is a chaos that is not worth studying.... Note that the question is not whether beliefs or attitudes, and so on, play a role in linguistic behavior and linguistic judgments... [but rather] whether distinct cognitive structures can be identified, which interact in the real use of language and linguistic judgments, the grammatical system being one of these. (Chomsky, 1979, pp. 140, 152-153)23) Language Is Inevitably Influenced by Specific Contexts of Human InteractionLanguage cannot be studied in isolation from the investigation of "rationality." It cannot afford to neglect our everyday assumptions concerning the total behavior of a reasonable person.... An integrational linguistics must recognize that human beings inhabit a communicational space which is not neatly compartmentalized into language and nonlanguage.... It renounces in advance the possibility of setting up systems of forms and meanings which will "account for" a central core of linguistic behavior irrespective of the situation and communicational purposes involved. (Harris, 1981, p. 165)By innate [linguistic knowledge], Chomsky simply means "genetically programmed." He does not literally think that children are born with language in their heads ready to be spoken. He merely claims that a "blueprint is there, which is brought into use when the child reaches a certain point in her general development. With the help of this blueprint, she analyzes the language she hears around her more readily than she would if she were totally unprepared for the strange gabbling sounds which emerge from human mouths. (Aitchison, 1987, p. 31)Looking at ourselves from the computer viewpoint, we cannot avoid seeing that natural language is our most important "programming language." This means that a vast portion of our knowledge and activity is, for us, best communicated and understood in our natural language.... One could say that natural language was our first great original artifact and, since, as we increasingly realize, languages are machines, so natural language, with our brains to run it, was our primal invention of the universal computer. One could say this except for the sneaking suspicion that language isn't something we invented but something we became, not something we constructed but something in which we created, and recreated, ourselves. (Leiber, 1991, p. 8)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Language
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