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81 παρά
παρά (Hom.+. On elision s. B-D-F §17; Rob. 208) prep. w. three cases (Kühner-G. §440; Schwyzer II 491–98; B-D-F §236–38; Rob. 612–16. Further lit. s.v. ἀνά, beg.; also HRau, De praepositionis παρά usu: GCurtius, Studien etc. III 1870).A. W. gen., which nearly always as in Hom., Hdt., Pla., X. et al. denotes a pers., and indicates that someth. proceeds fr. this pers. (Hs 2:3 is an exception):① marker of extension from the side of, from (the side of) w. local sense preserved, used w. verbs of coming, going, sending, originating, going out, etc. (TestAbr A 2 p. 78, 30 [Stone p. 4] παρὰ τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως ἀπεστάλην; Lucian, Demon. 13 ἀπιὼν παρʼ αὐτοῦ) ἐκπορεύεσθαι J 15:26b. ἐξέρχεσθαι 16:27; 17:8; Lk 2:1; 6:19. ἔρχεσθαι 8:49. παραγίνεσθαι Mk 14:43. πέμπειν τινὰ παρά τινος J 15:26a. πνεύματος ἁγίου … παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀποσταλέντος εἰς αὐτήν (=Μαρίαν) AcPlCor 2:5. εἶναι παρά τινος be from someone (cp. Job 21:2, 9) J 6:46; 7:29; 9:16, 33; 17:7.② marker of one who originates or directs, from (Appian, Bell. Civ. 4, 100 §420 παρὰ τ. θεῶν; TestJob 38:8 παρὰ θεοῦ) παρὰ κυρίου ἐγένετο αὕτη this was the Lord’s doing Mt 21:42; Mk 12:11 (both Ps 117:23). W. a double negative: οὐκ ἀδυνατήσει παρὰ τ. θεοῦ πᾶν ῥῆμα (s. ἀδυνατέω) Lk 1:37. τὰ λελαλημένα αὐτῇ παρὰ κυρίου what was said to her (by the angel) at the Lord’s command vs. 45. ἀπεσταλμένος παρὰ θεοῦ John the Baptist was not, like Jesus, sent out fr. the very presence of God, but one whose coming was brought about by God J 1:6 (cp. 2 Macc 11:17). παρʼ ἑαυτῆς φέρει καρπὸν καὶ παρὰ τῆς πτελέας it (i.e. the vine) bears fruit which comes both from itself and from the elm Hs 2:3. On 2 Pt 2:11 s. κρίσις 1bβ.③ marker of the point fr. which an action originates, fromⓐ after verbsα. of asking, demanding αἰτεῖν and αἰτεῖσθαι (cp. X., An. 1, 3, 16, Hell. 3, 1, 4; SIG 785, 9f; PFay 121, 12ff; Tob 4:19 BA al.; LXX; TestAbr A 9 p. 87, 2 [Stone p. 22]; TestJob 20:2; ParJer 7:14; Jos., Ant. 15, 92) Mt 20:20 v.l. (for ἀπʼ αὐτοῦ); J 4:9; Ac 3:2; 9:2; Js 1:5; 1J 5:15 v.l. (for ἀπʼ αὐτοῦ); 1 Cl 36:4 (Ps 2:8); Hm 9:2, 4; Dg 1. ζητεῖν (Tob 4:18; Sir 7:4; cp. 1 Macc 7:13) Mk 8:11; Lk 11:16; 12:48.β. of taking, accepting, receiving λαμβάνειν (class.; Appian, Mithrid. 88 §397; SIG 546 B, 23 [III B.C.]; Jdth 12:15; Sus 55 Theod.; 1 Macc 8:8; 11:34; 4 Macc 12:11; TestJob 11:5; JosAs 24:11; Just., A I, 39, 5 al.) Mk 12:2; Lk 6:34; J 5:34, 41, 44; 10:18; Ac 2:33; 3:5; 17:9; 20:24; 26:10 (Jos., Ant. 14, 167 λαβὼν ἐξουσίαν παρά σου [= τ. ἀρχιερέως]; 11, 169); Js 1:7; 2 Pt 1:17; 2J 4; Rv 2:28; Hs 1:8; 8, 3, 5; GJs 20, 2 codices. ἀπολαμβάνειν (SIG 150, 19f [restored text; IV B.C.]; 4 Macc 18:23) Hv 5:7. παραλαμβάνειν (Hdt. et al.; oft. ins; POxy 504, 14 al. in pap) Gal 1:12; 1 Th 2:13; 4:1; 2 Th 3:6. δέχεσθαι (Thu. 1, 20, 1 et al.; 1 Macc 15:20; TestJob 11:12; cp. διαδέχεσθαι Ath. 37, 1) Ac 22:5; Phil 4:18a. κομίζεσθαι (SIG 244 I, 5ff [IV B.C.]; Gen 38:20; 2 Macc 7:11; Ath. 12, 1) Eph 6:8. εὑρεῖν (SIG 537, 69; 1099, 28; cp. εὑρίσκω 3, end) 2 Ti 1:18. ἔχειν τι παρά τινος have received someth. fr. someone (1 Esdr 6:5) Ac 9:14; cp. Hv 3, 9, 8. γίνεταί μοί τι παρά τινος I receive someth. from someone (Att.) Mt 18:19. ἔσται μεθʼ ἡμῶν χάρις … παρὰ θεοῦ πατρὸς καὶ παρὰ Ἰησοῦ 2J 3 (cp. X., An. 7, 2, 25). οἱ πιστευθέντες παρὰ θεοῦ ἔργον those who were entrusted by God with a task 1 Cl 43:1 (cp. Polyb. 3, 69, 1; SIG 1207, 12f). παρὰ τοῦ κυρίου πλουτίζεσθαι receive one’s wealth fr. the Lord Hs 2:10.—Sim. in the case of a purchase the seller is introduced by παρά: buy fr. someone ἀγοράζειν (s. ἀγοράζω 1, end) Rv 3:18. ὠνεῖσθαι Ac 7:16. ἄρτον φαγεῖν παρά τινος receive support from someone 2 Th 3:8.γ. of learning, coming to know, hearing, asking ἀκούειν (s. ἀκούω 1bβ and 3) J 1:40; 6:45; 7:51; 8:26, 40; 15:15; Ac 10:22; 28:22; 2 Ti 1:13; 2:2; AcPlCor 1:6; ἀκριβοῦν Mt 2:7, 16. ἐξακριβάζεσθαι Hm 4, 2, 3. ἐπιγινώσκειν Ac 24:8. μανθάνειν (since Aeschyl., Ag. 858; Jos., C. Ap. 2, 176; Sir 8:8f; 2 Macc 7:2 v.l.; 3 Macc 1:1; Just., A I, 23, 1 and D. 78, 1 al.; Ath. 7, 2; 22, 8) 2 Ti 3:14. πυνθάνεσθαι (Hdt. 3, 68; X., Cyr. 1, 6, 23; Pla., Rep. 5, 476e; SIG 1169, 30; 2 Ch 32:31) Mt 2:4; J 4:52 (without παρά v.l.); B 13:2 (Gen 25:22).ⓑ w. adjectival function ὁ, ἡ, τὸ παρά τινος made, given, etc., by someoneα. w. a noun (funct. as a gen.: Pla., Symp. 197e ὁ παρά τινος λόγος ‘the expression made by someone’; X., Hell. 3, 1, 6 δῶρον παρὰ βασιλέως, Mem. 2, 2, 12 ἡ παρά τινος εὔνοια, Cyr. 5, 5, 13 τὸ παρʼ ἐμοῦ ἀδίκημα ‘the crime committed by me’; Polyb. 3, 69, 3 ἡ παρʼ αὐτοῦ σωτηρία; Polyaenus 3, 9, 28 ἡ παρὰ στρατηγοῦ ἀρετή; SIG 543, 27; Ex 4:20; 14:13; Philo, Plant. 14; Jos., Ant. 12, 400; Just., A I, 32, 8 and D. 92, 1 al.; Ath. 7, 1) ἡ παρʼ ἐμοῦ διαθήκη Ro 11:27 (Is 59:21).—Ac 26:12 v.l.; 22 v.l.β. w. subst. functionא. τὰ παρά τινος what someone gives, someone’s gifts (X., Mem. 3, 11, 13; Jos., Bell. 2, 124, Ant. 8, 175; Tat. 32, 1 τὰ παρὰ θεοῦ) Lk 10:7; Phil 4:18b. τὰ παρʼ αὐτῆς her property, what she had Mk 5:26 (cp. IPriene 111, 177). τὰ παρὰ ζώσης καὶ μενούσης (the help that I received) from a living, contemporary voice Papias (2:4).ב. οἱ παρά τινος someone’s envoys (οἱ παρὰ βασιλέω πρέσβει X., Hell. 1, 3, 9; oft. in ins.: see, e.g., OGI 5, 50 from Ptolemy; the full expression οἱ παρʼ ὑμῶν πρεσβείς OGI 8 VI, 108–9; Schwyzer II 498; B-D-F §237, 2) οἱ παρὰ τοῦ βασιλέως (1 Macc 2:15; 1 Esdr 1:15) 1 Cl 12:4.—The Koine also uses this expr. to denote others who are intimately connected w. someone, e.g. family, relatives (PGrenf II, 36, 9 [II B.C.]; POxy 805 [I B.C.]; 298, 37 [I A.D.]; CPR I, 179, 16; 187, 7; Sb 5238, 19 [I A.D.]; Sus 33; 1 Macc 13:52; Jos., Ant. 1, 193. Further exx. fr. pap in Mlt. 106f; Rossberg [s. ἀνά, beg.] 52) Mk 3:21 (s. CBruston/PFarel: RTQR 18, 1909, 82–93; AWabnitz, ibid. 221–25; SMonteil, ibid. 19, 1910, 317–25; JMoulton, Mk 3:21: ET 20, 1909, 476; GHartmann, Mk 3:20f: BZ 11, 1913, 248–79; FZorell, Zu Mk 3:20, 21: ZKT 37, 1913, 695–7; JBelser, Zu Mk 3:20f: TQ 98, 1916, 401–18; Rdm.2 141; 227.—S. also at ἐξίστημι 2a).B. w. dat., the case that exhibits close association① marker of nearness in space, at/by (the side of), beside, near, with, acc. to the standpoint fr. which the relationship is viewedⓐ near, besideα. w. things (Synes., Ep. 126 p. 262a; Kaibel 703, 1; POxy 120, 23; 2 Km 10:8; 11:9; Jos., Ant. 1, 196) εἱστήκεισαν παρὰ τῷ σταυρῷ J 19:25. κεῖσθαι παρὰ τῷ πύργῳ Hv 3, 5, 5.ⓑ in (someone’s) house, city, company, etc. (Demetr.: 722 Fgm. 1, 5 al. παρὰ Λάβαν)α. house: ἀριστᾶν Lk 11:37. καταλύειν 19:7 (Pla., Gorg. 447b; Demosth. 18, 82). μένειν (JosAs 20:8; Jos., Ant. 1, 298; 299) J 1:39; Ac 9:43; 18:3; 21:8. ξενίζεσθαι 10:6; 21:16 (ξενίζω 1). So prob. also ἕκαστος παρʼ ἑαυτῷ each one at home 1 Cor 16:2 (cp. Philo, Cher. 48 παρʼ ἑαυτοῖς, Leg. ad Gai. 271). ὸ̔ν ἀπέλιπον ἐν Τρῳάδι παρὰ Κάρπῳ 2 Ti 4:13.β. city: Rv 2:13. So prob. also ἦσαν παρʼ ἡμῖν ἑπτὰ ἀδελφοί Mt 22:25.—J 4:40; Col 4:16 (where the congregation at Laodicea is contrasted w. the one at Col.).γ. other uses: παρὰ Ἰουδαίοις among Judeans Mt 28:15. παρʼ αὐτοῖς ἐπιμεῖναι remain with them Ac 28:14; cp. 21:7. οἱ παρʼ ὑμῖν πρεσβύτεροι the elders among you 1 Cl 1:3.—παρὰ τῷ πατρί with (of spatial proximity) the Father Mt 6:1; J 8:38a; cp. 17:5 (Synes., Kingship 29 p. 31d: philosophy has her abode παρὰ τῷ θεῷ and if the world refuses to receive her when she descends to earth, μένει παρὰ τῷ πατρί). Of Jesus: παρʼ ὑμῖν μένων while I was with you (on earth) J 14:25. Of the Spirit: παρʼ ὑμῖν μένει vs. 17. Of the Father and Son in their relation to the faithful Christian: μονὴν παρʼ αὐτῷ ποιησόμεθα we will take up our abode with him vs. 23.δ. fig. παρά τινι before someone’s judgment seat (Demosth. 18, 13 εἰς κρίσιν καθιστάναι παρά τινι; Appian, Maced. 11 §8 παρʼ ὑμῖν ἐς κρίσιν) 2 Pt 2:11 v.l. Closely related is② marker of one whose viewpoint is relevant, in the sight or judgment of someone (Soph., Hdt.; PSI 435, 19 [258 B.C.] παρὰ τῷ βασιλεῖ) παρὰ τῷ θεῷ: δίκαιος παρὰ τῷ θεῷ righteous in the sight of God Ro 2:13 (cp. Job 9:2; Jos., Ant. 6, 205; Ath. 31, 2 εὐδοξοῦμεν … παρὰ τῷ θεῷ).—Cp. 1 Cor 3:19; Gal 3:11; 2 Th 1:6; Js 1:27; 1 Pt 2:4; 2 Pt 3:8. θυσία δεκτὴ παρὰ τῷ θεῷ Hs 5, 3, 8. ἔνδοξος παρὰ τῷ θεῷ m 2:6; Hs 5, 3, 3; 8, 10, 1; 9, 27, 3; 9, 28, 3; 9, 29, 3.—9, 7, 6.—Acc. to the judgment of humans (Jos., Ant. 7, 84; Just., A I, 20, 3) 8, 9, 1. τί ἄπιστον κρίνεται παρʼ ὑμῖν; Ac 26:8. ἵνα μὴ ἦτε παρʼ ἑαυτοῖς φρόνιμοι Ro 11:25; cp. 12:16 (s. Pr 3:7 μὴ ἴσθι φρόνιμος παρὰ σεαυτῷ).—‘In the judgment’ passes over into a simpler with (PsSol 9:5 παρὰ κυρίῳ; Jos. Himerius, Or. 8 [=23], 10 παρὰ θεοῖς=with the gods) εὑρεῖν χάριν παρά τινι find favor with someone (Ex 33:16; cp. Num 11:15) Lk 1:30; Hs 5, 2, 10. τοῦτο χάρις παρὰ θεῷ 1 Pt 2:20. χάριν ἔχειν (Ex 33:12) m 5, 1, 5. προέκοπτεν ἐν τῇ χάριτι παρὰ θεῷ καὶ ἀνθρώποις Lk 2:52. τί ταπεινοφροσύνη παρὰ θεῷ ἰσχύει, τί ἀγάπη ἁγνὴ παρά θεῷ δύναται how strong humility is before God, what pure love before God can do 1 Cl 21:8.③ marker of personal reference, at the side of, with almost equivalent to the dat. as such (Ps 75:13): δυνατόν or ἀδύνατον παρά τινι possible or impossible for someone (Gen 18:14; Just., A I, 33, 2; Ath., R. 9 p. 58, 6) Mt 19:26ab; Mk 10:27abc; Lk 1:37 v.l.; 18:27ab; 1 Cl 27:2.—AFridrichsen, SymbOsl 14, ’35, 44–46. Closely related in mng. is④ marker of connection of a quality or characteristic w. a pers., with (οὐκ) ἔστιν τι παρά τινι someth. is (not) with or in someone, someone has someth. (nothing) to do w. someth. (Demosth. 18, 277 εἰ ἔστι καὶ παρʼ ἐμοί τις ἐμπειρία; Gen 24:25; Job 12:13; Ps 129:4 παρὰ σοι ὁ ἱλασμός ἐστιν; Just., D. 82, 1 παρὰ … ἡμῖν … χαρίσματα) οὐκ ἔστιν προσωπολημψία παρὰ τ. θεῷ Ro 2:11 (TestJob 43, 13). Cp. 9:14; Eph 6:9; Js 1:17. Sim. Mt 8:10; 2 Cor 1:17.⑤ marker of a relationship w. a narrow focus, among, before παρʼ ἑαυτοῖς among themselves (Philo, Cher. 48) διαλογίζεσθαι Mt 21:25 v.l. (cp. Demosth. 10, 17 γιγνώσκειν παρʼ αὑτῷ; Epict., Ench. 48, 2).—In ἐν τούτῳ μενέτω παρὰ θεῷ 1 Cor 7:24, the mng. of παρὰ θεῷ is not certain: let the pers. remain in that position (the same one in which he was when called to salvation) before God; it is prob. meant to remind Christians of the One before whom they cannot even have the appearance of inferiority (ins: Mitt-Wilck, I/2, 4, 4 [13 B.C.] παρὰ τῷ κυρίῳ Ἑρμῇ=‘before, in the sight of’; Sb 7616 [II A.D.] τὸ προσκύνημά σου ποιῶ παρὰ τῷ κυρίῳ Σαράπι=‘before the Lord’ S.; 7661, 3 [c. 100 A.D.]; 7932, 7992, 6 [letter II/III A.D.]). Or perh. it simply means that no matter what the situation may be, one is to be focused on God.C. w. acc. of pers. or thing① marker of a position viewed as extended (w. no difference whether παρά answers the question ‘where?’ or ‘whither?’ See B-D-F §236, 1; Rob. 615).ⓐ by, along περιπατεῖν παρὰ τὴν θάλασσαν (Pla., Gorg. 511e. Cp. SIG 1182; Jos., Ant. 2, 81) Mt 4:18; cp. Mk 1:16.α. παρὰ (τὴν) θάλασσαν by the sea (or lake) , at the shore Mt 13:1; Mk 4:1; 5:21; Ac 10:6, 32; cp. Lk 5:1, 2. παρὰ τὴν ὁδόν by the side of the road (X., An. 1, 2, 13; Plut., Lysander 450 [29, 4] a tomb παρὰ τ. ὁδόν=beside the road) Mt 20:30; Mk 10:46; Lk 18:35 (but on the road is also poss. in these three places; s. d below).β. παρὰ τὴν θάλασσαν to (the side of) the sea (lake) Mt 15:29; Mk 2:13. παρὰ ποταμόν to the river Ac 16:13.ⓒ gener. near, at παρὰ τοὺς πόδας τινός at someone’s feet (sit, fall, place etc.; TestAbr A 17 p. 98, 16 [Stone p. 44]) Mt 15:30; Lk 7:38; 8:35, 41; 10:39 v.l.; 17:16; Ac 4:35, 37 v.l.; 5:2; 7:58; 22:3 (s. ET 30, 1919, 39f). παρὰ τὸν πὺργον beside the tower Hs 9, 4, 8; 9, 6, 5; 8; 9, 7, 1; 9, 11, 6.—παρὰ τὴν ἰτέαν 8, 1, 2 (cp. TestAbr A 6 p. 83, 10 [Stone p. 14] παρὰ τὴν δρῦν τὴν Μαμβρῆ).ⓓ on παρὰ τὴν ὁδόν on the road (w. motion implied; Aesop, Fab. 226 P.=420 H.: πεσὼν παρὰ τὴν ὁδόν; Phot., Bibl. 94 p. 74b on Iambl. Erot. [Hercher I p. 222, 22] πίπτουσι παρὰ τὴν ὁδόν) Mt 13:4, 19; Mk 4:4; Lk 8:5; on the road (w. no motion implied; Theophr., HP 6, 6, 10: the crocus likes to be trodden under foot, διὸ καὶ παρὰ τὰς ὁδοὺς κάλλιστος; Phot. p. 222, 29 H. [s. above]) Mk 4:15; Lk 8:12. Perh. also Mt 20:30; Mk 10:46; Lk 18:35 (s. bα above).—παρὰ τὸ χεῖλος τῆς θαλάσσης on the seashore Hb 11:12 (TestAbr A 1 p. 78, 1 [Stone p. 4]; ApcEsdr 3:10; ApcSed 8:9).② marker of extension in time, during, from … to (Lucian, Catapl. 24 παρὰ τ. βίον=during his life; POxy 472, 10; TestAbr A 20 p. 102, 26 [Stone p. 52] παρὰ μίαν ὥραν; Tat. 14, 2 παρʼ ὸ̔ν ἔζων χρόνον) παρʼ ἐνιαυτόν from year to year (Plut., Cleom. 15, 1; cp. ἐνιαυτός 1) B 10:7.③ marker of comparative advantage, in comparison to, more than, beyond ἁμαρτωλοί, ὀφειλέται π. πάντας Lk 13:2, 4 (PSI 317, 6 [95 A.D.] παρὰ πάντας; Jos., C. Ap. 2, 234 παρὰ τ. ἄλλους ἅπαντας; JosAs 10:6 παρὰ πάσας τὰς παρθένους; Just., A I, 20, 3 παρὰ πάντας ἀδίκως μισούμεθα). κρίνειν ἡμέραν παρʼ ἡμέραν (s. κρίνω 1) Ro 14:5. π. πᾶσαν τὴν γῆν B 11:9 (prophetic quot. of unknown orig.). π. πάντα τὰ πνεύματα more than all other spirits Hm 10, 1, 2. ἐλαττοῦν τινα π. τινα make someone inferior to someone Hb 2:7, 9 (s. ἐλαττόω 1 and cp. PGrenf I, 42, 12 [II B.C.] ἐλαττουμένων ἡμῶν παρὰ τοὺς δεῖνα). εἶδος ἐκλεῖπον π. τὸ εἶδος τῶν ἀνθρώπων (s. ἐκλείπω 4) 1 Cl 16:3.—After a comp. (Thu. 1, 23, 3; ApcEsdr 1:22; Tat. 2, 2) Lk 3:13; Hb 1:4; 3:3; 9:23; 11:4; 12:24; B 4:5 (cp. Da 7:7); Hv 3, 12, 1; Hs 9, 18, 2.—When a comparison is made, one member of it may receive so little attention as to pass fr. consideration entirely, so that ‘more than’ becomes instead of, rather than, to the exclusion of (Plut., Mor. 984c; PsSol 9:9; EpArist 134; Just., A I, 22, 2) λατρεύειν τῇ κτίσει παρὰ τὸν κτίσαντα serve the creation rather than the Creator Ro 1:25 (cp. EpArist 139: the Jews worship τὸν μόνον θεὸν παρʼ ὅλην τὴν κτίσιν). δεδικαιωμένος παρʼ ἐκεῖνον justified rather than the other Lk 18:14. ἔχρισέν σε … παρὰ τοὺς μετόχους (God) has anointed you and not your comrades Hb 1:9 (Ps 44:8). ὑπερφρονεῖν παρʼ ὸ̔ δεῖ φρονεῖν Ro 12:3 (Plut., Mor. 83f παρʼ ὸ̔ δεῖ). παρὰ καιρὸν ἡλικίας Hb 11:11 (Plut., Rom. 25, 6 παρʼ ἡλικίαν; cp. ἡλικία 2a).—παρὰ δύναμιν beyond their means (s. δύναμις 2) 2 Cor 8:3.—After ἄλλος (Pla., Lach. 178b, Leg. 3, 693b; X., Hell. 1, 5, 5; Demosth. 18, 235) another than 1 Cor 3:11.④ marker of degree that falls slightly short in comparison, except for, almost παρὰ μικρόν except for a little, almost (s. μικρός 1eγ) Hs 8, 1, 14. Likew. παρά τι (cp. Vett. Val. 228, 6) Lk 5:7 D; Hs 9, 19, 3.⑤ marker of causality, because of (cp. Pind., O. 2, 65 κενεὰν παρὰ δίαιταν ‘in the interest of’ or ‘for the sake of a scanty livelihood’, the scantiness here contrasting with the immense labor involved; Demosth. 4, 11; 9, 2; PRyl 243, 6; POxy 1420, 7) παρὰ τό w. acc. foll. because (SIG 495, 130; UPZ 7, 13 [163 B.C.] παρὰ τὸ Ἕλληνά με εἶναι.—Mayser II/1, 1926, 331; Gen 29:20; Ex 14:11) 1 Cl 39:5f (Job 4:20f). π. τοῦτο because of this (Kühner-G. I 513, 3; Synes., Ep. 44 p. 185a; 57 p. 192d) ITr 5:2; IRo 5:1 (quot. fr. 1 Cor 4:4, where Paul has ἐν τούτῳ). οὐ παρὰ τοῦτο οὐ (double neg. as a strengthened affirmative) not for that reason any the less 1 Cor 12:15f.⑥ marker of that which does not correspond to what is expected, against, contrary to (Hom., Alc. et al.; ins, pap, LXX; Just., Tat., Ath.—Schwyzer II 497) π. τὴν διδαχήν Ro 16:17. παρʼ ἐλπίδα against hope (s. ἐλπίς 1a) in wordplay w. ἐπʼ ἐλπίδι 4:18. παρὰ φύσιν (Thu. 6, 17, 1; Pla., Rep. 5, 466d; Tat. 22, 2; Ath. 26, 2, R. 6 p. 54, 13) 1:26; 11:24. παρὰ τὸν νόμον (Just., A II, 2, 4; Ath. 1, 3; cp. X., Mem. 1, 1, 18 παρὰ τοὺς νόμους; PMagd 16, 5 [222 B.C.] παρὰ τοὺς νόμους; Jos., C. Ap. 2, 233; Just., A I, 68, 10) Ac 18:13. παρʼ ὅ contrary to that which Gal 1:8f (Just., A I, 43, 8).⑦ marker of something that is less, less (Hdt. 9, 33; Plut., Caesar 722 [30, 5]; Jos., Ant. 4, 176; POxy 264, 4 [I A.D.]) τεσσεράκοντα παρὰ μίαν forty less one=thirty-nine (i.e. lashes) 2 Cor 11:24 (cp. Makkoth 3, 10 [tr. HDanby, The Mishnah ’33, 407]).—On παρʼ αὐτά ITr 11:1 s. παραυτά.—DELG. M-M. TW. -
82 Language
Philosophy is written in that great book, the universe, which is always open, right before our eyes. But one cannot understand this book without first learning to understand the language and to know the characters in which it is written. It is written in the language of mathematics, and the characters are triangles, circles, and other figures. Without these, one cannot understand a single word of it, and just wanders in a dark labyrinth. (Galileo, 1990, p. 232)It never happens that it [a nonhuman animal] arranges its speech in various ways in order to reply appropriately to everything that may be said in its presence, as even the lowest type of man can do. (Descartes, 1970a, p. 116)It is a very remarkable fact that there are none so depraved and stupid, without even excepting idiots, that they cannot arrange different words together, forming of them a statement by which they make known their thoughts; while, on the other hand, there is no other animal, however perfect and fortunately circumstanced it may be, which can do the same. (Descartes, 1967, p. 116)Human beings do not live in the object world alone, nor alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression for their society. It is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially without the use of language and that language is merely an incidental means of solving specific problems of communication or reflection. The fact of the matter is that the "real world" is to a large extent unconsciously built on the language habits of the group.... We see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do because the language habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation. (Sapir, 1921, p. 75)It powerfully conditions all our thinking about social problems and processes.... No two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the same social reality. The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same worlds with different labels attached. (Sapir, 1985, p. 162)[A list of language games, not meant to be exhaustive:]Giving orders, and obeying them- Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements- Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)Reporting an eventSpeculating about an eventForming and testing a hypothesisPresenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagramsMaking up a story; and reading itPlay actingSinging catchesGuessing riddlesMaking a joke; and telling itSolving a problem in practical arithmeticTranslating from one language into anotherLANGUAGE Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, and praying-. (Wittgenstein, 1953, Pt. I, No. 23, pp. 11 e-12 e)We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages.... The world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds-and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds.... No individual is free to describe nature with absolute impartiality but is constrained to certain modes of interpretation even while he thinks himself most free. (Whorf, 1956, pp. 153, 213-214)We dissect nature along the lines laid down by our native languages.The categories and types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do not find there because they stare every observer in the face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds-and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds.... We are thus introduced to a new principle of relativity, which holds that all observers are not led by the same physical evidence to the same picture of the universe, unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar or can in some way be calibrated. (Whorf, 1956, pp. 213-214)9) The Forms of a Person's Thoughts Are Controlled by Unperceived Patterns of His Own LanguageThe forms of a person's thoughts are controlled by inexorable laws of pattern of which he is unconscious. These patterns are the unperceived intricate systematizations of his own language-shown readily enough by a candid comparison and contrast with other languages, especially those of a different linguistic family. (Whorf, 1956, p. 252)It has come to be commonly held that many utterances which look like statements are either not intended at all, or only intended in part, to record or impart straightforward information about the facts.... Many traditional philosophical perplexities have arisen through a mistake-the mistake of taking as straightforward statements of fact utterances which are either (in interesting non-grammatical ways) nonsensical or else intended as something quite different. (Austin, 1962, pp. 2-3)In general, one might define a complex of semantic components connected by logical constants as a concept. The dictionary of a language is then a system of concepts in which a phonological form and certain syntactic and morphological characteristics are assigned to each concept. This system of concepts is structured by several types of relations. It is supplemented, furthermore, by redundancy or implicational rules..., representing general properties of the whole system of concepts.... At least a relevant part of these general rules is not bound to particular languages, but represents presumably universal structures of natural languages. They are not learned, but are rather a part of the human ability to acquire an arbitrary natural language. (Bierwisch, 1970, pp. 171-172)In studying the evolution of mind, we cannot guess to what extent there are physically possible alternatives to, say, transformational generative grammar, for an organism meeting certain other physical conditions characteristic of humans. Conceivably, there are none-or very few-in which case talk about evolution of the language capacity is beside the point. (Chomsky, 1972, p. 98)[It is] truth value rather than syntactic well-formedness that chiefly governs explicit verbal reinforcement by parents-which renders mildly paradoxical the fact that the usual product of such a training schedule is an adult whose speech is highly grammatical but not notably truthful. (R. O. Brown, 1973, p. 330)he conceptual base is responsible for formally representing the concepts underlying an utterance.... A given word in a language may or may not have one or more concepts underlying it.... On the sentential level, the utterances of a given language are encoded within a syntactic structure of that language. The basic construction of the sentential level is the sentence.The next highest level... is the conceptual level. We call the basic construction of this level the conceptualization. A conceptualization consists of concepts and certain relations among those concepts. We can consider that both levels exist at the same point in time and that for any unit on one level, some corresponding realizate exists on the other level. This realizate may be null or extremely complex.... Conceptualizations may relate to other conceptualizations by nesting or other specified relationships. (Schank, 1973, pp. 191-192)The mathematics of multi-dimensional interactive spaces and lattices, the projection of "computer behavior" on to possible models of cerebral functions, the theoretical and mechanical investigation of artificial intelligence, are producing a stream of sophisticated, often suggestive ideas.But it is, I believe, fair to say that nothing put forward until now in either theoretic design or mechanical mimicry comes even remotely in reach of the most rudimentary linguistic realities. (Steiner, 1975, p. 284)The step from the simple tool to the master tool, a tool to make tools (what we would now call a machine tool), seems to me indeed to parallel the final step to human language, which I call reconstitution. It expresses in a practical and social context the same understanding of hierarchy, and shows the same analysis by function as a basis for synthesis. (Bronowski, 1977, pp. 127-128)t is the language donn eґ in which we conduct our lives.... We have no other. And the danger is that formal linguistic models, in their loosely argued analogy with the axiomatic structure of the mathematical sciences, may block perception.... It is quite conceivable that, in language, continuous induction from simple, elemental units to more complex, realistic forms is not justified. The extent and formal "undecidability" of context-and every linguistic particle above the level of the phoneme is context-bound-may make it impossible, except in the most abstract, meta-linguistic sense, to pass from "pro-verbs," "kernals," or "deep deep structures" to actual speech. (Steiner, 1975, pp. 111-113)A higher-level formal language is an abstract machine. (Weizenbaum, 1976, p. 113)Jakobson sees metaphor and metonymy as the characteristic modes of binarily opposed polarities which between them underpin the two-fold process of selection and combination by which linguistic signs are formed.... Thus messages are constructed, as Saussure said, by a combination of a "horizontal" movement, which combines words together, and a "vertical" movement, which selects the particular words from the available inventory or "inner storehouse" of the language. The combinative (or syntagmatic) process manifests itself in contiguity (one word being placed next to another) and its mode is metonymic. The selective (or associative) process manifests itself in similarity (one word or concept being "like" another) and its mode is metaphoric. The "opposition" of metaphor and metonymy therefore may be said to represent in effect the essence of the total opposition between the synchronic mode of language (its immediate, coexistent, "vertical" relationships) and its diachronic mode (its sequential, successive, lineal progressive relationships). (Hawkes, 1977, pp. 77-78)It is striking that the layered structure that man has given to language constantly reappears in his analyses of nature. (Bronowski, 1977, p. 121)First, [an ideal intertheoretic reduction] provides us with a set of rules"correspondence rules" or "bridge laws," as the standard vernacular has it-which effect a mapping of the terms of the old theory (T o) onto a subset of the expressions of the new or reducing theory (T n). These rules guide the application of those selected expressions of T n in the following way: we are free to make singular applications of their correspondencerule doppelgangers in T o....Second, and equally important, a successful reduction ideally has the outcome that, under the term mapping effected by the correspondence rules, the central principles of T o (those of semantic and systematic importance) are mapped onto general sentences of T n that are theorems of Tn. (P. Churchland, 1979, p. 81)If non-linguistic factors must be included in grammar: beliefs, attitudes, etc. [this would] amount to a rejection of the initial idealization of language as an object of study. A priori such a move cannot be ruled out, but it must be empirically motivated. If it proves to be correct, I would conclude that language is a chaos that is not worth studying.... Note that the question is not whether beliefs or attitudes, and so on, play a role in linguistic behavior and linguistic judgments... [but rather] whether distinct cognitive structures can be identified, which interact in the real use of language and linguistic judgments, the grammatical system being one of these. (Chomsky, 1979, pp. 140, 152-153)23) Language Is Inevitably Influenced by Specific Contexts of Human InteractionLanguage cannot be studied in isolation from the investigation of "rationality." It cannot afford to neglect our everyday assumptions concerning the total behavior of a reasonable person.... An integrational linguistics must recognize that human beings inhabit a communicational space which is not neatly compartmentalized into language and nonlanguage.... It renounces in advance the possibility of setting up systems of forms and meanings which will "account for" a central core of linguistic behavior irrespective of the situation and communicational purposes involved. (Harris, 1981, p. 165)By innate [linguistic knowledge], Chomsky simply means "genetically programmed." He does not literally think that children are born with language in their heads ready to be spoken. He merely claims that a "blueprint is there, which is brought into use when the child reaches a certain point in her general development. With the help of this blueprint, she analyzes the language she hears around her more readily than she would if she were totally unprepared for the strange gabbling sounds which emerge from human mouths. (Aitchison, 1987, p. 31)Looking at ourselves from the computer viewpoint, we cannot avoid seeing that natural language is our most important "programming language." This means that a vast portion of our knowledge and activity is, for us, best communicated and understood in our natural language.... One could say that natural language was our first great original artifact and, since, as we increasingly realize, languages are machines, so natural language, with our brains to run it, was our primal invention of the universal computer. One could say this except for the sneaking suspicion that language isn't something we invented but something we became, not something we constructed but something in which we created, and recreated, ourselves. (Leiber, 1991, p. 8)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Language
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Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Bibliography
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