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pure+science

  • 81 ciencia pura

    f.
    pure science.

    Spanish-English dictionary > ciencia pura

  • 82 feed back

    1. phr v возвращать к источнику

    feed cistern — питающий бак; бак питательной воды

    2. phr v возвращаться к источнику

    a lot of ideas are feeding back from the applied sciences into the pure science — многие идеи из прикладных наук снова переходят в чистую науку

    3. phr v проявлять реакцию

    teachers complain that nothing is feeding back to them from the classroom — учителя жалуются, что ученики никак не реагируют

    English-Russian base dictionary > feed back

  • 83 toegepaste/zuivere wetenschap

    toegepaste/zuivere wetenschap
    applied/pure science

    Van Dale Handwoordenboek Nederlands-Engels > toegepaste/zuivere wetenschap

  • 84 oppose

    oppose [ə'pəʊz]
    (a) (decision, plan, bill etc) s'opposer à, être hostile à; (verbally) parler contre;
    ∎ the family opposed their marriage la famille s'opposa à leur mariage;
    ∎ the construction of the power station was opposed by local people la construction de la centrale s'est heurtée à l'hostilité de la population locale;
    ∎ 40 percent of voters are strongly opposed to the plan 40 pour cent des votants sont farouchement opposés au projet
    (b) (in contest, fight) s'opposer à; (combat) combattre
    (c) (contrast) opposer;
    ∎ the social sciences are often opposed to pure science on oppose souvent les sciences humaines aux sciences pures

    Un panorama unique de l'anglais et du français > oppose

  • 85 pur

    -pure
    I adj.
    1. toza, sof, boshqa narsa aralashtirilmagan; du vin pur sof vino; de l'or à l'état pur sof holdagi oltin; fig. à l'état pur haqiqiy, g‘irt; le plaisir pur haqiqiy rohat; loc.adj. confiture pur fruit sof mevadan qilingan murabbo; tissu pur laine sof jundan qilingan gazmol; cheval pur-sang zotdor ot
    2. toza, pokiza, bulg‘anmagan, ifloslantirilmagan, ichimli, beg‘ubor; eau pure toza, ichimli suv
    3. sof, asl; science pure sof nazariy fan
    4. butunlay, to‘la, haqiqiy, g‘irt; ton ami est un pur imbécile sening o‘rtog‘ing g‘irt ahmoq; loc.adv. en pure perte bekorga, befoyda, behuda; pur et simple shartsiz, so‘zsiz, jo‘n, sodda
    5. sof, toza, pok, beg‘ubor; un coeur pur sof qalb; ses intentions étaient pures uning niyatlari toza edi; il était pur de tout soupçon u harqanday shubhadan yiroqda edi
    6. bokira, pokiza; une jeune fille pure bokira qiz
    7. mutanosib, kelishgan
    II n. dindor, e'tiqodli odam.

    Dictionnaire Français-Ouzbek > pur

  • 86 ciencia

    f.
    1 science.
    a ciencia cierta for certain
    no se conoce a ciencia cierta el número de víctimas the number of victims isn't known for certain
    ciencias naturales natural sciences
    ciencias ocultas occultism
    ciencias políticas political science
    ciencias sociales social sciences
    2 learning, knowledge.
    * * *
    1 (disciplina) science
    2 (saber) knowledge, learning
    \
    saber algo a ciencia cierta figurado to know something for certain
    ser un pozo de ciencia to be a well of knowledge
    ciencia ficción science fiction
    ciencia infusa intuition
    ciencias empresariales business studies
    ciencias exactas mathematics sing
    ciencias naturales natural sciences
    ciencias ocultas the occult sing
    * * *
    noun f.
    * * *
    SF
    1) (=conocimiento) science

    no tener mucha ciencia —

    ciencia infusa, lo sabe por ciencia infusa — iró he has God-given intelligence

    2) (=doctrina) science, sciences pl

    ciencias sociales — social science, social sciences pl

    3) pl ciencias (Educ) science sing, sciences
    * * *
    a) ( rama del saber) science; (saber, conocimiento) knowledge, learning

    a ciencia cierta — for sure, for certain

    b) ciencias femenino plural (Educ) science
    * * *
    = scholarship, science.
    Ex. The most important of the functions of librarians is the collection, preservation and affording access to the materials of scholarship.
    Ex. Thus we all agree that one component of a building is a roof (and not vice versa!), and that chemistry is a branch of science.
    ----
    * academia de las ciencias = academy of sciences.
    * a ciencia cierta = for sure, for certain.
    * alfabetización en ciencias de la salud = health literacy.
    * árbol de la ciencia, el = tree of knowledge, the.
    * biblioteca de ciencias = science library.
    * biblioteca de ciencias de la salud = health sciences library, health library.
    * Biblioteca Nacional de Préstamo para la Ciencia y la Tecnología (NLL) = National Lending Library for Science and Technology (NLL).
    * bibliotecario de ciencias de la salud = health librarian.
    * bibliotecario de las ciencias de la salud = health sciences librarian.
    * centro de las ciencias = science centre.
    * ciencia aplicada = applied science.
    * Ciencia Cristiana, la = Christian Science.
    * ciencia de la comunicación = communication science.
    * ciencia de las zonas polares = polar science.
    * ciencia del conocimiento = cognitive science.
    * ciencia del libro = bookmanship.
    * ciencia de los alimentos = food science.
    * ciencia del suelo = soil science.
    * ciencia experimental = hard sciences, the.
    * ciencia ficción = science fiction, sci-fi.
    * ciencia forense = forensic science.
    * ciencia médica = medical science.
    * ciencia militar = military science.
    * ciencia mundial = world science.
    * ciencias agrícolas = agricultural economics.
    * ciencias biológicas = biological sciences.
    * ciencias biomédicas = biomedical sciences.
    * ciencias de la atmósfera = atmospheric sciences.
    * ciencias de la computación = computer science, computational science.
    * ciencias de la computación y tecnología informática = computer science and technology.
    * ciencias de la construcción = building sciences.
    * ciencias de la documentación = information science, library science.
    * ciencias de la educación = educational science.
    * ciencias de la navegación = nautical science.
    * ciencias de la salud = health sciences.
    * ciencias de las plantas = plant science(s).
    * ciencias de la tierra = geosciences.
    * ciencias de la tierra, las = earth sciences, the.
    * ciencias de la vida = biosciences.
    * ciencias de la vida, las = life sciences, the.
    * ciencias del comportamiento = behavioural sciences.
    * ciencias del espacio, las = space science(s), the.
    * ciencias del mar = aquatic sciences.
    * ciencias del mar, las = ocean sciences, the.
    * ciencias de los materiales = materials sciences.
    * ciencias domésticas = domestic science.
    * ciencias duras, las = hard sciences, the.
    * ciencias exactas, las = exact sciences, the, hard sciences, the.
    * ciencias físicas = physical science.
    * ciencias forestales = forestry.
    * ciencias históricas = historical sciences.
    * ciencias humanas = human science.
    * ciencias naturales = natural sciences.
    * ciencias navales = ship science.
    * ciencias planetarias, las = planetary sciences, the.
    * ciencias políticas = political science.
    * ciencias puras = pure sciences.
    * ciencias sobre la vida en el espacio = space life sciences.
    * ciencias sociales = social sciences, soft sciences, the, social studies.
    * ciencia virtual = e-science.
    * ciencia y tecnología = sci-tech [scitech o sci/tech].
    * Ciencia y Tecnología (C + T) = S & T (Science and Technology).
    * ciencia y tecnología de los alimentos = food science and technology.
    * ciencia y tecnología de los materiales = materials science and technology.
    * científico de las ciencias de la tierra = geoscientist.
    * conocer a ciencia cierta = know for + certain, know for + sure, know for + a fact.
    * delegación de educación y ciencia = local education authority (LEA).
    * enseñanza de las ciencias = science education.
    * especialista en ciencias de la tierra = earth scientist.
    * estudiante de ciencias de la educación = education student, student teacher.
    * facultad de ciencias de la educación = teachers college, teacher training college.
    * filosofía de la ciencia = philosophy of science.
    * Fundación Nacional para las Ciencias (NSF) = National Science Foundation (NSF).
    * humanidades y ciencias sociales = arts and social sciences.
    * Indice de Citas de Ciencia (SCI) = Science Citation Index (SCI).
    * Indice de Citas de las Ciencias Sociales (SSCI) = Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI).
    * investigación en ciencias de la documentación = information science research.
    * Licenciatura de Ciencias = M.Sc. (Master of Science).
    * Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia = Department of Education and Science.
    * mundo de la ciencia, el = world of science, the, scientific world, the.
    * museo de ciencias naturales = natural science museum.
    * museo de las ciencias = science museum.
    * no es una ciencia exacta = not (exactly) rocket science.
    * novela de ciencia ficción = science fiction novel.
    * relacionado con las ciencias = science-related.
    * revista de ciencia y tecnología = science and technology journal.
    * saber a ciencia cierta = know for + certain, know for + sure, know for + a fact.
    * saber a ciencia cierta que = know + for a fact that.
    * ser una ciencia exacta = be an exact science.
    * sistema de la ciencia, el = system of science, the.
    * tecnología de la información para ciencias de la salud = health informatics.
    * * *
    a) ( rama del saber) science; (saber, conocimiento) knowledge, learning

    a ciencia cierta — for sure, for certain

    b) ciencias femenino plural (Educ) science
    * * *
    = scholarship, science.

    Ex: The most important of the functions of librarians is the collection, preservation and affording access to the materials of scholarship.

    Ex: Thus we all agree that one component of a building is a roof (and not vice versa!), and that chemistry is a branch of science.
    * academia de las ciencias = academy of sciences.
    * a ciencia cierta = for sure, for certain.
    * alfabetización en ciencias de la salud = health literacy.
    * árbol de la ciencia, el = tree of knowledge, the.
    * biblioteca de ciencias = science library.
    * biblioteca de ciencias de la salud = health sciences library, health library.
    * Biblioteca Nacional de Préstamo para la Ciencia y la Tecnología (NLL) = National Lending Library for Science and Technology (NLL).
    * bibliotecario de ciencias de la salud = health librarian.
    * bibliotecario de las ciencias de la salud = health sciences librarian.
    * centro de las ciencias = science centre.
    * ciencia aplicada = applied science.
    * Ciencia Cristiana, la = Christian Science.
    * ciencia de la comunicación = communication science.
    * ciencia de las zonas polares = polar science.
    * ciencia del conocimiento = cognitive science.
    * ciencia del libro = bookmanship.
    * ciencia de los alimentos = food science.
    * ciencia del suelo = soil science.
    * ciencia experimental = hard sciences, the.
    * ciencia ficción = science fiction, sci-fi.
    * ciencia forense = forensic science.
    * ciencia médica = medical science.
    * ciencia militar = military science.
    * ciencia mundial = world science.
    * ciencias = science and technology.
    * ciencias agrícolas = agricultural economics.
    * ciencias biológicas = biological sciences.
    * ciencias biomédicas = biomedical sciences.
    * ciencias de la atmósfera = atmospheric sciences.
    * ciencias de la computación = computer science, computational science.
    * ciencias de la computación y tecnología informática = computer science and technology.
    * ciencias de la construcción = building sciences.
    * ciencias de la documentación = information science, library science.
    * ciencias de la educación = educational science.
    * ciencias de la navegación = nautical science.
    * ciencias de la salud = health sciences.
    * ciencias de las plantas = plant science(s).
    * ciencias de la tierra = geosciences.
    * ciencias de la tierra, las = earth sciences, the.
    * ciencias de la vida = biosciences.
    * ciencias de la vida, las = life sciences, the.
    * ciencias del comportamiento = behavioural sciences.
    * ciencias del espacio, las = space science(s), the.
    * ciencias del mar = aquatic sciences.
    * ciencias del mar, las = ocean sciences, the.
    * ciencias de los materiales = materials sciences.
    * ciencias domésticas = domestic science.
    * ciencias duras, las = hard sciences, the.
    * ciencias exactas, las = exact sciences, the, hard sciences, the.
    * ciencias físicas = physical science.
    * ciencias forestales = forestry.
    * ciencias históricas = historical sciences.
    * ciencias humanas = human science.
    * ciencias naturales = natural sciences.
    * ciencias navales = ship science.
    * ciencias planetarias, las = planetary sciences, the.
    * ciencias políticas = political science.
    * ciencias puras = pure sciences.
    * ciencias sobre la vida en el espacio = space life sciences.
    * ciencias sociales = social sciences, soft sciences, the, social studies.
    * ciencia virtual = e-science.
    * ciencia y tecnología = sci-tech [scitech o sci/tech].
    * Ciencia y Tecnología (C + T) = S & T (Science and Technology).
    * ciencia y tecnología de los alimentos = food science and technology.
    * ciencia y tecnología de los materiales = materials science and technology.
    * científico de las ciencias de la tierra = geoscientist.
    * conocer a ciencia cierta = know for + certain, know for + sure, know for + a fact.
    * delegación de educación y ciencia = local education authority (LEA).
    * enseñanza de las ciencias = science education.
    * especialista en ciencias de la tierra = earth scientist.
    * estudiante de ciencias de la educación = education student, student teacher.
    * facultad de ciencias de la educación = teachers college, teacher training college.
    * filosofía de la ciencia = philosophy of science.
    * Fundación Nacional para las Ciencias (NSF) = National Science Foundation (NSF).
    * humanidades y ciencias sociales = arts and social sciences.
    * Indice de Citas de Ciencia (SCI) = Science Citation Index (SCI).
    * Indice de Citas de las Ciencias Sociales (SSCI) = Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI).
    * investigación en ciencias de la documentación = information science research.
    * Licenciatura de Ciencias = M.Sc. (Master of Science).
    * Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia = Department of Education and Science.
    * mundo de la ciencia, el = world of science, the, scientific world, the.
    * museo de ciencias naturales = natural science museum.
    * museo de las ciencias = science museum.
    * no es una ciencia exacta = not (exactly) rocket science.
    * novela de ciencia ficción = science fiction novel.
    * relacionado con las ciencias = science-related.
    * revista de ciencia y tecnología = science and technology journal.
    * saber a ciencia cierta = know for + certain, know for + sure, know for + a fact.
    * saber a ciencia cierta que = know + for a fact that.
    * ser una ciencia exacta = be an exact science.
    * sistema de la ciencia, el = system of science, the.
    * tecnología de la información para ciencias de la salud = health informatics.

    * * *
    1 (rama del saber) science; (saber, conocimiento) knowledge, learning
    los adelantos de la ciencia scientific advances, the advances of science
    a ciencia cierta for sure, for certain
    no tiene ninguna ciencia there's nothing difficult o complicated about it
    2 ciencias fpl ( Educ) science
    Compuestos:
    soil science
    space science
    science fiction
    tiene la ciencia infusa ( iró); he has God-given intelligence ( iro)
    fpl Education
    fpl Media Studies
    fpl Business Studies
    fpl exact sciences
    fpl natural science(s)
    fpl occultism
    fpl Political Science, Politics
    * * *

     

    ciencia sustantivo femenino

    (saber, conocimiento) knowledge, learning;

    a ciencia cierta for sure, for certain
    b)

    ◊ ciencias sustantivo femenino plural (Educ) science;

    Cciencias Empresariales/de la Información Business/Media Studies;
    Cciencias Políticas/de la Educación Politics/Education
    ciencia sustantivo femenino
    1 science
    2 frml (conocimiento) knowledge: descorchar un botella no tiene mucha ciencia, there is no mystery about uncorking a bottle
    3 ciencia ficción, science fiction
    irón ciencia infusa, divine inspiration
    ciencias ocultas, the occult sing
    ♦ Locuciones: a ciencia cierta, for certain: lo sé a ciencia cierta, I'm absolutely sure o I know it for certain
    ' ciencia' also found in these entries:
    Spanish:
    divulgación
    - estadística
    - interés
    - jurisprudencia
    - mecánica
    - óptica
    - ortopedia
    - padre
    - ramo
    - reino
    - toponimia
    - acústica
    - adelanto
    - aeronáutica
    - avanzar
    - contabilidad
    - dedicar
    - economía
    - evolucionar
    - ramificarse
    - triunfo
    - veterinaria
    English:
    advancement
    - area
    - branch
    - certain
    - data processing
    - economics
    - electronic
    - forestry
    - medicine
    - sci-fi
    - science
    - science fiction
    - statistics
    - surgery
    - social
    - wishful thinking
    * * *
    ♦ nf
    1. [método, estudio] science;
    la ciencia ya no puede hacer nada para salvar al enfermo science is unable to do anything more to help the patient;
    la astronomía es la ciencia que estudia los cuerpos celestes astronomy is the science in which heavenly bodies are studied
    ciencias aplicadas applied sciences;
    ciencias biológicas life sciences;
    ciencia del conocimiento cognitive science;
    ciencias económicas economics [singular];
    ciencias empresariales business studies;
    ciencias exactas mathematics [singular];
    ciencia ficción science fiction;
    ciencias físicas physical sciences;
    ciencias naturales natural sciences;
    ciencias ocultas occultism;
    ciencias políticas political science;
    ciencias de la salud medical sciences;
    ciencias sociales social sciences;
    ciencias de la Tierra earth sciences
    2. [sabiduría] learning, knowledge;
    Fam
    tener poca ciencia to be straightforward;
    la cocina tiene poca ciencia, pero requiere mucho sentido común cooking doesn't require a lot of skill, but you do need to use common sense;
    Hum
    por ciencia infusa through divine inspiration
    3. Educ
    ciencias science;
    soy de ciencias I studied science
    ciencias mixtas = secondary school course comprising mainly science subjects but including some arts subjects;
    ciencias puras = secondary school course comprising science subjects only
    ♦ a ciencia cierta loc adv
    for certain;
    no se conoce a ciencia cierta el número de víctimas the number of victims isn't known for certain
    * * *
    f
    1 science;
    a ciencia cierta for certain, for sure;
    ser un pozo de ciencia fam be a fount of knowledge
    2
    :
    ciencias pl EDU science sg ;
    ciencias (naturales) natural sciences
    * * *
    1) : science
    2) : learning, knowledge
    3)
    a ciencia cierta : for a fact, for certain
    * * *
    ciencia n science

    Spanish-English dictionary > ciencia

  • 87 Knowledge

       It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and, in a word, all sensible objects, have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But, with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it into question may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. For, what are the forementioned objects but things we perceive by sense? and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations? and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived? (Berkeley, 1996, Pt. I, No. 4, p. 25)
       It seems to me that the only objects of the abstract sciences or of demonstration are quantity and number, and that all attempts to extend this more perfect species of knowledge beyond these bounds are mere sophistry and illusion. As the component parts of quantity and number are entirely similar, their relations become intricate and involved; and nothing can be more curious, as well as useful, than to trace, by a variety of mediums, their equality or inequality, through their different appearances.
       But as all other ideas are clearly distinct and different from each other, we can never advance farther, by our utmost scrutiny, than to observe this diversity, and, by an obvious reflection, pronounce one thing not to be another. Or if there be any difficulty in these decisions, it proceeds entirely from the undeterminate meaning of words, which is corrected by juster definitions. That the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the squares of the other two sides cannot be known, let the terms be ever so exactly defined, without a train of reasoning and enquiry. But to convince us of this proposition, that where there is no property, there can be no injustice, it is only necessary to define the terms, and explain injustice to be a violation of property. This proposition is, indeed, nothing but a more imperfect definition. It is the same case with all those pretended syllogistical reasonings, which may be found in every other branch of learning, except the sciences of quantity and number; and these may safely, I think, be pronounced the only proper objects of knowledge and demonstration. (Hume, 1975, Sec. 12, Pt. 3, pp. 163-165)
       Our knowledge springs from two fundamental sources of the mind; the first is the capacity of receiving representations (the ability to receive impressions), the second is the power to know an object through these representations (spontaneity in the production of concepts).
       Through the first, an object is given to us; through the second, the object is thought in relation to that representation.... Intuition and concepts constitute, therefore, the elements of all our knowledge, so that neither concepts without intuition in some way corresponding to them, nor intuition without concepts, can yield knowledge. Both may be either pure or empirical.... Pure intuitions or pure concepts are possible only a priori; empirical intuitions and empirical concepts only a posteriori. If the receptivity of our mind, its power of receiving representations in so far as it is in any way affected, is to be called "sensibility," then the mind's power of producing representations from itself, the spontaneity of knowledge, should be called "understanding." Our nature is so constituted that our intuitions can never be other than sensible; that is, it contains only the mode in which we are affected by objects. The faculty, on the other hand, which enables us to think the object of sensible intuition is the understanding.... Without sensibility, no object would be given to us; without understanding, no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind. It is therefore just as necessary to make our concepts sensible, that is, to add the object to them in intuition, as to make our intuitions intelligible, that is to bring them under concepts. These two powers or capacities cannot exchange their functions. The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through their union can knowledge arise. (Kant, 1933, Sec. 1, Pt. 2, B74-75 [p. 92])
       Metaphysics, as a natural disposition of Reason is real, but it is also, in itself, dialectical and deceptive.... Hence to attempt to draw our principles from it, and in their employment to follow this natural but none the less fallacious illusion can never produce science, but only an empty dialectical art, in which one school may indeed outdo the other, but none can ever attain a justifiable and lasting success. In order that, as a science, it may lay claim not merely to deceptive persuasion, but to insight and conviction, a Critique of Reason must exhibit in a complete system the whole stock of conceptions a priori, arranged according to their different sources-the Sensibility, the understanding, and the Reason; it must present a complete table of these conceptions, together with their analysis and all that can be deduced from them, but more especially the possibility of synthetic knowledge a priori by means of their deduction, the principles of its use, and finally, its boundaries....
       This much is certain: he who has once tried criticism will be sickened for ever of all the dogmatic trash he was compelled to content himself with before, because his Reason, requiring something, could find nothing better for its occupation. Criticism stands to the ordinary school metaphysics exactly in the same relation as chemistry to alchemy, or as astron omy to fortune-telling astrology. I guarantee that no one who has comprehended and thought out the conclusions of criticism, even in these Prolegomena, will ever return to the old sophistical pseudo-science. He will rather look forward with a kind of pleasure to a metaphysics, certainly now within his power, which requires no more preparatory discoveries, and which alone can procure for reason permanent satisfaction. (Kant, 1891, pp. 115-116)
       Knowledge is only real and can only be set forth fully in the form of science, in the form of system. Further, a so-called fundamental proposition or first principle of philosophy, even if it is true, it is yet none the less false, just because and in so far as it is merely a fundamental proposition, merely a first principle. It is for that reason easily refuted. The refutation consists in bringing out its defective character; and it is defective because it is merely the universal, merely a principle, the beginning. If the refutation is complete and thorough, it is derived and developed from the nature of the principle itself, and not accomplished by bringing in from elsewhere other counter-assurances and chance fancies. It would be strictly the development of the principle, and thus the completion of its deficiency, were it not that it misunderstands its own purport by taking account solely of the negative aspect of what it seeks to do, and is not conscious of the positive character of its process and result. The really positive working out of the beginning is at the same time just as much the very reverse: it is a negative attitude towards the principle we start from. Negative, that is to say, in its one-sided form, which consists in being primarily immediate, a mere purpose. It may therefore be regarded as a refutation of what constitutes the basis of the system; but more correctly it should be looked at as a demonstration that the basis or principle of the system is in point of fact merely its beginning. (Hegel, 1910, pp. 21-22)
       Knowledge, action, and evaluation are essentially connected. The primary and pervasive significance of knowledge lies in its guidance of action: knowing is for the sake of doing. And action, obviously, is rooted in evaluation. For a being which did not assign comparative values, deliberate action would be pointless; and for one which did not know, it would be impossible. Conversely, only an active being could have knowledge, and only such a being could assign values to anything beyond his own feelings. A creature which did not enter into the process of reality to alter in some part the future content of it, could apprehend a world only in the sense of intuitive or esthetic contemplation; and such contemplation would not possess the significance of knowledge but only that of enjoying and suffering. (Lewis, 1946, p. 1)
       "Evolutionary epistemology" is a branch of scholarship that applies the evolutionary perspective to an understanding of how knowledge develops. Knowledge always involves getting information. The most primitive way of acquiring it is through the sense of touch: amoebas and other simple organisms know what happens around them only if they can feel it with their "skins." The knowledge such an organism can have is strictly about what is in its immediate vicinity. After a huge jump in evolution, organisms learned to find out what was going on at a distance from them, without having to actually feel the environment. This jump involved the development of sense organs for processing information that was farther away. For a long time, the most important sources of knowledge were the nose, the eyes, and the ears. The next big advance occurred when organisms developed memory. Now information no longer needed to be present at all, and the animal could recall events and outcomes that happened in the past. Each one of these steps in the evolution of knowledge added important survival advantages to the species that was equipped to use it.
       Then, with the appearance in evolution of humans, an entirely new way of acquiring information developed. Up to this point, the processing of information was entirely intrasomatic.... But when speech appeared (and even more powerfully with the invention of writing), information processing became extrasomatic. After that point knowledge did not have to be stored in the genes, or in the memory traces of the brain; it could be passed on from one person to another through words, or it could be written down and stored on a permanent substance like stone, paper, or silicon chips-in any case, outside the fragile and impermanent nervous system. (Csikszentmihalyi, 1993, pp. 56-57)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Knowledge

  • 88 tonterías

    intj.
    nonsense, hooey, rats, rot.
    f.pl.
    1 nonsense, bunk, baloney, boloney.
    2 stupidity, stupid thing.
    * * *
    (n.) = drivel, nonsense, baloney, blather, piffle, palaver, moonshine, claptrap, buncombe, bunkum, bunk, hogwash
    Ex. The article 'In defense of 'ignorant drivel'' criticises the reforms in scholarly serials publication proposed by John Lubans.
    Ex. Since 'added entry' maps to 'access point' and 'main entry' maps to 'access point', some curious, but harmless non-sense results.
    Ex. The author characterises the strategic plan as baloney carefully crafted to conceal the real problem.
    Ex. The article 'Information science: blather and piffle?' points out that the term 'Information science' is used in a variety of ways often to mean quite different things.
    Ex. The article 'Information science: blather and piffle?' points out that the term 'Information science' is used in a variety of ways often to mean quite different things.
    Ex. To speak the argot, one of the main rules is called 'police palaver' -- never use a short word where a long one will do.
    Ex. He describes as 'pure moonshine' the account that Columbus supposedly failed to persuade professors of mathematics, geography, and astronomy that the world was round.
    Ex. Such antediluvian claptrap has every appearance of using a presumed hurt to military effectiveness as a shield for prejudice.
    Ex. The word ' buncombe,' often misspelled as 'bunkum,' soon came to refer to any sort of spurious or questionable statement.
    Ex. The word 'buncombe,' often misspelled as ' bunkum,' soon came to refer to any sort of spurious or questionable statement.
    Ex. Henry Ford is often quoted as saying 'History is bunk'.
    Ex. The film proves beyond a shadow of a doubt that the official story is hogwash and that all the evidence points towards an inside job.
    * * *
    (n.) = drivel, nonsense, baloney, blather, piffle, palaver, moonshine, claptrap, buncombe, bunkum, bunk, hogwash

    Ex: The article 'In defense of 'ignorant drivel'' criticises the reforms in scholarly serials publication proposed by John Lubans.

    Ex: Since 'added entry' maps to 'access point' and 'main entry' maps to 'access point', some curious, but harmless non-sense results.
    Ex: The author characterises the strategic plan as baloney carefully crafted to conceal the real problem.
    Ex: The article 'Information science: blather and piffle?' points out that the term 'Information science' is used in a variety of ways often to mean quite different things.
    Ex: The article 'Information science: blather and piffle?' points out that the term 'Information science' is used in a variety of ways often to mean quite different things.
    Ex: To speak the argot, one of the main rules is called 'police palaver' -- never use a short word where a long one will do.
    Ex: He describes as 'pure moonshine' the account that Columbus supposedly failed to persuade professors of mathematics, geography, and astronomy that the world was round.
    Ex: Such antediluvian claptrap has every appearance of using a presumed hurt to military effectiveness as a shield for prejudice.
    Ex: The word ' buncombe,' often misspelled as 'bunkum,' soon came to refer to any sort of spurious or questionable statement.
    Ex: The word 'buncombe,' often misspelled as ' bunkum,' soon came to refer to any sort of spurious or questionable statement.
    Ex: Henry Ford is often quoted as saying 'History is bunk'.
    Ex: The film proves beyond a shadow of a doubt that the official story is hogwash and that all the evidence points towards an inside job.

    * * *
    tonterías npl nonsense

    Spanish-English dictionary > tonterías

  • 89 Artificial Intelligence

       In my opinion, none of [these programs] does even remote justice to the complexity of human mental processes. Unlike men, "artificially intelligent" programs tend to be single minded, undistractable, and unemotional. (Neisser, 1967, p. 9)
       Future progress in [artificial intelligence] will depend on the development of both practical and theoretical knowledge.... As regards theoretical knowledge, some have sought a unified theory of artificial intelligence. My view is that artificial intelligence is (or soon will be) an engineering discipline since its primary goal is to build things. (Nilsson, 1971, pp. vii-viii)
       Most workers in AI [artificial intelligence] research and in related fields confess to a pronounced feeling of disappointment in what has been achieved in the last 25 years. Workers entered the field around 1950, and even around 1960, with high hopes that are very far from being realized in 1972. In no part of the field have the discoveries made so far produced the major impact that was then promised.... In the meantime, claims and predictions regarding the potential results of AI research had been publicized which went even farther than the expectations of the majority of workers in the field, whose embarrassments have been added to by the lamentable failure of such inflated predictions....
       When able and respected scientists write in letters to the present author that AI, the major goal of computing science, represents "another step in the general process of evolution"; that possibilities in the 1980s include an all-purpose intelligence on a human-scale knowledge base; that awe-inspiring possibilities suggest themselves based on machine intelligence exceeding human intelligence by the year 2000 [one has the right to be skeptical]. (Lighthill, 1972, p. 17)
       4) Just as Astronomy Succeeded Astrology, the Discovery of Intellectual Processes in Machines Should Lead to a Science, Eventually
       Just as astronomy succeeded astrology, following Kepler's discovery of planetary regularities, the discoveries of these many principles in empirical explorations on intellectual processes in machines should lead to a science, eventually. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)
       Many problems arise in experiments on machine intelligence because things obvious to any person are not represented in any program. One can pull with a string, but one cannot push with one.... Simple facts like these caused serious problems when Charniak attempted to extend Bobrow's "Student" program to more realistic applications, and they have not been faced up to until now. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 77)
       What do we mean by [a symbolic] "description"? We do not mean to suggest that our descriptions must be made of strings of ordinary language words (although they might be). The simplest kind of description is a structure in which some features of a situation are represented by single ("primitive") symbols, and relations between those features are represented by other symbols-or by other features of the way the description is put together. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)
       [AI is] the use of computer programs and programming techniques to cast light on the principles of intelligence in general and human thought in particular. (Boden, 1977, p. 5)
       The word you look for and hardly ever see in the early AI literature is the word knowledge. They didn't believe you have to know anything, you could always rework it all.... In fact 1967 is the turning point in my mind when there was enough feeling that the old ideas of general principles had to go.... I came up with an argument for what I called the primacy of expertise, and at the time I called the other guys the generalists. (Moses, quoted in McCorduck, 1979, pp. 228-229)
       9) Artificial Intelligence Is Psychology in a Particularly Pure and Abstract Form
       The basic idea of cognitive science is that intelligent beings are semantic engines-in other words, automatic formal systems with interpretations under which they consistently make sense. We can now see why this includes psychology and artificial intelligence on a more or less equal footing: people and intelligent computers (if and when there are any) turn out to be merely different manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon. Moreover, with universal hardware, any semantic engine can in principle be formally imitated by a computer if only the right program can be found. And that will guarantee semantic imitation as well, since (given the appropriate formal behavior) the semantics is "taking care of itself" anyway. Thus we also see why, from this perspective, artificial intelligence can be regarded as psychology in a particularly pure and abstract form. The same fundamental structures are under investigation, but in AI, all the relevant parameters are under direct experimental control (in the programming), without any messy physiology or ethics to get in the way. (Haugeland, 1981b, p. 31)
       There are many different kinds of reasoning one might imagine:
        Formal reasoning involves the syntactic manipulation of data structures to deduce new ones following prespecified rules of inference. Mathematical logic is the archetypical formal representation. Procedural reasoning uses simulation to answer questions and solve problems. When we use a program to answer What is the sum of 3 and 4? it uses, or "runs," a procedural model of arithmetic. Reasoning by analogy seems to be a very natural mode of thought for humans but, so far, difficult to accomplish in AI programs. The idea is that when you ask the question Can robins fly? the system might reason that "robins are like sparrows, and I know that sparrows can fly, so robins probably can fly."
        Generalization and abstraction are also natural reasoning process for humans that are difficult to pin down well enough to implement in a program. If one knows that Robins have wings, that Sparrows have wings, and that Blue jays have wings, eventually one will believe that All birds have wings. This capability may be at the core of most human learning, but it has not yet become a useful technique in AI.... Meta- level reasoning is demonstrated by the way one answers the question What is Paul Newman's telephone number? You might reason that "if I knew Paul Newman's number, I would know that I knew it, because it is a notable fact." This involves using "knowledge about what you know," in particular, about the extent of your knowledge and about the importance of certain facts. Recent research in psychology and AI indicates that meta-level reasoning may play a central role in human cognitive processing. (Barr & Feigenbaum, 1981, pp. 146-147)
       Suffice it to say that programs already exist that can do things-or, at the very least, appear to be beginning to do things-which ill-informed critics have asserted a priori to be impossible. Examples include: perceiving in a holistic as opposed to an atomistic way; using language creatively; translating sensibly from one language to another by way of a language-neutral semantic representation; planning acts in a broad and sketchy fashion, the details being decided only in execution; distinguishing between different species of emotional reaction according to the psychological context of the subject. (Boden, 1981, p. 33)
       Can the synthesis of Man and Machine ever be stable, or will the purely organic component become such a hindrance that it has to be discarded? If this eventually happens-and I have... good reasons for thinking that it must-we have nothing to regret and certainly nothing to fear. (Clarke, 1984, p. 243)
       The thesis of GOFAI... is not that the processes underlying intelligence can be described symbolically... but that they are symbolic. (Haugeland, 1985, p. 113)
        14) Artificial Intelligence Provides a Useful Approach to Psychological and Psychiatric Theory Formation
       It is all very well formulating psychological and psychiatric theories verbally but, when using natural language (even technical jargon), it is difficult to recognise when a theory is complete; oversights are all too easily made, gaps too readily left. This is a point which is generally recognised to be true and it is for precisely this reason that the behavioural sciences attempt to follow the natural sciences in using "classical" mathematics as a more rigorous descriptive language. However, it is an unfortunate fact that, with a few notable exceptions, there has been a marked lack of success in this application. It is my belief that a different approach-a different mathematics-is needed, and that AI provides just this approach. (Hand, quoted in Hand, 1985, pp. 6-7)
       We might distinguish among four kinds of AI.
       Research of this kind involves building and programming computers to perform tasks which, to paraphrase Marvin Minsky, would require intelligence if they were done by us. Researchers in nonpsychological AI make no claims whatsoever about the psychological realism of their programs or the devices they build, that is, about whether or not computers perform tasks as humans do.
       Research here is guided by the view that the computer is a useful tool in the study of mind. In particular, we can write computer programs or build devices that simulate alleged psychological processes in humans and then test our predictions about how the alleged processes work. We can weave these programs and devices together with other programs and devices that simulate different alleged mental processes and thereby test the degree to which the AI system as a whole simulates human mentality. According to weak psychological AI, working with computer models is a way of refining and testing hypotheses about processes that are allegedly realized in human minds.
    ... According to this view, our minds are computers and therefore can be duplicated by other computers. Sherry Turkle writes that the "real ambition is of mythic proportions, making a general purpose intelligence, a mind." (Turkle, 1984, p. 240) The authors of a major text announce that "the ultimate goal of AI research is to build a person or, more humbly, an animal." (Charniak & McDermott, 1985, p. 7)
       Research in this field, like strong psychological AI, takes seriously the functionalist view that mentality can be realized in many different types of physical devices. Suprapsychological AI, however, accuses strong psychological AI of being chauvinisticof being only interested in human intelligence! Suprapsychological AI claims to be interested in all the conceivable ways intelligence can be realized. (Flanagan, 1991, pp. 241-242)
        16) Determination of Relevance of Rules in Particular Contexts
       Even if the [rules] were stored in a context-free form the computer still couldn't use them. To do that the computer requires rules enabling it to draw on just those [ rules] which are relevant in each particular context. Determination of relevance will have to be based on further facts and rules, but the question will again arise as to which facts and rules are relevant for making each particular determination. One could always invoke further facts and rules to answer this question, but of course these must be only the relevant ones. And so it goes. It seems that AI workers will never be able to get started here unless they can settle the problem of relevance beforehand by cataloguing types of context and listing just those facts which are relevant in each. (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p. 80)
       Perhaps the single most important idea to artificial intelligence is that there is no fundamental difference between form and content, that meaning can be captured in a set of symbols such as a semantic net. (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)
        18) The Assumption That the Mind Is a Formal System
       Artificial intelligence is based on the assumption that the mind can be described as some kind of formal system manipulating symbols that stand for things in the world. Thus it doesn't matter what the brain is made of, or what it uses for tokens in the great game of thinking. Using an equivalent set of tokens and rules, we can do thinking with a digital computer, just as we can play chess using cups, salt and pepper shakers, knives, forks, and spoons. Using the right software, one system (the mind) can be mapped into the other (the computer). (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)
        19) A Statement of the Primary and Secondary Purposes of Artificial Intelligence
       The primary goal of Artificial Intelligence is to make machines smarter.
       The secondary goals of Artificial Intelligence are to understand what intelligence is (the Nobel laureate purpose) and to make machines more useful (the entrepreneurial purpose). (Winston, 1987, p. 1)
       The theoretical ideas of older branches of engineering are captured in the language of mathematics. We contend that mathematical logic provides the basis for theory in AI. Although many computer scientists already count logic as fundamental to computer science in general, we put forward an even stronger form of the logic-is-important argument....
       AI deals mainly with the problem of representing and using declarative (as opposed to procedural) knowledge. Declarative knowledge is the kind that is expressed as sentences, and AI needs a language in which to state these sentences. Because the languages in which this knowledge usually is originally captured (natural languages such as English) are not suitable for computer representations, some other language with the appropriate properties must be used. It turns out, we think, that the appropriate properties include at least those that have been uppermost in the minds of logicians in their development of logical languages such as the predicate calculus. Thus, we think that any language for expressing knowledge in AI systems must be at least as expressive as the first-order predicate calculus. (Genesereth & Nilsson, 1987, p. viii)
        21) Perceptual Structures Can Be Represented as Lists of Elementary Propositions
       In artificial intelligence studies, perceptual structures are represented as assemblages of description lists, the elementary components of which are propositions asserting that certain relations hold among elements. (Chase & Simon, 1988, p. 490)
       Artificial intelligence (AI) is sometimes defined as the study of how to build and/or program computers to enable them to do the sorts of things that minds can do. Some of these things are commonly regarded as requiring intelligence: offering a medical diagnosis and/or prescription, giving legal or scientific advice, proving theorems in logic or mathematics. Others are not, because they can be done by all normal adults irrespective of educational background (and sometimes by non-human animals too), and typically involve no conscious control: seeing things in sunlight and shadows, finding a path through cluttered terrain, fitting pegs into holes, speaking one's own native tongue, and using one's common sense. Because it covers AI research dealing with both these classes of mental capacity, this definition is preferable to one describing AI as making computers do "things that would require intelligence if done by people." However, it presupposes that computers could do what minds can do, that they might really diagnose, advise, infer, and understand. One could avoid this problematic assumption (and also side-step questions about whether computers do things in the same way as we do) by defining AI instead as "the development of computers whose observable performance has features which in humans we would attribute to mental processes." This bland characterization would be acceptable to some AI workers, especially amongst those focusing on the production of technological tools for commercial purposes. But many others would favour a more controversial definition, seeing AI as the science of intelligence in general-or, more accurately, as the intellectual core of cognitive science. As such, its goal is to provide a systematic theory that can explain (and perhaps enable us to replicate) both the general categories of intentionality and the diverse psychological capacities grounded in them. (Boden, 1990b, pp. 1-2)
       Because the ability to store data somewhat corresponds to what we call memory in human beings, and because the ability to follow logical procedures somewhat corresponds to what we call reasoning in human beings, many members of the cult have concluded that what computers do somewhat corresponds to what we call thinking. It is no great difficulty to persuade the general public of that conclusion since computers process data very fast in small spaces well below the level of visibility; they do not look like other machines when they are at work. They seem to be running along as smoothly and silently as the brain does when it remembers and reasons and thinks. On the other hand, those who design and build computers know exactly how the machines are working down in the hidden depths of their semiconductors. Computers can be taken apart, scrutinized, and put back together. Their activities can be tracked, analyzed, measured, and thus clearly understood-which is far from possible with the brain. This gives rise to the tempting assumption on the part of the builders and designers that computers can tell us something about brains, indeed, that the computer can serve as a model of the mind, which then comes to be seen as some manner of information processing machine, and possibly not as good at the job as the machine. (Roszak, 1994, pp. xiv-xv)
       The inner workings of the human mind are far more intricate than the most complicated systems of modern technology. Researchers in the field of artificial intelligence have been attempting to develop programs that will enable computers to display intelligent behavior. Although this field has been an active one for more than thirty-five years and has had many notable successes, AI researchers still do not know how to create a program that matches human intelligence. No existing program can recall facts, solve problems, reason, learn, and process language with human facility. This lack of success has occurred not because computers are inferior to human brains but rather because we do not yet know in sufficient detail how intelligence is organized in the brain. (Anderson, 1995, p. 2)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Artificial Intelligence

  • 90 galimatías

    f. s.&pl.
    1 gibberish, double-talk, doubletalk, double Dutch.
    2 galimatias.
    * * *
    1 familiar gibberish, double Dutch
    * * *
    SM INV (=asunto) rigmarole; (=lenguaje) gibberish, nonsense
    * * *
    masculino (pl galimatías) ( lenguaje incomprensible) gibberish; (de cosas, ideas) jumble
    * * *
    = welter, gibberish, a pretty kettle of fish, a fine kettle of fish, gobbledygook [gobbledegook], mumbo jumbo, rigmarole [rigamarole].
    Ex. Without language we would go bumping around in the dark and eventually take leave of our senses under the welter of the incomprehensible, withdrawing, as some people do, into a closed world in order to protect ourselves against the unbearable onslaught.
    Ex. ' Gibberish' in information science jeopardises the current state of archival literature and practice.
    Ex. A pretty kettle of fish indeed, out of whom only Tracy is really trying seriously to make a new life for herself.
    Ex. Knowing the historical roots of their misfortune may not make it easier for them to escape the fine kettle of fish they are in.
    Ex. Tired of printing scientific gobbledygook that almost no one can read, one of the world's top science journals has ordered its authors to write plain English.
    Ex. This is all the legal mumbo jumbo that protects me from some random lawsuit for god only knows what.
    Ex. She sensed intelligence behind this rigmarole, but it was meaningless to her.
    * * *
    masculino (pl galimatías) ( lenguaje incomprensible) gibberish; (de cosas, ideas) jumble
    * * *
    = welter, gibberish, a pretty kettle of fish, a fine kettle of fish, gobbledygook [gobbledegook], mumbo jumbo, rigmarole [rigamarole].

    Ex: Without language we would go bumping around in the dark and eventually take leave of our senses under the welter of the incomprehensible, withdrawing, as some people do, into a closed world in order to protect ourselves against the unbearable onslaught.

    Ex: ' Gibberish' in information science jeopardises the current state of archival literature and practice.
    Ex: A pretty kettle of fish indeed, out of whom only Tracy is really trying seriously to make a new life for herself.
    Ex: Knowing the historical roots of their misfortune may not make it easier for them to escape the fine kettle of fish they are in.
    Ex: Tired of printing scientific gobbledygook that almost no one can read, one of the world's top science journals has ordered its authors to write plain English.
    Ex: This is all the legal mumbo jumbo that protects me from some random lawsuit for god only knows what.
    Ex: She sensed intelligence behind this rigmarole, but it was meaningless to her.

    * * *
    con ese galimatías de explicación nadie entendió nada his explanation was pure gibberish o pure gobbledygook o double Dutch and nobody understood a word
    es un galimatías de fórmulas it's just a confusing mass of formulas
    * * *

    galimatías sustantivo masculino (pl


    (de cosas, ideas) jumble
    galimatías m inv fam gibberish: este informe es un auténtico galimatías, this report is written in gobbledygook
    ' galimatías' also found in these entries:
    Spanish:
    jerga
    English:
    gibberish
    * * *
    galimatías nm inv
    Fam
    las instrucciones de esta lavadora son un galimatías the instructions for this washing machine are complete gibberish;
    su explicación fue un galimatías his explanation was in double Dutch;
    el debate acabó en un auténtico galimatías the debate ended up in a free-for-all
    * * *
    m gibberish
    * * *
    galimatías nms & pl
    : gibberish, nonsense

    Spanish-English dictionary > galimatías

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    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Bibliography

  • 92 zweckfrei

    Adj. with no specific purpose; zweckfreie Forschung / Wissenschaft pure research / science
    * * *
    zwẹck|frei
    adj
    Forschung etc pure
    * * *
    zweckfrei adj with no specific purpose;
    zweckfreie Forschung/Wissenschaft pure research/science

    Deutsch-Englisch Wörterbuch > zweckfrei

  • 93 རིག་པ་

    [rig pa]
    (pure, sheer) presence, know, knower, knowledge, understand, actually experience, (immediate, pure, intrinsic, aesthetic, value-sustained, -) awareness, noetic act, pure sensation, information input, cognition, cognitive (capacity, being), energetic charge, intrinsic perception, science, -> rtogs pa'i rig pa, the flash of knowing that gives awareness its illumining quality, insight, logic, mantra, talent, wit, science, learning, literature, intellectual reasoning

    Tibetan-English dictionary > རིག་པ་

  • 94 scienza

    f science
    scienze pl naturali natural science
    * * *
    scienza s.f.
    1 science: il progresso della scienza, scientific progress; i principi generali della scienza, the general principles of science; scienza pura, esatta, pure, exact science; scienze politiche, sociali, political, social science; scienze economiche, economics (o economic science); scienza del diritto, jurisprudence; scienze naturali, natural science; scienza delle costruzioni, construction theory; scienza delle finanze, public finance; scienze occulte, occult arts // uomo di scienza, man of science // la scienza di far quattrini, the art of making money // avere la scienza infusa, to be a know-it-all
    2 ( conoscenza) knowledge
    3 (relig.) ( dono dello Spirito Santo) science.
    * * *
    ['ʃɛntsa]
    sostantivo femminile

    l'ora di -e — scol. science lesson o class

    2) (conoscenza) knowledge
    •

    - e occulte — black o occult arts

    - e sociali — social science, social studies

    * * *
    scienza
    /'∫εntsa/
    sostantivo f.
     1 science; l'ora di -e scol. science lesson o class
     2 (conoscenza) knowledge; un uomo di scienza a man of learning; crede di avere la scienza infusa he thinks he knows everything
    scienza dell'informazione information science; - e della comunicazione communication science; - e economiche economics; - e della formazione education; - e naturali natural sciences; - e occulte black o occult arts; - e politiche politics; - e sociali social science, social studies.

    Dizionario Italiano-Inglese > scienza

  • 95 Psychology

       We come therefore now to that knowledge whereunto the ancient oracle directeth us, which is the knowledge of ourselves; which deserveth the more accurate handling, by how much it toucheth us more nearly. This knowledge, as it is the end and term of natural philosophy in the intention of man, so notwithstanding it is but a portion of natural philosophy in the continent of nature.... [W]e proceed to human philosophy or Humanity, which hath two parts: the one considereth man segregate, or distributively; the other congregate, or in society. So as Human philosophy is either Simple and Particular, or Conjugate and Civil. Humanity Particular consisteth of the same parts whereof man consisteth; that is, of knowledges which respect the Body, and of knowledges that respect the Mind... how the one discloseth the other and how the one worketh upon the other... [:] the one is honored with the inquiry of Aristotle, and the other of Hippocrates. (Bacon, 1878, pp. 236-237)
       The claims of Psychology to rank as a distinct science are... not smaller but greater than those of any other science. If its phenomena are contemplated objectively, merely as nervo-muscular adjustments by which the higher organisms from moment to moment adapt their actions to environing co-existences and sequences, its degree of specialty, even then, entitles it to a separate place. The moment the element of feeling, or consciousness, is used to interpret nervo-muscular adjustments as thus exhibited in the living beings around, objective Psychology acquires an additional, and quite exceptional, distinction. (Spencer, 1896, p. 141)
       Kant once declared that psychology was incapable of ever raising itself to the rank of an exact natural science. The reasons that he gives... have often been repeated in later times. In the first place, Kant says, psychology cannot become an exact science because mathematics is inapplicable to the phenomena of the internal sense; the pure internal perception, in which mental phenomena must be constructed,-time,-has but one dimension. In the second place, however, it cannot even become an experimental science, because in it the manifold of internal observation cannot be arbitrarily varied,-still less, another thinking subject be submitted to one's experiments, comformably to the end in view; moreover, the very fact of observation means alteration of the observed object. (Wundt, 1904, p. 6)
       It is [Gustav] Fechner's service to have found and followed the true way; to have shown us how a "mathematical psychology" may, within certain limits, be realized in practice.... He was the first to show how Herbart's idea of an "exact psychology" might be turned to practical account. (Wundt, 1904, pp. 6-7)
       "Mind," "intellect," "reason," "understanding," etc. are concepts... that existed before the advent of any scientific psychology. The fact that the naive consciousness always and everywhere points to internal experience as a special source of knowledge, may, therefore, be accepted for the moment as sufficient testimony to the rights of psychology as science.... "Mind," will accordingly be the subject, to which we attribute all the separate facts of internal observation as predicates. The subject itself is determined p. 17) wholly and exclusively by its predicates. (Wundt, 1904,
       The study of animal psychology may be approached from two different points of view. We may set out from the notion of a kind of comparative physiology of mind, a universal history of the development of mental life in the organic world. Or we may make human psychology the principal object of investigation. Then, the expressions of mental life in animals will be taken into account only so far as they throw light upon the evolution of consciousness in man.... Human psychology... may confine itself altogether to man, and generally has done so to far too great an extent. There are plenty of psychological text-books from which you would hardly gather that there was any other conscious life than the human. (Wundt, 1907, pp. 340-341)
       The Behaviorist began his own formulation of the problem of psychology by sweeping aside all medieval conceptions. He dropped from his scientific vocabulary all subjective terms such as sensation, perception, image, desire, purpose, and even thinking and emotion as they were subjectively defined. (Watson, 1930, pp. 5-6)
       According to the medieval classification of the sciences, psychology is merely a chapter of special physics, although the most important chapter; for man is a microcosm; he is the central figure of the universe. (deWulf, 1956, p. 125)
       At the beginning of this century the prevailing thesis in psychology was Associationism.... Behavior proceeded by the stream of associations: each association produced its successors, and acquired new attachments with the sensations arriving from the environment.
       In the first decade of the century a reaction developed to this doctrine through the work of the Wurzburg school. Rejecting the notion of a completely self-determining stream of associations, it introduced the task ( Aufgabe) as a necessary factor in describing the process of thinking. The task gave direction to thought. A noteworthy innovation of the Wurzburg school was the use of systematic introspection to shed light on the thinking process and the contents of consciousness. The result was a blend of mechanics and phenomenalism, which gave rise in turn to two divergent antitheses, Behaviorism and the Gestalt movement. The behavioristic reaction insisted that introspection was a highly unstable, subjective procedure.... Behaviorism reformulated the task of psychology as one of explaining the response of organisms as a function of the stimuli impinging upon them and measuring both objectively. However, Behaviorism accepted, and indeed reinforced, the mechanistic assumption that the connections between stimulus and response were formed and maintained as simple, determinate functions of the environment.
       The Gestalt reaction took an opposite turn. It rejected the mechanistic nature of the associationist doctrine but maintained the value of phenomenal observation. In many ways it continued the Wurzburg school's insistence that thinking was more than association-thinking has direction given to it by the task or by the set of the subject. Gestalt psychology elaborated this doctrine in genuinely new ways in terms of holistic principles of organization.
       Today psychology lives in a state of relatively stable tension between the poles of Behaviorism and Gestalt psychology.... (Newell & Simon, 1963, pp. 279-280)
       As I examine the fate of our oppositions, looking at those already in existence as guide to how they fare and shape the course of science, it seems to me that clarity is never achieved. Matters simply become muddier and muddier as we go down through time. Thus, far from providing the rungs of a ladder by which psychology gradually climbs to clarity, this form of conceptual structure leads rather to an ever increasing pile of issues, which we weary of or become diverted from, but never really settle. (Newell, 1973b, pp. 288-289)
       The subject matter of psychology is as old as reflection. Its broad practical aims are as dated as human societies. Human beings, in any period, have not been indifferent to the validity of their knowledge, unconcerned with the causes of their behavior or that of their prey and predators. Our distant ancestors, no less than we, wrestled with the problems of social organization, child rearing, competition, authority, individual differences, personal safety. Solving these problems required insights-no matter how untutored-into the psychological dimensions of life. Thus, if we are to follow the convention of treating psychology as a young discipline, we must have in mind something other than its subject matter. We must mean that it is young in the sense that physics was young at the time of Archimedes or in the sense that geometry was "founded" by Euclid and "fathered" by Thales. Sailing vessels were launched long before Archimedes discovered the laws of bouyancy [ sic], and pillars of identical circumference were constructed before anyone knew that C IID. We do not consider the ship builders and stone cutters of antiquity physicists and geometers. Nor were the ancient cave dwellers psychologists merely because they rewarded the good conduct of their children. The archives of folk wisdom contain a remarkable collection of achievements, but craft-no matter how perfected-is not science, nor is a litany of successful accidents a discipline. If psychology is young, it is young as a scientific discipline but it is far from clear that psychology has attained this status. (Robinson, 1986, p. 12)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Psychology

  • 96 Philosophy

       And what I believe to be more important here is that I find in myself an infinity of ideas of certain things which cannot be assumed to be pure nothingness, even though they may have perhaps no existence outside of my thought. These things are not figments of my imagination, even though it is within my power to think of them or not to think of them; on the contrary, they have their own true and immutable natures. Thus, for example, when I imagine a triangle, even though there may perhaps be no such figure anywhere in the world outside of my thought, nor ever have been, nevertheless the figure cannot help having a certain determinate nature... or essence, which is immutable and eternal, which I have not invented and which does not in any way depend upon my mind. (Descartes, 1951, p. 61)
       Let us console ourselves for not knowing the possible connections between a spider and the rings of Saturn, and continue to examine what is within our reach. (Voltaire, 1961, p. 144)
       As modern physics started with the Newtonian revolution, so modern philosophy starts with what one might call the Cartesian Catastrophe. The catastrophe consisted in the splitting up of the world into the realms of matter and mind, and the identification of "mind" with conscious thinking. The result of this identification was the shallow rationalism of l'esprit Cartesien, and an impoverishment of psychology which it took three centuries to remedy even in part. (Koestler, 1964, p. 148)
       It has been made of late a reproach against natural philosophy that it has struck out on a path of its own, and has separated itself more and more widely from the other sciences which are united by common philological and historical studies. The opposition has, in fact, been long apparent, and seems to me to have grown up mainly under the influence of the Hegelian philosophy, or, at any rate, to have been brought out into more distinct relief by that philosophy.... The sole object of Kant's "Critical Philosophy" was to test the sources and the authority of our knowledge, and to fix a definite scope and standard for the researches of philosophy, as compared with other sciences.... [But Hegel's] "Philosophy of Identity" was bolder. It started with the hypothesis that not only spiritual phenomena, but even the actual world-nature, that is, and man-were the result of an act of thought on the part of a creative mind, similar, it was supposed, in kind to the human mind.... The philosophers accused the scientific men of narrowness; the scientific men retorted that the philosophers were crazy. And so it came about that men of science began to lay some stress on the banishment of all philosophic influences from their work; while some of them, including men of the greatest acuteness, went so far as to condemn philosophy altogether, not merely as useless, but as mischievous dreaming. Thus, it must be confessed, not only were the illegitimate pretensions of the Hegelian system to subordinate to itself all other studies rejected, but no regard was paid to the rightful claims of philosophy, that is, the criticism of the sources of cognition, and the definition of the functions of the intellect. (Helmholz, quoted in Dampier, 1966, pp. 291-292)
       Philosophy remains true to its classical tradition by renouncing it. (Habermas, 1972, p. 317)
       I have not attempted... to put forward any grand view of the nature of philosophy; nor do I have any such grand view to put forth if I would. It will be obvious that I do not agree with those who see philosophy as the history of "howlers" and progress in philosophy as the debunking of howlers. It will also be obvious that I do not agree with those who see philosophy as the enterprise of putting forward a priori truths about the world.... I see philosophy as a field which has certain central questions, for example, the relation between thought and reality.... It seems obvious that in dealing with these questions philosophers have formulated rival research programs, that they have put forward general hypotheses, and that philosophers within each major research program have modified their hypotheses by trial and error, even if they sometimes refuse to admit that that is what they are doing. To that extent philosophy is a "science." To argue about whether philosophy is a science in any more serious sense seems to me to be hardly a useful occupation.... It does not seem to me important to decide whether science is philosophy or philosophy is science as long as one has a conception of both that makes both essential to a responsible view of the world and of man's place in it. (Putnam, 1975, p. xvii)
       What can philosophy contribute to solving the problem of the relation [of] mind to body? Twenty years ago, many English-speaking philosophers would have answered: "Nothing beyond an analysis of the various mental concepts." If we seek knowledge of things, they thought, it is to science that we must turn. Philosophy can only cast light upon our concepts of those things.
       This retreat from things to concepts was not undertaken lightly. Ever since the seventeenth century, the great intellectual fact of our culture has been the incredible expansion of knowledge both in the natural and in the rational sciences (mathematics, logic).
       The success of science created a crisis in philosophy. What was there for philosophy to do? Hume had already perceived the problem in some degree, and so surely did Kant, but it was not until the twentieth century, with the Vienna Circle and with Wittgenstein, that the difficulty began to weigh heavily. Wittgenstein took the view that philosophy could do no more than strive to undo the intellectual knots it itself had tied, so achieving intellectual release, and even a certain illumination, but no knowledge. A little later, and more optimistically, Ryle saw a positive, if reduced role, for philosophy in mapping the "logical geography" of our concepts: how they stood to each other and how they were to be analyzed....
       Since that time, however, philosophers in the "analytic" tradition have swung back from Wittgensteinian and even Rylean pessimism to a more traditional conception of the proper role and tasks of philosophy. Many analytic philosophers now would accept the view that the central task of philosophy is to give an account, or at least play a part in giving an account, of the most general nature of things and of man. (Armstrong, 1990, pp. 37-38)
       8) Philosophy's Evolving Engagement with Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science
       In the beginning, the nature of philosophy's engagement with artificial intelligence and cognitive science was clear enough. The new sciences of the mind were to provide the long-awaited vindication of the most potent dreams of naturalism and materialism. Mind would at last be located firmly within the natural order. We would see in detail how the most perplexing features of the mental realm could be supported by the operations of solely physical laws upon solely physical stuff. Mental causation (the power of, e.g., a belief to cause an action) would emerge as just another species of physical causation. Reasoning would be understood as a kind of automated theorem proving. And the key to both was to be the depiction of the brain as the implementation of multiple higher level programs whose task was to manipulate and transform symbols or representations: inner items with one foot in the physical (they were realized as brain states) and one in the mental (they were bearers of contents, and their physical gymnastics were cleverly designed to respect semantic relationships such as truth preservation). (A. Clark, 1996, p. 1)
       Socrates of Athens famously declared that "the unexamined life is not worth living," and his motto aptly explains the impulse to philosophize. Taking nothing for granted, philosophy probes and questions the fundamental presuppositions of every area of human inquiry.... [P]art of the job of the philosopher is to keep at a certain critical distance from current doctrines, whether in the sciences or the arts, and to examine instead how the various elements in our world-view clash, or fit together. Some philosophers have tried to incorporate the results of these inquiries into a grand synoptic view of the nature of reality and our human relationship to it. Others have mistrusted system-building, and seen their primary role as one of clarifications, or the removal of obstacles along the road to truth. But all have shared the Socratic vision of using the human intellect to challenge comfortable preconceptions, insisting that every aspect of human theory and practice be subjected to continuing critical scrutiny....
       Philosophy is, of course, part of a continuing tradition, and there is much to be gained from seeing how that tradition originated and developed. But the principal object of studying the materials in this book is not to pay homage to past genius, but to enrich one's understanding of central problems that are as pressing today as they have always been-problems about knowledge, truth and reality, the nature of the mind, the basis of right action, and the best way to live. These questions help to mark out the territory of philosophy as an academic discipline, but in a wider sense they define the human predicament itself; they will surely continue to be with us for as long as humanity endures. (Cottingham, 1996, pp. xxi-xxii)
       In his study of ancient Greek culture, The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche drew what would become a famous distinction, between the Dionysian spirit, the untamed spirit of art and creativity, and the Apollonian, that of reason and self-control. The story of Greek civilization, and all civilizations, Nietzsche implied, was the gradual victory of Apollonian man, with his desire for control over nature and himself, over Dionysian man, who survives only in myth, poetry, music, and drama. Socrates and Plato had attacked the illusions of art as unreal, and had overturned the delicate cultural balance by valuing only man's critical, rational, and controlling consciousness while denigrating his vital life instincts as irrational and base. The result of this division is "Alexandrian man," the civilized and accomplished Greek citizen of the later ancient world, who is "equipped with the greatest forces of knowledge" but in whom the wellsprings of creativity have dried up. (Herman, 1997, pp. 95-96)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Philosophy

  • 97 matemáticas

    f.pl.
    mathematics, maths, math.
    * * *
    1 mathematics sing
    * * *
    noun f. plural
    * * *
    femenino plural, matemática femenino mathematics, math (AmE), maths (BrE)
    * * *
    = mathematics, maths [math, -USA], math [maths, -UK].
    Ex. P H Hirst defines eight such primary divisions of knowledge: mathematics, physical science, human science, history, moral knowledge, art, religion, philosophy.
    Ex. This sort of informal discussion between teacher and pupils is really a 'bridge passage' leading smoothly from one occupation -science, or P.E. or maths, etc.- to literary reading.
    Ex. Salaries of library professionals compare unfavourably with pay scales in the information industry and math and science-related fields.
    ----
    * desde el punto de vista de las matemáticas = mathematically.
    * fobia a las matemáticas = mathophobia.
    * * *
    femenino plural, matemática femenino mathematics, math (AmE), maths (BrE)
    * * *
    = mathematics, maths [math, -USA], math [maths, -UK].

    Ex: P H Hirst defines eight such primary divisions of knowledge: mathematics, physical science, human science, history, moral knowledge, art, religion, philosophy.

    Ex: This sort of informal discussion between teacher and pupils is really a 'bridge passage' leading smoothly from one occupation -science, or P.E. or maths, etc.- to literary reading.
    Ex: Salaries of library professionals compare unfavourably with pay scales in the information industry and math and science-related fields.
    * desde el punto de vista de las matemáticas = mathematically.
    * fobia a las matemáticas = mathophobia.

    * * *
    mathematics, math ( AmE), maths ( BrE)
    Compuesto:
    matemáticas puras/aplicadas
    fpl pure/applied mathematics
    * * *

    matemáticas sustantivo femenino plural
    mathematics, math (AmE), maths (BrE)
    matemáticas fpl mathematics sing: me gustan las matemáticas, I like maths
    ' matemáticas' also found in these entries:
    Spanish:
    atragantarse
    - base
    - darse
    - ducha
    - ducho
    - en
    - estrellarse
    - evaluación
    - honda
    - incapaz
    - negada
    - negado
    - nota
    - portento
    - sopa
    - suspender
    - talón
    - tumbar
    English:
    deficiency
    - do
    - expertise
    - mathematics
    - maths
    - proficiency
    * * *
    * * *
    fpl mathematics sg
    * * *
    : mathematics, math
    * * *
    matemáticas npl mathematics

    Spanish-English dictionary > matemáticas

  • 98 mondo

    m world
    giro m del mondo world tour, tour round the world
    l'altro mondo the next world
    il più bello del mondo the most beautiful in the world
    divertirsi un mondo enjoy oneself enormously or a lot
    * * *
    mondo1 s.m.
    1 world (anche fig.): fare il giro del mondo, to go round the world; vedere il mondo, to see the world; in tutto il mondo, per tutto il mondo, all over the world; è conosciuto in tutto il mondo, he is known all over the world; il mondo in cui viviamo, the world we live in; il mondo animale, the animal kingdom (o world); il mondo cattolico, medioevale, the Catholic, medi (a)eval world; il mondo della fantasia, dei sogni, the world of the imagination, of dreams (o dreamland); il mondo della scienza, the world of science; il mondo di un bambino, the world of a child (o a child's world); il mondo esterno, the external world: il mondo letterario, musicale, artistico, politico, the literary, musical, artistic, political world; il suo mondo si è sgretolato, her world crumbled // il terzo mondo, the Third World // il Nuovo, il Vecchio Mondo, the New, the Old World // vecchio come il mondo, as old as the hills (o as Methuselah) // (econ.): il mondo degli affari, the business world; il mondo finanziario, the financial world, (amer.) Wall Street; il mondo operaio, the working world; il mondo dell'editoria, the world of publishing; il mondo industrializzato, the developed world // il mondo è bello perché è vario, variety is the spice of life; questo mondo è fatto a scale, chi le scende, chi le sale, (prov.) the world is like a game, sometimes you win, sometimes you lose; tutto il mondo è paese, it's the same the whole world over
    2 (la gente) the world; humanity; everybody: il mondo ride alle sue spalle, everybody laughs at him behind his back; il mondo spera in un avvenire migliore, humanity hopes for a better future; dice male di tutto il mondo, he speaks badly (o ill) of everybody (o fam. he runs everyone down); vuole salvare le apparenze agli occhi del mondo, he wants to preserve appearances in the eyes of the world // il bel mondo, il gran mondo, (fashionable) society, jet set; donna di mondo, society woman; uomo di mondo, (ricco di esperienza) man of the world, (che fa vita di società) man about town // alla festa c'era mezzo mondo, there were loads of people at the party
    3 (grande quantità) un mondo di, a world of, a lot of, lots of: un mondo di auguri, di baci, all the best, lots of kisses; un mondo di gente, a large crowd; costa un mondo, it costs a fortune; gli usò un mondo di cortesie, he treated him with every courtesy; mi ha fatto un mondo di bene, it has done me a world of good; mi sono divertito un mondo, I have had a really good time.
    ◆ FRASEOLOGIA: come è piccolo il mondo!, what a small world! // da che mondo è mondo, from time immemorial // niente al mondo gli può far cambiare idea, nothing in the world can make him change his mind; non ha un pensiero al mondo, he hasn't a care in the world // non è poi la fine del mondo, it is not the end of the world; una festa che è stata la fine del mondo, it was a fantastic party; è la cosa più semplice del mondo, it's the easiest thing in the world // fermate il mondo, voglio scendere!, stop the world, I want to get off! // ti troverò in capo al mondo!, I'll find you even at the end of the earth!; andare in capo al mondo, to go to the end of the earth // non lo cederei neppure per tutto l'oro del mondo, I wouldn't part with it for the world (o for all the tea in China); non lo farei neppure se dovesse cascare il mondo, I wouldn't do it for the world (o fam. I'll be damned if I do it!) // vivere nel mondo della luna, to have one's head in the clouds; ma in che mondo vivi?, where have you been? // porco mondo!, mondo cane!, damn! // così va il mondo, that's life; stanco del mondo, weary of life // non è più di questo mondo, he is no longer of this world; quando era al mondo mio padre, when my father was alive; essere al mondo, to be alive (o fam. to be in the land of the living); mettere al mondo, to bring into the world; tornare al mondo, to come to life again; venire al mondo, to be born (o to come into the world); non ha più voglia di stare al mondo, he no longer wants to live // l'altro mondo, the next world (o the hereafter); andare all'altro mondo, to pass away; mandare qlcu. all'altro mondo, to send s.o. to kingdom-come; cose dell'altro mondo!, (fig.) really weird! // vivere fuori del mondo, (fig.) to live cut off from the world; prendere il mondo come viene, to take the world as it comes; è uno che sa stare al mondo, he knows the ways of the world; rinunciare al mondo, to forsake (o to retire from) the world.
    mondo2 agg. (letter.)
    1 (pulito) clean
    2 (fig.) (puro) pure: cuore mondo, pure heart; è un uomo mondo da vizi, he is a man free from vice.
    * * *
    I ['mondo] sm
    1) (gen), fig world

    in tutto il mondo — all over the world, throughout the world

    il mondo dell'aldilà — the next life, the after life

    il gran o bel mondo — high society

    2)

    (fraseologia) ti faccio un mondo di auguri; ti auguro un mondo di bene — all the best!

    gli voglio tutto il bene di questo mondo ma... — I'm very fond of him but...

    per niente al mondo; per nessuna cosa al mondo — not for all the world

    da che mondo è mondo — since time o the world began

    mettere/venire al mondo — to bring/come into the world

    il mondo è bello perché è vario — (Proverbio) variety is the spice of life

    II mondo (-a)
    (verdura) cleaned, (frutta, patate) peeled
    * * *
    I ['mondo]
    sostantivo maschile

    in tutto il mondo, nel mondo intero — all over the world, worldwide

    girare il mondo — to go o travel round the world

    la fame, pace nel mondo — world famine, peace

    è la cosa più bella del mondo — fig. it's the best thing in the world

    sono i migliori amici del mondo — fig. they're the best of friends

    vive nel suo mondo, in un mondo a parte — fig. he lives in a world of his own, in a world apart

    l'altro mondo, il mondo ultraterreno — (l'adilà) the next o other world

    andare all'altro mondo — to die, to pass away

    mandare qcn. all'altro mondo — to send o knock sb. to kingdom, to dispatch sb

    3) (ambiente) world, scene

    il mondo dell'arte, della musica — the art, music world

    il mondo antico, arabo — the ancient, Arab world

    lo sa tutto il mondo o mezzo mondo the whole world knows; agli occhi del mondo — in the eyes of the world

    il bel o gran mondo the beautiful people, the high society; un uomo di mondo — a man of the world, a man-about-town

    nessuno o niente al mondo le farà cambiare idea nothing in the world will make her change her mind; per niente al mondo mi convincerei a fare nothing on earth would persuade me to do; nessuno al mondo no man alive; non c'è nessuna ragione al mondo — there's no earthly reason

    ••

    così va il mondo — that's the way of the world, that's the way it goes o the cookie crumbles

    da che mondo è mondo — since o from time immemorial

    vecchio come il mondo — world-old, as old as the world

    vivere fuori dal mondo o nel mondo delle nuvole to be living in cloud-cuckoo-land o in a dreamworld; tutto il mondo è paese it's o people are the same the whole world over; il mondo è bello perché è vario — there's nowt so queer as folk

    II ['mondo]
    aggettivo lett.
    1) (pulito) clean
    2) fig. (puro) pure, clean
    * * *
    mondo1
    /'mondo/
    sostantivo m.
     1 world; in tutto il mondo, nel mondo intero all over the world, worldwide; girare il mondo to go o travel round the world; giro del mondo world tour; la fame, pace nel mondo world famine, peace; il cuoco peggiore del mondo the world's worst chef; la città più antica del mondo the oldest city on earth; è la cosa più bella del mondo fig. it's the best thing in the world; sono i migliori amici del mondo fig. they're the best of friends; vive nel suo mondo, in un mondo a parte fig. he lives in a world of his own, in a world apart; l'altro mondo, il mondo ultraterreno (l'adilà) the next o other world; andare all'altro mondo to die, to pass away; mandare qcn. all'altro mondo to send o knock sb. to kingdom, to dispatch sb.
     2 (parte del globo) il Nuovo Mondo the New World; il Vecchio Mondo the Old World; il Terzo Mondo the Third World
     3 (ambiente) world, scene; il mondo dell'arte, della musica the art, music world; il mondo degli affari the business community o world; il mondo della droga the drug scene
     4 (civiltà) il mondo antico, arabo the ancient, Arab world
     5 (regno) il mondo animale the animal kingdom; il mondo delle favole the land of make-believe
     6 (la gente) lo sa tutto il mondo o mezzo mondo the whole world knows; agli occhi del mondo in the eyes of the world
     7 (alta società) il bel o gran mondo the beautiful people, the high society; un uomo di mondo a man of the world, a man-about-town
     8 un mondo (molto) avere un mondo di cose da fare to have loads of things to do; divertirsi un mondo to have great fun o a great time
     9 al mondo mettere al mondo un bambino to bring a child into the world; venire al mondo to come into the world; saper stare al mondo to know how to behave (in society); nessuno o niente al mondo le farà cambiare idea nothing in the world will make her change her mind; per niente al mondo mi convincerei a fare nothing on earth would persuade me to do; nessuno al mondo no man alive; non c'è nessuna ragione al mondo there's no earthly reason
    così va il mondo that's the way of the world, that's the way it goes o the cookie crumbles; da che mondo è mondo since o from time immemorial; cose dell'altro mondo! it's unbelievable! mondo cane! damn! cascasse il mondo! no matter what (happens)! come what may! com'è piccolo il mondo! it's a small world! vecchio come il mondo world-old, as old as the world; essere la fine del mondo to be terrific; non è mica la fine del mondo! it's not the end of the world! vivere fuori dal mondo o nel mondo delle nuvole to be living in cloud-cuckoo-land o in a dreamworld; tutto il mondo è paese it's o people are the same the whole world over; il mondo è bello perché è vario there's nowt so queer as folk.
    ————————
    mondo2
    /'mondo/
    lett.
     1 (pulito) clean
     2 fig. (puro) pure, clean.

    Dizionario Italiano-Inglese > mondo

  • 99 Mind

       It becomes, therefore, no inconsiderable part of science... to know the different operations of the mind, to separate them from each other, to class them under their proper heads, and to correct all that seeming disorder in which they lie involved when made the object of reflection and inquiry.... It cannot be doubted that the mind is endowed with several powers and faculties, that these powers are distinct from one another, and that what is really distinct to the immediate perception may be distinguished by reflection and, consequently, that there is a truth and falsehood which lie not beyond the compass of human understanding. (Hume, 1955, p. 22)
       Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white Paper, void of all Characters, without any Ideas: How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store, which the busy and boundless Fancy of Man has painted on it, with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of Reason and Knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from Experience. (Locke, quoted in Herrnstein & Boring, 1965, p. 584)
       The kind of logic in mythical thought is as rigorous as that of modern science, and... the difference lies, not in the quality of the intellectual process, but in the nature of things to which it is applied.... Man has always been thinking equally well; the improvement lies, not in an alleged progress of man's mind, but in the discovery of new areas to which it may apply its unchanged and unchanging powers. (Leґvi-Strauss, 1963, p. 230)
       MIND. A mysterious form of matter secreted by the brain. Its chief activity consists in the endeavor to ascertain its own nature, the futility of the attempt being due to the fact that it has nothing but itself to know itself with. (Bierce, quoted in Minsky, 1986, p. 55)
       [Philosophy] understands the foundations of knowledge and it finds these foundations in a study of man-as-knower, of the "mental processes" or the "activity of representation" which make knowledge possible. To know is to represent accurately what is outside the mind, so to understand the possibility and nature of knowledge is to understand the way in which the mind is able to construct such representation.... We owe the notion of a "theory of knowledge" based on an understanding of "mental processes" to the seventeenth century, and especially to Locke. We owe the notion of "the mind" as a separate entity in which "processes" occur to the same period, and especially to Descartes. We owe the notion of philosophy as a tribunal of pure reason, upholding or denying the claims of the rest of culture, to the eighteenth century and especially to Kant, but this Kantian notion presupposed general assent to Lockean notions of mental processes and Cartesian notions of mental substance. (Rorty, 1979, pp. 3-4)
       Under pressure from the computer, the question of mind in relation to machine is becoming a central cultural preoccupation. It is becoming for us what sex was to Victorians-threat, obsession, taboo, and fascination. (Turkle, 1984, p. 313)
       7) Understanding the Mind Remains as Resistant to Neurological as to Cognitive Analyses
       Recent years have been exciting for researchers in the brain and cognitive sciences. Both fields have flourished, each spurred on by methodological and conceptual developments, and although understanding the mechanisms of mind is an objective shared by many workers in these areas, their theories and approaches to the problem are vastly different....
       Early experimental psychologists, such as Wundt and James, were as interested in and knowledgeable about the anatomy and physiology of the nervous system as about the young science of the mind. However, the experimental study of mental processes was short-lived, being eclipsed by the rise of behaviorism early in this century. It was not until the late 1950s that the signs of a new mentalism first appeared in scattered writings of linguists, philosophers, computer enthusiasts, and psychologists.
       In this new incarnation, the science of mind had a specific mission: to challenge and replace behaviorism. In the meantime, brain science had in many ways become allied with a behaviorist approach.... While behaviorism sought to reduce the mind to statements about bodily action, brain science seeks to explain the mind in terms of physiochemical events occurring in the nervous system. These approaches contrast with contemporary cognitive science, which tries to understand the mind as it is, without any reduction, a view sometimes described as functionalism.
       The cognitive revolution is now in place. Cognition is the subject of contemporary psychology. This was achieved with little or no talk of neurons, action potentials, and neurotransmitters. Similarly, neuroscience has risen to an esteemed position among the biological sciences without much talk of cognitive processes. Do the fields need each other?... [Y]es because the problem of understanding the mind, unlike the wouldbe problem solvers, respects no disciplinary boundaries. It remains as resistant to neurological as to cognitive analyses. (LeDoux & Hirst, 1986, pp. 1-2)
       Since the Second World War scientists from different disciplines have turned to the study of the human mind. Computer scientists have tried to emulate its capacity for visual perception. Linguists have struggled with the puzzle of how children acquire language. Ethologists have sought the innate roots of social behaviour. Neurophysiologists have begun to relate the function of nerve cells to complex perceptual and motor processes. Neurologists and neuropsychologists have used the pattern of competence and incompetence of their brain-damaged patients to elucidate the normal workings of the brain. Anthropologists have examined the conceptual structure of cultural practices to advance hypotheses about the basic principles of the mind. These days one meets engineers who work on speech perception, biologists who investigate the mental representation of spatial relations, and physicists who want to understand consciousness. And, of course, psychologists continue to study perception, memory, thought and action.
    ... [W]orkers in many disciplines have converged on a number of central problems and explanatory ideas. They have realized that no single approach is likely to unravel the workings of the mind: it will not give up its secrets to psychology alone; nor is any other isolated discipline-artificial intelligence, linguistics, anthropology, neurophysiology, philosophy-going to have any greater success. (Johnson-Laird, 1988, p. 7)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Mind

  • 100 ficción

    f.
    1 fiction, make-believe, invention.
    El bus empezó a andar The bus got going.
    2 fictitious tale, figment, fable, fabrication.
    * * *
    1 fiction
    * * *
    noun f.
    * * *
    1. SF
    1) (Literat) fiction
    2) (=invención) fiction
    3) (=mentira) fabrication
    2.
    ADJ INV fictitious, make-believe

    historia ficción — (piece of) historical fiction, fictionalized history

    * * *
    femenino (Lit) fiction; ( invención) fiction
    * * *
    Nota: Obras literarias en prosa que presentan caracteres y acontecimientos imaginados por el autor con objeto de entretener al lector.
    Ex. It is widely recognised that it is difficult and unhelpful to categorise fiction according to a subject classification = Es un hecho ampliamente reconocido la dificultad y la poca utilidad de clasificar la literatura narrativa de acuerdo con una clasificación por materias.
    ----
    * ciencia ficción = science fiction, sci-fi.
    * ficción infantil = children's fiction.
    * ficción literaria = literary fiction.
    * ficción narrativa = fiction.
    * ficción para adolescentes = young adult fiction.
    * ficción para adultos = adult fiction.
    * literatura de ficción = imaginative literature, imaginative writing.
    * literatura de no ficción = subject literature.
    * llevar a la ficción = fictionalise [fictionalize, -USA].
    * novela de ciencia ficción = science fiction novel.
    * obras de ficción = fiction.
    * obras de no ficción = non-fiction [nonfiction].
    * personaje de ficción = fictional character.
    * separar la realidad de la ficción = distinguish + fact from fiction.
    * * *
    femenino (Lit) fiction; ( invención) fiction
    * * *
    Nota: Obras literarias en prosa que presentan caracteres y acontecimientos imaginados por el autor con objeto de entretener al lector.

    Ex: It is widely recognised that it is difficult and unhelpful to categorise fiction according to a subject classification = Es un hecho ampliamente reconocido la dificultad y la poca utilidad de clasificar la literatura narrativa de acuerdo con una clasificación por materias.

    * ciencia ficción = science fiction, sci-fi.
    * ficción infantil = children's fiction.
    * ficción literaria = literary fiction.
    * ficción narrativa = fiction.
    * ficción para adolescentes = young adult fiction.
    * ficción para adultos = adult fiction.
    * literatura de ficción = imaginative literature, imaginative writing.
    * literatura de no ficción = subject literature.
    * llevar a la ficción = fictionalise [fictionalize, -USA].
    * novela de ciencia ficción = science fiction novel.
    * obras de ficción = fiction.
    * obras de no ficción = non-fiction [nonfiction].
    * personaje de ficción = fictional character.
    * separar la realidad de la ficción = distinguish + fact from fiction.

    * * *
    1 ( Lit) fiction
    2 (invención) fiction
    lo de su herencia es pura ficción all that talk about his inheritance is a complete fabrication o is pure fiction
    Compuesto:
    science fiction
    * * *

    ficción sustantivo femenino
    fiction
    ficción sustantivo femenino fiction
    ' ficción' also found in these entries:
    Spanish:
    ciencia
    - pantomima
    - relato
    - fantasía
    - país
    English:
    fact
    - fiction
    - fictional
    - nonfiction
    - outsell
    - pretence
    - pretense
    - pulp fiction
    - sci-fi
    - science fiction
    * * *
    1. [invención] fiction
    2. [simulación] pretence, make-believe
    3. [género literario] fiction;
    * * *
    f fiction
    * * *
    1) : fiction
    2) : fabrication, lie
    * * *
    ficción n fiction

    Spanish-English dictionary > ficción

Страницы

См. также в других словарях:

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